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SOUTHEAST ASIA 
During the 1980s and 1990s Asian 'developmental states' attracted much 
attention in political science and economics literature, but the role of law in their 
economic development was neglected. It was only after the Asian crisis of 1997 
that many analysts began to focus on a lack of regulation and transparency as a 
major factor triggering the crisis. As a result, international financial institutions 
now tend to make further financial support for Asian economies dependent on 
improvements of the legal framework in which businesses operate. The crucial 
questions now are how successful the current reforms will be, and which features 
of the Asian approach to commercial law will be resistant to reform pressures. 
This book examines the prospects for commercial law reform in Asia. Japan and 
Singapore, as frequently cited role models for Asian developmentalism, receive 
particular attention. Development related business laws in countries such as 
China, Korea, Indonesia, Malaysia, Vietnam and the Philippines are also 
examined. The book includes chapters on individual fields of commercial law 
such as intellectual property law, financial market regulation and labour law as 
well as chapters that explain the socio-legal background of Asian legal 
development. All are placed into the industrial policy framework of the countries 
concerned. 
Christoph Antons is Senior Lecturer in the Faculty of Law and Centre for 
Southeast Asian Law at the Northern Territory University, Darwin, Australia. 
RoutledgeCurzon-IIAS Asian Studies Series 
Series Co-ordinator: Dick van der Meij 
Institute Director: Wim A.L. Stokhof 
The International Institute for Asian Studies (IIAS) is a postdoctoral 
research centre based in Leiden and Amsterdam, The Netherlands. Its main 
objective is to encourage Asian Studies in the Humanities and the Social 
Sciences and to promote national and international co-operation in these 
fields. The Institute was established in 1993 on the initiative of the Royal 
Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences, Leiden University, Universiteit 
van Amsterdam and Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam. It is mainly financed by 
The Netherlands Ministry of Education, Culture, and Sciences. IIAS has 
played an active role in co-ordinating and disseminating information on 
Asian Studies throughout the world. The Institute acts as an international 
mediator, bringing together various entities for the enhancement of Asian 
Studies both within and outside The Netherlands. The RoutledgeCurzon-
1 [AS Asian Studies series reflects the scope of the Institute. The Editorial 
Board consists of Erik Zurcher, Wang Gungwu, Orn Prakash, Dru Gladney, 
Amiya K. Bagchi, James C. Scott, Jean-Luc Domenach and Frits Staal. 
Images of the 'Modern Woman' in Asia 
Edited by Shoma Munshi 
Nomads in the Sedentary World 
Edited by Anatoly M. Khazanov & Andre Wink 
Reading Asia 
Edited by Frans Husken & Dick van der Meij 
Tourism, Heritage and National Culture in Java 
Heidi Dahles 
Asian-European Perspectives 
Edited by Wim Stokhof & Paul van der Velde 
Law and Development in East and Southeast Asia 
Edited by Christoph Antons 
The Indian Ocean Rim 
Edited by Gwyn Campbell 
Rethinking Chinese Transnational Enterprises 
Edited by Leo Douw, Cen Huang & David Ip 
'Hinduism' in Modern Indonesia 
Edited by Martin Ramstedt 
Indonesian Sea Nomads 
Cynthia Chou 
Diasporas and Interculturalism in Asian Performing Arts 
Edited by Hae-Kyung Um 
Reading East Asian Writing 
Edited by Michel Hockx & lvo Smits 

LAW AND DEVELOPMENT IN 
EAST AND SOUTHEAST ASIA 
EDITED BY 
Christoph Anions 
!l I~ ~~o~f~;n~~:up 
(:) LONDON AND NEW YORK 
First published 2003 by RoutledgeCurzon 
Published 2017 by Routledge 
2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN 
711 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10017, USA 
Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business 
Copyright © 2003 Editorial matter and selection, Christoph Antons 
The Open Access version of this book, available at www.tandfebooks.com, 
has been made available under a Creative Commons Attribution-Non 
Commercial-No Derivatives 4.0 license. 
Typeset in Times New Roman by Dick van der Meij 
British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data 
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library 
Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data 
A catalogue record for this book has been requested 
ISBN 978-0-7007-1321-9 (hbk) 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Contributors 
Preface 
PART ONE: PARADIGMS OF LAW AND DEVELOPMENT IN ASIA 
1 Introduction 
Christoph Antons 
2 Law and Development from the Southeast Asian Perspective: 
Methodology, History, and Paradigm Change 
Nobuyuki Yasuda 
3 APEC, Industry Policy, and the Role of Law 
Bernard G. Bishop 
4 The Rule of Law, Economic Development, and the 
Developmental States of Northeast Asia 
John K.M Ohnesorge 
PART Two: JAPAN AS A MODEL FOR LAW AND DEVELOPMENT IN ASIA 
5 Globalization vs. Paternalistic Regulation: 
Some Thoughts about Economic Success, the Role of Law, 







Harald Baum 131 
6 The Rule of Law or Law as Instrument of Rule? 
Law and the Economic Development of Japan with 
Particular Regard to Industrial Policy 
Richard Boyd 154 
7 Industrial Policy and Intellectual Property in Japan and Beyond 
Christopher Heath 197 
8 Japan as a Model? Comparing Law and 
Development in Japan, Singapore, and Indonesia 
Christoph Antons 216 
CONTENTS 
PART THREE: LAW IN A 'SOCIALIST MARKET ECONOMY' :THE CASE OF 
CIDNA 
9 Policy as Law and Law as Policy: 
The Role of Law in China's Development Strategy 
Jianfu Chen 
10 The Clonability of the Singapore Model of Law and Development: 
The Case of Suzhou, China 
251 
Connie Carter 271 
PART FOUR: SOUTHEAST ASIAN APPROACHES TO LAW AND DEVELOPMENT 
11 Prosperity at a Price: Regulation of Organized Labour in Malaysia 
Jesse Wu Min Aun 289 
12 The Legal Regulation of Technology Transfer: 
Arrangements within ASEAN 
Michael Blakeney 314 
PART FIVE: LAW AND DEVELOPMENT AND 'THE REGION' 
13 Resolving Trade Disputes in Asia: An Essay about the Laws, 
Institutions, and Cultures 
Robert E. Lutz 337 
14 Asian Economic Crisis and Legal Institutions: 
A Tale of Two Cities 
Roman Tomasic 358 
CONTRIBUTORS 
CHRISTOPH ANTONS is a Senior Lecturer in the School of Law and Director 
of the Centre for Southeast Asian Law, Northern Territory University, 
Darwin, Australia. 
HARALD BAUM is a Senior Research Fellow at the Max Planck Institute for 
Foreign and International Private Law, Hamburg, Germany. 
BERNARD G. BISHOP is a Senior Lecturer in the Faculty of International 
Business and Politics, Griffith University, Brisbane, Australia. 
MICHAEL BLAKENEY is Professor and Director of the Queen Mary 
Intellectual Property Institute, Queen Mary and Westfield College, 
University of London, United Kingdom. 
RICHARD BOYD is Reader in law and society with respect to Japan in the 
Department of Languages and Cultures of Japan and Korea, Faculty of Arts, 
Leiden University, the Netherlands. 
CONNIE CARTER is a Barrister and a Visiting Lecturer at the School of 
African and Oriental Studies, University of London, United Kingdom. 
JIANFU CHEN is Associate Professor and Reader in the School of Law and 
Legal Studies, La Trobe University, Melbourne, Australia. 
CHRISTOPHER HEATH is a Senior Research Fellow and Head of the East and 
Southeast Asia Department at the Max Planck Institute for Foreign and 
International Patent, Copyright and Competition Law in Munich, Germany. 
ROBERT E. LUTZ is Professor in the School of Law, Southwestern 
University, Los Angeles, USA. 
JOHN K.M. OHNESORGE is Assistant Professor in the School of Law, 
University of Wisconsin, Madison, USA. 
ROMAN TOMASIC is Professor and Dean, Faculty of Law and Business, 
Victoria University, Melbourne, Australia. 
CONTRIBUTORS 
JESSE Wu MIN AUN is Professor in the School of Law, Northern Territory 
University, Darwin, Australia. 
NOBUYUKI YASUDA is Professor in the Graduate School of International 
Development, Nagoya University, Japan. 
PREFACE 
This books results from a workshop held at the International Institute for 
Asian Studies (IIAS) in Leiden, the Netherlands, in January 1998. Ten of the 
fourteen papers in this book were originally presented at the workshop, but 
due to the rapidly changing legal environment in the countries covered, most 
of the papers had to be revised during 1999 and 2000. The workshop was 
funded by a generous grant of the International Institute for Asian Studies 
and supported by smaller grants of the Van Vollenhoven Institute for Law 
and Administration in Non-Western Countries of Leiden University, and 
Kluwer Law International. At the IIAS, I would like to thank in particular its 
Director Professor W.A.L. Stokhof, for his continuing encouragement and 
support for this project and Dr Dick van der Meij for the excellent final 
editing of the papers for publication. Thanks also to Ms Marianne 
Langehenkel for organizing the workshop and making it such a pleasant 
event. I would further like to thank the director of the Van Vollenhoven 
Institute, Professor Jan-Michiel Otto, for supporting the workshop and 
suggesting some of the speakers. Many thanks are further due to Professor 
Martin Chanock, who was head of the school of law and legal studies at La 
Trobe University in Melbourne at the time, for allowing me to prolong my 
research stay in Europe for the workshop. 
The concept of the workshop was based on my project 'Japan as a Model? -
Law and Development in Japan, Singapore, and Indonesia', which was 
funded by a large grant of the Australian Research Council from 1994 to 
1996. My stay in the Netherlands in 1997 and early 1998 was made possible 
by an outside study grant of La Trobe University and an exchange 
fellowship of the Research School of Pacific Studies at the Australian 
National University in Canberra. I would like to thank all these institutions 
for their support of my work. I would further like to thank Professor Masaji 
Chiba in Tokyo and Professor Bill Comish in Cambridge for crucial support 
at the initial stages of my ARC project. Last but not least, many thanks to 
my research assistants Ms. Megan Lennie and Ms. Deborah Cooper at the 
Centre for Southeast Asian Law at Northern Territory University in Darwin 
and to Ms. Gillian Jenik for many hours of help in proof reading and 
formatting the chapters. 









This is not simply another book on the Asian crisis. A lot has been written 
over the last few two years on the economic and political causes of the 
crisis. Nevertheless, the Asian crisis will provide an important background 
for the arguments in this book. At the core of the book are papers from a 
workshop at the International Institute for Asian Studies at Leiden in the 
Netherlands in January 1998. The workshop thus took place only a few 
months after the first shock waves of the crisis reached Asia in May 1997. 1 
The crisis had an important impact on the workshop discussions as it 
brought the long neglected question of the role of law in what had become 
termed as Asian capitalism back into play. The idea for the workshop came 
from my earlier research on law and development in Japan, Singapore, and 
Indonesia which had been funded by the Australian Research Council 
(ARC) from 1994 to 1996. Participants thus consisted of many people that I 
had spoken to during my research and there was consequently a 
concentration of papers on the Japanese, Singaporean, and Indonesian 
developments, four of which (by Baum, Boyd, Carter, and Antons) are 
published in this volume. Other papers discussed the theoretical and cultural 
framework of Asian legal development (Yasuda, Ohnesorge) or analysed 
legal developments in China (Chen) or particular areas of business law in 
the region (Heath, Blakeney, and Lutz). During 1999 and 2000, for the 
publication of this book, the conference papers were updated and three 
further chapters (Wu on labour law in Malaysia, Bishop on APEC, industry 
policy and the role of law, and Tomasic on the Asian economic crisis and 
legal institutions in Singapore and Hong Kong) were added to them. 
My earlier ARC funded project was entitled 'Japan as a Model? - Law 
and Development in Japan, Singapore and Indonesia.' It examined the 
question in how far the Japanese experience of development had provided a 
role model for Southeast Asian countries such as Singapore and Indonesia 
and in how far this was reflected in the approaches to legal development. 
During the course of the project it appeared that Singapore as one of the 
initial followers of Japan in the flying geese picture painted by political 
scientists at the time, was beginning to present itself to developing countries 
as a role model in its own right and was making attempts to export its 
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approach to countries such as China and India. The structure of the work-
shop represented the debate surrounding these role models for Asian 
economic development and their influence on commercial law. While some 
chapters have been rearranged, this structure has basically been maintained 
for the present volume. 
Part I provides a theoretical and historical background to the question of 
Asian legal development. It begins with a chapter by Nobuyuki Yasuda on 
Southeast Asian perceptions of the role of law in economic development. 
The first notable feature of this chapter is Yasuda's redefinition of the 
boundaries of Southeast Asia. He contrasts the accepted definition of 
Southeast Asia with what he calls Monsoon Asia. Apart from those 
countries commonly grouped under the label 'Southeast Asia,' Monsoon 
Asia includes also parts of India, China, Japan, and Korea. Yasuda returns to 
Wittfogel's (1977) argument of the importance ofrice farming in these areas 
and the common characteristics created by this mode of production and the 
climatic circumstances of it. The scope of his paper is thus different from 
other politically and culturally defined notions of Southeast Asia, but it is 
also different from the ASEAN plus three group of countries that is 
currently harmonizing its policies to a certain extent. This is perhaps a 
timely reminder that the roots of the term Southeast Asia go back no further 
than fifty years and that the term was increasingly used during and after 
World War II to refer to what was previously called 'Further India,' 
predominantly former colonies between India and China ( on the origins and 
the future of the term 'Southeast Asia' see Fifield, 1983). In the era of 
globalization and stronger rights to self-determination of various ethnic 
groups in border regions, the colonial distinction between South, Southeast, 
and East Asia might be increasingly questioned. 
Yasuda's chapter is an appeal for inclusion of cultural aspects into the 
study of law and development. He proposes to analyse Asian legal 
developments by contrasting three types of law (indigenous law, imported 
law, and development law) and their operational concepts 'community,' 
'market,' and 'command.' By applying these concepts to the historical 
development of Southeast Asian legal systems, to political, economic, and 
social development in 'Asian developmental states' and in post-crisis 
Southeast Asia, he comes to some interesting findings. While 'indigenous 
law' has been superseded by 'imported law' with origins mostly in Western 
jurisdictions it continues to play an important role in the daily life of Asian 
people, in particular in legal areas related to family or religious matters. 
There is even a revival of originally Asian laws as with Islamic law in much 
of South and Southeast Asia. Yasuda explains the relative lack of success in 
completely transplanting Western derived systems with the fact that they 
were mostly introduced during colonialism and, as a consequence, displayed 
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an oppressive nature during much of their history. From the community 
principle, Asian states have inherited their tendency towards authoritarian 
forms of government and patron-client relationships, to which development 
law and the developmental state has added a large discretionary power. 
In the epical struggle between the market and the community principle, 
globalization and the information technology revolution have led to a 
victory of the former over the latter and nationalism, nation states, and 
socialist regimes are losing their power. Business laws have been liberalized 
since the 1980s following demands of the IMF and the World Bank to 
combat inefficiencies in national economies. Yasuda sees this hasty 
liberalization as one of the main reasons for the Asian crisis, which was 
made worse by structural deficiencies such as lack of transparency, crony 
capitalism, and nepotism in the countries concerned. Yasuda believes that as 
a result of the developments of the last few years, the paradigm of the 
'Asian developmental state' has come to an end. Southeast Asian countries 
have democratized their political systems considerably and crucial 
commercial laws have been amended. Nevertheless, the community 
principle still plays a role in dispute resolution, at the level of the family and 
in rural areas, but also in informal mutual assistance schemes, which in 
many parts of Asia are a substitute for a social security system. With the 
disastrous social consequences of the Asian crisis, these informal support 
systems have in fact seen a revival. While globalization means that the state 
becomes less important as a tool for identification, the community principle 
and local interests will in future be represented increasingly at a regional 
instead of at a national level. 
The paradigm change in the law and development debate in Asia is also 
the topic of Bernard Bishop's Chapter 3. He presents an excellent overview 
of what he calls the 'old' idea of industry policy. Bureaucratic and political 
capacities were decisive for the success of this policy. By bureaucratic 
capacity, he means generally the competence of the bureaucracy, but also 
the degree of cohesion within and between government agencies. Political 
capacity refers to the degree that decision-makers are insulated from social 
pressures, but still 'embedded' enough within society to formulate policies 
that reflect market conditions. In this regard, Bishop sees factors at work in 
Northeast Asia that were not, or not to the same extent, present in Southeast 
Asia. In Northeast Asia, bureaucrats held prestigious social positions that 
made them less prone to rent seeking activities than their counterparts in 
Southeast Asia. The considerable ethnic and social divisions in Southeast 
Asia also made policies there less cohesive. Southeast Asian industrial 
policies were, therefore less insulated from politics and also more difficult to 
supervise, because of the important role of Overseas Chinese business 
networks for their economies. 
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Since the mid-1980s, the pressures resulting from democratization processes 
have reduced the effectiveness of developmental policies in Asia. Economic 
deregulation has required the separation of business-government links and 
the WTO agreement has restricted the possibilities for governments to 
intervene in key areas of the economy. What has also to be kept in mind is 
the increasing complexity of Asian economies, which makes them much 
more difficult to supervise than the relatively small economies of the 1960s 
and 1970s. Bishop perceives a growing consensus within APEC to replace 
the old industry policy with a new policy that favours a healthy degree of 
competition. The new policy requires the prevention of industry dominance, 
cartels, and unfair trade practices. Paradoxically, however, the implement-
ation of this policy relies on the same bureaucratic and political capacities 
that are now under pressure. To decide about dominant market position and 
to define what this means, for example, requires a high degree of bureau-
cratic competence. Again, policy makers must be sufficiently independent to 
prevent a use of the new approach for particular interests. On both of these 
issues, Bishop is rather pessimistic. On the one hand, the intensive networks 
built between business and government in Asia will not disappear quickly. 
On the other hand, democratic institution building in Asia might ultimately 
take more time than the quickly changing international environment will 
allow. In the absence of strong bureaucratic and political capacity, the rule 
of law needs to fill this gap immediately. The competition policies will, 
therefore, lead to a renewed emphasis on the rule of law and away from the 
traditional Asian understanding of law as an instrument of state power, that 
suited the needs of the old industry policy. 
John Ohnesorge questions in Chapter 4 precisely this renewed 
importance attached to the rule of law for economic development. If the rule 
of law was really such an important prerequisite for economic growth, then 
how was the East Asian success of the last few decades to be explained? 
Ohnesorge differentiates between an approach to the rule of law as an ideal 
of jurisprudence that is reached in different societies to a differing degree, 
but that is hardly ever fully established, and a vision of the rule of law as a 
complete and seamless legal infrastructure. The latter perception is often to 
be found in the writings of social scientists and economists rather than 
lawyers. The 'Rule of Law-Economic Development' literature focuses on 
two themes: the definition and enforcement of private property rights and 
the reduction of bureaucratic discretion in economic government. The first 
theme relates to the avoidance of 'transaction costs' in the economy, 
whereas the second theme relates to transparency and avoidance of corrup-
tion to attract foreign investment. It must be noted, however, that contrary to 
a common assumption by institutions such as the World Bank, the rising 
complexity of commercial transactions in Asia was not accompanied by a 
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rising importance of contracts and courts. The small litigation rates actually 
suggest a relatively well functioning system, which is supported by socio-
cultural values favourable to contractual market behaviour. This in tum 
either suggests that legal norms are well integrated into society or that they 
are simply not of primary importance. Similarly, the reasons for private 
property protection are often political rather than socio-legal and have to do 
with the attraction of foreign investment. However, portfolio investors in 
Asia seem generally little interested in questions of ownership rights and 
corporate control. The Asian crisis has demonstrated how little foreign 
banks cared for transparency in their lending to Asia. Furthermore, the lack 
of enforcement of intellectual property rights and of competition law in Asia 
belies the claim that these laws are necessary for development. Currently, 
the rule of law is on the rise in the national screening of foreign investment, 
yet its strict application may actually be disadvantageous to foreign 
investors, because the decision making in this area will lose its former 
flexibility. John Ohnesorge concludes that the rule of law needs a more 
concrete definition to defend itself against claims of 'Western' vs. 'Asian' 
versions. Finally, the assumption that the current Rule of Law approach with 
its focus on trade issues will have spillover benefits in other areas of law is 
questionable. 
The book then proceeds in Part 2 to examine the impact of what has been 
called the 'Japanese model' on Asian legal developments. The alleged 
superiority of Japanese capitalism and its features was a topic for hefty 
debates during the 1970s and 1980s. The many titles of popular books on the 
topic from this period range from enthusiastic appraisals of the 'Japanese 
economic miracle' (e.g. Kahn, 1970; Morishima, 1982) to often gloomy 
pictures of a 'Nipponized' world painted at a time of heightened US-
Japanese trade tensions (e.g. Burstein, 1988, and Prestowitz, 1988).2 The 
picture changed again after the burst of the Japanese 'bubble economy' in 
the early 1990s, when 'the end of Japan Inc.' was promulgated (Wood, 
1994), only to make way for publications asking how to restore the Japanese 
economy as an economic locomotive for Asia after the onset of the Asian 
crisis (Posen, 1998). 
Perhaps the most famous and most influential appraisal of the particular 
features of Japanese economic development was made by Professor 
Chalmers Johnson in his book on 'MITI and the Japanese Miracle' (1982). 
Chalmers Johnson proposed a move away from an overemphasis on cultural 
explanations of Japan's economic development. In his view, the famous 
Japanese consensus was due to a large extent to the various economic and 
social emergencies the Japanese had been facing throughout their history 
(Johnson, 1982:8-9, 307). To explain Japan's economic performance, the 
view should rather be directed towards its nature as what he termed a plan-
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rational, developmental state. In a summary of his thoughts in the 1992 
Panglaykim Memorial lecture on 'Capitalism: East Asian Style,' he cited 
former MITI official Koji Matsumoto for some of the key features of 
Japanese postwar development: de facto total separation of management 
from the wishes of the owners, a shift of the burden of corporate risk to the 
side of labour and the autonomy of management. A further interesting 
Japanese source for the features of the Japanese 'developmental state' is a 
chapter entitled 'Developmentalism as a System' in Yasusuke Murakami's 
book An Anticlassical Political-Economic Analysis: A Vision for the Next 
Century.3 Here, Murakami finds the following policies fundamentally 
necessary for developmentalism: designation of priority industries, industry-
specific indicative planning, policies to promote technological progress, and 
regulation of excessive price competition. Protectionist policies and a policy 
of subsidies may further supplement these policies.4 
The state-centered view of Japanese development has not remained 
unchallenged. Kent Calder (1993:8-13) basically accepted most of Chalmers 
Johnson's analysis but has pointed to gaps in the existing theories and sees 
the power of the state institutions constrained by the political world and by 
the private sector.5 In a matrix capturing state intervention and strategic 
resource allocation, Calder distinguishes between the developmental state 
(state intervention and strategic resource allocation), corporate-led strategic 
capitalism (strategic resource allocation without state intervention), the 
clientelized state (state intervention without strategic resource allocation) 
and what he calls 'Silicon Valley capitalism' (neither state intervention nor 
strategic resource allocation).6 As the title of his book suggests, he prefers to 
see Japan in the second category as a state practicing corporate-led strategic 
capitalism. Apart from the more differentiated views of scholars such as 
Calder, there is also a type of analysis that rejects approaches based on state-
intervention completely and explains Japan's economic development as a 
result of the famous invisible hands of Adam Smith (Miwa, 1996). 
The state-centered view of the Japanese economy has important 
implications for the field of law. Chalmers Johnson has pointed out, how 
administrative guidance has prevailed over detailed legislation: 
Perhaps the most important market-conforming method of inter-
vention is administrative guidance. This power, which amounts to an 
allocation of discretionary and unsupervised authority to the bureau-
cracy, is obviously open to abuse, and may, if used improperly, result 
in damage to the market. But it is an essential power of the capitalist 
developmental state for one critical reason: it is necessary to avoid 
overly detailed laws that, by their very nature, are never detailed 
enough to cover all contingencies and yet, because of their detail, put 
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a strait jacket on creative administration. One of the great strengths of 
Japanese industrial policy is its ability to deal with discrete complex 
situations without first having to enact a law that covers the situation. 
Highly detailed statutes serve the interests primarily of lawyers, not 
of development. The Japanese political economy is strikingly free of 
lawyers; many of the functions performed by lawyers in other 
societies are performed in Japan by bureaucrats using administrative 
guidance. The Japanese of course rely on law, but on short and highly 
generalized laws. They then give concrete meaning to these laws 
through bureaucratically originated cabinet orders, ordinances, rules, 
and administrative guidance. (Johnson, 1982:318-19) 
In his description of developmentalism and referring to Max Weber's 'Eco-
nomy and Society,' Murakami also pays attention to this administrative 
discretion, which he regards in line with Weber as a phenomenon that is not 
exclusively Japanese (or Asian): 
There is therefore room for discretion in the enforcement of the law, 
and decisions by bureaucrats, who are supposed to be nothing more 
than executors of the law, will play a substantial role. Thus the law-
dependent and the discretionary character of the bureaucracy make 
each other necessary, and .at the same time they dispute each other's 
domain. At one extreme is the image of the bureaucracy as automatic 
executor of the law, and at the other one can imagine a Kadi-esque, 
precedent-based bureaucracy. 'Kadi-justice' refers to making deci-
sions not on the basis of a formal legal rationality but on the basis of 
'informal judgments rendered in terms of concrete ethical or other 
practical valuations.' This tendency can be seen in the former 
'administration by notables' in England and in the Japanese bureau-
cracy. 
The influence of this administrative decision-making on Japanese and on 
East and Southeast Asian commercial laws is a recurring theme in the 
remaining chapters of this book. Because of its historical role as a pioneer of 
industrialization in Asia, Part 2 pays particular attention to Japan. In his 
appropriately entitled Chapter 5 'Globalization vs. Paternalistic Regulation: 
Some Thoughts About Economic Success, the Role of Law and the 
Regulation of Japan's Financial Markets' Harald Baum shares the view of 
Yasuda in Chapter 2 that the Japanese economic model has run out of steam. 
Different from Yasuda, however, Baum focuses on structural deficiencies 
rather than on culture. As a consequence, he sees similarities between Japan 
and non-Asian countries with stronger non-economic social objectives such 
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as Germany. While he basically agrees with views of Japan as a 'planned 
market' and a country subscribing to 'developmental-state capitalism,' he 
sees important forces of change at work. Former nationalist economic 
policies of maximized production for exports and suppressed domestic 
consumption have become less acceptable for foreign trading partners and 
local consumers alike. With the end of Japan's catch up position, the 
development of new technologies has become much more difficult and 
bureaucratic interference has come to be regarded as an impediment to 
research and development activities. 
Baum then turns to the example of the Japanese financial industry. This 
tightly controlled and protected sector of the economy proved little prepared 
for the deregulation and international competition that started in the 1980s. 
The fraud and corruption scandals of the 1990s pointed to severe regulatory 
problems. Baum sees the reasons for this in general in 'collusive regulation,' 
in particular in public law and economic regulation. The 'regulatory cartel' 
that governs Japanese financial markets consists of powerful elite 
bureaucrats in the Ministry of Finance that draft financial laws and 
ordinances with little or no parliamentary control, their retired former 
colleagues who under the amakudari system have come to head financial 
institutions, the carrot-and-stick mechanisms of administrative guidance 
(gyosei shido), a discretionary 'licensing system' for all kinds of business 
activities, and a system of 'ex ante monitoring' rather than 'ex post 
monitoring' by the courts. With globalization, this 'regulatory cartel' has 
come under pressure and belatedly Japan has to follow the example of other 
international financial centres to find a balance between deregulation and re-
regulation. The result is the Japanese version of the 'Big Bang' which will 
result in an increasingly important role of courts and lawyers in 'ex post 
monitoring.' However, the reforms will not lead to a convergence with the 
Anglo-American model because of the staying power of what Baum calls 
'path-dependent' institutional settings. 
Richard Boyd returns in Chapter 6 to the examination of the common 
equation of the rule of law and economic development that Ohnesorge 
discussed in the introductory part of this book. However, Boyd puts his 
discussion into the specific context of Japan. As Ohnesorge in Chapter 3, he 
contrasts the neo-liberal view of the rule of law and secure property rights 
with the by now fairly large 'developmental state' literature that sees law 
rather as a tool of economic policies than as an essential pre-condition for a 
market economy. Interestingly, however, rather than simply contrasting 
these two ideal types, Boyd perceives a convergence of the 'rule oflaw' and 
the 'developmental state' literature. He cites as an example the 1997 World 
Bank report The State in a Changing World which at times interprets a wide 
ranging government discretion as the privileged means of successful 
10 
INTRODUCTION 
government intervention. As Bishop in Chapter 2, Boyd points to the long 
historical tradition in Japan that regarded law as an instrument of state 
control. Law reform in Meiji Japan was then also driven by a desire to 
expand the instruments that the state had at its disposal. Boyd cites Meiji 
officials and their view of European-type legislation such as the Dutch civil 
code as 'an excellent instrument for regulating the people.' Accordingly, the 
Meiji constitution allowed for orders of the Emperor and of administrative 
agencies without a statutory authority. Judicial scrutiny was limited to 
'administrative litigation enumerated by statutes.' The great freedom for 
administrative decision-making was further aided by a pre-war under-
standing of 'the national order,' in which law was a weapon of control of a 
strict hierarchy with the Emperor on the top. 
Things improved somewhat after World War II. The independent 
administrative orders were abolished and administrative acts were subjected 
to reviews by the regular courts. However, when it came to enforcing crucial 
parts of the postwar legislation such as the Public Prosecutors Office Law, 
exceptions were made for political reasons. While Boyd regards the 
'developmental state' literature as a useful starting point for a debate on law 
and development, he nevertheless finds a caveat appropriate, because the 
notion of the 'developmental state' has been rarely tested empirically and 
the few empirical studies that have been carried out have found little 
positive impact of industrial policies on economic development. In three 
areas, however, law did have an impact. First, in the area of trade 
restrictions to nurture new industries, but this area is of little importance 
today. Secondly, in the generation, collection, and transmission of infor-
mation, which has little to do with law. Thirdly and finally, in the successful 
management of industries in decline. Boyd uses legislation from the last 
mentioned area to show that officials from MITI and other departments 
charged with industrial policy actually do make intensive use of the relevant 
laws, but these are so broadly worded that they only define policy goals. 
Actual bureaucratic action is then discretionary and informal and it cannot 
be scrutinized by the courts. 
Turning to the specifics of legal informality in Japan, Boyd at first points 
out that 'administrative guidance' is not so much enforcement of law but of 
policy positions, which are the result of protracted negotiations between the 
bureaucracy and the industry. He then examines the concrete example of the 
declining Japanese shipbuilding industry in the 1970s and the various pieces 
of legislation that were enacted to make this process not too painful. As in 
other examples for administrative guidance, the responsible Ministry of 
Transport used its licensing powers to force the industry to accept the 
recommendations of the bureaucracy. An important prerequisite to achieve 
this without any legal challenge was a pledge by surviving businesses to 
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bear the losses of the 'losers' collectively. The manner in which the 
Depressed Industries Law was discussed in Parliament and substantially 
amended contradicts the Western stereotype of a rubber-stamp parliament, 
which is often regarded as a pre-condition for the 'developmental state.' The 
bureaucracy's policy goals often put in it on collision course with the Fair 
Trade Commission (FTC). However, the FTC's position has been 
strengthened by a 1977 revision of the Anti-Monopoly Law and by a 
landmark decision of 1983 that requires the agreement of the FTC for 
measures restricting competition. 
The specific Japanese bureaucratic culture is maintained through an 
emphasis on harmony within a Ministry, a protection of the interests of the 
industry rather than those of the public, continuity and seniority, and the 
practice of amakudari that Baum discussed in the previous chapter. 
Ultimately, Ministries tend to be competitive in bureaucratic politics, but 
anti-competitive within the industrial sectors for which they are responsible. 
The following two chapters by Christopher Heath and Christoph Antons 
provide a bridge from Japanese approaches to law and development to the 
experiences in East and Southeast Asia. The preceding chapters repeatedly 
referred to intellectual property matters as a core topic of the law and 
development literature. Christopher Heath's Chapter 7 is the first of two 
chapters in this volume that look specifically at intellectual property issues. 
He examines the relationship between industrial property legislation and 
industrial policies in Japan and in other Asia-Pacific countries. The Japanese 
developed an interest in industrial property legislation only after the Meiji 
restoration. The former Tokugawa government had in fact prohibited 
technical innovations. A first Patent Act with initially little practical 
relevance was introduced in 1871 and the patent system was consolidated in 
the first few decades of the twentieth century. A particular success was the 
introduction of a utility model system that satisfied domestic needs for a 
short-term, low-level protection for minor improvements. 
Significantly, industrial property legislation is nowadays the responsi-
bility of the Ministry of Industry and Trade (MITI), but Guidelines on 
International Licensing are also issued by the Japanese Fair Trade 
Commission (FTC). Until the liberalization of these guidelines in 1997, the 
FTC rejected approximately one-fifth of the proposed licensing contracts, 
mostly because they contained 'grant-back clauses' providing for a transfer 
of improvement inventions from the licensee to the licensor. Both the FTC 
and the Japanese courts have continuously encouraged the parallel 
importation of intellectual property protected material. Patent infringement 
suits are rare, because ex ante monitoring by the Japanese administration 
largely prevents the ex post monitoring by the courts. In addition, there is a 
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shortage of attorneys and judges and a lack of courts that are specialized in 
intellectual property matters. 
In the international arena, the Japanese had used the accession to the 
Paris Convention for the protection of industrial property as a bargaining 
tool to achieve the revision of the 'unequal treaties' that were forced upon 
her by the Western imperialist nations of the nineteenth century to exempt 
their nationals from an 'inferior' Japanese jurisdiction. During the 1930s, 
Japan reluctantly complied with her international obligation to enact unfair 
competition legislation. Until 1950, however, there was only one reported 
case under this legislation. 
Outside of Japan, Korea had largely modeled its intellectual property 
legislation after the Japanese example. Different from the Japanese juris-
diction, however, the Supreme Court of Korea took an active interest in 
intellectual property matters. A separate Patent Court was established in 
1994 and the court took up its tasks in 1998. China and Taiwan, on the other 
hand, demonstrated, similar to Japan, a preference for bureaucratic institu-
tions over independent courts. Intellectual property systems were used for 
domestic industrial development while enforcement has been weak. 
Singapore followed the Japanese example in as far as it promoted parallel 
importation of intellectual property material. In many other developing 
countries of Asia, in particular in India and Indonesia, opposition against a 
strengthening of the intellectual property system has been strong. Here, the 
remnants from the colonial period still have some impact, for example 
design protection in Malaysia is still based on the British legislation of 1949. 
In Heath's view, Asian developing countries would be well advised to see in 
the WTO Agreement on Trade-related intellectual property rights (TRIPS) 
an opportunity to enact intellectual property systems that are truly 
advantageous to the domestic industry, for example by introducing a utility 
model system and a narrow interpretation of patent claims, by permitting 
parallel importation and by tightly controlling clauses detrimental to 
technical progress. He believes that seen in this light, the introduction of 
intellectual property rights might even spearhead the introduction of 
subjective human rights on a more general level. 
In my own Chapter 8, I have attempted to contrast the approaches of the 
often-cited development models of Japan and Singapore with those used in 
Indonesia. The chapter focuses on a few key strategies used during the 
industrialization process and on the laws to implement these strategies. As 
all three countries relied during the initial phase of their development on 
abundant cheap labour, the chapter begins with an examination of the 
regulation of industrial relations. During the first few decades of this 
century, the attitude of the Japanese government towards organized labour 
changed slowly from suppression to the encouragement of 'factory councils' 
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as rivals of independent unions. These councils re-emerged after World War 
II in the form of 'enterprise unions,' which have largely marginalized the 
national unions. In Singapore, the union movement was streamlined by a 
system which allowed for the deregistration of unions. For a long time, 
wages were adjusted by the National Wages Council, a tripartite body 
comprising unionists, employers, and government representatives. From 
1979 onwards, these wage guidelines were used to force employers to 
upgrade technologically and to create skill development funds for 
strategically important industries. Since the early 1980s, Japanese-style 
enterprise unions are encouraged and management is allowed greater 
flexibility in employment policies. In Indonesia, the Suharto government 
emphasized 'harmonious' industrial relations through its concept of 
'Pancasila industrial relations.' The Indonesian trade union movement 
became centralized with the formation of the All Indonesian Workers' 
Union. As a reaction to international scrutiny of Indonesia's labour 
conditions during the 1990s, the government encouraged the setting up of 
enterprise unions. Towards the end of the Suharto rule, the Law on 
Manpower finally gave a legal basis to the concept of Pancasila industrial 
relations. 
Differences begin to appear when the strategies of the three countries to 
mobilize capital are examined. Japan has traditionally been hostile to foreign 
investment and relied instead for a long time on its tax system, a high rate of 
savings and the peculiarities of the Japanese banking system. While the 
Japanese banking system is currently being reformed, foreign investment is 
still carefully scrutinized and foreign investors still need to consult MITI 
and the Ministry of Finance for administrative guidance. In contrast to 
Japan, foreign investment has been an essential feature of Singapore's 
industrialization policy. The main regulatory instrument was the discre-
tionary granting of tax incentives by the Minister of Finance. Besides 
foreign investment, the government encouraged domestic savings via the 
Central Provident Fund (CPF). Contributions to the CPF are currently at 
around 40 per cent of the monthly wage. Indonesia's policies alternated 
between a strict scrutiny of foreign investment and liberalization and 
deregulation. These shifts in policy depended largely on the price of oil as 
the main government revenue. The Indonesian banking system was for a 
long time under tight state control and state banks were responsible for 
allocating loans to priority sectors. However, regulatory mechanisms to 
oversee the system and the administrative capacity of the central bank were 
weak and as a consequence, corruption was rampant. The deregulation from 
1988 on took place without prior improvement of the supervisory 
framework. This resulted in an unusually large number of undercapitalized 
banks. Many of those banks were part of Indonesia's conglomerates and 
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they lent excessively to affiliated companies. When the value of the rupiah 
crashed in 1997, the Indonesian government prevented a total collapse of the 
system by closing many of the new private banks and by bringing other 
troubled banks under the supervision of the newly established Indonesian 
bank Restructuring Agency (IBRA). Recent amendments to the 1992 
Banking Law provide for a tighter scrutiny of the system and a 
centralization of the Bank oflndonesia's supervisory powers. 
In all three countries surveyed, the formation of powerful national 
enterprises was facilitated by the absence or lack of enforcement of anti-
monopoly legislation and cross-shareholdings in strategic companies. 
However, the Japanese Anti-Monopoly law has been strengthened since the 
late 1970s, Indonesia has introduced anti-monopoly legislation in 1999 and 
Singapore is undertaking a review of the share of government-linked 
companies in the Singaporean economy. In summary, the commercial laws 
of the three countries were largely instrumentalized for development 
purposes. Developmental ideology became incorporated into legislation and 
the bureaucracy was given a large discretion in implementing it. With a 
similar emphasis on such administrative guidance, success· depended largely 
on the quality of the administration and the absence of corruption. 
In Part 3, Chapter 9 of this book, Jianfu Chen takes a close look at the 
role of law in the 'socialist market economy' of China. He points to the 
impressive law making efforts of the National People's Congress (NPC) 
since 1979. In the first part of his paper, he shows that China in fact 
experienced similar periods of active legal reform from 1949 to 1957 and 
then again from 1961 to 1963. However, under Mao Zedong's leadership, 
periods of legal reform alternated with periods of political re-education and 
disregard for law such as the 'Great Leap Forward' and the 'Cultural 
Revolution.' While a period of uninterrupted legal modernization began 
under Deng Xiaoping, Chen points out that Deng' s understanding of law as 
a tool for party policies was hardly different from that of Mao. As a 
consequence, Chinese laws show the same features that are discussed in 
other chapters in this book with regards to capitalist states with a 
developmental outlook such as Japan or Indonesia. The actual laws embody 
only vague and general principles, which are then supplemented by various 
'implementing rules' at a later stage according to prevailing policy consi-
derations. Since these policy considerations are often the result of ad hoe 
developments, there is little consistency, clarity, or legal certainty and legal 
reform appears to proceed in a piecemeal fashion. After the adoption of the 
concept of a 'socialist market economy,' the Chinese government developed 
its notion of 'ruling the country by law.' Chen points out that Chinese legal 
scholars are mistaken, if they confuse the concept with the 'Rule of Law' in 
a Western sense. The Chinese notion of 'Rule by Law' contains little of the 
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guarantees for judicial independence and supremacy of the law that is at the 
centre of the Western concept. It is still the Communist party whose final 
approval is required for important principles in legislation. Nevertheless, 
Chen believes that the increase in legal discourse and the involvement of 
legal experts in lawmaking are important steps in the right direction. 
Connie Carter examines in Chapter 10 the emergence of Singapore as a 
development model in its own right. The chapter examines the export of the 
Singapore model to the China-Singapore Industrial Park in Suzhou. It 
provides, therefore, a useful bridge to the next part of this book that deals 
exclusively with Southeast Asia. The 1990s have seen a comeback of the 
'law and development' paradigm. This time, however, it is used as an 
instrument by supra-national institutions, regional aid agencies, NGOs, and 
powerful individual countries. One of these countries with an assertive role 
and influence in developing countries is Singapore. The appearance of 
Singapore among the development models is significant in that it signals a 
departure from the old definition of a North-South dialogue. 
Singapore's model of law and development diverges from currently 
dominant Western models. Carter describes the Singapore system as 
'Westernistic' because of its emphasis on a Western form and as 
'syncretistic' because of its borrowing from many different legal traditions. 
English law transplanted to Singapore was of a colonial variety aiming at 
running the colonial economy as profitable as possible. From 1965 onwards, 
Singapore's policies became clearly subordinated to the purposes of nation-
building and economic development. With its export-oriented development 
approach, the fostering of social discipline and a strong work ethic became 
paramount. Carter characterizes Singapore as an enterprise association 
whose rules are different from a civic society in that they gain their 
credibility from the association's goals and purposes. The particular policy 
mix of Singapore includes selected free market access, an efficient 
infrastructure, investment in key export-led sectors, the maintaining of 
discipline and the education of the workforce and, last but not least, the 
delivery of tangible benefits to ensure the acquiescence of the population. 
The achievements of this policy mix include the abolition of corruption, an 
efficient health care and educational system, and social and political 
stability. Law was an important facilitator in this context and its nature was 
administrative with an abundance of subsidiary rules. The government 
regulated not only classical fields of development policies such as labour 
and education, but also many areas that are regarded as private in a Western 
context such as child-bearing or the failure to look after one's parents. 
In the second part of her paper, Carter analyses the assistance of 
Singapore in building and administering the China-Singapore Industrial 
Park in Suzhou. Singapore's communitarian, corporatist ideology appeared 
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attractive to Deng Xiaoping and in 1994, a bilateral economic development 
agreement was concluded between the city-state and China. Suzhou was 
planned as a modem industrial town and modeled after Jurong, the industrial 
estate of Singapore. At the centre of the administrative structure is the 
holding company China-Singapore Suzhou Development (CSSD). Both 
countries represented by the China Suzhou Industrial Park Corporation 
(CSIPC) and the Singapore Suzhou Trade and Development (SSTD) have 
shareholdings in the CSSD. There is a governing body headed by the mayor 
of Suzhou, which includes representatives of Singapore's Economic 
Development Board. There is also a joint working committee and a joint 
steering committee. The Singapore Software Project Office (SSPO) oversees 
the transfer of Singapore's administrative and management experiences. 
This transfer includes the training of Suzhou officials in Singapore and the 
borrowing of statutory law, procedures, and regulations. Carter described 
this borrowing as taking place within the context of China's incremental law 
reform that began in the late 1970s and that shows civil law as well as 
common law influences. Singapore's involvement in this regard was also 
meant to remedy weaknesses of the legal system such as a lack of 
transparency, ambiguities, and inconsistencies between different levels of 
legislation. The rules and regulations of the Suzhou Park are delegated 
administrative law within the Chinese national system. They are more 
precisely drafted and clearer ~han most Chinese laws, but they nevertheless 
embody an understanding of 'rule by law' rather than 'rule of law.' Foreign 
investors apparently appreciated successful reforms in Suzhou such as the 
setting up of a one-stop shop for business licenses and the reduction and 
publication of administrative fees. Yet, for a variety of reasons that might 
include a recent tendency towards a stronger central administrative control, 
Singapore announced a substantial reduction of its shareholding in Suzhou 
in 1999. 
Part 4 of the book deals with 'Southeast Asian approaches.' The chapters 
presented here discuss two issues that have been central to the economic 
development debate in Southeast Asia: industrial relations and technology 
transfer. Jesse Wu returns in Chapter 11 to the issue of the regulation of 
organized labour. His discussion focuses on Malaysia, which after the 
financial crisis has become one of the cheapest places for foreign direct 
investment in the world. A restrictive regulation of trade unions has played a 
key role in keeping the production costs low. Prior to the independence of 
Malaysia, the British originally saw no necessity to introduce trade union 
legislation in the colony. They finally changed their mind only after a 
Colonial Development and Welfare Act of 1940 made certain financial 
assistance to the colony subject to the existence of such legislation. The 
Trade Union Enactment of 1940 introduced the same compulsory 
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registration system for trade unions that became also a prominent feature of 
the industrial relations system of Singapore. Emergency provisions under 
the Internal Security Act that allowed for detention without trial were 
introduced during the period of violent Communist upheaval during the late 
1940s and the 1950s. These provisions are still occasionally used by the 
Government to end a strike. 
Malaysian trade unions are federally regulated by the Trade Unions Act 
of 1959 and the Industrial Relations Act of 1967. Freedom of association is 
guaranteed, but restricted to registered trade unions. Registration of unions 
will only be approved, if they are operating in 'similar trades, occupations or 
industry' and the decision whether this is the case is within the discretion of 
the Director General of Trade Unions. Malaysian courts have disallowed 
legal challenges to the Director-General's decision, which leaves an appeal 
to the Minister of Human Resources as the only remaining option for a 
union that is barred from registration. Trade unions may not engage in 
political activities and union funds may not be used to further 'any political 
object.' The definition of what constitutes a 'political object' is a matter of 
discretion for the Minister. According to regulations drafted during another 
emergency following race riots in 1969, office bearers and employees of 
political parties are disallowed from holding an office in a trade union. In 
exceptional cases, the King may exempt public officers from this 
prohibition. Employees of statutory authorities are basically confined to 'in-
house' unions, unless the Minister of Human Resources makes an exception 
and allows employees of smaller statutory authorities to join other trade 
unions. The minister also has an extraordinary wide discretion to suspend 
trade unions which 'in his opinion' are used for purposes prejudicial to or 
incompatible with the interests of the security or public order of Malaysia or 
any part thereof. 
The right to strike may be inferred from several provisions of the 
legislation, but strikes for political, economic or social purposes not 
immediately connected to a trade dispute with the employer are prohibited. 
Significantly, in case of unlawful industrial action the burden of proof is 
reversed, so that the union has to show that the quite burdensome 
requirements for a strike are complied with. Furthermore, the legislation 
gives considerable discretionary powers to the Director General to decide 
whether a proposed strike is lawful. Strikes are in general prohibited in 
'essential industries' and they are prohibited in the public service and in 
statutory authorities if the King has refused to refer the industrial dispute to 
an Industrial Court for settlement. Penalties for unlawful strikes are harsh 
and may include the exclusion of participants in such strikes from the union 
and a prohibition to join other trade unions in the future. Restrictions on 
collective bargaining are particularly strong in so-called pioneer companies. 
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These companies often involve foreign direct investment and they are 
thereby guaranteed extremely low labour costs. 
Michael Blakeney presents in Chapter 12 a survey of technology transfer 
regulations of ASEAN countries. There is a common assumption of a link 
between technology and economic development. As a consequence, 
international organizations such as WIPO and UNCTAD have been 
committed to advise developing countries on how to achieve suitable 
intellectual property systems and technology transfer arrangements. 
Increasingly, concepts are also developed within regional organizations such 
as APEC, NAFTA, the Anden Pact, Mercosur, and ASEAN. The most 
significant development in the regional harmonization of intellectual 
property laws has been the ASEAN Framework Agreement on Intellectual 
Property Cooperation of December 1995. A driving force behind the 
agreement has been Thailand, which has also concluded bilateral agreements 
with Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Vietnam, and China. The Framework 
Agreement envisages the creation of an ASEAN patents and trade marks 
system and an ASEAN Patents and Trade Marks Office. One of the most 
important aims of the agreement is the prevention of abuses of intellectual 
property rights that might adversely affect trade and technology transfer. 
The approaches to technology transfer regulation in ASEAN have been 
as diverse as the members of this regional group. They range from a laissez 
faire attitude in Singapore over partial regulation of technology transfer 
agreements in Indonesia and Malaysia to a comprehensive transfer of 
technology code in Vietnam. Blakeney contrasts the very elaborate 
provisions of Vietnam with the approach in the Philippines, where the 
compulsory registration of technology transfer arrangements was abolished 
following a merger of the Technology Transfer Board and the Patent Office. 
In Vietnam, intellectual property and technology transfer is now regulated in 
the Vietnamese Civil Code. The provisions contain detailed prescriptions as 
to the nature and the price of technology, length of technology transfer 
contracts and warranties as to quality and title. In contrast to this, the 
Philippines has increasingly liberalized screening procedures for technology 
transfer since 1992. The previous cap on royalties to be earned has been 
removed. Cambodia, Laos, and Myanmar have so far only rudimentary 
systems of intellectual property protection, but new legislation is currently 
being drafted. Blakeney concludes that an increase in legislation was in the 
past often accompanied by an increase in corruption. Overlapping legislation 
has also often led to conflicts of authority and to fractional fighting over 
approaches to technology transfer between different ministries. 
The final part of the book presents two chapters that traverse different 
countries of 'the region.' As a result of globalization, commercial arbitration 
and alternative means of dispute resolution have become increasingly 
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important. Robert Lutz examines the different means of resolving trade 
disputes in Asia in Chapter 13. Lutz perceives a cultural fusion between East 
and West in litigation culture so that the traditional assumption of an Asian 
tendency to dispute avoidance is no longer entirely correct. Asians who are 
involved in international trade are increasingly willing to accept arbitration 
or even litigation to solve their disputes. The current shift towards 
privatization will inevitably lead to an increase in private trade disputes. 
Since arbitration rules become increasingly harmonized, the advances in 
communication and transportation technology shift the emphasis away from 
the place of arbitration. Besides international dispute settlement facilities 
such as the International Center for the Settlement of Investment Disputes 
(ICSID) of the World Bank, and WIPO and WTO mechanisms, regional 
economic groups such as the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) of ASEAN 
and the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) have also created their 
own mechanisms for dispute settlement. In particular the AFT A mechanism 
is designed to shield disagreements within AFT A from the public and to 
resolve disputes between member states within the circle of the Economic 
Ministers. Asian countries have also frequently used the dispute settlement 
mechanism of the WTO, but only a few of these cases have concerned 
disputes between Asian nations. Lutz assumes that Asian countries will 
increasingly resort to the regional mechanisms provided by ASEAN and 
APEC rather than using the more legalistic procedures of the WTO. These 
regional decisions may be able to pay greater attention to Asian cultural 
values of dispute solving and to emphasis harmony over strict interpretation 
of the law. 
Enforcement of arbitral awards remains difficult in some countries. 
While most Asian nations have acceded to the New York Convention of 
1958 on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, the 
enforcement of foreign arbitral decisions remains unclear in Indonesia and 
subject to public policy considerations in China. Thai courts have to 
consider a broad number of defenses with the result that disputes frequently 
end up in the Thai legal system. 
The fusion between Asian and Western culture in this area appears 
perhaps most clearly in the preference that businesses in Asia show for 
hybrid forms of consultation and arbitration. Consultation and arbitration 
may be blended, so that the parties shift back and forth between the two, or 
conjoined, so that the failure of consultation triggers arbitration. The fused 
process helps to come to a final decision without endangering the business 
relationship. 
The number of foreigners acting as arbitrators is increasing in most 
Asian countries and even Singapore has given up its former hostile attitude 
towards foreign arbitrators. There is a further trend in Asia towards 
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harmonization of arbitration law in accordance with the UNCITRAL Model 
Law and Arbitration Rules. Lutz ends his chapter with an optimistic outlook 
on the emerging international dispute resolution culture, although he adds a 
cautious note regarding the remaining enforcement problems in some 
countries. 
As a nice conclusion to a book dealing with the issues of develop-
mentalism and the rule of law, Roman Tomasic contrasts in Chapter 14 the 
views of former Singapore Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew and those of 
former Hong Kong governor Chris Patten. Tomasic finds many examples in 
Lee Kuan Yew's memoirs for the instrumentalist view of law that Lee 
embraced. In this view, the role of law in guaranteeing individual rights is 
clearly subordinated to its primary function of maintaining order. Interesting 
is also the frequent use by Lee (and other members of the ruling PAP) of 
defamation and libel actions to restrain political opponents. In contrast to 
Lee's instrumentalist view of law, Chris Patten presents very much the 
idealist notion of the rule of law discussed by Ohnesorge in Chapter 4 of this 
book. While his views of law as a defence 'against anyone however 
powerful' will appear rather naive to sociologists of law, Patten makes an 
interesting distinction between 'quality growth' and 'quantity-based' 
growth. He notes that 'quality growth' will be achieved by using the 
creativity and inventiveness of citizens and that these talents can be more 
easily nurtured in a pluralist political environment. In spite of their 
otherwise opposing views, Patten and Lee agree on the importance of the 
fight against corruption for a well-functioning economy. As to Asian values, 
Lee's memoirs show how he used a particular brand of Neo-Confucianism 
to rally the Chinese population of Singapore behind him. Patten rightly 
criticizes the overemphasis on hierarchy and authority in this interpretation 
of Confucianism, while the humanistic side of Confucius' teachings tends to 
be neglected. Again, however, Patten's assumption of emerging universalist 
values based on 'the same respect for human decency' and 'the same regard 
for an economic philosophy that maximizes the opportunity for the 
individual to excel' is simplistic. If anything, the economic globalization and 
cultural Americanization mentioned by Tomasic will be the driving forces 
behind such a process and their effects will not be the same in all parts of the 
legal system. 
In the second part of his chapter, Tomasic's discusses some of the more 
recent examples of socio-legal scholarship on Asian commercial laws. The 
first of these is Anthony Woodiwiss's study of 'Globalization, Human 
Rights and Labour Law in Pacific Asia.' Woodiwiss analyses the labour 
laws of the Philippines, Hong Kong, Malaysia, and Singapore by using the 
concept of patriarchalism, by which he means a form of traditional authority 
with a strong familialist focus. Tomasic interest lies again with the labour 
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laws of Hong Kong and Singapore, which are described as 'enforceable 
benevolence.' Under the Hong Kong legislation, labour disputes need to be 
transferred to the Labour Tribunal by the Labour Department, which will 
only do so after attempts at conciliation have failed. Short term or temporary 
employees also receive little protection under the Employment Ordinance 
which require some continuity in employment. Tomasic correctly questions 
Woodiwiss's assumption that the Japanese rather than the American style of 
capitalism will become archetypal in the Asia-Pacific region. As has been 
noted by several commentators in this book, the parameters of the 'Japanese 
model' are under pressure in Japan and elsewhere in Asia since quite some 
time and the Asian crisis has intensified this pressure. 
Roman Tomasic's and Peter Little's project on 'Insolvency Law and 
Practice in Asia' included the findings from 115 interviews in the 
jurisdictions of the People's Republic of China (PRC), Hong Kong, Taiwan, 
Singapore, Malaysia, and Indonesia. The study found that traditional ideas 
of 'losing face' still played a role in the way Chinese businesses handled 
insolvency matters. This led to the seeking of alternative remedies, even in 
such 'modernized' jurisdictions as Singapore and Hong Kong. Interestingly, 
the social stigma associated with bankruptcy was less strongly perceived in 
Mainland China than in more traditionally oriented Taiwan. Nevertheless, in 
both jurisdictions, the study found significant non-cultural considerations for 
avoiding bankruptcy courts such as employment policies and debts of state 
enterprises in the PRC and an inefficient court system and archaic laws in 
Taiwan. 
Tomasic finally takes a brief look at the study by Katharina Pistor and 
Philip Wellons of Harvard University on 'The Role of Law and Legal 
Institutions in Asian Economic Development 1960-1995 .' The study finds 
that economic laws in Asia had at first little influence on the economy and 
developed only much later in line with the acceleration in economic 
development. While the current market-oriented economic policies have 
made Asian systems more market-allocative and more rule-based, 
differences in legal processes and institutions remain. This leads to a 
situation where the systems under study are partly converging and partly 
diverging. The study finds cultural factors not completely unimportant in 
that they influenced the nuances of a population's response to economic 
change but they are clearly subordinated to economic strategies. Tomasic 
concludes his survey of these recent studies by encouraging further studies 
into the 'big picture questions' of law and development that should provide 
for a balance of theory and data. The obstacles to carrying out such projects 
in the high stress environment that modem universities have become are 
formidable, but they can be overcome by heeding Tomasic's advice to 




1 On the chronological development of the crisis see Henderson (1998), 
Gamaut (1998), Gough (1998), Delhaise (1998), Arndt & Hill (1999), 
and Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade-East Asia Analytical Unit 
(1999). 
2 For a survey of the earlier literature on Japanese economic development 
see also Johnson, 1982:6-17. 
3 Stanford University Press 1996. 
4 Murakami, 1996:185-7; cf. also Boyd, in this volume. 
5 Calder (1993:8-13). 
6 Calder (1993:6) and Pistor and Wellons (1998:55) have used a similar 
matrix to capture allocative and procedural dimensions of law. Their 
distinction between 'market/rule-based,' 'state/rule based,' 'market/ 
discretionary' and 'state/discretionary' are the legal equivalents of 
Calder's political and economic dimensions. 
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CHAPTER2 
LAW AND DEVELOPMENT FROM THE 
SOUTHEAST ASIAN PERSPECTIVE: 
MEmODOLOGY, HISTORY, AND PARADIGM CHANGE 
NOBUYUKI YASUDA 
Since World War II, Southeast Asian countries have achieved the most 
successful development among all developing countries in the world. 1 This is 
an undeniable fact in spite of the fact that these countries were suddenly 
trapped by a serious financial crisis in mid-1997. At present, they are still 
striving to recover from the disastrous aftershock of this crisis in the economic, 
political, and social fields.2 
There may be various economic and cultural reasons both for past 
praiseworthy performances of these economies and also their sudden collapse 
in the mid-1990s. In my understanding both their glittering success and their 
miserable failure have a common cause, which can be conceptualized by 
using the term 'Asiatic.' It is virtually impossible to define it in the articulate 
words of social science, but in this vague word I find the key not only for a 
reconsideration of the reality of the present crisis, but also to re-establish the 
framework of Law and Development Studies (LOS) from an Asian 
perspective. 
It is well known that for various reasons, Law and Development Studies 
disappeared as a paradigm from tertiary establishments in the United States in 
the early 1970s. The main reason for this disappearance was that the 
conceptualization of law in Law and Development Studies was based 
substantially on Liberal Legalism, which was at the time a dominant paradigm 
of legal study. What was regarded as 'proper law' for developing countries 
was nothing more nor less than the laws and legal institutions of Western 
countries in general and of the United States in particular. The customs and 
mores surviving in non-Western societies were disregarded, or otherwise 
understood as obstacles which should be removed in the interests of national 
development. Needless to say that this paradigm was built wholly on Western 
ethnocentrism. 3 It was symbolic that the two leading scholars in this academic 
movement expressed their serious and sincere self-criticism in 1974, at a time 
when the United States, as the most hegemonic Western state, was defeated 
by Vietnam, a presumably small, traditional, and pre-modern Asian state.4 
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During the 1970s and 1980s, Asian countries continuously achieved 
remarkable economic and social development in contrast to other regions of 
the world that suffered serious economic stagnation. What is remarkable is 
that their development process was substantially different from the Western 
model of development that formed the basis of the above-mentioned LOS 
paradigm. This indicates effectively an 'Asiatic' nature of their development 
process, questioning the predominance of Western values.5 As a result of this, 
'Asian values' were claimed strongly in the early 1990s in opposition to 
modern Western values which had become universally accepted.6 According 
to the proponents of Asian values, the secret of the successful development of 
Asian countries was a combination of the harmonious collectivist spirit of the 
people and a strong authoritative government. This was in clear contrast to the 
values of modern Western societies focusing on individualism and democratic 
government. 
The sudden collapse of the Asian economies in 1997, however, disclosed 
the fatal defects in these Asian values. Many Western financial experts from 
institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank locate the main cause of the 
crisis in a lack of transparency and accountability, nepotism in business and 
various other political practices including corrupt crony capitalism, and 
authoritarian forms of government (Fisher, 1998). These defects have a strong 
affinity with the discourses regarding Asian values. What we currently need is 
to create a new framework for LOS, one which is able to answer the two 
contradicting questions of why Asia was prosperous and developing 
successfully from the late 1980s to the early 1990s, and of why it has been 
trapped by such a critical economic and social crisis since 1997. The term 
'Asiatic' is presumably a key word to be infused into the LOS paradigm, 
although it is essential to refine it into a more effective and operational 
concept for social science. In other words, we must design LOS by including 
cultural elements in order to understand Asian legal systems in depth. 7 
For this purpose, the work will be divided into four parts. First, I set up a 
methodological framework by proposing several sets of concepts consisting 
of three types of law ('indigenous law,' 'imported law,' and 'development 
law'), three types oflegal principles ('community,' 'market,' and 'command') 
as more operational concepts and 'community force' and 'market force' to 
refer to their dynamics. Second, in applying these concepts, I illustrate the 
historical development of Southeast Asian legal systems under the three 
different state concepts, the 'proto-state,' 'colonial state,' and 'developmental 
state.' The effectiveness of these concepts will be tested during this process. 
Third, I outline law and development problems with regards to the aspects of 
political, economic and social development under the regime of the 
'developmental state,' which functioned most effectively during the 1970s 
and early 1980s and led to rapid development in the region. Finally, I inquire 
26 
LAW AND DEVELOPMENT FROM TIIE SOUTHEAST ASIAN PERSPECTIVE 
why the developmental legal systems of East and Southeast Asia have been 
facing such a serious crisis in the closing years of the twentieth century, and I 
will look for an answer which will state what lessons can be learned for global 
development in the next century. 
THREE TYPES OF LAW AND LEGAL PRINCIPLES 
Three Types of Law 
Observing the legal systems in Asian and other non-Western countries, we 
can categorize them with regards to their origin into three groups. One group 
is 'indigenous law' originating in the proto-state, which is defined as the 
indigenous or traditional state before colonization by a Western power or 
modernization by the strong influence of such a power. 8 It is true that 
substantial parts of this law were degraded to mere customary mores or 
non-state law by the newly introduced modem Western law in the process of 
modernization under colonial rule. However, indigenous law still effectively 
regulates various aspects of the daily life of the people, and some of it is still 
recognized as state law in such fields as family and religious matters.9 In many 
Southeast Asian countries, for example, Islamic personal law is state law for 
the Muslim people. Cogently, it is perceptible that this law is gaining new 
force and is expanding in comparison to some fields of secular law, which are 
based on imported Western law. 10 Even in China, still an anti-religious 
socialist country, there are indications of a revival of Confucianism and 
Taoism. It does not need to be stressed that these religions are deeply 
connected with family and community systems. 
The second group is 'imported law' introduced or imposed by Western 
countries during their colonial rule. 11 At the initial stage of colonization, 
Western law was applied and adapted only to disputes between Western 
people. Only when colonial rule had been stabilized and had become a normal 
state of affairs was the jurisdiction of this law gradually expanded to 
indigenous peoples by state courts and local administrations which were 
created as institutions of colonial states. Naturally, this law displays typical 
characteristics of modem Western law such as individualism, although the 
transplantation to Asia of many such core values was, seemingly, 
unsuccessful, because of the oppressive nature of colonial rule and the vast 
cultural differences between the two distant regions. Nevertheless, what is 
most important is that this law forms an essential part of the present state legal 
systems of all countries. 
The third group comprises what I have called 'development law.' This 
type of law is a series of products of the development policies implemented 
after the independence of these countries following World War II. The 
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transfer of power from the former colonial rulers to the new governments 
within the region was peaceful with the exception of Indonesia and the 
countries of Indochina. Southeast Asian countries basically inherited the 
colonial legal systems for their new nations. 12 However, their political and 
economic systems were very fragile because of the disastrous result of World 
War II and they were destabilized even more by the post-war international 
order of the Cold War period. In order to overcome political instability and to 
achieve rapid political, economic, and social development, a different type of 
law emerged, which delegated to the state or government wide discretionary 
powers. These laws cover a huge area of both political and economic fields, as 
we will discuss later. 
Three Legal Principles 
We can deduce more functional and operational 'principles' from these three 
types of laws, which will help us not only to understand the contemporary 
Asian legal systems more systematically, but also to design more effective 
legal systems for their development. The origins of indigenous law, either in 
Western or in non-Western countries, is the customary law of village or tribal 
communities which can be traced back many generations into the mist of time. 
These communities were and still are the most primordial organizations of 
human beings and they represent the primal nature of human society. In 
comparison to a modem society, there is no specific 'individual' in these 
communities. Their members are unified and solidified as part of the 
community with others as cells of an organ. In the process of the development 
of the society, this unity is gradually loosened and independent and 
autonomous individuals will emerge. However, the feeling of togetherness 
and identification with the group has remained strong at least within families 
and to some extent in local or religious communities. 
This is especially true in monsoon Southeast Asia, because wet rice 
farming as the basic mode of production requires collective and co-operative 
labour among peasants. This is the reason why until today 'harmony' is 
emphasized as a common cultural value in this region. We may call this the 
'community principle.' This principle represents the most basic human 
feelings in which human beings seek to identify themselves with others or 
with a group like a family or a specific community. It may perhaps be 
compared to fraternity or brotherhood, which was one of three principles of 
the French Revolution. This value is also expressed as a communist ideal in 
'one for all and all for one.' The community principle is the core concept for 
analysing a 'communal society' in the sense of an 'expanded family.' 13 
Disputes between members within such a community shall be solved 
amicably through the mediation or conciliation of all members, but not in a 
legalistic or judicial (litigious) way in a court or a similar institution. From the 
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viewpoint of Western legal tradition, this is of a non- or para-legal nature and 
does not strictly belong to the field oflaw. 14 Nevertheless, this principle plays 
an important role in Asian (and non-Western) legal systems. It is also another 
term for concepts such as 'dyadic relation of patrons and clients' and 
'dependency,' used by the eminent political scientist Lucian Pye 
(1985:90-132) to express the common nature of Asian political powers. 
Roberto Unger (1976:50-1) correctly defines it as 'customary-interaction law' 
because of its unarticulated nature in his trichotomy. 
'Imported law' is law transplanted from modem Western countries and 
supplies a basic legal infrastructure not only for the commercial and economic 
area but also for the state system as a whole in almost all non-Western 
countries. As expressed in the famous finding of a movement 'from status to 
contract,' modem society is based on the contractual network of the citizens. 
The most important element of this society is the contractual relation between 
autonomous individuals. I call this the 'market principle' because it reflects 
common human behaviour during transactions in a market place. It represents 
the exchange of goods and services for equivalent values between equal 
independent parties out of free will. Needless to say this is the essence of 
commercial and contract laws which typically regulate economic activities of 
human beings in a market system. In modem Western societies, the impact of 
this principle has expanded from the economic field to the political level. This 
expansion finds its expression in the discourse about a 'social contract' of 
modem political philosophy according to which the state is theoretically 
created by a social contract between free people. But it goes further than this. 
The principle has also penetrated into the arena of the community which we 
presume to be a simple gathering of free and independent 'individuals.' It 
seems to me that the democratic polity directly reflects this principle because 
it stands for 'free competition for power'. 15 We may express another aspect of 
it with the word 'liberty' which presupposes horizontal relations between 
human beings. The dispute settlement model in this field is 'adjudication' by 
legal experts Qudges) as umpires, because obtaining a judgment from an 
independent and socially recognized authority can solve the disputes between 
equal and independent persons. It is quite understandable that Unger (1976: 
52-8) expresses a similar principle simply as 'legal order and legal system' 
because it expresses the essential values of modem legal systems in his 
typology. 
The purpose of' development law' is to authorize a state or government to 
command people to commit or not to commit certain acts for the purpose of 
development, a key object of which is to achieve 'equality' or redistribution of 
common wealth among the people. From this aspect of development law we 
may abstract the 'command principle' which represents a vertical relation 
such as 'order and obedience' between human beings, in contrast to the 
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horizontal relation of the market principle. 16 It is a dominant principle of 
public or political law, where a superior (the 'state' in a modem concept) 
enjoys a 'discretionary power' in the name of public interest in exercising its 
power. This principle is an essential part of any kind of 'state' or 'political 
society' because people are compelled by it conclusively whether in a legal or 
non-legal manner. Nevertheless, a dictatorial state as typically exemplified by 
the former socialist states is the most suitable model to represent this principle. 
Unger (1976:50) defines this type oflaw as 'bureaucratic law enforced ... by 
an identifiable government.' 
Table I shows a comparative list of the three principles in certain fields oflaw 
and society. Needless to say the real world is much more complex and shows 
a mixture of these three principles. 
TABLE I THREE TYPES OF LEGAL PRINCIPLES 
Principles Community Principle Market Principle Command 
Princiole 
Basic relation Unifying and Horizontal, and Vertical order and 
solidifvine. eauivalent obedience 
Basic value Fraternity Liberty Equality 
Model social One for all, all for one Voluntary exchange Compulsion by the 
action of goods superior 
Core sphere Communal society Economic society Political society 
or dimension (community) (economy) (state) 
State model (Commune state) Modem capitalist (Former) Socialist 
Proto-states state state 
Colonial states developmental 
states 
General Not clear, depending Supplying clear Giving discre-
pattern of on community feeling interpretation rules tionary power to 
norms the authority 
Typical Family law Civil and Public (political) 
branch of law commercial law law 
Nature of Amicable settlement Adjudication by Reconsideration 
disputes (mediation or third party (like by authority 
settlement reconciliation) courts) 
Basic value Identification Legality Uustice) Reasonable-ness 
for the (solidarity) (fairness) 
settlement 
Typical Community mediation Judicial Courts Administrative 
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Name Community Market Principle Command Principle 
Principle 
Unger, R, (1986) Customary-inter Legal order and Bureaucratic law 
action Jaw legal system 
Nonnet & Selznick Responsive law Autonomy Jaw Strict Jaw 
(1977) 
Kamenka & Tay Gemeinschaft Gesellschaft type of Bureaucratic 
(1980) type oflaw Jaw -adminstrative type of 
law 
Ghai Y ash ( 1986) Custom Market State and its law 
Miller (1976) Primitive Market Hierarchy 
Pollani, P. (1977) Reciprocity Exchange Market 
Paul Tillich ( 1954) Love Justice Power 
Sources: R.M. Unger, Law in Modern Society; Toward a Criticism of Social 
Theory, New York, The State Press, 1976. P. Nonnet and P. Selznnik, Law and 
Society in Transition, Towards Responsive Law, New York, Happer Colphan 
Books, 1978. Kamenka Augen and A.E. Tay, 'Social Traditions, Legal 
Traditions' in Kamenka &Tay (eds), Law and Social Control, London, Edward 
Arnold, 1980. Ghai Yash, 'Land Reform and Paradigm of Development: 
Reflections in Melanesian Constitutions,' in: P. Sack (ed.) Legal Pluralism, 
Proceeding of Canberra Law Workshop VII, Research School of Social Science, 
ANU, 1986). Miller, D., Social Justice, Oxford, Clarendon, Press, 1976. K. 
Polanyi, The Livelihood of Man, ed. by H. W. Peason, New York, Academic Press, 
1977. Paul Tillich, Love, Power and Justice, Oxford University Press, 1954. 
MARKET FORCE AND COMMUNITY FORCE: 
Two DYNAMIC ELEMENTS OF DEVELOPMENT 
The word 'development' has various meanings, but in our context it definitely 
expresses a kind of progressive process of history. Therefore, it is essential to 
determine what are the driving forces motivating the development of society. 
Many historians and social scientists have been gripped by this question. 17 It 
is not my intention here to enter into this debate, but I do feel that it is 
unavoidable that this field should be drawn upon for concepts which, together 
with our three types of legal principles, can help explain such dynamic 
processes. The market principle and community principle clearly contrast 
with one another, and it seems to me that we can postulate a similarly 
opposing set of dynamic concepts which helps to explain the process of 
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development. These corresponding concepts can be termed the 'market force' 
and the 'community force.' 18 
'Market force' is the dynamic counterpart of the market principle. The 
essence of the market principle is a horizontal relation based on free and 
autonomous individuals. If we look at history, we can easily understand that 
the dynamic expression of this relation is 'individualization,' which enables 
members of society to be liberated from various fetters of traditional 
communities. This forms the basis of the vitality of 'modem capitalist 
society.' Although numerous explanations might be offered as to how this 
force developed within Western feudal society, this process undoubtedly 
involved the merchandisation of all existences, especially of land and human 
labour, as has been explained by Marxist historians. In this process, all things 
have become merchandise, interchangeable for money. As the basic laws 
regulating this exchange process, contract and property law lie at the core of 
the whole legal system based on the market principle. 
This force is characterized by three attributes. The first is the strong 
tendency to dissolve social or communal bonds as suggested by the words 
'individualization' and 'atomization' often associated with modem capitalist 
society. This can be characterized as 'centrifugal power.' This power has 
functioned to dissolve and divide the primordial human relationships of 
traditional society which had been based on the community principle, and to 
reconstruct the society into a uniform and less humanistic gathering of 
individuals through contractual relations. As we saw, when this process 
occurs not only the economic but also the political society is rebuilt on the 
basis of the market principle. The second is the characteristic of calculable 
rationality. This rationality is realized in the process of individualization and 
atomization induced by the market force. This process has subjected human 
beings, and indeed all things in the world, to an evaluation in calculable 
(typically money) terms. Individuality and calculability are the basis for 
modem science. Max Weber refers to the concepts of 'rationality,' 
'calculability,' and 'predictability' in this regard. The concept of bureau-
cratization that he foresaw as the final stage of the market society suggests 
that the rationality he posits is essentially of the mechanical and 
de-humanized sort. 19 The last nature is universality. By the nature of 
rationality, this force can obtain the universality expressed in the contractual 
relation of the individuals, which can apply equally to all social phenomena in 
the world. It is the universal nature of the market force which allows it to 
break through and even dissolve the traditional community, and produce 
modem Western society. 
In contrast to the operation of the market force, the nature of the 
community force is and was conservative and defensive, because it usually 
impugns the expanding and break-through effect of the market force. Its 
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conservative character might be due to the fact that this force is shaped in the 
daily life of a community through shared experience and tradition over a long 
period of time and, furthermore, because it was scattered and closed up among 
small communities - villages, churches, guilds, and so forth. As already 
mentioned, the community principle is postulated to have originated from the 
most primitive human feelings which unify people into a group or body. It is, 
however, observable even in modem society as a principle unifying and 
solidifying people into any group or organization to which they choose to 
adhere. We can see the dynamic dimension of this principle in contrast with 
the market force from the following: 
First, it is clear that the nature of this force is a 'centripetal power' in 
contrast to the 'centrifugal power' of the market force. Any society in which 
there is a need for certain feelings or values with which its members are able 
to identify, is based on this power. The concrete expression of these values is 
innumerable in each community, and it is nearly impossible to specify what 
the bounds of these values might be. 20 Second, and related to this 
centripetality, it is impossible to expect this force to be rational in the same 
sense as the market force, because there is no room for calculability based on 
individuality. In this sense, it may be characterized by its 'irrationality' from 
the view of modem science. By the word 'irrationality,' however, we mean 
only something similar to 'incalculability' in contrast with the rationality of 
the market force.21 There must be another type of rationality from the mere 
calculable one, which is not based on individuality, but on the totality or 
wholeness of the society. We can define it as 'holistic rationality.' Third, by 
the nature of centripetality, the community force is characterized to some 
extent by exclusiveness. It is natural that any community maintains its own 
culture and tradition which shows some level of exclusivity and there may be 
many variations of specific values across different communities. As a 
consequence, it is characterized by its 'particularity' in contrast to the 
universality of the market force (See Table II). 
TABLE II CONTRAST BETWEEN MARKET FORCE AND COMMUNITY FORCE 
Marketforce Community force 
Basic nature Individualization/ato Solidification 
mization 
Nature of power Centrifugal Centripetal 
Kind of rationality Calculable rationality Holistic rationality 
Scope of effectiveness Universal Particular 
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While a dynamic counterpart can be given for both the market and the 
community principles, the command principle, the last of the above 
mentioned three principles, cannot be conceptualized in the same way. This is 
because of the hierarchical nature of this principle. I believe that hierarchies 
can evolve, be maintained, transformed, or destroyed as a result of the 
confrontation or contradiction between the market and the community forces 
in society. The command principle as a concept defines only a static relation 
for the operational function,22 and cannot have its own force motivating the 
development of society. As noted, the community principle and force, which 
substantially influenced the operations of the command principle in 
proto-states, is still recognizable in the present political ( command) structure 
of Asia. In contrast to this, we find in modem capitalist society a command 
principle in operation which is rationalized by the market principle and force. 
Social history is often summarized in the way that the market force 
evolved among the primitive tribal societies in which human beings sustained 
their lives in an organic group unified by the primordial community force, and 
gradually created individuals within it. The market force steadily expanded 
and disbanded the group, while the community force resisted against it and 
reorganized itself into a larger size of society, a proto-state, by reunifying the 
dissolved communities. This type of state continued to exist for a long time in 
history with numerous variations, from small tribal or village states to feudal 
states and even to absolutist states, which appeared at the dawn of modem 
states in Europe. During this lengthy time span, the individual increasingly 
gained his or her independent autonomy. 
It should be noted, however, that the absolute autonomy of the individual 
was only recognized from the birth of the modem capitalist state in which the 
market force has been unfolded to its full extent. The market force dissolved 
the various feudal communities based on personal (status) relations and 
reshaped them into an integrated nation-state. All citizens are presumed not 
only to enter into contracts among themselves as free, independent, and 
autonomous individuals in the sphere of economic and social relations, but 
also to create their state as exemplified in the social contract theory. The 
perception of the community was diversified from various local or kinship 
communities to the national and even international level although it remains 
most effective within the confines of a nuclear family. The larger the size of a 
community, the more it will be able to obtain an individual and universal 
nature because the influence of the market force will be more effective in 
larger communities. 
The nation state became the fierce battlefield where the market force tried 
to expel the community force and to dissolve it in order to create a larger 
community beyond the state in which capitalism evolved. However, until 
recently, the market force could not succeed in this attempt because it simply 
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did not have the power to do so. On the contrary, we were subjected to a wave 
of strong state nationalism at the turn of the twentieth century as exemplified 
in the various socialist ideologies from communism to state socialism. In 
addition, we may find similar examples even in the post-war era in the idea of 
welfare states in the advanced countries as well as in the concept of 
'developmental states' in the developing countries. 
Now it seems that the market force has regenerated its power with the help 
of the information technology revolution that started in the late 1970s. This 
reinvigorated market force has developed not only in the advanced countries 
but all over the world since the 1980s. The socialist regimes in East Europe 
and in the Soviet Union collapsed totally by the early 1990s. This fact is 
nothing short of a declaration of triumph of the market force against the nation 
state based community force, because these socialist regimes represented the 
very antithesis to any liberal ideology and market principle-based institutions. 
This force has been continuously breaking through the national borders of all 
nation states and disbanding or nullifying any kind of state regulatory systems 
not only in the economic sphere but also in the political and social 
dimensions. 
We may presume that to resist the inroads of this expanding market force, 
the community force is now forced to reconstruct itself on a wider and more 
universal basis. Needless to say, this relates to the ideas of 'regionalism' or 
'global community' which are very often on the agenda at the tum from the 
twentieth to the twenty-first century. It is a difficult task, however, to define 
this 'global community' theoretically because the community principle in my 
definition is particularly effective in more particular face-to-face community 
relationships than in the universal phase of human societies.23 
HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN LAW 
The development of Southeast Asian law is understood more constructively 
when we set up three state models; that is, the proto-state, the colonial state 
and the development state24 (see Table III). 
TABLE III VARIOUS TYPES OF LAWS IN ASEAN COUNTRIES 
Philippines Indonesia Brunei Malaysia Singapore 
Primitive Indigenous Malay (Adat) Malay Malay Malay 
(Malay) (Adat) (Adat) (Adat) 
Proto-state 1 Hindu? Hindu/ Hindu/ Hindu/ Hindu/ 
Buddhism Buddhism Buddhism Buddhism 
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Proto-state 2 Islam in Islam Islam Islam Islam 
south 
Colonial Spain US Dutch UK UK UK 
State 
Imported law Spain US Dutch UK UK UK 
from; 
Develop- Republic Republic Constitu- Constitu- Republic 
mental State Presidency Presidency tional tional Presidency 




Constitution 1987 1945 1959 1963 (1958) 1963 (1965) 
(enacted in) (1984) 
Myanmar Thailand Laos Cambodia Vietnam 
Primitive Indigenous Indigenous Indigenous Indigenous Indigenous 
Proto-state 1 Hindu/ Hindu/ Hindu/ Hindu/ Chinese 
Buddhism Buddhism Buddhism Buddhism 
Proto-state 2 Buddhism Buddhism Buddhism Buddhism Chinese 
Colonial UK Non France France France 
State 
Imported law UK France, France, 
from; Germany, 
Japan Socialist Socialist Socialist 
Develop- Republic Constitu- Socialist Constitu- Socialist 




Constitution (1974) 1997 1991 1993 1992 
(enacted in) 
Proto-State Legal Systems 
In pre-historic Southeast Asia, there were scattered tribal communities based 
on local customs united in following animist religions. Gradually, these 
communities became integrated into small states through federation or 
conquest by a stronger community. At the initial stage of state building, 
Hinduism25 (and Confucianism in the area of present North Vietnam26) was 
borrowed as state ideology. Funan, for example, probably the oldest 'state' in 
Southeast Asia, emerged in the first century and had a foundation strongly 
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coloured by Hindu mythology. Various states evolved and disappeared and 
some of them grew to large empires such as Khmer and Srivijaya. 
In the due course of development by the expansion of the market force 
within the region, the new universal religions were introduced from outside to 
supply fresh ideologies for the newly expanded proto-state. Among them was 
Theravada Buddhism which was introduced into the mainland of Southeast 
Asia in the eleventh century. It not only became the state religion of the Thai 
and Burmese proto-states, but it also penetrated into the spiritual or mental 
structure of the common people within this region. In the fourteenth century 
another religion, Islam, was brought to the Southeast Asian islands. The 
conversion of families of kings to Islam resulted subsequently in the 
formation of many sultanate states. 
There were innumerable proto-states in the history of this region. It is, 
therefore, impossible to discuss their specific state or legal systems, but we 
can identify two common natures of these systems.27 The first concerns the 
nature of kingship and state structure. The kings and their families were 
connected to the god, and sometimes they claimed to be of divine descent 
themselves (Deva-Raja - Divine-Kingship in Hindu ideology).28 The state 
was constructed in a hierarchical and organic order, from a king on the top to 
slaves at the bottom, although each social group or class enjoyed wider 
autonomy within its community. 
The second characteristic relates to the state territory. There was no clear 
state border as in modern Western states, partly because of scattered 
populations at that time. In the capital or centre, autocratic kings reigned, their 
power endorsed by the direct influence of a major religion such as Hinduism, 
Buddhism, or Islam, although royal effulgence was naturally diminished and 
eventually faded away the further one moved from the centre. The territorial 
limit of the 'sovereignty' of these states was the place where it was exhausted. 
Therefore, at the centre there was a fairly sophisticated state system 
influenced by borrowings from major civilizations, based on the command 
principle, but in scattered villages, daily lives were regulated by local customs 
related closely to the community principle. This was a common feature of 
Asian proto-states. It must be emphasized, however, that indigenous elements 
based on the community principle survived strongly even at the state level, 
because statecraft and ideology for proto-state building were borrowed from 
the outside world and therefore were not really equipped to root out the 
indigenous structures.29 
Colonial State Legal Systems 
Following the advent of Islam in Southeast Asia, Western colonialism 
reached this region in the early sixteenth century. The initial ventures led by 
the Spaniards and Portuguese were motivated by Christianity (Roman 
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Catholicism) as well as by mercantilism. But these were superseded by newly 
emerging powers generated by incipient industrial capitalism such as Britain, 
Holland, and a while later France and the United States. Almost all areas of 
Asia except Thailand (Siam), China, Korea, and Japan were colonized by 
Western powers until about the middle of the twentieth century.30 As a result, 
the state systems were reshaped more or less on the Western model, although 
the autocratic nature either remained or was somewhat reconstructed, because 
of the essential nature of colonial rule which necessarily oppressed other 
nations. The laws and legal systems ineluctably assumed a more important 
part of this transformation. Western laws were imported as far as required by 
colonialism in order to rule the colonies, not only in the area of commerce and 
trade, but also in the sphere of political institutions such as judiciaries and 
central or local administrations. 
Spanish law dominated by Roman Catholicism was imposed on the 
Philippines in 1565 when Legaspi conquered the islands. In the late nine-
teenth century, French Napoleonic Civil and Commercial Codes were 
introduced into this colony following the reception of these Codes in Spain. 
More important was, however, the introduction of American law after 1898 
when sovereignty over the Philippines was transferred from Spain to the 
United States. As a result, the mixture of the two major Western legal families, 
Continental civil law and Anglo-American common law, constitutes a special 
feature of the official Philippine legal system. 
In Indonesia, the Dutch had steadily expanded their colonial rule since the 
early seventeenth century and their territorial sovereignty was confirmed by a 
treaty with Britain in 1824. From then, Dutch law, which was influenced by 
French codes, was introduced into Indonesia (the Netherlands East Indies) on 
a large scale. However, Dutch colonial legal policy in Indonesia was 
characterized by what we may call a 'dual legal policy.' Dutch based Western 
law was applied only to Western people (and to a limited extent to so-called 
'Foreign Orientals,' mainly Chinese and Arabs), but not to 'natives' who were 
governed by various indigenous adat laws. As a result of this policy, 'legal 
pluralism' has become a distinguishing feature of the present Indonesian legal 
system, in spite of various government attempts since independence to 
integrate the various systems into a Hukum Nasional (National Law) (Yusuf, 
1998). 
There were wide variations in the way common law was introduced into 
the Strait Settlements, British Malaya, and North Borneo, all of which were 
British colonies. Generally speaking, British law was introduced directly into 
the Strait Settlements, because of their position as the advanced commercial 
centre of the region. In contrast, its influence was only superficial in North 
Borneo (present-day Brunei, and Sabah and Sarawak in Malaysia) which was 
a distant outpost of British Colonialism. After three invasions by the British in 
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the late nineteenth century, the entire territory of present-day Myanmar 
(Burma) was attached to the territory of British India as provinces of this 
Empire until 1937 when it became a separate colony. For this reason, this 
country was strongly influenced by Anglo-Indian law.31 
In Indochina, France invaded the Mekong Delta ruled by the Nguyen 
Dynasty in the late nineteenth century and colonized almost all the areas of the 
Indochina Peninsula (present-day Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia) until the 
early twentieth century. While French law was introduced into the entire 
region, there were wide variations about what law was introduced into each of 
the various types of colonies and protectorates. (Hooker, 1978:154-75). 
Thailand, the only country not colonized by a Western power in Southeast 
Asia, was also forced to W esternize its state and legal systems in order to 
repeal the unequal treaties that granted 'extra-territorial jurisdiction' to 
citizens of Western countries.32 Thanks to its independence and sovereignty, 
however, Western laws were introduced into Thailand from various countries 
on a selective basis. The Royal Siam Government employed foreign legal 
consultants in the process of 'codification' from the early twentieth century. 
There were many countries whose laws were referred to and whose legal 
codes were examined as models. This is an important difference from the 
colonized states, which were forced to introduce law exclusively from their 
colonial ruling country. 
Western power reached the East Asian region comparatively late, in the 
middle of nineteenth century. After several interventions following the 
Opium War (1840-2), the coastal points of China (the Qing Empire) were 
conceded to Western Powers. Japan was an exception in Asia because it was 
able to modernize its state system on its own initiatives, although its major 
aim was to amend the unequal treaties with the Western powers. After 
searching for models in the UK and France, Japan chose Germany as its main 
model for legal development, and had codified its major laws basically 
following the German law model by the end of the nineteenth century. These 
codified laws were introduced into Korea and Taiwan, then the colonies of 
Japan. They also exerted substantial influence on the codification in the new 
China after the Revolution of 1911 and to some extent on the legal 
development in Thailand. 
As a result, Western imported laws became dominant and formed a 
substantial part of the 'state legal system' of these countries. But they were not 
able to replace indigenous laws completely. Numerous indigenous laws were 
left largely untouched in many areas of the daily lives of people such as 
family, 33 religion, and land, although many of them were degraded to 
non-state or customary law. This dual structure between imported state law 
and indigenous non-state law forms a remarkable feature, not only of Asian 
laws but also of non-Western Third World legal systems. It is also very often 
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referred to as legal pluralism. Needless to say, this dualism reflected a serious 
problem in the colonial state system characterized by dual structures at 
economic, political, and socio-cultural levels. 
Developmental State Legal Systems 
After World War II, almost all of the Asian countries became independent, 
but they faced serious political instability both in domestic and in 
international spheres. The whole region was left in a political vacuum and in 
the concomitant confusion after the surrender of the occupying Japanese 
military and subsequently because of the post-war world order which became 
known as the Cold War. But by the mid-1960s, these countries, with the 
exception of the Indochina region, were to some extent successfully 
controlling these instabilities and they had started a state building process in 
the true sense of the word. This process is nothing more or less than 
development, and this is why I call these states 'developmental states.'34 
Although this development has many aspects, one of its main concerns has 
undoubtedly been solving the problem of the dual political, economic, and 
social structure that had evolved during colonial rule. In order to achieve this 
aim, various types of development laws have emerged, which generally 
confer discretionary power on the government under the command principle. I 
will discuss the situation with regard to law and development in Southeast 
Asian developmental states in the 1970s and 1980s in greater detail in the next 
section. 
LAW AND DEVELOPMENT UNDER THE DEVELOPMENTAL STATE 
REGIME IN SOUTHEAST ASIA 
It is convenient to examine LD problems in three different dimensions of 
society; the political society (state), the economic society (economy), and the 
communal society (society), each of which is based mainly on the principles 
of 'command,' 'market,' and 'community' respectively. 
Law and Political Development 
Political development can be defined as an achievement of a democratic 
system in the government structure that necessarily reflects the relation 
between a rule and the people ruled by it, that is the command principle. A 
constitution is the most important document in the political regime of a 
nation. 35 With a few exceptions, Southeast Asian states have adopted more or 
less Western-style constitutions, which deal with two major subjects: the 
structure of government and the protection of human rights (Bill ofRights).36 
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In the structure of government, all of those countries except Brunei37 have 
opted for a 'democratically' elected government, either through a parlia-
mentary system (Singapore, Malaysia, and Thailand) or through a Presidency 
system (the Philippines and Indonesia).38 However, this does not necessarily 
mean that these countries have copied the Western model of the state. Strong 
nationalist and cultural values can be observed even in the constitutional 
systems. National religion (Buddhism in Thailand and Islam in Muslim 
majority states) and nationalist ideology (Pancasi/a in Indonesia) play an 
important role in tying a diverse population to a new nation. The kings of 
Thailand and Malaysia are not only to some extent a symbol of their nation, 
but they are also expected to act as the fathers of their nations who will take 
care of their subjects as if they were their children. 39 
The governments in operation are characterized more or less by 
authoritarianism, which was justified during the Cold War when it was 
considered necessary to oppress the political rights of the people in order to 
control communist movements and to promote the rapid development of the 
nation. The Philippines came under martial rule under President Marcos from 
1972 to 1981, and even after martial law was lifted, continued to experience 
his dictatorial rule until 1989 when it was finally ended by the Aquino 
revolution. In Thailand, there were regular cycles of military coups and 
constitutional amendments until the early 1990s. 40 Indonesia presented a 
typical model of 'developmel).tal dictatorship' under President Suharto for 
thirty years until 1998, when public pressure forced him to resign in the thick 
of an economic and political crisis. Malaysia and Singapore were categorized 
as comparatively democratic parliamentary states as far as their formal system 
was concerned, but it is well known that these elected government systems 
were maintained by similarly oppressive internal security legislation.41 The 
socialist regimes in Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, and Burma (Myanmar) were 
dictatorial in their nature. 
It should be noted that Asian authoritarianism is deeply rooted in cultural 
tradition and is characterized by 'patron and client relationships' and 
'dependency' (Pye, 1985:127-32), both of which are closely linked to our 
community principle. There is abundant evidence for this. Most remarkable in 
this context is the tendency to build family dynasties, as has been the case with 
the Marcos government in the Philippines and with the Suharto government in 
Indonesia. 
Almost all constitutions in Southeast Asian countries contain provisions 
for the protection of human rights (fundamental rights),42 but it is true that, 
because of the nature of the authoritarian governments, in practice these rights 
were not sufficiently guaranteed. However, political developments during the 
late 1980s showed that human rights became an increasingly important 
political agenda. The development of a human rights movement in the region 
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undoubtedly reflects an emerging urban middle class in the wake of a 
successful economic development. In addition, drastically changing 
international political circumstances after the collapse of the Soviet and East 
European socialist regimes contributed to an explosion of the human rights 
discourse as an expression of the universal value of humans. 
It should be noted in this context that a new concept of human rights called 
'rights to development' (Rich, 1988; Baxi, 1988) has evolved and is 
advocated in these countries. Although it is difficult to conceptualize it in 
strict legal terms, it seems to refer to a set of rights to achieve justice for 
common people in the development process, which includes the right to 
protect the environment, and to the preservation of cultural identities of 
various ethnic groups. These rights are meaningful only when they are 
constructed on the basis of a group of people; a kind of 'community' to be 
distinguished either from a 'state' or an 'individual.' Needless to say that 
society is a sphere where the 'community principle' works most effectively, 
and we can learn a lot from existing rural and ethnic communities. The 
concept of rights to development has a certain affinity to the idea of 'Asian 
values,' although the latter concept is thrown into the arena in the context of 
national culture and tradition by Asian authoritarian governments in order to 
justify their oppression of human rights.43 But, it also undeniably represents 
values of common people such as harmonious collectivism based on our 
community principle. 
In sum, during the 1980s Southeast Asian countries gradually started to 
democratize their political systems, but they maintained basically 
authoritarian systems, which were not only based on the command principle, 
but also deeply rooted in their own cultural traditions based on the community 
principle. In the early 1990s, we can witness the same development ifwe look 
at the process and result of the election in the Philippines, Thailand, and 
Indonesia. As we will discuss later, this process was suddenly accelerated by 
the Asian economic crisis that erupted in 1997. 
Law and Economic Development 
Economic development aims to achieve the material prosperity of the people. 
It has been the most important agenda for Asian developmental states and 
often justified the authoritarian nature of their political regimes during the 
1970s and 1980s. In order to achieve this objective, innumerable laws were 
drafted to promote rapid industrialization and to solve the dual economic 
structure, which was regarded as a major cause of underdevelopment. These 
legal measures are influenced by the theories and practices of 'development 
economics,' and vary in accordance to changing theoretical frameworks. It is 
virtually impossible to examine all aspects oflaw and economic development, 
but a short discussion of foreign investment laws, company laws and transfer 
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of technology regulations will give some indication of the importance of this 
area. 
Foreign investment laws are the most important instruments to motivate 
foreign capital to assist domestic economic development. Forced with the 
inadequacy of domestic capital, by the 1960s almost all ASEAN countries 
started to enact laws to promote foreign investment.44 The common feature of 
these laws was to set up regulatory boards with wide discretionary power to 
approve and regulate foreign investments and to provide for various 
incentives to raise investment in desired areas of national development. 
Foreign investment policies have varied in time and space, but a glance is 
enough to show that the emphasis has shifted from import substitute industries 
to an export oriented approach from the early 1970s onwards. 
There were no significant reforms of company laws before 1965, when 
Malaysia introduced the new Companies Act, in part because there were not 
yet many large-scale business corporations. As time passed, as a result of 
industrialization and with the help of foreign capital, the number of big 
businesses of either a domestic character (mainly Chinese-dominated) or 
operated as joint ventures with Transnational Corporations (TNCs) increased 
rapidly during the 1960s. Under the influence of economic nationalism in the 
early 1970s, some countries started revising their company laws in order to 
control such big corporations. This philosophy expressed itself in three 
elements: nationalization or 'fading out' (which means transfer of foreign 
shares to local shareholders), dispersal of shareholdings or private (family) 
companies going public, and the securing of professional management. The 
first mentioned aspect is also a subject of foreign investment laws, whereas 
the second is closely connected with capital market regulation.45 In addition, 
the equal distribution of national wealth between ethnic groups has been an 
important area of corporate policies in a multi-racial society such as Malaysia 
(Yasuda, 1991:331-49). 
Transfer of technology (ToT) was also an important measure in the 
promotion of 'industrialization.' Some ASEAN countries began introducing 
ToT regulations as a part of foreign investment regulations, influenced by the 
UN and UNCTAD discussions on TNCs, restrictive trade practices and ToT, 
which took place during the 1970s.46 
Changes were in the air and the policies behind many of the 
above-mentioned laws changed during the 1980s because of the 
transformation of the world economies. The world recession in the early 
1980s revealed critical problems of economic management of Third World 
developmental governments. The strict regulatory systems caused not only 
inefficiency through delays in policy making and implementation, but also 
induced serious problems of corruption based on nepotism, which still 
remained a strong feature of Third World societies. Foreign debt 
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accumulation loured as a crucial problem in many countries. The IMF and the 
World Bank thought it appropriate to compel these countries to take a step 
towards 'structural adjustment,' which generally means deregulation or 
liberalization of economic systems. 
Although ASEAN economies with the exception of the Philippines 
showed rather good performances during the recession in the 1980s, the 
governments implemented various policies towards deregulation and 
liberalization. Foreign investment laws were amended in order to simplify the 
regulatory process and the types of incentives.47 The ToT policies of these 
countries changed radically in nature and have emphasized the legal 
protection of intellectual property since the late 1980s. 48 Besides this, it 
should also be recalled that socio-economic legislation such as environment 
laws and consumer protection laws have been developed rapidly in the 
ASEAN region, although legislation in these areas does go back to the 1970s. 
As discussed earlier, economic activities are generally based on the market 
principle. It is, therefore, natural to think that the more development the 
countries achieve, the wider liberalization required. This means their 
economic systems will shift from state centred command systems to 
market-oriented ones. Pertinently Southeast Asian economic systems are not 
based completely on the market principle which requires economic rationality, 
but are also still substantially influenced by the community principle which 
emphasizes personal relationship. This defect became apparent in the Asian 
financial crisis as discussed in the next section. 
Law and Social Development 
Social development, from local communities to the global human community, 
aims to maximize people's moral and spiritual satisfaction through the sense 
of identity or feeling of unity within a society. Society is based on what we 
refer to as the community principle, and is distinguished clearly from the state 
(political society) which concerns our command principle, as well as from the 
economy (economic society) dominated mainly by the market principle. The 
basic unit of society is the 'family' where members enjoy maximum 
autonomy under different personal laws.49 Family law tends to be modernized 
more slowly than other branches of law, because family systems are 
profoundly intertwined with the traditional feelings of people as a group. It is 
true, however, that the modem nuclear family based on individualism, has 
also become common in urban areas and has expanded rapidly in the process 
of economic development during the 1970s and 1980s. 
Local communities are the most important areas for social development, 
where members feel happy to identify themselves with such development and 
participate in the decision-making and in the implementation of its 
management. The governmental structure of many Asian countries is still 
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centralized under the inexorable influence of developmentalism and 
authoritarianism, with the local government adequately recognized at the 
official level.so Although this is so, villages have maintained a rich tradition of 
autonomy at the informal level, a continuation from the proto-state stage. 
These communities have been playing an important role as social security 
systems in providing mutual assistance for their members. Such informal 
mutual assistance systems protect the poor from the violent upheavals 
necessarily resulting from the course of economic development. There are 
clear signs that such community systems have been expanded to urban areas 
in general, especially to the slums of metropolitan cities. During the 1970s 
and 1980s, so many migrants poured in from rural areas and having done so, 
introduced their systems in order to sustain their lives in the cities. These 
informal systems are characterized by methods of solving social problems 
through mutual or collective approaches based on the community principle. 
As far as legal systems are concerned, there have been strong indications 
of a revival of traditional informal justice systems, which endeavour to solve 
disputes through conciliation or compromise between the disputing parties. 
Any such attempts ineluctably modify the Western imported legal system 
model, which is characterized more or less as an 'adversary system.' The 
informal justice systems are more effective and efficient in the solution of 
disputes at the community level. Not only do they save the formal courts from 
becoming overburdened and very costly, but they also satisfy community 
members by allowing them participation in the settlement process and thus 
securing harmony within the community.s1 
The social systems of Southeast Asian developmental states remain 
strongly anchored to their cultural traditions based on our community 
principle, although they have been affected by both the market and the 
command principle that evolved rapidly during the process of development. 
In sum, we can observe two contrasting or even contradictory directions in 
law and development problems of Asian developmental states in the 1970s 
and 1980s. One direction, motivated by the market force, was to modernize 
and liberalize (democratize) their economic and political systems. The other 
direction was a kind of revivalism, clearly apparent in the political and social 
field, to reunite people through traditional values based on the community 
force. 
THE END OF DEVELOPMENTAL STATES OR THE BEGINNING OF POST 
DEVELOPMENTAL STATES? 
A newly emerging powerful wave of the market force, created by the 
electronics and information revolution and starting from the late 1970s, has 
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been nullifying existing state and economic systems all over the world. 
Initially, this wave made its impact on Western developed countries and 
forced them to deregulate and privatize their economic system, as in the 
United States under the presidency of Reagan and in the United Kingdom 
under the Thatcher Government in the early 1980s. during the rest of the 
1980s this new force gradually penetrated all countries of the world and 
forced them to transform not only their economies drastically but also to 
overhaul their political regimes. The fiercest impact is exemplified by the 
collapse of the socialist states of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union from 
the end of the 1980s to the early 1990s. The globalizing market force eroded 
the socialist command systems through the leaking of information in various 
sectors that had previously been strictly monopolized by these states. It was 
symbolic that the various electronic media, the main products of the 
continuing information technology revolution, disseminated the epoch 
making news of the collapse of the socialist regimes. 
The wave of globalization then swept up Asian developing countries in the 
mid- l 980s. At an initial stage, East and Southeast Asian countries adapted 
themselves successfully to this wave, and continued to achieve the highest 
economic growth in the world, while economies elsewhere were suffering 
from serious recession in their attempts to cope with globalization. During the 
1980s, all Asian, including socialist, countries substantially liberated and 
deregulated their economic systems and they took various steps to induce 
foreign investment which in tum accelerated their economic growth. China 
has been developing successfully since the early 1980s after the gradual 
liberation of its economic system under the new label of 'market socialism.' 
This may be contrasted with the drastic dissolution of the European and 
Soviet socialist systems. 
What was unforeseen was that in this process the states themselves 
gradually started to erode the controlling power of national economies. One 
typical instance is the amendment of intellectual property laws in almost all 
countries, a move which was strongly urged by government and businesses of 
the United States. It means that technology transfer policy shifted drastically 
from industrial policies in which the state had a powerful regulatory role to the 
protection of property as the core concept of the market system (Uphoff, 
1991 ). In this context, it should be noted that since the early 1990s trade 
liberalization in the Asia Pacific region has been promoted by Asia Pacific 
Economic Co-operation (APEC) and on a more global level by the 
establishment of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995. Inexorably in 
this global wave of trade liberalization, nation states would naturally lose the 
effective regulatory power over their national economies. This is the reason 
why in the Southeast Asian region during the 1990s A SEAN has strengthened 
its solidarity through implementing various measures of co-operation and 
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co-ordination among its members.52 These phenomena show that the com-
munity force, which was about to be dissolved at the national level, was now 
reconstructing itself at a wider regional level within ASEAN. 
The financial crisis suddenly exploded first in Thailand in mid-1997 and 
subsequently expanded to almost all East and Southeast Asian countries. A 
major cause of this crisis was a hasty liberalization of the financial systems of 
these countries, compelled not only by international organizations such as the 
IMF and WTO but also by governments of developed countries in general and 
of the United States in particular. There is also evidence that a regenerated 
and globalizing market force shows its supremacy over the rather outdated 
financial systems of Asian countries through its sophisticated financial 
techniques, as demonstrated by the activities of hedge funds. The IMF pointed 
out that the crisis 'was exacerbated by governance issues, notably government 
involvement in the private sector and lack of transparency in corporate and 
fiscal accounting and provision of financial and economic data .. .' 53 This 
shows that this crisis is not only to be blamed on the failure of economic 
management, but is also deeply rooted in the cultural structure of these 
countries. 
What implication does this crisis have for the future of legal systems of 
Asian countries? It is not easy to answer this question, but it is foreseeable that 
the paradigm of the developmental state will lose its effectiveness for an 
analysis of Southeast Asian legal systems. The reason is that globalization has 
been corroding the efficacy of state power in various fields as is demonstrated 
by the present crisis. Nevertheless, I will try to search for a tentative answer to 
this question. I will now briefly discuss what law reforms, divided over 
political, economic, and social fields, are required to overcome this crisis. 
The Political Field 
Although the present crisis occurred because of the financial sector and its 
disastrous shock waves mainly concerns the economic and social fields of the 
society, political systems have also been forced to change radically. The 
actual direction that this change is taking differs widely among the nations, 
but we may generally identify a greater democratization of the political 
system. In Southeast Asian countries, democratization itself proceeded 
gradually from the late 1980s and stepped up its speed in the early 1990s 
because of the effect of globalization and the rapidly expanding market force 
as seen in the Philippines, Thailand, and even in Indonesia. However, the 
accelerated liberalization of the financial system as the main cause of the 
present crisis confirms that Southeast Asian states are losing effective control 
over international financial activities. The failure of governments seriously 
discredited the political justification of authoritarian developmental state 
regimes, as the crisis expanded from the economic to the social field. 
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Although the situation of each country is different, Thailand, Indonesia, and 
Malaysia have been facing a serious political crisis in the wake of the 
economic and social effect of this financial turmoil. In Thailand, where the 
crisis began, the government was forced to accelerate the democratization of 
its polity; partly to ease the anti-government mood caused by the economic 
collapse but also because of the pressure exerted by the IMF and other 
international organizations coming to the rescue. As a result, the Constitution 
was totally amended and taken in a radically democratic direction in 
September 1997.54 The new Constitution consists of twelve Chapters and 336 
Articles and is intended to promote the democratization of the Thai political 
systems through the introduction of an elected Senate and the limitation of its 
power and through widening local autonomy. 55 It also strengthens the 
protection of human rights not only through the expansion of the catalogue of 
rights, but also by establishing a National Human Rights Commission in order 
to guarantee implementation.56 It also incorporates various measures to end a 
lengthy tradition of patronage and corrupt 'money' politics. Among these are 
the compulsory disclosure of assets of Parliamentarians and other political 
officials and the establishment of the powerful National Counter Corruption 
Commission. It is important to note that 50,000 voters have the right to 
request the Senate to remove corrupt high officials including the prime 
minister. It is too early to evaluate how this Constitution will impact on Thai 
politics, but no one can deny that it supplies a firm base for the future 
development of democracy in Thailand. 
In Indonesia, the situation is more complicated. Indonesia has been most 
seriously affected by the present financial crisis within the region, partly 
because of its authoritarian political system for more than three decades. As 
the economic crisis expanded to the social and political fields, President 
Suharto, previously dubbed 'father of development,' was forced to terminate 
his authoritarian regime in the midst of miserable political and social turmoil 
in May 1998. Vice-President Habibie succeeded him as the third president in 
Indonesian history.57 Habibie and his government have struggled to stabilize 
the Indonesian polity through gradual democratization of the political system. 
In early 1999, bills for a reform of the election system as well as for a more 
democratic reorganization of the Peoples Consultative Council and the House 
of Representative were passed and, in June 1999, a general election was held 
under the new regulations.58 It was the first democratic election in Indonesian 
history. However, because of an after effect of the long authoritarian regime, 
the future of the Indonesian polity is not looking very bright. This assumption 
is based on several reasons. First, the armed forces still have a strong 
influence on politics. Secondly, the economic crisis has led to violent ethnic 
conflicts between the majority poor pribumi and the rich Chinese minority. 
This antagonism had deepened during the developmental era of the 1980s, but 
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it had been suppressed by the authoritarian political regime.59 Thirdly and 
perhaps most seriously, partly because of the liberalization of the political 
system, Indonesia has been facing a potential dissolution of its state system. 
There have been the outbreaks of separatist movements not only in East 
Timor, but also in Aceh, Sumatra, and in many other places.60 It will be a 
difficult job to democratize and liberalize Indonesia's political system while 
at the same time trying to control these unstable tendencies in various parts of 
the country.61 
In observing these two cases of democratization of political systems in 
Thailand and Indonesia, we can come to the conclusion that the introduction 
of liberal democracy into Southeast Asia is inevitable. However, at the same 
time it will be essential to maintain or recreate a feeling of national unity 
based on the community principle, if the countries want to avoid the tragedies 
of state dissolution that have been experienced by the former Yugoslavia. 
The Economic Field 
The crisis occurred in the financial sector and, as mentioned above, its main 
cause was the weak monitoring and controlling mechanisms within both 
government and corporations. Many analysts have pointed out that the origins 
of the crisis are rooted in the Asian-style of management itself. For instance, 
Rajan and Zingales contrast the nature of Asian and Western financial 
transactions by using the tern} 'relationship v. arm's length.' According to 
them, 
relationship-based system[s] ensure a return to [the] financier by 
granting some form of power over the firm being financed. . . . the 
financier attempts to secure her return on investment by retaining some 
kind of monopoly over the firm she finances. As with every monopoly, 
this requires some barriers to entry. These barriers may be due to 
regulation or to lack of transparency- or 'opacity' of the system, which 
subsequently raises the cost of entry to potential competitors. Contrast 
this with the arm's length, Anglo-Saxon system, where the financier is 
protected by explicit contracts. In such systems, contract and asso-
ciated prices determine the transactions that are undertaken.62 
This contrast can be related to the contrast between community and market 
principles in our analysis. Having said this it is undeniable that the collectivist 
style in business management was one of the important factors of rapid 
economic development within the region (Hefner (ed.), 1998). This method 
mobilized limited resources for economic growth through organizing and 
sometimes manipulating group identity within the family, corporate sector, 
and nation, based on the community principle. It is correct that group 
solidarity or unity can operate effectively at the production stage within a 
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factory or in personal management, because the co-operation of workers is 
indispensable to the work place. But when a great deal of weight is exerted on 
this group feeling it pushes the organization in the direction of a lack of 
calculable rationality and transparency because of the rejection of 'otherness' 
or individualism. As a necessary result of this collectivist system and 
collectivist feeling, crony capitalism and nepotism cause a fatal flaw 
especially in financial management, in which transparency and accountability 
are essential. 
The main cause of the Asian financial crisis has been, therefore, that Asian 
collectivist capitalism based on harmony in family and work place was 
defeated by Western individualist capitalism which attained much more 
sophisticated financial techniques while globalizing their approaches to 
management. This means that economic law reform is indispensable in areas 
related to financial management, in both the banking and corporate sectors of 
these countries. Needless to say, financial and banking law reforms are 
essential to the reconstruction of these sectors. Almost all governments 
affected by the ongoing crisis within the region have been forced to create 
more transparent and accountable financial systems as a condition for rescue 
exacted under the severe pressure by the IMF and the World Bank.63 Under 
the influence of these institutions, the law has been amended to secure strict 
financial stability, transparent accounting systems and, more importantly, to 
induce foreign investment (World Bank, 1998b:62-70). 
In this operation, laws dealing with corporate bankruptcy and 
reconstruction have been the most urgent topic for reform, because many 
financial and corporate firms were facing insolvency, floored by the 
outstanding heavy debt burden after the bubble burst. This reform is also 
essential to enable foreign enterprises to buy these firms.64 It is intimately 
related to judicial reforms because these laws are generally operated and 
enforced by the civil courts. This is also the reason why the reform of the 
judicial system and the establishment of the rule of law has been emphasized 
so strongly.65 
Competition law and policy have also been strengthened in the process of 
recovery from the crisis. From the Anglo Saxon viewpoint mentioned above, 
a relationship-based system of 'opacity,' monopoly must be transformed to a 
more competitive market-oriented system. 66 As a result, competition laws 
were enacted in Indonesia and Thailand in early 1999. 67 In this area, 
international co-operation has been promoted, not only within the region, but 
also more widely in APEC and universally in the WTO (Lloyd, 1998: 157-77). 
The reform in the economic field, especially in the financial and corporate 
sectors will lead to the introduction of more transparency and accountability 
in order to adjust the economy to the rapidly globalizing business 
environment based on the market principle. The downside is that 
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marketization will necessarily also cause society to disorganize and to lose its 
solidarity. How to prevent this is an urgent concern, because such 
disorganization is resulting in serious poverty problems among common 
people as well as in the deterioration of the natural environment. 
The Social Field 
The result of the crisis has been disastrous to Asian countries. For instance, 
Indonesia's currency was devalued six months after the onset of the crisis to 
less than one-fifth to the US Dollar. It means that the per capita GNP of these 
countries suddenly dropped from a little more than US$ I 000 to less than 
US$200, the same level as LLDC countries. The serious economic recession 
resulting from the crisis has caused grave unemployment and poverty 
problems. 68 
This region made great strides in various fields of social development as a 
result of rapid economic development from the 1970s to the early 1990s. Life 
expectancy, infant mortality rates, and the primary/secondary education rate 
were remarkably improved and poverty was alleviated substantially during 
this period.69 After such remarkable success, the people suddenly lost their 
achievements. In 1998, the number of poor was expected to increase from 5 to 
I 0 percentage points in Indonesia, from 2 to 12 per cent in Korea, and from 3 
to 12 per cent in Thailand. 70 
The abrupt degradation of the social life of the common people has been 
more serious than expected, especially in Southeast Asian countries. 
Paradoxically the crisis produced more disastrous results precisely because 
these countries had succeeded in rapid economic development. There are 
several reasons for this. First, the traditional community-based social safety 
net systems were eroded during the period of rapid urbanization and evolution 
of middle class people as a necessary result of development. Before the 
industrialization, there were traditional systems of mutual assistance and 
co-operation at the village and family level. These were informal, but so 
resilient and autonomous within such communities that people did not need to 
rely heavily on state social security schemes. 71 These informal systems 
protected poor and vulnerable people against harsh and negative effects of 
development during the 1970s and 1980s, but they withered away when the 
people started to gain from development. The crisis attacked just at a time 
when those systems had disappeared. 
Secondly, formal or state social security systems were underdeveloped, 
even after successful economic development, because the traditional safety 
nets had been functioning so well. 72 The developmental state could con-
centrate on mobilizing resources to achieve economic growth by placing the 
social costs on those informal social institutions. It should be noted that 
income disparity widened during the process of economic growth (World 
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Bank, 1998b:77-8) while traditional safety nets were eroded and the state 
neglected the duty incumbent on it to take measures to protect the poor. The 
poor, therefore, became increasingly vulnerable as a result of development. 
They are now left without the protection of either traditional/informal safety 
nets or of modem/formal social security systems. 
Therefore, law reforms in the social field will take two directions. One 
direction is to create or strengthen official security systems such as 
unemployment insurance, medical or health care schemes, and pension funds. 
These measures can be planned and implemented at the national level. In this 
context, the state or government is expected to play an increasingly important 
role through its regulatory measures and its financial resources. This may be 
contrasted with the state being forced to retreat substantially from the 
economic sphere and to some extent from the political field. The state should 
enforce vigorous legislation for the protection of vulnerable people such as 
workers, peasants, and the urban poor. This can only be implemented by a 
state that has sufficient financial and personal capacities to set up and 
implement nation-wide social security systems. 
Another direction is either to revive traditional community systems which 
have nearly vanished or to construct new community systems based on the 
community principle. There has been a strong tendency during this period to 
favour mutual assistance and co-operation, not only within traditional villages 
but also in urban areas through the migration of rural people. This is why 
'community development' has become an important agenda in the newly 
advocated paradigm of 'alternative development' since 1980, and of 'social 
development' as asserted by International Development Organizations such 
as UNDP and World Bank in the 1990s.73 
As the crisis deepened within the region, solutions to various social 
problems became more urgent. A recent World Bank paper dealt with this 
topic, under (1) employment generation and income maintenance; (2) 
monitoring poverty impact and income distribution; (3) maintaining basic 
social services; (4) small and medium enterprise development and 
micro-finance; (5) protecting the social fabric; (6) social consequence at city 
and community level (World Bank, 1999a, 1999b). This agenda not only 
requests that international aid organizations and governments take various 
policy measures, but also that local communities and local and international 
NGOs play a progressive role in co-operation with those national and 
international official organizations. In this context, the community principle is 
expected to maintain or even expand to wider perspectives its effectiveness in 
the social field. 
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CONCLUSION 
I have proposed the concepts of three legal principles; community, market, 
and command, and two dynamic forces for development; market and 
community. These concepts have proved their effectiveness for a systematic 
understanding of the historical development of legal systems of Southeast 
Asian countries, divided into three state concepts; the proto-state, colonial 
state, and developmental state. But their usefulness is not confined to this. As 
part of the analysis of developmental states, they are competent operational 
concepts for setting up a framework of legal policies, by dividing society into 
political society (state), economic society (market), and societal society 
(community), each of which is in turn based on the command, market, or 
community principle. 
Needless to say, LDS will not be a branch of orthodox dogmatic law 
research, but rather a kind of policy study mobilizing the knowledge of 
various branches of social sciences to design more suitable legal systems and 
law for developing countries. In this context, I strongly advocate the need to 
infuse cultural aspects into LDS. The problem is that because of the universal 
nature of law influenced by modern Western legal science, legal scholars are 
accustomed to deal with hierarchical (command) and vertical (market) 
relationships, but tend to disregard the cultural elements of society which 
show affinity with our community principle. This is one of the reasons why 
the old LOS paradigm of the 1960s and 1970s lost its influence. 
Legal pluralism or comparative legal culture (Varga, 1992) has emerged 
as a post-LOS paradigm during the 1980s and 1990s, but it has not yet been 
successful in exploring any effective methodological concepts which can 
apply to both academic and practical (policy making) fields. I have presented 
the concept of community principle in order to throw light on this dark area of 
culture from the perspective of legal study. Of course this concept is still 
primitive and in need of improvement not only in specific fields but also for 
general theory. 
Finally, I would like to add a little more to make a sketch of the 
international aspects of globalization from the perspectives of the three legal 
principles and two development forces. The accelerated wave of the market 
force has been rampaging all over the world, collapsing the nearly one 
century-old socialist regimes and causing serious political, economic and 
social crises to Southeast Asian countries. As a result, developmental states 
are facing a grave crisis both from an international and from a domestic 
perspective. In the international arena, states start losing their 'sovereignty.' 
In the political dimension we witness the evolution of regionalism as typified 
by the establishment of the European Union and the assertion of international 
human rights. But beyond this, states have lost their regulatory power to the 
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IMF, World Bank, WTO, and other international institutions in various 
economic fields. In the domestic arena, the developmental state has lost its 
wide power substantially because of the ongoing democratization and 
decentralization of the political system. It shall be noted that democratization 
closely relates not only to the political movements in the narrow sense, but 
also to various social (community) reform movements initiated by domestic 
NGOs in co-operation with international counterparts. Needless to say, these 
NGOs base their ideas and values substantially on the community principle. 
In sum, the state will lose its effective power and retreat to the position of 
an arbitrator of conflicts between groups representing the market and 
community forces. The market force is represented by international 
businesses together with international economic organizations such as the 
IMF, World Bank, and WTO, which aim to produce economic surplus using 
individualist rational methods such as securing transparency and 
accountability. The serious fault of these approaches is a tendency to 
disregard the value of the community which is often characterized as being 
incompatible with the market value. In contrast, the community force is 
represented by various communities in co-operation with domestic and 
international NGOs. They strongly oppose the anarchical profit-seeking 
behaviour of international businesses, which often damages the natural 
environment and traditional human life based on holistic community values. 
Therefore, uncompromising disputes between business/economic interest 
groups based on the individualistic market principle, and social/community 
groups based on the holistic community principle in various fields of 
development policies especially with regard to environmental problems, are 
inevitable. As political systems in Southeast Asian countries are democratized, 
the state will fade out its authoritarian nature and assume increasingly the 
nature of an arbitrator whose legitimacy is secured through elections. 
NOTES 
l The Southeast Asian region (and to some extent East Asia) is part of 
Monsoon Asia, which may be defined geographically as an area 
stretching from the Indian Sub-continent through continental and island 
Southeast Asia via South or Coastal China and the Korean Peninsula to 
the Japanese islands. This region is characterized by either a tropical or a 
temperate wet zone with agriculture based on rice farming. These 
characteristics are clearly different not only from the West European 
region but also from other dry regions of Asia such as Central and West 
Asia and parts of North India and China where agriculture is based on 
grazing land, and wheat and cereal production. 
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2 Before the crisis, they were applauded by the World Bank for their 
economic success in The East Asian Miracle (World Bank, 1993). Only 
five years later, after the onset of the crisis, the World Bank denounced 
the same countries in a further publication (World Bank, 1998b). 
3 For a critical survey of the Law and Development paradigm in the United 
States see also John Henry Merryman (1977) and Elliot M. Burg (1977). 
For a further collection of important works on the topic see Anthony 
Carty (1992). 
4 David M. Trubek and Mark Galanter (1974). In my view this is the most 
important work in understanding the LOS paradigm in the 1960-70s and 
from which to learn lessons for a future reconstruction of LOS. 
5 The East Asian Miracle report of the World Bank admitted this. The 
universal applicability of this 'Asiatic development' seems limited. 
6 One of the most controversial issues concerned the question of universal 
human rights versus Asian values. There are many articles on this topic in 
journals such as Foreign Affairs. It was also a major topic of 'Law in a 
Changing World; Asian Alternatives; Proceedings of the Fourth Kobe 
Lecture' ARSP, Beiheft Nr. 72, though the focus was not specifically on 
this issue. See also Joanne R. Bauer and Daniel A. Bell (1999). 
7 See Amy L. Chua (1998). She argues for a reconstruction of LOS by 
infusing the fairly cultural concept of' ethnicity' into the dualism between 
Market and Democracy. The latter has been a classic paradigm of LOS 
since it was formulated by David M. Trubek in his article 'Toward a 
Social Theory of Law: An essay on the Study of Law and Development,' 
{Trubek, 1972). This chapter aims to achieve the same purpose from a 
different point of view. 
8 There are only three countries in East and Southeast Asia which were 
officially never colonized: China, Japan, and Thailand. These countries 
were forced to modernize their legal systems in a Western mode, however, 
to achieve amendments to unequal treaties concluded with Western 
hegemonic powers. 
9 I define state law in a wider sense here as including law authorized or 
recognized by state authorities. Islamic legislation in many countries 
stipulates procedural matters as well as substantive laws which Islamic 
courts apply. In this case, these substantive laws, if recognized by a state 
are a kind of 'state law' and they show affinity with 'official law' as 
defined by Masaji Chiba (1989:107-18). 
10 The most remarkable example is the 'Islamization' of the state systems in 
Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Malaysia. In these countries, not only are 
legislative measures such as the establishment of Islamic banks 
remarkable, but also the expansion of power and jurisdiction of Islamic 
courts noteworthy. For Malaysia, see 'In God's Name: Kelantan 
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continues push to implement Islamic law,' Far Eastern Economic Review, 
2 September 1992, p. 13. 
11 In Southeast Asia, there is yet another type of 'imported' laws, such as 
Islamic, Hindu, and traditional Chinese laws. However, these laws were 
integrated with native laws, in contrast to the imported Western laws, 
which is what brought about the present 'legal pluralism' in these 
countries. This is why M.B. Hooker (1978) divides his book into two 
parts under the headings of 'status' and 'contract.' 
12 Former French Indochina countries (Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia) 
adopted socialist legal regimes, although they have been transforming 
their systems to legal systems based on market economy principles since 
the mid-1980s. 
13 This concept has strong affinity with the 'community' as defined by 
Tonnies in his Community and Society (1957). 
14 When Van Hoecke and Warrington emphasize the rational and individual 
nature of Western legal systems, the law is understood as an independent 
and autonomous system from other social norms like morality or religion 
(Van Hoecke and Warrington, 1998). 
15 Schumpeter defines democracy as an 'institutional arrangement for 
arriving at political decision in which individuals acquire the power to 
decide by means of competitive struggle for the people's vote' in his 
Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy (1950). See Chua (1998:9 fn. 27). 
16 Initially, I used the term 'direction' in my article, 'Law and Development 
in ASEAN Countries' (1993). I changed this to 'imperative' in 'The 
Evolution of the Easy Asian Law region' (1995) and finally adopted the 
term 'command' in this paper. Needless to say, the contrast between 
market and command is very popular, not only for the comparative 
analysis of capitalist and socialist economies, but also for the LDS 
approach. See Trubek (1972:24-34); Robert B. Seidman (1978). 
17 The most effective and comprehensive theory is Karl Marx's historical 
materialism which explains the historical development of society as the 
process of the conflict between two different elements; that is, increasing 
production capacity and social relations regarding production. 
18 This idea is tentative and not yet well refined. Although it is essential to 
make it more sophisticated in the light of such grand theories of social 
development as Marx's 'historical materialism,' I believe that it is useful 
and effective as an explanation of the development of the legal system 
within the framework of this paper. 
19 Although it is necessary to study what Weber said as a whole, I think this 
continuity between market rationality and bureaucracy is one of the key 
elements of his thinking. 
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20 Theoretically, the community principle and force are not necessarily 
presupposed to have a centre. Unitary or solidarity feeling between 
members in the network without a centre is effective and sufficient. It is 
true that the centre strengthens such feelings among people, but it seems 
the centre has more affinity to the command principle defined earlier. 
21 Here, I can only pose the question of whether there might be different 
types of rationality in industrial societies, where everything is calculable 
over a relatively short time span, and non-industrial societies (e.g. purely 
agrarian societies) where the measuring time interval is much longer, 
because of the different nature of their production cycle. This idea of 
'social time' is hinted by Barbara Adam (1990:148-69). 
22 This does not mean that the command principle is not effective for an 
analysis of social relations or phenomenon, or that it is only an operational 
concept without any value. A feeling of order and obedience certainly 
must have some value. Rather, what I mean here is that it cannot be a 
dynamic concept which serves as a decisive force in the development 
process of society. 
23 I am rather sceptical about the idea of the 'Internet community' as an 
alternative to the future community. But it is undeniable that NGOs would 
be important components of such a global community, because they 
represent a countervailing power against a fierce market force pushed by 
multinational enterprises. _ 
24 In this section, I refer mainly for general history to D.G.E. Hall (1981 ); for 
legal history to M.B. Hooker (1978, 1986-7) and for legal systems to 
Poh-Ling Tan (1997). See also Nobuyuki Yasuda (1993). 
25 See G. Coedes (1968) on the introduction of Hinduism in the Southeast 
Asian region. 
26 Japan borrowed the Chinese state system and ideology when it started 
creating its own state in the seventh century, although Confucian 
influence came much later, after the fifteenth century, and this influence is 
limited. See Yasuda (1995) on the legal development in peripheral East 
Asia (Japan and Korea). 
27 Mabbet (1985:3-5) summarizes nine common natures of Asian kingship. 
28 To some extent, this concept is applicable to the Chinese idea of the 
emperor, a Chinese term which literally means the 'son of heaven.' The 
Japanese concept of the emperor shows more affinity with Southeast 
Asian thought, because the emperor was defined officially as a 'living 
god' up to the end of World War II. 
29 See Hooker (1978:17-94) and Hooker (ed.) (1986), on law texts of 
proto-states in the region, which were imported or 'borrowed' from major 
oriental legal systems. The introduction of Chinese systems into the 
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proto-states of Vietnam, Korea, and Japan can basically be explained in 
the same way. 
30 Japan colonized Korea in 1910. This was a very rare case of colonization 
of a modem Asian State by its neighbouring state. 
31 In India, British laws had been introduced substantially through 
'codification' since the late nineteenth century. The products such as 
Contract Act, Penal Code, Criminal Procedure Code, etc. were spread not 
only to Asian but also to all other British colonies. 
32 The first of these treaties was concluded in 1855 with Britain. Treaties 
with other European countries followed. Japan entered into similar 
treaties with the United States, the Netherlands, Britain, France, and 
Russia in 1858. 
33 It is notable that there is a substantial inheritance of indigenous norms in 
the codification of family law in almost all countries. In Japan as well as 
in Thailand, the indigenous family system was incorporated into the Civil 
Codes after fierce debates about whether or not to introduce modem 
Western family law. 
34 'Developmentalism' is the main cause for the authoritarian regimes of 
these nations, although there is also some close relationship with the 
cultural structure of the 'proto-states.' For a more detailed definition of 
the 'developmental state' in the context of Japan, see Chalmers Johnson 
(1982:17-19). I believe that socialist systems, especially in Asia, may be 
categorized as extreme types of developmental states, although Chalmers 
Johnson contrasts his concept with both the American market system and 
the Soviet command system. 
35 See Lawrence W. Beer (1992), on a general view of the present 
constitutional problems of each country. See also Sison (1990) with 
complete texts of the constitution of each country. See Poh-Ling Tan 
( 1997) about the contemporary legal systems of some East Asian 
countries more generally. 
36 Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia adopted a socialist system after fierce 
independence and national liberation wars. 
37 The Brunei Constitution provides for a partly elected 'Legislative 
Council,' but it has not been operating since 1984 when the country 
became independent. 
38 In 1987, the Philippines returned to the American presidency model 
originally introduced in the Commonwealth Constitution of 1935, after 
previously changing its political regime from a parliamentary system in 
the 1973 Constitution (which was not operative because of martial law) to 
a Presidency Cabinet system (a Gaullist style presidency) in a 1981 
amendment under Marcos. The present Indonesian Constitution enacted 
in 1945 (and re-introduced in 1959 to replace a provisional Constitution 
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of 1950) provides that the president shall be elected by the People's 
Consultative Council (MPR) composed of elected parliament members 
and other members appointed by the president. 
39 It is interesting that the stress on these traditional values grew stronger 
during the 1980s when these countries successfully achieved economic 
development, as we can see from the emphasis on Pancasila in Indonesia 
and on Islamic values in Malaysia and from the increasing political role of 
the king in Thailand. 
40 It was only in 1995 that the Constitution was amended for the first time 
democratically and constitutionally without a military coup. In 1997 there 
was a further democratic amendment. 
41 The Internal Security Acts of Malaysia and Singapore both have the same 
colonial origin, although they were slightly differentiated after the 
separation of these two countries in 1965. 
42 The Brunei constitution is an exception. All constitutions other than that 
of Indonesia have comprehensive catalogues of human rights under the 
head of an independent chapter. By human rights I mean fundamental or 
basic rights as in a Bill of Rights, although there is a widening gap 
between these two conceptions of rights. 
43 It is well known that arguments between mainly Western advocates of the 
universal nature of human rights and their Asian counterparts propagating 
Asian values were a critical agenda during the International Human 
Rights Conferences in Bangkok and Vienna in 1993. See Daniel A. Bell, 
'The East Asian Challenge to Human Rights: Reflection on an East West 
Dialogue,' Human Rights Quarterly 18 (Aug. 1996), Joseph Chan (1998), 
Yash Ghai (1994) and Onuma Yasuaki (1996). 
44 The earliest legislation is the 'Industries Promotion Act' in Thailand 
(1957), the 'Pioneer Investment Ordinance' in Malaysia (1958), the 
'Investment Promotion Act' in the Philippines (1967), and the 'Foreign 
Investment Law' in Indonesia (1967), all of which were repeatedly 
amended in part or in total. 
45 See the 'Public Companies Act' in Thailand (1979) and the 'Philippines 
Corporation Code' (1980). See also Nobuyuki Yasuda (1986) on the 
development of company laws with brief reference to securities 
regulation within the region. It should be noted that the city state of 
Singapore has kept a 'liberal approach to both domestic and foreign 
capitals, although her company law has been amended repeatedly with the 
intention to build a financial centre of the region since its enactment in 
1968.' 
46 Pedro Roff (1985). 'Rules & Regulations to implement the Intent & 
Provisions of S.5 creating the Technology Transfer Board within the 
Ministry of Industry (PD.52, 10 October 1978)' of the Philippines 
59 
NOBUYUKJ YASUDA 
provide for comprehensive guidelines on ToT by foreign investors. In 
other countries, foreign investment bodies exercise a regulatory power 
under similar guidelines. 
47 Typical examples are the 'Promotion of Investment Act' (1986) in 
Malaysia and the 'New Omnibus Investment Code' (1987) both of which 
have been substituted for former investment laws. 
48 See Elisabeth Uphoff (1991) on how the US Government influenced the 
amendment of the relevant legislation in Southeast Asian countries. 
49 Only Thailand and the Philippines have a general family law applicable to 
all citizens, although they also have special laws applicable to Muslims in 
the Southern parts of their nations. 
50 It seems that the Philippines is the only country which has a 
comprehensive 'Local Government Code' (1991) providing for all kinds 
of local governments elected by the local people. 
51 It is true, however, that there will be serious problems if these systems are 
manipulated and abused by rural bosses, as can be seen in some cases of 
the Barangai Justice System in the Philippines. 
52 ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) was established in 
1967, but it was only from the late 1980s that it started to produce 
documents such as agreements and protocols, which focused on 
economic issues. These activities have been accelerated since the early 
1990s. Member states agreed to set up the 'ASEAN Free Trade Area 
(AFTA)' by the Agreement on the Common Effective Preferential Tariff 
Scheme (CEPT) for the ASEAN Free Trade Area in 1992. For intellectual 
property laws, they agreed on a 'Framework Agreement on Intellectual 
Property Cooperation' in 1995, and at a more general level in the same 
year on a 'Framework Agreement on Enhancing Economic Cooperation.' 
It is interesting that there is a general Agreement on the Protocol on the 
ASEAN Disputes Settlement Mechanism which was concluded in 1996. 
Its aim is to establish the different mechanisms drawn from the universal 
WTO system. See Nobuyuki Yasuda (1997). On co-operation in the field 
of the intellectual property law, see Michael Blakeney, 'The Legal 
Regulation of Technology Transfer Arrangements within ASEAN,' in 
this book. 
53 http://www.imf.org/External/np/exr/facts/asia.HTM, 'The IMF's Res-
ponse to the Asian Crisis' (1999). This document also proposes six 
lessons from this crisis, (I) more effective surveillance of countries' 
economic policies and practice; (2) financial sector reform, including 
better prudential regulation and supervision; (3) ensuring that the 
integration of international financial markets is orderly and properly 
sequenced; (4) promoting regional surveillance; (5) a world wide effort to 
promote good governance and fight against corruption; and (6) more 
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effective structures for orderly debt workout, including better bankruptcy 
law. 
54 The Amendment of the Constitution started with a first meeting on 9 
January 1997 (Bangkok Post, 12 Jan. 1997), and the Constitutional 
Drafting Committee completed its first draft on 20 April 1997 (Bangkok 
Post, 20 and 22 April, 1997). This was presented to the Constitution 
Drafting Assembly (CDA) for first reading on 7 May 1997 (Bangkok Post, 
8 May 1997) and faced strong resistance from politicians and bureaucrats 
(Bangkok Post 23, 25 May, 25 June 1997). The Draft also received a 
strongly negative response from parliament (Bangkok Post, 3 Aug. 1997). 
Nevertheless, bowing to public pressure, parliament finally adopted the 
Draft with an overwhelming majority of 578 of its 651 Members. A 
Bangkok Post article of 11 October 1997 expressed the linkage between 
economic crisis and democratization. '... with the promulgation of the 
new constitution, the country will quickly be rid of this government which 
is perceived to have failed in all respects so that the process of economic 
recovery can begin in earnest.' This Constitution received the Royal 
Assent on 11 October 1997. 
55 http://www.krisdika.go.th/law/text/lawpub/el 1102540/ 
56 It should be noted that the Philippine Constitution of 1987 set up the 
Philippine Commission of Human Rights and Indonesia established such 
a commission by a Presidential Decree of 1994. 
57 See 'Indonesia's May Revolution' Far Eastern Economic Review, 28 
May 1998, pp. 12-23. 
58 Parliament passed three laws concerning political reforms 6n 28 January 
1999, Asahi Shimbun, 29 January 1999. See also 'No Fear or favor' Far 
Eastern Economic Review, 11 February 1999, pp. 22-3. 
59 See 'Indonesian Chinese, Fight or Flee,' Far East Economic Review, 30 
July 1998, pp. 12-16. These conflicts are also interwoven with religious 
antagonism between the predominantly Muslim Pribumi and the 
predominantly Christian Chinese. 
60 The Habibie government has softened its attitude on the East Timor 
problem and it has hinted at wide autonomy for this province and even the 
possibility of its independence. 'Sudden Impact,' Far Eastern Economic 
Review, 11 February 1999, pp. 18-20. 
61 President Wahid, elected by the first democratic process in the Indonesian 
political history in 1999, has shown comparatively remarkable results of 
democratization, although he is still facing too many problems to see a 
bright future oflndonesian polity (I O April 2000). 
62 Raghuram G. Rajan and Luigi Zingales (1998). They define the 
relationship by emphasizing the aspect of power relation (which relates to 
command principle), but the core of this relation seems to rest on the 
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family like community feeling among parties. See Wendy Dobson 
(1998:24-47). She identified four patterns; Japanese Keiretsu, Korean 
Chaebol, Chinese family firms, and Southeast Asian conglomerates. 
63 Only Malaysia took a different approach, when it introduced foreign 
exchange controls on 1 September 1998, South China Morning Star, 2 
September 1998. See IMF, 'The IMF' s Response to the Asian Crisis,' 17 
January 1999. (http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/asia.htm) for the 
general stance of the IMF on the Asian Crisis and its response to it. 
64 The IMF clearly mentioned that among the aims of the reform is to 
'increase(d) potential for foreign participation in domestic financial 
systems.' See IMF, op. cit. See also World Bank (1998a:105-9). Bank-
ruptcy laws were enacted or substantially amended in Korea (February 
1998), Indonesia (April 1998), and Thailand (October 1998), see Timothy 
Lane, Atish R. Ghosh, Javier Hamann, Steven Phillips, Marianne 
Schulze-Ghattas, and Tsidi Tsikata (1999:98). 
65 In Indonesia, a special court for bankruptcy was established in 1998, 
South China Morning Star, 1 September 1998. 
66 The IMF paper above under footnote 63 mentions that 'reform to promote 
governance and competition in the program countries included 
dismantling state-sponsored monopolies and cartels; privatizing state 
enterprise that had served as vehicles of 'crony capitalism'; strengthening 
competition law; improving corporate disclosure requirements ... ; and 
restructuring or dismantling corporate network ... ' Timothy Lane et al. 
(1999:112). 
67 The Business Competition Act (BE 2542) in Thailand and the Law 
Concerning Prohibition of Monopolistic Practices and Unfair Business 
Competition (Law No. 5, 1999) in Indonesia, both of which passed 
Parliament in February 1999. Malaysia drafted the Trade Practices Bill in 
1996, but the draft has not yet received consent of the cabinet. 
68 From 1996 to 1998 the unemployment rate jumped from 7.5 to 15.5 per 
cent in Indonesia, 2.0 to 9.0 per cent in Korea, 2.6 to 6.4 per cent in 
Malaysia, 8.3 to 14.0 per cent in the Philippines and 2.0 to 9.0 per cent in 
Thailand, ILO (1998a). See also 'Will Government Help?' (Cover Story) 
Far Eastern Economic Review, 8 October 1998, pp. 10-16. 
69 Throughout the whole of East Asia, life expectancy at birth increased 
from 59.6 to 68.8 years between 1970 and 1995, while the infant mortality 
rate (per 1,000 births) decreased from 76 to 34 cases during same period. 
The head-count index of poverty (percentage) decreased from 57.6 to 
21.2 during 1975 and 1990. World Bank (1998b). 
70 Lane, et al., ibid, p. 115, note 104. See also ILO (1998a) for more 
statistical data on the affected countries. 
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71 See Roger Goodman, Gordon White, and Huck-ju Kwon (1998). This 
book deals with Japan, Korea, China, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore 
and thus with countries that have come under the influence of 
Confucianism. However, we may discuss Southeast Asian countries in 
the same way, when we look at their emphasis on a 'harmonious 
community' based on collectivist wet rice farming agriculture. 
72 No East or Southeast Asian country with the exception of Korea had an 
unemployment insurance scheme, World Bank (1998b:89). Thailand 
enacted the Labor Protection Act in January 1998, but the ILO pointed out 
its inadequacy to protect labourers, ILO (1998b ). 
73 See ESCAP ( 1998) on Asian perspectives of social development. 
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CHAPTER3 
APEC, INDUSTRY POLICY, AND THE ROLE OF LAW 
BERNARD G. BISHOP 
A sea change may be underway in industry policy in many of the East Asian 
states within APEC. The old idea of industry policy where states sought to 
alter their industrial structure through the deliberate guidance and 
supervision of industry is giving way to newer ideas of maintaining 
international competitiveness through competition policy. The ability to 
implement old style industry policy was dependent upon the state's. 
bureaucratic capacity and political capacity. Bureaucratic capacity refers to 
the competence and cohesiveness of the bureaucracy. Political capacity 
refers to the extent to which the state was insulated from rent seeking 
demands yet embedded enough within society to carry society along with its 
goals. The twin forces of democratization and deregulation have resulted in 
diminished bureaucratic and political capacity to undertake the detailed 
supervision of industries required by the industry policy of the past. 
However a close examination of the details of competition policy reveals 
that its effective implementation also relies on policy makers being insulated 
from rent seeking pressures and consistency and cohesiveness within the 
bureaucracy. The difficulty for the new industry policy rests with achieving 
bureaucratic and political capacity in an environment where democratization 
and deregulation have tended to reduce the capacity of the state in policy 
implementation. This chapter suggests that adherence to a rule of law may 
provide sufficient capacity to successfully devise and implement 
competition policies. The competition principles recently adopted by APEC 
appear to rely to a considerable extent on greater adherence to the rule of 
law by politicians, bureaucrats, and business alike. There are both optimistic 
and pessimistic assessments of this occurring in the near future. It may be 
the case that the Asian crisis has provided the necessary impetus for the 
institutional change needed to bring about a greater prominence of the rule 
of law in the more developed capitalist societies in East Asia. 
The chapter commences with an explanation of old style industry policy 
and its institutional underpinnings - bureaucratic and political capacity. It 
then proceeds to show how the twin forces of democratization and 
deregulation have undermined the capacity of the state to implement old 
style industry policy. Following this is an analysis of competition policy and 
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APEC's role in seeking to establish it as the new industry policy for member 
economies. Finally, an argument is made that greater adherence to a rule of 
law will be necessary in order to restore sufficient bureaucratic and political 
capacity to make the new style industry policy workable. 
THE 'OLD' IDEA OF INDUSTRY POLICY 
In the East Asian context, the term industry policy is most often identified 
with what Johnson (1992) describes as the tired old cliche of governments 
targeting particular industries for growth or 'picking winners.' The Japanese 
government's targeting of consumer electronics industries in the late 1960s 
and early 1970s, the Korean government's targeting of heavy and chemical 
industries also during the 1970s, the Malaysian government's national car 
project in the 1980s and multimedia super-corridor in the late 1990s, and 
Indonesia's aircraft industry are all often cited examples of the practice. 
Picking winners, however, is not confined to East Asian countries. Weiss 
(1992) uses examples from the United States and Europe to highlight the 
pervasiveness of this form of government intervention. He includes the US 
space programme and high technology defence industries, the European 
airbus project, and the various attempts to develop industrial clusters and 
high technology hubs as evidence of the tendency of all governments to 
engage in targeting practices. 
This narrow view of industry policy fails to explain whether industry 
policy has been different in East Asia and if so in what ways. There is now 
considerable agreement that East Asian countries have gone much further 
than utilizing industry policy to occasionally select particular industries for 
promotion. Rather in the developmental states of Japan, Korea, and Taiwan 
governments liaised closely with business not only to determine which 
industries should be promoted and which wound down but also to plan on a 
broader level the future industrial structure of the economy. The reason was 
simple. Key policy makers in those countries were of the view that without 
change in industrial structure they may not have been able to catch up with 
the more advanced nations and would forever have been locked into 
production of agricultural products and light manufactured goods (Amsden, 
1994). The resulting failure to raise living standards would have drastically 
limited their tenuous holds on power. Accordingly, the developmental states 
clearly aimed to shift comparative advantage by deliberate intervention to 
change the industrial structure via an industry policy that entailed, in 
Johnson's words, the 'development, guidance, and supervision of industry' 
(Johnson, 1992:20). 
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Korea provides a useful example here. In the early 1960s, Korea was an 
impoverished nation recovering from the devastation of the Korean War. 
The Park Chung Hee government in conjunction with advice from 
international development agencies (Haggard, 1994:274) and in close co-
operation with business embarked upon a strategy of export promotion to 
first of all develop light manufacturing industries. The foreign exchange 
obtained was used to finance the development of heavy industries such as 
steel, chemicals, and metals with both the sources and uses of finance 
closely controlled by the state. These provided the basis for industries such 
as shipbuilding and automobiles that in tum were encouraged to become 
exporters. Once these became successful in the international market place, 
the government turned its attention to broadening high technology 
capabilities particularly among small and medium firms in an attempt to 
create an industrial structure on par with other advanced industrialized 
countries such as Japan and the USA. 
In this respect Korea, and also Taiwan, followed a similar strategy to that 
pursued earlier by Japan. The larger Southeast Asian countries of Indonesia, 
Malaysia, and Thailand have also sought to deliberately intervene to move 
their industrial base away from primary products and towards manufactures 
for export. In addition, they have intervened in the market place to develop 
heavy industries such as automobiles and petrochemicals. In Malaysia's 
case, there has been a recent move towards developing a high technology 
base. 
While there is considerable agreement that the East Asian countries have 
extensively utilized an industrial policy of this genre, there is much 
disagreement about its effectiveness (Smith, 1995). The issue is whether 
successful internationally competitive industries developed as a result of 
industry policy or in spite of it. The in-depth studies by Johnson (1982, 
1995) on Japan, Amsden (1989) on Korea, and Wade (1991) on Korea and 
Taiwan suggest that those countries had an active industry policy and further 
that it was an integral part of their success in achieving high rates of growth 
over several decades. Others attribute East Asia's economic 'miracle' to 
sound underlying macroeconomic policies and careful attention by 
governments to the underlying factors necessary for growth including the 
provision of infrastructure, education, a healthy environment for tech-
nological development, and an equitable distribution of income (World 
Bank, 1993). They favour the view that if industry policy was used it only 
succeeded if it was in conformity with what the market would have 
produced in any event (Ostry, 1994). 
To review the many arguments and counter arguments that have been 
advanced in this debate is beyond the scope of this work. The issue of most 
significance here concerns the underlying institutional factors that allowed 
70 
APEC, INDUSTRY POLICY, AND THE ROLE OF LAW 
industry policy to be practised in the manner that it was. To the extent that 
industry policy has been successful, it may well be due to particular 
institutional features of the Northeast Asian developmental states that were 
only present in part in Southeast Asia. These features warrant some 
discussion because, as will be seen, they also have considerable bearing on 
the effectiveness of the 'new' industry policy. 
To successfully devise and implement an industry policy in the East 
Asian style requires a high degree of both bureaucratic capacity and political 
capacity. During their period as developmental states, Japan, Korea, and 
Taiwan can all be argued to have possessed high levels of bureaucratic and 
political capacity. Bureaucratic capacity includes not only the competence of 
the bureaucracy in being able to plan the details of industrial development 
but also a high degree of cohesion within and between government agencies 
to implement the necessary supporting policies. Political capacity refers to 
the extent to which those who formulate and implement policies are 
insulated from internal and external social pressures yet are 'embedded' 
enough within society to ensure that those policies reflect market conditions. 
The structure and stability of the political and bureaucratic arms of the 
state are critical to bureaucratic capacity. Without a well-structured state in 
which different agencies have clearly defined responsibilities, coherent 
policies will not be able to be formulated. Without continuity in political 
leadership, it is difficult to ensure a sufficient time frame for policies to be 
implemented consistently. In terms of stability, Japan had a single political 
party in power from the 1950s until the 1990s, Taiwan's KMT has 
continuously held power since the late 1940s, and in Korea Park Chung Hee 
ruled from 1961 until 1979 and was followed by another army general, 
Chun Doo Hwan from 1980 until 1987. 
But as Johnson (1982) notes, while the politicians may have reigned, it is 
the bureaucrats who ruled in the developmental states. The bureaucracy was 
carefully structured with a lead agency in a co-ordinating role. Many 
attribute this role to MITI in Japan and the EPB in Korea. In Taiwan, while 
a lead agency did not exist to the same extent, the KMT itself played a major 
role in resolving disputes between Ministries. In all three countries, the best 
talent was recruited into the bureaucracy with this being facilitated by a pre-
existing culture of respect for the bureaucrat's role in the social order. The 
prestigious social positions that bureaucrats held also promoted loyalty 
although this was reinforced with careful screening and training to ensure 
that civil servants remained 'politically correct.' 
Political capacity also depends very much on the features of the political 
system. In Japan, Korea, and Taiwan government agencies were insulated to 
a significant extent from social pressure and rent seeking activities partly 
due to the social position that bureaucrats held but more significantly 
71 
BERNARD G. BISHOP 
because of the widespread acceptance within the bureaucracy, and society 
generally, of an ideology of developmentalism whereby personal goals and 
aspiration were subordinated to the greater welfare of society. In addition, 
Japan, Korea, and Taiwan were insulated from external economic and 
political pressures due in large part to the geopolitical circumstances at the 
time of the cold war. This allowed them considerable latitude to do as they 
pleased in internal policy matters as long as those policies reinforced their 
positions as strong and vibrant 'frontline' states (Wade, 1992). Geopolitical 
circumstances also contributed significantly to the stability of the political 
order. 
As Evans (1995) argues, insulation from societal pressures is a necessary 
but insufficient condition to bring forth sound economic policy and 
outcomes. Policy makers must also be 'embedded' within society to ensure 
that policy goals align with market capabilities. In Japan, Korea, and 
Taiwan, the bureaucracy was firmly connected to industry through both 
formal and informal mechanisms. In these three countries, key economic 
agencies had formal links with industry through industry associations 
thereby enabling them to monitor individual firms' compliance with policy 
initiatives (Weiss, 1994). All firms were required to belong to an industry 
association in order to obtain an operating licence and were subject to the 
discipline of the industry association (Singh and Weisse, 1999). The leaders 
of industry associations were often directly or indirectly appointed by the 
relevant ministry thereby guaranteeing co-operation in industry development 
plans. Formal consultations also occurred between industry and the 
bureaucracy as to future industry development such as the Japanese and 
Korean deliberation councils where key business leaders and bureaucrats 
thrashed out future plans for the development of industry and the economy 
generally (Weiss, 1994). Informal ties existed in all three countries. In Korea 
the old school tie network meant that key bureaucrats and industry leaders 
often shared an educational history. In Japan, ex-bureaucrats were often 
appointed to the boards of major corporations while in Taiwan the 
pervasiveness of the KMT ensured that key industries and key bureaucrats 
were linked together through the party. 
It is arguable that the degree of bureaucratic capacity and political 
capacity was less in Southeast Asia than in Northeast Asia. While Indonesia, 
Malaysia, and Thailand all have had industry policy devised and implemen-
ted by a core of technocrats, the bureaucracies were never as insulated as 
those in Northeast Asia (Macintyre, 1994). Patrimonial ties in Suharto's 
Indonesia, Mahathir' s Malaysia, and in the era of military government, in 
Thailand led to extensive rent seeking (Haggard, 1994). In addition the 
bureaucracies may not have been as co-ordinated as in Northeast Asia as 
Smith (1995) and Macintyre (1994) have pointed out in the case of 
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Indonesia. Further, the control of finance as an important instrument of 
industrial policy may not have been as strong and the links between industry 
associations and the bureaucracy were also less developed than in Japan, 
Korea, and Taiwan. 
A further explanation for the variance in bureaucratic and political 
capacity between Northeast and Southeast Asian countries is the degree to 
which the political leadership, the bureaucracy, and society at large were 
united by an ideology of developmentalism. In Northeast Asia the economic 
policies of authoritarian regimes were accepted by the population at large 
who were prepared for a time to defer narrow self-interest in the interests of 
national wealth (Krugman, 1994). It is arguable that in the Southeast Asian 
nations where significant ethnic and social divisions existed between the 
business class and the rest of the population, an overriding ideology of 
developmentalism was unable to be firmly implanted thus leading to a 
greater willingness of the business, bureaucratic, and political elite to engage 
in rent seeking and predatory behaviour. This may provide one explanation 
for the relatively less effective implementation of industry policy in those 
countries than in the Northeast Asian developmental states. However, as 
Booth (1999:310) notes, while there are differences between Northeast and 
Southeast Asia, the relative ability of the various states to implement growth 
related policies was much greater in these two regions than in other parts of 
the developing world. 
THE DEMISE OF THE OLD INDUSTRY POLICY 
The institutional foundations of the old industry policy have been described 
above as high levels of bureaucratic and political capacity particularly in 
Northeast Asia. However, since the mid-1980s serious cracks have begun to 
appear in these foundations. Perhaps the most significant of these is the 
weakening of the East Asian states' political capacity as a result of the 
pressures flowing from the trend towards democratization in the region since 
the mid-1980s. 
In 1986 and 1987, both Korea and Taiwan made significant moves 
towards democracy with the transition to democratically elected govern-
ments complete in the early 1990s. At this same time, the monolithic 
political power of the LDP came to an end when a coalition of opposition 
parties formed the government in Japan. In Thailand, the end of the reign of 
the army generals came in the late 1980s and, despite a brief interlude of a 
non-elected government in the early 1990s, the country has utilized the 
electoral process for political change since that time. In Indonesia, the fall of 
the Suharto regime brought about the first democratic elections in more than 
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three decades. Within the more developed group of Southeast Asian 
countries, Malaysia and perhaps Singapore remain the only ones where 
quasi-authoritarian regimes remain in power. 
The impact of democratization on the capacity to implement the broad 
ranging style of industry policy practiced in East Asia is significant. It is 
now much more necessary for political leaders and parties to take into 
account the demands of a wide range of interest groups. With differing 
demands for support from big business, small business, labour, environ-
mental, and regional groups, governments are faced with making policy 
compromises. The detailed press scrutiny that accompanies democratization 
imposes further on the state's ability to single-mindedly pursue policies that 
favour one sector of industry over another, or over other interest groups, 
without significant political consequences. With democracy also comes a 
greater awareness by the population at large of their civil rights and liberties. 
The coercive agencies of the authoritarian state and supporting propaganda 
in the form of a developmental ideology may have kept political unrest at 
bay during this phase of development but a greater awareness of the ability 
to assert rights and freedoms makes it more difficult to carry the population 
along with government policies that overtly favour capital over, for 
example, the interests of consumers. In Japan, for instance, consumers are 
becoming much less sympathetic to a system that has delivered national 
wealth but not quality of life (Ohmae, 1995). Thus, democratization reduces 
the state's insulation from interest group demands and accordingly reduces 
political capacity. 
A further key element of the state's political capacity to implement 
industry policy was the close relationship between business and government 
described earlier. While the old structures remain in place for the most part, 
there are increasing pressures on the governments of most East Asian states 
to separate the functions of the state from those of the private sector. 
Foremost among these is a general international trend towards deregulation 
led by the US government, international organizations including the World 
Trade Organisation and the IMF, as well as regional groupings such as 
APEC and NAFTA. 
The end of the cold war, together with spiralling trade deficits with many 
Northeast Asian countries, led the US to become more strident in demanding 
access to Asian markets for its goods and services. The enactment of Section 
301 of the US Trade Law was designed specifically to allow the US 
government to place countries on notice that if they did not sufficiently open 
their markets to US products they would face retaliatory actions against their 
exports. Thus Asian countries were placed in a position of reviewing their 
regulatory measures with regard to trade matters. In addition US concerns 
regarding the restrictiveness of the Japanese and Korean distribution 
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systems has resulted in those countries reviewing various regulations 
regarding access to their markets although not without some bitter inter-
national feuding as demonstrated by the US-Japan dispute over auto parts 
(Mollins, 1994). 
While the successful conclusion of the GA TT Uruguay round and its 
establishment of a more powerful World Trade Organisation has tended to 
result in a more ordered format for the resolution of bilateral disputes, it has 
also resulted in increased pressure on member states to deregulate many 
areas of their economy. The new agreement has significantly narrowed the 
ability of governments to intervene in economic activity by expanding the 
potential coverage of the WTO to such areas . as agriculture, textiles, 
services, intellectual property rights, and trade related investment measures. 
The effect of the WTO agreement is to aim to achieve an ordered reduction 
in the barriers to entry in these sectors through deregulation. This in tum 
makes it more difficult for states to maintain the instruments previously 
utilized for industry policy. In the past these included import controls in the 
form of quantitative restrictions and non-tariff barriers, controls over 
technology development, export promotion measures, and controls over 
foreign investment particularly in the services sector. These are the very 
areas where adherence to the WTO agreement will require deregulation. 
A further key instrument of industrial policy was the state's control over 
credit and the practice of directing it to sectors of the economy which were 
priorities in terms of industry policy. While moves have been underway in 
Japan, Korea, and Taiwan to deregulate the finance sector since the early 
1990s, the Asian crisis has given significant impetus to this. Many observers 
attribute the underlying causes of the Asian crisis to the lending policies of 
banks and more particularly to the practice of governments interfering with 
bank lending policies in their pursuit of industry policy and other more 
political objectives. One of the main conditions that the IMF has imposed on 
Thailand, Indonesia, and Korea is to restructure the banking sector including 
the removal of the power of politicians and bureaucrats to directly interfere 
with lending policies. Thus the Asian crisis has produced further pressure 
for deregulation not only on IMF recipient countries but also in Japan and 
Malaysia where there are also major structural problems in the finance 
sector. 
Regional organizations including APEC are adding to the deregulatory 
pressures confronting member states. Formed in 1989, APEC's major goals 
are the liberalization and facilitation of trade and investment in the region 
and economic co-operation. In particular, it has the aim of free trade and 
investment for developed countries in the region by 2010 and for developing 
countries by 2020. While APEC is often criticized for its slow progress 
towards these goals due to its consensus based decision making process, 
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there are many co-operative initiatives being implemented by the working 
groups established under the auspices of its Committee on Trade and 
Investment (APEC, 1998). The output from these groups and other advisory 
bodies including the APEC business advisory council (ABAC) and the 
Pacific Economic Cooperation Council (PECC) feeds into regular senior 
officials and ministerial meetings and the annual leaders meeting. There is 
therefore significant contact at governmental level among APEC's member 
economies to advance the goal of a liberalized trade and investment 
environment. Although there are major domestic constraints (such as 
industry policy) on the pace of liberalization and deregulation, the pressure 
for deregulation that a consensus based process imposes should not be 
underestimated. 
The combined forces of deregulation and democratization have meant 
that the state now has reduced political capacity to implement a coherent 
industry policy. This does not mean that the state will desist altogether from 
promoting various industries at various times if there is an advantage in 
doing so. However, to successfully implement an industry policy that covers 
many sectors including the politically difficult task of winding down some 
industries while promoting others may well be beyond the political capacity 
of the more democratic societies emerging in East Asia. 
The bureaucratic capacity of the state to implement a coherent industry 
policy has also declined. The developmental states of Korea and Taiwan in 
the 1960s and 1970s were economies of relatively small size and 
complexity. It was not beyond the competence of a highly trained team of 
technocrats to closely monitor changes in the international competitiveness 
of various industry subgroups and put in place policies that either promoted 
or wound down particular industries. However as the economy matured and 
became more internationalized, it became much more difficult for 
bureaucrats to monitor the business activities of individual firms that were 
increasingly locating parts of their operations in overseas countries beyond 
the reach of the bureaucratic agencies of their home states. 
Bureaucratic capacity also requires a high degree of cohesiveness within 
the bureaucratic agencies of the state. As was seen earlier this was achieved 
by key co-ordinating agencies. In Japan and Korea, these co-ordinating 
agencies have themselves been downgraded in the 1990s with Korea 
abolishing the Economic Planning Board and Japan's MITI suffering 
setbacks as some of its 'mistakes' in industry policy were more widely 
publicized (Callon, 1995). In addition the general international deregulatory 
climate has seen increasing criticism of the role of bureaucrats interfering in 
the private sector (Tanzi, 1998). For bureaucrats this leads to a tendency to 
protect one's turf thereby reducing the potential for co-operation across 
government agencies. Increasing democratization also leads to greater 
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scrutiny of bureaucratic activities leading perhaps to less enthusiasm for old 
style industry policy in the bureaucracy because of the more severe 
consequences of policy error. 
It may be argued that the bureaucracy in Southeast Asian countries has 
always been less co-ordinated than in the developmental states of East Asia 
where a long tradition of an elite bureaucracy was entrenched. Co-ordination 
may therefore have been more a matter for the political leadership rather 
than government agencies. For example, while there has been significant 
growth of an indigenous entrepreneurial class in Malaysia and Indonesia, 
both they and the traditional Chinese business class continue to look to the 
political leadership rather than the bureaucracy for industry support 
(Jesudason, 1997). In addition, the highly developed international networks 
of the overseas Chinese, the dominant business class in Southeast Asia, has 
always made co-ordination difficult in any event thereby resulting in a less 
comprehensive industry policy. Further, the Southeast Asian states as later 
developers than the states in Northeast Asia, faced a more open and more 
rapidly changing international economic environment making it more 
difficult to implement an industry policy that relied upon the protection of 
selected industries from international competition until those industries 
themselves became internationally competitive. 
While both the political capacity and the bureaucratic capacity necessary 
for devising and implementing industry policy across a broad range of 
industries has declined sharply in many of the East Asian states, this does 
not mean that the practice is likely to disappear altogether as the examples 
from the developed countries mentioned above demonstrate. Regardless of 
the economic merits of any particular case, it seems that it is just too 
tempting for governments to stay away completely from some form of 
industry promotion if there is political mileage to be gained by pump 
priming a certain industry interest group. Nonetheless, in both Northeast and 
Southeast Asia the institutional underpinnings of the old style of industry 
policy have been severely shaken. The question that naturally follows is 
what, if anything, is taking its place. 
APEC AND THE NEW INDUSTRY POLICY 
The old idea of industry policy relied upon detailed development, 
supervision, and guidance of industry in order to effect changes in the state's 
industrial structure to maintain the international competitiveness of its 
industrial base. Mody (1999) has argued that a new idea of industry policy is 
emerging that seeks to maintain competitiveness not through industry 
development and guidance but rather through ensuring that firms and the 
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industries to which they belong are exposed to healthy competition. If firms 
are constantly faced with competitive pressures from internal and external 
sources, they will be placed in the position of keeping up with the 
competition or going out of business. Thus, Mody argues, competition 
policy is rapidly gaining international acceptance as the new form of 
industry policy. 
Competition policy seeks to maintain competitiveness in a number of 
ways. The first of these is to prevent any firm abusing a position of 
dominance in an industry. Dominance can arise from the state granting 
enterprise monopoly rights through a firm gradually increasing its market 
share or through merger and acquisition. Examples of abuse of a dominant 
position include preventing new firms from entering the industry or 
eliminating existing competition through pricing or other policies. If a firm 
is able to use its dominant position in this fashion in a domestic market, then 
the overall efficiency and international competitiveness of that industry will 
decline making consumers within that market relatively worse off. 
There are difficult issues involved in determining whether a firm is 
abusing a position of dominance. Initially it is necessary to establish that a 
position of dominance exists. Different countries have different guidelines to 
resolve this (Wood, 1995). Further, abuse of dominance rather than 
dominance itself is the objective of competition policy. To seek to prevent 
firms obtaining a position of dominance at all would provide a major 
disincentive to firms to grow and hence to overall growth and 
competitiveness. In addition, a political issue arises as to whether free 
competition should be allowed in industries that are considered to be of 
strategic importance to the state. For example, many countries maintain a 
less than competitive environment in industries considered to be of national 
importance such as transport, telecommunications, energy, media, and 
agriculture. Preventing the abuse of dominance therefore involves fairly 
sophisticated analysis of industrial structure while keeping an eye on 
political priorities. The aim however is clear. It is to maximize the number 
of industries where free competition is allowed and in those industries 
prevent any firm from abusing a position of dominance. 
The second element of competition policy is to prevent firms from 
entering into restrictive agreements including agreements to fix prices, 
quantities, or market share. This also includes agreements to eliminate some 
sellers or buyers from the market and arrangements that involve a refusal to 
deal. The objective here is to prevent firms from entering into cartel type 
arrangements because they are seen as limiting competition and hence 
reducing the industry's overall international competitiveness. Again there 
are difficult issues to be resolved. For example, the protection of intellectual 
property rights is often accompanied by the right to grant exclusive licences. 
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This appears to amount to a restrictive business practice. There are therefore 
difficult choices to be made between providing continuing incentives for 
innovation and ensuring that consumers receive quality products on the one 
hand, and the availability of goods and services at the best possible prices 
for consumers, on the other. 
The third feature of competition policy is to prevent firms from engaging 
in unfair practices such as providing misleading information damaging to 
other firms or making false claims with respect to goods or services. If firms 
are able to gain unfair advantage through the dissemination of misleading 
information about competitors, this provides them with an artificial 
advantage in the market place, which in turn affects the true competitiveness 
of the industry. 
There is a growing consensus in the APEC region towards the adoption 
of competition policies in member economies. Perhaps the first tentative 
steps towards this goal were taken by the Group of Eminent persons 
appointed by member economies to advise on the future direction that 
APEC should take. The 1993 report of this group recommended that a 
necessary accompaniment to trade and investment liberalization was a 
strengthening of competition policies in the region. This view was accepted 
and in 1994, APEC's Committee on Trade and Investment was mandated to 
establish a working party on competition policy with a view to developing 
an understanding in relation to competition policies among member 
economies. The working party has held several workshops on competition 
policy and has developed a database of the competition policies and laws of 
all those member economies that have them. In 1996, in recognition of the 
fact that deregulation and competition policies were complementary policy 
measures, APEC merged the deregulation and competition working groups. 
The Asian crisis gave added impetus to the work of this committee and in 
1999, the Pacific Economic Co-operation Council used its official status in 
APEC processes to put forward a set of competition principles for the 
consideration of member economies. These principles were subsequently 
endorsed at the formal APEC meetings that took place in Auckland in 
September 1999. 
The PECC competition principles (PECC, 1999) are an important 
milestone in building understanding on competition policy in the region. 
They endorse the notion that competition policy is central in enhancing 
economic efficiency and is a necessary accompaniment to trade and 
investment liberalization. Rather than stating the details of what competition 
policy should be, the PECC competition principles set out broad underlying 
principles upon which more detailed laws regarding such matters as abuse of 
market dominance, restrictive business practices, and unfair competition can 
be based. One reason for adopting general principles rather than the 
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specifics of competition lies in the fact that different members of APEC 
have different views about what amounts to abuse of dominance or 
restrictive business practices (Rosenthal and Matsushita, 1995). For 
example, many of the bilateral disputes between Japan and the US such as 
the automotive parts dispute referred to earlier, rest upon very different 
views as to the extent to which restrictive business practices should be 
permitted in the interests of industry efficiency. 
The four core principles set out in the PECC report are comprehensive-
ness, transparency, accountability, and non-discrimination. Comprehensive-
ness refers to the need for competition policies to apply to all goods and 
services. Transparency means that the policies and laws based upon them 
should be clear in substance and consistent in the way in which they are 
implemented. In addition, those devising and implementing the laws should 
be accountable for their operation and should apply them in a non-
discriminatory manner between domestic and internationally sourced goods 
and services. 
It is immediately apparent that the principles of this new industry policy 
are diametrically opposed to those upon which the old idea of industry 
policy was based. Frequently, the old industry policy was selective rather 
than comprehensive and its operation lacked transparency for those outside 
the narrow confines of the network of business government relationship in 
any particular industry. Further, those implementing the old industry 
policies had significant discretion and frequently lacked accountability 
either to an elected government or to any form of administrative review. The 
old industry policies were often deliberately designed to be discriminatory in 
order to protect local industries from foreign competition until those 
industries could compete in the international market place. 
Somewhat curiously however, it can be argued that many of the 
institutional features necessary to implement the old industry policy are 
equally as important to implement an effective competition policy. The 
institutional underpinnings of the old industry policy were described earlier 
as bureaucratic capacity and political capacity. The extent to which these are 
present in the APEC member economies may well determine the 
effectiveness or otherwise of the new industry policy. 
High levels of both bureaucratic competence and cohesiveness are 
needed to devise and implement competition policy. The old industry policy 
required bureaucrats working with business to select sectors of industry for 
promotion or for winding down as they lost competitiveness. While this is a 
complicated task subject to many errors of judgment, so too is the task of 
determining if, for example, an industry has a particular firm or group of 
firms that hold a dominant position in the market. Even if arbitrary levels of 
market share (such as 30 per cent) are set as indicating that a firm holds a 
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dominant position, considerable skill is needed to determine the relevant 
market and what percentage any firm holds in such a market. The market 
dominance question remains a major difficulty in countries that have had 
active competition policies for many years and is exacerbated by the fact 
that firms that may be dominant may be controlled from outside of the 
territorial jurisdiction of the state. 
In addition, the old industry policy involved the development of 
industries as well as supervision and guidance. The new competition policy 
has shifted the role of the bureaucrats away from development and guidance 
and much more towards supervision. A bureaucracy trained in the old ways 
cannot be reasonably expected to change its mindset and approach 
overnight. Competition policies require bureaucrats to detect and weed out 
uncompetitive practices rather than work closely with industry to select 
areas for growth and then support industry in achieving that growth. 
Bureaucrats must therefore be more independent of their constituent 
industries than may have been the case under the old industry policy. The 
networks that have been built up over generations and the expectations that 
bureaucracy and business has of each other will make the new roles assumed 
by competition policy difficult to accept. 
Cohesiveness in the bureaucracy is also needed to implement a sound 
competition policy. As pointed out in some detail in the US submission to 
the Competition and Deregula~ion Workshop in Christchurch (APEC, 1999), 
it is necessary for significant inter-agency co-operation to occur in antitrust 
matters. In the light of this, suggestions have been made that the agency 
responsible for competition policy should assume a high status within the 
overall structure of the bureaucracy in order to ensure that the overriding 
goals of competition policy are built into all other policy initiatives (Cooke 
and Elliott, 1999). Some have suggested that the competition agency should 
also play a major role as an advocate of competition policy within the 
bureaucracy offsetting the inevitable arguments that will come from other 
parts of the bureaucracy for protection of their industry constituents 
(Hoekman and Holmes, 1999). 
While some of APEC's member economies have had a tradition of 'key' 
agencies playing leadership roles in industry policy, few have given a 
competition authority such status. In countries such as Japan and Korea 
where there have been competition authorities for several decades, those 
agencies were often overridden by the more important agencies associated 
with the old industry policy. It should theoretically be feasible for countries 
to change the role of these lead agencies from implementing the old industry 
policy to implementing a competition policy. As indicated earlier however, 
the skills and different roles required may make this quite difficult to 
achieve in practice. 
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As was the case for the old style industry policy, competition policy also 
requires a high level of political capacity in order to be effective. If those 
formulating and implementing competition policy are insufficiently 
insulated from societal groups with an interest in the outcomes of those 
policies, then it is likely that rent seeking will occur with competition policy 
being tailored to suit particular interests rather than achieving the broader 
societal goals referred to earlier. There are clearly winners and losers from 
competition policy (Jenny, 1995) and this therefore requires policy makers 
to have the ability to make choices between competing groups. For example, 
the large industrial combines in Japan and Korea are likely to oppose laws 
that attack either their market dominance or their vertical distribution 
arrangements. Likewise, business interests closely allied to the former 
Suharto regime in Indonesia are likely to lobby against attempts to break up 
the lucrative monopolies created for them by that regime. Although there is 
now significant pressure from powerful external sources including the IMF 
for Korea and Indonesia to reform past business practices this is proving 
difficult in practice in the more democratic settings that exist in these two 
countries. 
It was noted earlier that increasing democratization in East Asian 
countries has resulted in a reduction of the political capacity to implement 
difficult policies. This may have serious implications for competition policy 
unless sufficiently strong democratic institutions can be constructed to 
provide the necessary degree of insulation for policy makers. In this respect 
it has to be noted that democratic institutions took many years to develop in 
the older democracies in the region with refinements occurring on a 
continuing basis. It may be difficult for the newer democracies to change 
their institutions quickly enough to keep pace with the rapidly developing 
international policy environment in which competition policy is emerging as 
an important force in dealing with the effects of globalization. 
Bureaucratic capacity and political capacity can therefore be argued to be 
as necessary for the implementation of an effective competition policy as 
they were for the implementation of old style industry policy. However, the 
twin forces of democratization and deregulation have significantly eroded 
both of these elements of state capacity. The question is whether a degree of 
competence and cohesiveness in the bureaucracy and political insulation 
from rent seeking can be obtained in other ways. It is suggested here that an 
argument can be made that greater reliance upon a rule of law may fill this 
gap. However, a rule of law tradition is relatively new to many states in the 
APEC grouping. The following section sets out the basis for divergent views 
as to the role of law and the prospects for its enhanced role in maintaining 
the bureaucratic and political capacity necessary to implement competition 
policies as a new form of industry policy. 
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ROLE OF LAW 
The role that law plays in the relationship between citizens and the state 
differs and can be argued to depend largely on the tradition of political 
culture in the country concerned. In the APEC region two major traditions 
stand out in any analysis of the role of law in determining state-citizen 
relations. These are traditions that have been loosely derived from Chinese 
political culture and traditions derived from European and more particularly 
Anglo Saxon traditions. The Chinese tradition has historically seen law used 
as an instrument of state power. A major influence here has been Confucian 
principles whereby rulers were encouraged to lead by example rather than 
by reliance upon the law itself. Certainly law had its uses but these tended to 
be confined to prescribing standards of behaviour for different classes, 
setting out broad principles of state organization and governance and 
imposing obligations on citizens in relation to revenue and other matters 
directly relevant to the maintenance of state power. 
Citizens were therefore conditioned to see law as a tool that an all-
powerful state might use against them if they failed to follow the standards 
of behaviour appropriate to their station in life. Political culture in traditional 
China thus revolved around the power of the state. Rulers were only 
accountable to the population for the maintenance of stability in the broadest 
sense. There was no independent body to monitor the exercise of state 
power although an extra-legal and elaborate system of checking the 
behaviour of others evolved to minimize challenges to the state and ensure 
that state officials performed their duty in accordance with the standards set 
for them. Any direct challenge to officials in their exercise of state power 
was impossible, as citizens would inevitably end up worse off. In their day-
to-day business and social affairs citizens had little use for the law. Business 
relationships developed on the basis of trust rather than contract and the 
settlement of disputes was actively encouraged to occur through mediation 
presided over by those in a superior social position. 
Japanese and Korean political culture was derived from China. In the 
seventh and eighth centuries Japan adopted many of the principles of the 
Tang dynasty codes and principles of governance while the Yi dynasty in 
Korea adopted their successor, the Ming codes, in the fourteenth century. If 
anything, the Yi dynasty in Korea and the Tokugawa shogunate in Japan, 
allowed far less freedom to the citizenry and had their own elaborate 
systems in place to preserve state power. The five hundred years of the Yi 
dynasty and the two hundred and sixty years of Tokugawa rule in Japan 
entrenched an authoritarian political culture that has been difficult to change 
even with the advent of more democratic institutions in the past fifty years 
in Japan and even more recently in Korea. 
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During the time of the Qing, Tokugawa, and Yi dynasties in Northeast Asia, 
Southeast Asian societies were being actively colonized by Europeans - the 
Dutch in Indonesia, the Spanish in the Philippines, and later the British in 
Malaysia. At the time of colonization these countries consisted of a series of 
kingdoms and among them only Thailand bore any resemblance to the all-
powerful dynasties to the North. Yet the detailed adat laws existing in 
Indonesia and Malaysia and the major legal codes in Thailand tended to 
have had the effect of preserving the power of local rulers. While the British 
in Malaysia and the Dutch in Indonesia displaced the power that these rulers 
enjoyed, they did little to change an authoritarian political culture. The 
colonizers were far from accountable to local populations and their 
administrations were as unchallengeable as those of the dynasties of 
Northeast Asia. 
The old idea of industry policy fits in neatly with the traditional role of 
law and political culture in East Asia. State direction and power was seen as 
the established order of things and it was only natural for this power to be 
extended to the regulation and ordering of economic activity in the aim of 
economic development. As tradition might have predicted, law was used as 
a back-up device. The intricate web of regulations that accompanied 
industry policy in Northeast Asia was there to force business to comply if 
persuasion failed. Bureaucrats were provided with wide discretion in the 
administration of the law (Pistor and Wellons, 1999:106). There were 
frequently layers of laws, regulations, enforcement decrees, and internal 
procedures which, while giving the bureaucracy discretion in a general 
sense, maintained some consistency. However, to those outside the 
bureaucracy, internal procedures and the interpretation of regulations 
remained a mystery thereby leading to them being characterized as lacking 
'transparency' and predictability. In addition in accordance with tradition 
there was little redress for those aggrieved by the decisions of the 
bureaucracy. 
As noted earlier, political culture in East Asia is changing rapidly 
towards increased accountability of governments, bureaucrats, and business 
to the law. Politicians are becoming more accountable through the 
development of democratic institutions such as electoral systems and 
constitutions. Bureaucrats are becoming more accountable through the 
gradual evolution of greater power to elected politicians, a system of review 
of administrative decisions by the courts (Pistor and Wellons, 1999:248-61) 
and the scrutiny of a free press. The breakdown of old patterns of business 
government relations means that business itself is being held more directly 
accountable to the law rather than to its bureaucratic masters. In addition, 
there has been a slow but steady trend towards the development of the courts 
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as independent monitors of accountability of politicians to the constitution 
and bureaucrats and business to the law. 
The new industry policy is consistent with this evolution towards a rule 
of law approach. 
The underlying values of the PECC competition principles highlight this. 
The first of these is comprehensiveness. This implies that competition policy 
should apply equally to all sectors of the economy. Equality of application is 
also a fundamental principle underlying a rule of law approach and 
democratic values. The second of the principles is transparency. This 
suggests a much larger role for clear rules and a rule of law rather than 
obscure layers of regulation designed to give the bureaucracy maximum 
power and discretion. The third of the competition principles is 
accountability. One of the fundamental values of a rule of law approach is 
accountability of lawmakers, bureaucrats, and business. Finally competition 
policy should also be non-discriminatory. Again this suggests that the same 
rules should apply to both domestic and international suppliers which is a 
departure from the different-rules-for-different-players approach that 
prevailed under the old industry policy. 
It can be argued that the future success of the new industry policy is 
intricately bound up with the acceptance of a rule of law approach. It was 
suggested earlier that both bureaucratic and political capacity is necessary to 
successfully implement the new style of industry policy. A rule of law 
enhances bureaucratic capacity by promoting consistency in bureaucratic 
actions. It also ensures that all parts of the bureaucracy are accountable to 
the same standards and in that respect may promote cohesiveness. However 
adherence to a rule of law may be a necessary but insufficient condition for 
the cohesive implementation of the new industry policy. As was the case for 
the old style industry policy, the structuring of the agencies of the state is 
crucial. If competition authorities have little status among the agencies of 
the state, competition policy issues may be overridden by those agencies 
whose policy measures are aimed at more short-term political gain. Political 
capacity will also be enhanced by adherence to a rule of law. If competition 
law is transparent, and politicians, bureaucrats, and business are accountable 
to the law, then a measure of protection against rent seeking and predation is 
provided. However, this requires not only acceptance of a rule of law 
approach but also an independent judiciary with the ability to monitor the 
business-bureaucracy relationship to ensure that actions taken are in 
accordance with the law (Cooke and Elliott, 1999). What then are the 
prospects in the APEC region for the evolution of the institutions, attitudes 
and political culture necessary for a rule of law? 
Carothers (1998) argues there is more to a rule of law than the enactment 
of pertinent legislation. Rather he suggests that bureaucrats must accept that 
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the law applies to their conduct and that the judiciary acts as an independent 
monitor to ensure that this is the case. Further, governments themselves 
must seek to be law abiding and that it is more through enlightened 
leadership rather than technical measures that a rule of law approach will 
become entrenched. Carothers's prognosis is pessimistic. His view is that 
the breaking down of entrenched political interests, the transformation of 
values, and the evolution of sufficiently enlightened leadership to bring 
about a change to wide acceptance of the rule oflaw will take generations. 
On the other hand, Pistor and Wellons (1999) find in their study of the 
role of law in Japan, China, Taiwan, India, Malaysia, and Korea that there 
has been a shift to what has been described here as a rule of law approach. 
In their study they examine the role of law in economic development from 
two dimensions. The first of these is to regard economic activity as either 
state based or market based. In a state-based system, the role of law will be 
to support the state's control over the economic activity of firms. In a 
market-based system law will play the major role of preserving order in the 
market place. The second dimension of the role of law concerns the legal 
process itself. They see economic law making and enforcement as either 
discretionary or rule based. In discretionary based legal systems, those 
administering the law have wide discretion and are largely immune from 
any form of judicial review. In rule-based systems, politicians, bureaucrats, 
and business are all subject to the law with an independent judiciary 
ensuring that this occurs. Pistor and Wellons conclude that there has been a 
shift in the six Asian countries from state-based to market-based law. More 
significantly they also find that in all countries studied other than Malaysia, 
there has been a trend away from a discretionary based role of law to a rule-
based role oflaw. 
Their findings can also be interpreted as evidence of a change in political 
culture away from authoritarianism and state guidance of economic activity 
towards democracies and a market led economy. Democracy implies that 
governments and bureaucrats are accountable to citizens and it follows that 
institutions will develop to enforce this. A rule of law and its associated 
values are one such institution. A market-based system also relies for its 
proper working on a rule of law. Under a state based economic system, 
bureaucrats are able to closely guide business activity to ensure that there is 
order, predictability, and certainty in the market place. However, under a 
market based system the state is precluded from playing such a close 
supervisory role. Some other mechanism must therefore be found to 
maintain order and certainty. Again a rule of law approach allows the state 
to withdraw but at the same time do so without affecting order in the 
marketplace provided that governments, bureaucrats, and business all accept 
this approach. 
86 
APEC, INDUSTRY POLICY, ANDTHEROLEOFLAW 
Both Pistor and Wellons, and Carothers agree however that the transition 
process to a rule of law is a slow one. On the issue of institutional change 
generally, Akyuz, Chang, and Wright (1998) note that changes in the role of 
institutions will occur slowly and in a piecemeal fashion. They argue that 
fundamental changes to the economic system involve not only a change in 
substantive law but changes in traditional values and modes of behaviour. 
However, what may have been overlooked is the increased rapidity with 
which social and political change now seems to be able to occur. Davis 
(1998:322) refers to Krasner's view of institutional change as 'punctuated 
equilibrium.' Krasner argues that institutions tend to remain relatively stable 
and only change radically at times of significant social disruption. It may yet 
be the case that the Asian crisis will provide the impetus that brings about a 
rule of law approach and establishes competition policy as the new industry 
policy in the APEC region. 
CONCLUSION 
The East Asian states used old style industry policy in an attempt to bring 
about changes in their industrial structure. To this end, the state played a key 
role in the development, guidance, and supervision of industry and its 
constituent firms. The degree to which industry policy succeeded may well 
have been determined by the bureaucratic and political capacity of each 
individual state. 
The decline of the institutional underpinnings of old style industry policy 
in East Asia has left the door open for competition policy to emerge as a 
new approach in the maintenance of international competitiveness. 
However, just as bureaucratic capacity and political capacity were necessary 
to implement the close supervision and guidance of industry under the old 
industry policy, they are also essential institutional foundations for the 
successful implementation of competition policy. 
This chapter has advanced an argument that bureaucratic and political 
capacity may be strengthened if a rule of law and its associated institutions 
develop in the East Asian states. However, the traditional role of law has 
been much better suited to old style industry policy being grounded in a 
political culture that entailed authoritarian regimes and state directed 
economic activity. Nothing short of a change in this political culture can 
bring about a change in the traditional role oflaw. 
While democracy and deregulation have tended to weaken bureaucratic 
and political capacity, they may also yet produce a new political culture that 
develops the institutions associated with a rule of law. It is these institutions 
that may provide the necessary bureaucratic and political capacity to 
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implement competition policy as the new industry policy in the APEC 
region. The speed at which these institutions develop, or whether they 
develop at all, may provide the most effective indicator of potential success 
in achieving the objectives of competition policy. 
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CHAPTER4 
THE RULE OF LAW, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, AND 
THE DEVELOPMENTAL STATES OF NORTHEAST ASIA 
JOHN K.M. OHNES0RGE 
Rule of Law rhetoric is all around us - in the business press, in the programs 
and publications of the World Bank, International Monetary Fund (IMF) and 
Asian Development Bank (ADB), in bilateral development assistance 
projects, and even in US-China diplomatic dialogue. Notably, however, the 
Rule of Law is not being touted in these primarily for its traditional political 
role as a protector of human rights and individual dignity. Rather, the new 
rhetoric makes the claim that the Rule of Law is a crucial element in 
economic development, not only in formerly socialist countries ('transition 
economies') (World Bank, 1996), but in developing capitalist countries as 
well. 1 
More recently, a separate torrent of Rule of Law language has been 
unleashed, this time in reaction to the Asian financial crisis. Some of this is 
serious and well intentioned, 2 while some of it has a distinctly gloating 
tone.3 It should be clear, however, that these two claims cannot both be true. 
If the claim that East and Southeast Asian societies lack the Rule of Law is 
true, this presents a serious challenge to the first claim, given that these parts 
of Asia have been the economic development success story of the twentieth 
century. A compromise position might be to posit that the Rule of Law 
becomes necessary once a certain level of economic development and 
complexity has been reached, now the case in a country like South Korea. 
This position would fit well with the idea being put forth elsewhere that an 
'Asian model' was effective for catching-up, but that the model suffers from 
inherent flaws that make it ineffective for an advanced economy. But even 
this more nuanced approach, to the extent that it admits a lack of the Rule of 
Law in, for example, Taiwan of the 1960s and 1970s, presents a clear 
challenge to claims for the necessity of the Rule of Law for economic 
development. 
This chapter will attempt to evaluate some of these economic claims for 
the Rule of Law in the context of post-World War II Northeast Asia, defined 
as Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. The focus will be on economic 
governance in these countries during the decades of high economic growth, 
the 1960s and 1970s, the era that spawned the moniker 'developmental 
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state. '4 A necessary starting point for such an exercise is a working 
understanding of the Rule of Law as a concept, found in the second part of 
the chapter. The third part moves from a discussion of the Rule of Law to an 
examination of how the concept is being used in the Rule of Law-economic 
development literature. The nature of that literature requires that this effort 
be somewhat impressionistic, but two interrelated concerns are apparent: the 
Rule of Law as the protection of private property rights, and the Rule of 
Law as a limit on government discretion. 
The fourth part of the chapter explores to what extent the Rule of Law in 
these two senses functioned in the 'developmental states' of Northeast Asia. 
The conclusion is that the Rule of Law as a system of fairly stable property 
rights and contractual relations functioned well, but that this was not 
necessarily a result of the Rule of Law in any full sense. Other functions of 
the Rule of Law, for example as a curb on government discretion in 
economic governance, were just as clearly not met, however. Out of the 
empirical investigation of the fourth part, the fifth part argues that there are 
serious problems with the present Rule of Law-economic development 
rhetoric, problems that are related to the fact that the rhetoric doesn't 
reconcile easily with the Northeast Asian experience. The chapter concludes 
with a call for further use of empirical knowledge of Northeast Asia to test 
universalist theories in the social sciences generally, not only in the 
relationship between law and economic development. 
AN INITIAL PROBLEM: WHAT IS THE RULE OF LAW? 
The first task in this exercise must be a definition of the Rule of Law. Below 
I discuss two related, but somewhat distinct, ways of thinking about the Rule 
of Law, the first more traditionally jurisprudential, the second more in the 
socio-economic tradition. 
To many jurists and philosophers of law, the term 'Rule of Law' brings 
to mind an array of particular yet related concerns about how a just legal 
system should operate. 5 These concerns with the administration of justice 
mark this approach as more procedural than substantive, and most would 
agree that these are aspirations, and that failures to meet the aspirations are 
found in all legal systems.6 In this tradition, therefore, to say that a society is 
characterized by the Rule of Law could only mean a high number of these 
goals being met a high percentage of the time, and it is rare to find jurists 
using the term as a benchmark for comparing different legal systems. 7 
An alternative way of thinking about the Rule of Law is as describing the 
condition of a society governed by a complete and functioning legal 
infrastructure, governing relations both among private actors, and between 
92 
THE RULE OF LAW, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
private actors and public authorities. The independent judge as enforcer of 
the rules and of privately bargained out contracts is important in this way of 
thinking about the Rule of Law, but the phenomenon of judging itself, and 
the challenges that the act of judging pose for the Rule of Law, is not the 
focus. It is in this sense, which could be described as heavily positivist 
formalism, 8 that the term is being used in the economic development 
literature. 9 
The relationship between these two paradigms is complex. Legal 
scholars tend to approach the Rule of Law in the first mode, testing the 
extent to which the various aspirations of the model are met by examining 
judicial decisions, often focusing on difficult cases. This approach highlights 
judicial discretion, judicial law making, and weaknesses in the system of 
rules, even if many who write in this tradition would accept that rules are 
often relatively clear, and often do shape social action in predictable, 
understandable ways. The jurisprudential approach tends not to address the 
broad issues of economic performance that are the focus of the Rule of Law-
economic development literature. 
Thinking about the Rule of Law in the second mode, as shorthand for a 
functioning legal infrastructure, requires one to proceed as if the aspirations 
of the first model were met without serious qualification in certain 'Rule of 
Law' societies. The goal is to reduce the Rule of Law to a fact about an 
economy, similar to its literacy rate, or the level of union membership in its 
workforce, thus facilitating a certain kind theorizing about the relationship 
between the system of courts and rules, and socio-economic behaviour 
(Knack and Keefer, 1995). 
In spite of obvious conflict between the two approaches, the second 
approach appears able to exist alongside, but also in isolation from, the first 
for at least two reasons. First, its practitioners tend to be economists, 
political scientists, or historians, not jurists.10 Thus they tend to lack formal 
training in law, at least not the experience of actually reading lots of cases 
deciding economic disputes in which the applicable rules, defining the rights 
of the parties, were surprisingly unclear or debatable. Not being jurists, they 
also have not had the additional education of working as a judicial clerk or 
as an attorney, situations which teach that the administration of a legal 
system is much more than the application of rules to facts, and that contracts 
are not always clear, written memorials documenting the results of market 
bargaining over property rights. Second, if those who approach the Rule of 
Law as legal infrastructure took the issues raised by the jurisprudential 
approach too seriously, it could undermine their effort to understand the 
relationship between the framework of rules and social life, just as ideas of 
bounded rationality tend to undermine simplistic rational actor models of 
politics and economics. 11 
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SUBSTANTIVE CONCERNS OF THE RULE OF LAW-ECONOMIC 
DEVELOPMENT RHETORIC12 
As an alternative to focusing on definitions, which might reflect an 
unrealistic concern with conceptual clarity, a more productive approach may 
be to identify the substantive concerns underlying the Rule of Law-
economic development literature. The rhetoric generally revolves around 
two core themes: defining and enforcing private property rights, and 
reducing bureaucratic discretion in economic governance.13 The 'property 
rights-Rule of Law' branch can be again divided into at least two separate 
strands. A more theoretical and abstract strand focuses on property rights for 
their role in the functioning of a market economy (World Bank, 1996:44-
65), while a second strand focuses on the effective enforcement of statutory 
law creating and protecting more particular economic rights, such as statutes 
on intellectual property or competition law. The second main branch of the 
Rule of Law-economic development rhetoric addresses itself to limiting 
bureaucratic discretion, to binding official action within the strictures of the 
law and the machinery of justice. In this sense it tends to overlap with 
contemporaneous discussions of transparency, anti-corruption, and 'good 
governance.' 
Private Property Rights and Economic Development 
Rule of Law rhetoric focusing on the creation and protection of property 
rights can be seen as guided by two different clusters of themes and 
concerns. The first addresses itself to property rights as the basic object of 
market activity. This literature is grounded on the truism that market 
exchange implies at least some basic right of control over the object to be 
exchanged. The literature then addresses itself to the 'security' of these 
property rights as a precursor to economic success or failure. The second 
area where Rule of Law rhetoric arises in connection with property rights 
focuses on the effective enforcement of statutory regimes creating particular 
rights, or enforcing certain market conditions. 
The Rule of Law as the Creator of Property Rights, Building Block 
of Markets 
The primary focus of this branch is on positive law enshrining private 
property rights, courts to enforce those rights according to the pre-
established law, and state organs ready to enforce the rulings of the courts.14 
Enforcement vis-a-vis other private actors, which includes both the 
enforcement of contracts and the enforcement of criminal law, 15 is seen as 
necessary for the free contractual exchange of property rights, the basic 
activity in a market economy.16 Enforcement vis-a-vis the state is seen as 
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necessary to prevent arbitrary state interference with private property .17 In 
the words of the World Bank, 'markets cannot develop very far without 
effective property rights. Those rights can only work with three 
preconditions: first, protection from theft, violence, and other predatory acts; 
second, protection from arbitrary actions, ranging from ad-hoe regulation 
and taxes to outright corruption that disrupts business activity; and third, a 
fair and predictable judicial system (World Bank, News Rel: No 
97 /1380/S).' 
Writings in this more abstract branch of the property rights-Rule of Law 
rhetoric, in their emphasis on legally created and enforced property rights as 
part of the structure of a market economy, reflect the influence of 'new 
institutionalism' in economics and political economy, and more specifically, 
the claims of Douglass North (1990:139), Mancur Olson (1993:567, 574) 
and others concerning the importance of property rights in the economic 
development of the West. 18 Although North's extremely broad definition of 
an 'institution' seems clearly drawn from Weber's sociological approach, or 
perhaps from Karl Popper (1976:103-4) (institutions include 'any form of 
constraint that human beings devise to shape human interaction,' (North, 
1990:4) including formal legal rules as well as social norms), North still sees 
the institutional structure in essentially positivist-formalist terms, 
demonstrating his affiliation with the 'legal infrastructure' approach to the 
Rule of Law. For North, institutions are 'the framework within which 
human interaction takes place. ... perfectly analogous to the rules of the 
game in a competitive team sport' (North, 1990:4). These rules determine 
the cost and incentive structures of societies, and can be more or less 
congenial toward productive behaviour.19 
Of particular interest to those with East Asian expertise is how easily 
government with any degree of autonomy from the private sphere, a 
hallmark of the 'developmental state,' becomes the villain in this story in 
terms of economic development. Government unresponsiveness to private 
interests (the 'transaction costs of the political marketplace') explains for 
North, in large part, the inability of a society to move to a more efficient 
property rights regime.20 Taking seriously the prescriptive implications of 
this view would encourage even well-intentioned international bureaucrats 
to suppress reservations about intervening in domestic political affairs, as 
inefficient property rights are now seen as the result of unjustified 
transaction costs in the local political system, ripe for progressive reform. 
The shape and content of a country's entire domestic legal regime can thus 
be reduced from sovereign political to purely technocratic economic 
matters.21 It seems clear from reading the literature that ~he speculations of 
North, Olson, and others have provided important theoretical justification 
for the drastic expansion of the IMF's involvement in domestic legal and 
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political affairs that is finally being brought to mainstream attention by the 
crisis in East Asia. 22 
The Rule of Law as Effective Enforcement of Statutory Regimes 
The second strand of the 'property rights' branch of the Rule of Law-
economic development literature attempts to connect economic development 
to the aggressive enforcement of legal regimes that protect rights and 
interests beyond those normally seen as necessary to constitute a market 
economy.23 These claims are probably most prevalent in the areas of 
intellectual property rights (IPR) and trade, but are heard often now in 
connection with competition law. 
Enforcement of a statutory regime in Rule of Law terms is enforcement 
on non-political, purely formal legal grounds, uninfluenced by substantive 
political concerns and without instrumental aims. For example, a Rule of 
Law IPR regime would mean, in these terms, not only positive law creating 
rights, but also a court system that is practically available to private litigants, 
that reaches its decisions on the basis of the law alone, uninfluenced by non-
legal objectives, and that has effective enforcement powers.24 Legal 
assistance programs thus often emphasize the training of the legal 
functionaries, the examiners, judges, and prosecutors, of developing 
countries,25 presumably in the hope that they will begin to aggressively 
enforce existing IPR regimes in a Rule of Law manner, i.e., without 
reference to extraneous substantive considerations such as whether the law 
is being invoked by a foreign entity against a domestic manufacturer trying 
to localize an expensive, or perhaps unavailable, technology. 
A good example from the area of international trade is the way in which 
the US State Department invokes the Rule of Law to suggest why joining 
the WTO will benefit China: 
To meet WTO requirements, China must make laws public, require 
judicial review of all trade actions, apply all trade laws uniformly, 
and submit to WTO dispute settlement to ensure compliance with 
WTO rules. All of these measures will enhance the rule of law and the 
application of international norms in China's trade regime, to the 
benefit of China and the United States. The rule of law in trade has 
spillover benefits to the rule of law elsewhere.26 
In the area of competition law we find a similar set of concerns: effective 
enforcement means not only an appropriate statutory framework, but also an 
enforcement authority that is adequately staffed, adequately insulated from 
political and private pressures, and that seeks to actively enforce a non-
cartelized, non-monopolized market economy (World Bank, 1996:92-3). 
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The Rule of Law as invoked here tends to mean, in historical terms, the 
active enforcement, primarily for the benefit of foreigners, of positive law 
that countries have adopted in order to comply with international norms, or 
to benefit from participation in the international economic system, but which 
has been implemented in ways which are not seen by the international 
community as appropriate. 
Limiting Discretion in Economic Governance 
The second main branch of the Rule of Law-economic development rhetoric 
focuses on using law and the courts to legalize government processes and 
strictly limit official discretion, often put in terms of increasing the 
transparency or accountability of governance.27 A good example of this 
vision of the Rule of Law can be found in the World Bank's World 
Development Report 1997: The State in a Changing World. In the Report, 
the Bank puts forth a two-prong strategy for defining the proper role of the 
state in a developing economy: i) matching the state's role to its capabilities, 
and ii) increasing state capability by reinvigorating public institutions 
(World Bank, 1997:3). Not surprisingly, however, 'reinvigorating public 
institutions' involves a heavy dose of 'new institutionalist' Rule of Law 
thinkin~ which itself draws heavily on 'public/rational choice' analyses of 
politics. 8 The report emphasizes first and foremost the need to bind state 
actors within a system of 'ert:ective rules and restraints,' before moving on 
to list other approaches to improving the performance of state institutions 
(World Bank, 1997:3, 7-11). 
Limiting official discretion is not always put forth as a goal in itself; 
rather, what is usually put forth is one of the assumed benefits of limiting 
official discretion, such as reducing opportunities for official corruption,29 or 
increasing the predictability of the regulatory environment by preventing 
arbitrary state action, thus encouraging private investment activity. In this 
way, limiting official discretion tends to become synonymous with 'good 
governance,' and it is here that the IMF in particular seems to have found 
justification for the 'mission creep' that has brought it into the Rule of Law 
business. Although there is no necessary connection between the desire to 
bring bureaucratic discretion within the Rule of Law and a deregulatory 
substantive agenda, cynicism about the ability of an activist government to 
refrain from rent-seeking seems to result in a blending of the two, so that 
subjecting government discretion to the Rule of Law is presented as 
requiring substantive deregulation.30 
Arguments for the importance of transparency in governance are most 
persuasive in discussions of foreign investment climates,31 while they appear 
less persuasive than the 'property rights-Rule of Law' rhetoric with regard 
to the purely domestic functioning of an economy. After all, what is opaque 
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to outsiders may be perfectly transparent to national economic actors, 
particularly large ones. 32 Perhaps reflecting this issue of perspective, 
transparency from the outsider's perspective is raised to an economic 
necessity by the claim that it is a key to a country's attractiveness to foreign 
investors, who, in turn, are presented as being necessary for economic 
development. 
WHAT THE NORTHEAST ASIAN 'DEVELOPMENTAL STATES' 
SUGGEST ABOUT THE RULE OF LAW AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
Following this rough outline of the major themes of the Rule of Law-
economic development literature, we now turn to an evaluation of these 
claims in light of Northeast Asia's experience in economic development 
post-1945. 
Private Property Rights and Effective Enforcement of Statutory 
Regimes 
In the third part above, the concerns addressed by the Rule of Law-
economic development literature were first divided into two branches, one 
concerned with property rights, the other concerned with limiting 
government discretion in economic governance. The property rights branch 
was then divided into two strands, one focusing on property rights as the 
basis for market behaviour, the other on the effective enforcement of 
particular statutory regimes. 
Creation and Protection of Private Property Rights 
This strand of the 'property rights-Rule of Law' rhetoric emphasizes the role 
of law in creating and protecting the private property rights owned and 
traded by private actors in the market. Independent courts are a key 
component of this vision of the Rule of Law, as protectors of the sanctity of 
contract, and as a check on arbitrary interference by the state with private 
property. 
At first glance, Northeast Asian economic development seems to support 
the connection between economic development and this 'property rights' 
version of the Rule of Law, given that Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan were 
all market economies based largely on private ownership, though with some 
important qualifications, such as state ownership of banks in both South 
Korea and Taiwan, and a very large state enterprise sector in Taiwan. The 
importance of the particular rights created by the positive law, and the 
necessity of active, independent courts for the protection and functioning of 
these rights, is less well supported, however. 
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First, at least some forms of private property were long present in Northeast 
Asian societies prior to the importation of Western law, as were 
sophisticated trading systems (Scogin, 1990:1325; Henderson, 1968:203), 
yet traditional Northeast Asian formal law did not concern itself primarily 
with the creation and enforcement of private property rights. When Western 
rights-oriented law was adopted in Northeast Asia, it accompanied other 
modern economic institutions such as modern banking and accounting 
practices, modern corporate forms, modern manufacturing technology, etc., 
which might have functioned in Northeast Asia even without the same legal 
infrastructure with which they grew up in the West. The existence of 
traditional socio-cultural norms and practices favourable to private property 
and market behaviour at least raises the possibility that the more complex 
legal relationships of a modern economy were effectively instituted and 
have functioned in Northeast Asia without being as dependent upon the 
legal system as the Rule of Law-economic development literature would 
posit as necessary, in particular, with comparatively less enforcement by the 
judicial system. While some clearly understate the role law has played in the 
economic systems of Northeast Asia,33 the experience there does at least 
suggest that the creation of clear positive law as well as highly user-friendly 
and powerful courts may not be strictly necessary in societies with an 
existing social/cultural consensus favouring private property and trade. 
Second, it is no coincidence that Northeast Asian societies have been the 
inspiration for much speculation about socio-cultural factors as supplements 
to, or functional equivalents to, judicial enforcement of contracts.34 
Although the literature on 'relational contracting,' 'social capital,' and 
Chinese business networks tends to praise the pervasiveness of these extra-
legal sources of stability in exchange relations, suggesting a gain from legal 
informality (Winn, 1994:193; Upham, 1994:233), it is interesting to 
remember here Franz Neumann's argument that the formal Rule of Law 
may have been demanded by economic actors in the 'competitive 
capitalism' of the nineteenth century West, as Weber argued, but that 
'monopoly' capitalists did not need formal legality to protect their rights in 
the market, and actually benefited from greater informality. 35 Thus, against 
all the potentially positive aspects of relational contracting and legal 
informality in Northeast Asia we should counterpoise the potentially 
negative aspects of private ordering unconstrained by law. We should also 
take this into account when trying to understand to what extent demand for 
the Rule of Law at even this basic level existed in the 'developmental 
states. ' 36 This is not simply an interesting academic question, however. As 
the international economic institutions try to compel both mass 
privatization/deregulation and the Rule of Law in countries like Russia and 
the People's Republic of China (China), we should keep in mind that the 
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first objective, especially if it takes place too quickly, may result in societies 
dominated by private economic actors not only indifferent, but hostile to, the 
Rule of Law (Liu and Link, 1998:19-23). 
Northeast Asian societies are also cited for their low rates of civil 
litigation, and even if these claims are overstated, they suggest caution in 
making strong claims for the necessity of easily accessible and effective 
judicial dispute settlement for a functioning market economy.37 Low 
litigation rates in Northeast Asia arguably have more to do with material 
disincentives such as legal fee structures and inconvenient court procedures 
and fees than with cultural aversions to judicial conflict resolution, though 
arguably these material disincentives are themselves the result of 
political/cultural factors shaping the implementation of the imported legal 
institutions. In any case, however, low levels of litigation suggest either that 
the formal legal norms are so clear and well integrated into these societies 
that they are law-governed without much resort to the courts, ironic 
considering the usual thinking that the assimilation of Western law has been 
difficult in Northeast Asia, or that the particular form of the positive law and 
the threat of court enforcement has not been of primary importance in 
market behaviour there. The relatively low incidence of civil litigation in 
Northeast Asia should at least caution against simplistic approaches to 
understanding the complex relationship between courts, rules, and market 
behaviour. 
Turning to the clarity and judicial enforcement of contracts, a theme 
often emphasized in the economic development literature that deals with the 
Rule of Law, one would expect the greatest clarity of rights in fairly simple 
transactions, where it is plausible that the language of the contract and the 
relevant law would be sufficiently clear so that a judge could simply enforce 
bargained-for rights. This, however, is precisely the level at which so much 
is made of the importance of relationships in Northeast Asia, and the 
reluctance to litigate contract disputes. As the level of complexity of 
exchange increases, a paradox arises. According to North's evolutionary 
model, which seems to be accepted by the World Bank, social norms or 
other non-legal institutions can be relied upon to enforce simple exchange 
contracts, but increasing complexity of exchange will not be possible 
without reliable, authoritative judicial enforcement.38 This certainly seems 
right, but on the other hand, as the complexity of the contract to be enforced 
increases, it seems to become increasingly difficult for a judge to perform 
his/her Rule of Law role of simply sorting out bargained-for rights based on 
the existing infrastructure of rules. 
At least according to the perceived wisdom, Northeast Asian economic 
actors have not dealt with increasing transactional complexity by attempting 
to draft contracts that cover all possible contingencies, as we tend to do in 
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the US, and which would thus assist a court in parsing out rights in a 
complex transaction. The amount of even relatively complex, long-term 
contracting done on the basis of fairly simple written contracts suggests that 
the demand for full clarity of rights, especially through judicial enforcement, 
has been lower in Northeast Asia than would seem necessary from reading 
the Rule of Law-economic development literature. 
In the context of present-day East Asia, the rhetoric of clear property 
rights is often employed with regard to the transformation of Chinese State-
owned enterprises (SOEs), and the necessity of creating stable private 
property interests in these entities so that the dysfunctional incentives of 
current managers can be replaced by the appropriate incentives of private 
shareholders (World Bank, News Rei: No 98/1425). However, this emphasis 
on the necessity of creating clear private property rights in Chinese SOEs, 
based as it seems to be on prevailing US corporate governance theory, is 
also called into question by the Northeast Asian experience in corporate 
governance. Few would argue that Japanese, South Korean, or Taiwanese 
corporate managers have been effectively disciplined by shareholders in the 
way that liberal corporate governance theory calls for. They were not 
disciplined by market forces created by widely dispersed shareholders 
buying and selling shares in highly liquid markets, nor by 'markets for 
corporate control,' nor by shareholder derivative suits, despite the existence 
of provisions for such suits in the corporate laws. 39 This has long been 
discussed in the comparative corporate governance literature, where the 
focus has been on the comparative effectiveness of Japanese corporate 
governance, particularly the keiretsu structure of stable cross-shareholding 
arrangements and 'main bank' monitoring of management. To the extent, 
therefore, that the property rights-Rule of Law rhetoric makes strong claims 
for the necessity of corporate governance arrangements based on current US 
thinking, the history of corporate governance in East Asia suggests that such 
claims are overdrawn.40 This call for caution is supported by the candid 
admission of one writer for the OECD that, 'the interrelation of corporate 
governance and corporate performance ... is a subject which is in its infancy 
and it is unquestionably premature to base policy decisions on the evidence 
which is available to date' (Mayer, OECD Working Paper: No 164). 
One also encounters property rights-Rule of Law language in discussions 
of foreign investment climates, claiming that foreign investment is 
conditional upon the Rule of Law.41 But the Northeast Asian experience 
shows that what passes for the Rule of Law in this context should be 
understood as essentially a political commitment to keep order and to not 
expropriate foreign investments, and should not be confused with a Rule of 
Law in any deeper sense.42 This simple commitment probably is necessary 
for economic development that depends to any degree on private initiative, 
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but should not be confused even with a Rule of Law limited to strict judicial 
protection of private property rights.43 In China, for example, one finds 
enormous foreign and domestic investment in the shadow of a political and 
quasi-legal commitment to protect private property in the constitution and 
various statements in specific laws and regulations, but no sense that at this 
point this commitment is met through a domestic Rule of Law in the sense 
that foreign ( or domestic) investors could count on effective judicial 
protection of their property interests. There are grave difficulties with the 
enforcement of purely domestic civil judgments against private parties in 
China, 44 to say nothing of judgments against the government. Whether or 
not China would have more foreign investment if it had a more developed 
legal system cannot be proven, but at least over the last fifteen years foreign 
investment and domestic economic activity have proceeded in the presence 
of a political commitment in favour of development and to protect foreign-
invested property, but in the absence of even a 'property rights' Rule of 
Law.45 
Portfolio investment by foreign investors is also often said to depend 
upon clear, enforceable shareholder rights, although this claim too seems 
problematic in light of the Northeast Asian experience. Foreign portfolio 
investors have invested in Northeast Asian stock markets with little interest 
in exercising their rights as shareholders, primarily to gain exposure to fast 
growing economies and to diversify their portfolios. The 'developmental 
state' model forced this approach by limiting foreign portfolio investment, 
so it is impossible to say how investors would have behaved in the absence 
of such limits. Clearly the 'developmental states' developed rapidly with 
limited foreign portfolio investment, which served political objectives of 
industrial and technological autonomy and self-sufficiency, and relative 
insulation from international market forces. 
Finally, the current financial crisis has demonstrated how willing banks 
have been to lend to private borrowers around Asia, a form of foreign 
investment, despite the absence of legal regimes requiring a great deal of 
transparency, or providing effective creditor protection in cases of 
bankruptcy.46 The Asian Development Bank would have us believe that, 
'[C]ommercial lenders ... will not come to a country unless it can offer an 
attractive ... lending climate, an important component of which is an 
effective and protective legal and regulatory framework (Asian 
Development Bank, 1997), but such a broad claim risks over-emphasizing 
legality at the expense of a realistic assessment of business interests. The 
current crisis shows that we would all have been better off had lending 
banks insisted on transparency and clearly enforceable rights in their Asian 
lending operations, but the crisis itself puts lie to the claim that lenders' own 
interests lead them to demand these elements of the Rule ofLaw.47 
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Effective Enforcement of Statutory Regimes 
Rule of Law rhetoric is also commonly invoked in connection with attempts 
to encourage developing countries to enforce certain statutory regimes more 
aggressively, particularly IPR and competition law regimes. For example, 
the US Government's trade strategy now includes a drastically increased 
emphasis on effective enforcement, and often puts this emphasis in Rule of 
Law terms. The aggressiveness of this new emphasis on enforcement in 
developing countries suggests that important actors now recognize that such 
legal regimes were systematically and intentionally 'under enforced' in 
developing Northeast Asia. For example, the agenda of the United States 
Trade Representative (USTR) in China seems to be an implicit 
acknowledgment that IPR enforcement in other Northeast Asian countries 
was intentionally weak, as well as a commitment to preventing China from 
following the same path.48 
Given this tacit acknowledgment, and the fact that the other Northeast 
Asian countries are now technologically very advanced, it seems absurd to 
argue that effective IPR protection is intrinsically necessary to economic 
development, though of course it can be made necessary by threat of 
technology boycotts, or by linking IPR protection with other trade issues. It 
is often argued that the incentive structure for local intellectual property (IP) 
creators also depends upon effective IPR enforcement, but at what point the 
benefits of protecting locally-produced IP outweigh the costs of protecting 
foreign IP obviously varies from country to country, and with technological 
change, and would seem impossible to calculate absent drastic simplifying 
assumptions. 
A relatively new agenda for international Rule of Law advocacy is in 
competition law. Here again, the notorious under-enforcement of 
competition law and monopoly regulation in Japan, South Korea, and 
Taiwan provides reason for scepticism about claims that active competition 
law enforcement is in some way necessary for economic development. Part 
of the 'developmental state' model has included the creation of business 
groups large enough to compete internationally in industries where 
economies of scale are crucial, as well as the de facto and at times de jure 
cartelization of many industries. Both of these features of the 
'developmental state' would be undermined by fully independent, 
enforcement-oriented competition law authorities, which perhaps best 
explains why competition law has played such a minor role in shaping the 
economies of Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. In the words of Japan 
scholar Christopher Heath, '[w]ithin the framework of an economic policy 
that clearly puts Japanese interests first, an independent antitrust agency that 
upholds the rule of law and thereby prohibits cartels simply does not fit in.' 
(Heath, 1997:433). 
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LIMITING GOVERNMENT DISCRETION IN ECONOMIC GOVERNANCE 
The other main branch of Rule of Law-economic development rhetoric 
speaks in terms of making the government as well as the citizen subject to 
the law, though it tends to focus on the activities of lower level state 
functionaries, rather than insisting on democratic participation in the law 
making process. This section of the chapter will examine some areas of 
bureaucratic governance integral to industrial policy in the 'developmental 
states' to see whether, or to what extent, a Rule of Law functioned.49 
Credit Allocation 
One of the central elements of the 'developmental state' model has been 
government involvement in the allocation of credit, beyond simply 
providing the framework for financial market activities. This has been 
accomplished through direct government ownership of the banks, as in 
South Korea (Jung-En, 1991) or Taiwan (Jia-Don and Yang, 1994:193), or 
through less direct means in Japan.50 Governments have sometimes 
'replaced' markets, as where all lending for a particular project or industry 
has come from the government or at government direction, and sometimes 
governments have 'guided' markets by providing some funding, and thus 
signalling that private lending to that company or industry was favoured and 
would be relatively secure. 
Although government involvement in credit allocation raises interesting 
questions for political science51 and economics,52 for purposes of an inquiry 
into the Rule of Law the important questions concern neither the existence 
nor the effectiveness of policy lending, but rather the means by which it was 
and is carried out. Once government involves itself directly in the allocation 
of credit its actions can be analysed in Rule of Law terms. Assuming that the 
government is pursuing substantive objectives in allocating credit, some way 
to decide between different applicants for credit is necessary. Inquiry into 
the Rule of Law would then centre on how allocation decisions are made, 
and how the discretion retained by the relevant government actors is 
contained and structured. Assuming that the government actors act under 
some general statutory authority, do they themselves act to cabin their 
authority by publishing binding rules or even non-binding policy statements 
governing how lending decisions will be made? Are criteria publicly 
available which, if met, would entitle an applicant to receive policy loans, in 
some sense as a matter of right? Is judicial review available to enforce 
transparency in policy loan administration or to try to ensure that decisions 
are made based on legitimate rather than on irrelevant or corrupt grounds? 
These questions are crucial to any exploration of the Rule of Law in this 
crucial facet of the 'developmental state.' Like any similar regulatory 
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program, policy lending will involve a good deal of discretion on the part of 
the implementing officials. But this discretion can be limited and shaped by 
various means to meet some of the objectives of the Rule of Law, or this 
discretion can be exercised within a 'black box,' so that only insiders can 
guess at the exact constellation of considerations, legitimate or otherwise, 
that lead to a particular decision. The freeze that South Korea's Kim Young-
sam government imposed on lending by formally private banks to the 
Hyundai Group, sadly reminiscent of the destruction of the Kukje Group by 
the Chun Doo Hwan government, suggests that at least in the South Korean 
context executive branch influence over lending policy is little constrained 
by Rule of Law considerations. 53 There was reportedly concern that current 
President Kim Dae-Jung would attempt similar reprisals against the Sam-
sung group because of personal antagonism against Chairman Lee Kun-hee 
(Lee, 1998), and while international observers generally praise the South 
Korean government's 'Big Deal' policy, under which chaebo/ are ex-
changing and merging subsidiaries in order to rationalize the Korean 
industrial structure, serious concerns are being raised as to the legality of the 
methods the government is employing to obtain chaebo/ co-operation. In 
Japan, as well, the ability of the Ministry of Finance to influence the Bank of 
Japan, which in turn was able to influence private bank lending decisions, 
has been described as a particularly lawless phenomenon (Mabuchi, 1993; 
1997). 
Screening of Foreign Investment 
The Rule of Law has traditionally been seen as an attribute of national 
governance, between a government and its citizens, or it is invoked in the 
international arena, to describe a situation where relations between states are 
governed by international law, rather than simply by force. What is not 
found in these two traditional contexts, but what seems to be implicit in the 
Rule of Law-economic development conception, is that a sort of 
administrative, or procedural, Rule of Law should govern relations between 
sovereign governments and foreign economic actors. 
But should a government be criticized for not upholding the Rule of Law 
because it retains discretion to screen foreign investment based on non-Rule 
of Law concerns, such as foreign dominance of its domestic industry, or the 
amount or appropriateness of technology being transferred by foreign 
investors? Although Northeast Asia generally escapes attacks on the 'New 
International Economic Order' (NIEO) movement of the 1970s, which 
sought to legitimate screening of foreign investment, 54 such discretion was 
rampant in the heyday of the 'developmental states,' which did not 
recognize 'rights of establishment,' 'national treatment' or MFN obligations 
with regard to foreign investment applications, and where foreign investors 
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generally went to the governments, rather than to the courts, to try to 
influence exercises of bureaucratic discretion in the foreign investment 
approval process.55 
This raises again the conflict between Rule of Law-economic 
development rhetoric, and the complex reality of foreign investment 
decisions. 56 It is often stressed that foreign investors demand certain Rule of 
Law attributes from the legal systems of the countries in which they invest, 
yet foreign investors might fare worse under a Rule of Law system that 
forced respect for lawful exercises of bureaucratic discretion, unless at the 
same time they can have the scope within which such discretion can operate 
permanently narrowed. This is in fact the tack that is being taken 
internationally, in the various initiatives to create a multilateral regime to 
discipline national foreign investment regimes57 
Tax Administration 
A third area of economic governance that raises Rule of Law concerns is tax 
administration. Given the impossibility of auditing all taxpayers, tax 
officials in perhaps any system will be left with discretion to decide which 
taxpayers will be audited, a discretion similar to prosecutorial discretion. 
Rule of Law concerns could be met by a purely random selection system, by 
a system where all taxpayers meeting certain pre-established criteria would 
be audited, or by some sort of 'probable cause' requirement to preclude 
audits based solely on criteria unrelated to the likelihood of improper 
underpayment. What the Rule of Law would seem to exclude would be a 
decision to audit based upon considerations unrelated to revenue collection, 
such as whether the taxpayer had followed 'administrative guidance' in 
some formally unrelated matter. 
Although evidence is difficult to find, it is often alleged that tax audits 
have been used as a disciplinary tool by the 'developmental state' to enforce 
administrative guidance that was unenforceable through legal means.58 This 
flies in the face of the Rule of Law, but it is not entirely clear that such 
behaviour by the government would undermine the predictability objective 
of the Rule of Law, considered necessary for economic activity. 
This raises again the issue of administrative guidance and the Rule of 
Law, and highlights the fact that the problem with administrative guidance 
from a Rule of Law perspective is not its existence, but its enforcement. If, 
as is often alleged, ministries are able to coerce compliance with admini-
strative guidance in one field by threatening retaliatory measures in other 
regulatory fields, such as taxation, policy lending, access to foreign 
exchange, or business licensing, 59 such retaliatory measures would be 
motivated by considerations unrelated to that other field, and thus arbitrary 
from a Rule of Law perspective.60 Aggressive judicial review would seem to 
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be the only way to stamp out such cross-jurisdiction, or cross-issue, enforce-
ment, even if appealing for relief through political channels is effective in 
individual cases. 
To conclude this part, it seems that from the role of courts, to the 
enforcement of statutory regimes, to government discretion in economic 
governance, the experiences of Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan in the 
'developmental state' era at least raise questions about easy connections 
between the Rule of Law and successful economic development. 
ENGAGING THE RULE OF LAW-ECONOMIC 
DEVELOPMENT RHETORIC 
If it is so difficult to reconcile the Rule of Law-economic development 
rhetoric with the actual development experience of Northeast Asia, it makes 
sense to examine the usefulness of that rhetoric with regard to today's 
developing economies. The following passages will examine first what it 
means to try to reduce the Rule of Law to a social science variable. The 
question will then be raised whether the Rule of Law-economic 
development approach is likely to help, or hinder, development of a 
normatively attractive Rule of Law in any society. 
Problems with the Rule of Law as a Social Science Variable 
Whether one takes a jurisprudential or a legal infrastructure approach to the 
Rule of Law, caution is called for when trying to reduce the concept to a 
variable for social science theorizing. Looking first at the jurisprudential 
approach, while most in the Anglo-American tradition could, if pressed, 
agree on a core set of concepts required in any definition of the Rule of Law, 
there is ample room for disagreement over the inclusion of additional 
concepts within the core, and over the interpretation and carrying out in 
practice of the principles in the core.61 Second, the specific principles that 
are included within the definition, whatever they are, are in the nature of 
goals toward which it is thought a legal system should aspire. Thus, even if 
one proceeds on the assumption that the goals are in fact desired, the utility 
of an over-arching concept such as the Rule of Law can have only relative 
significance when all the elements of the umbrella concept are in fact 
aspirations rather than concrete achievements of any existing system. A final 
problem arises once one treats the elements as aspirational, however, 
because even if one favours the Rule of Law, few who think seriously about 
the relationship between formal rules and substantive justice, however 
defined, are likely to favour complete fulfilment of all of its elements all of 
the time.62 Perhaps reflecting this seemingly perpetual problem, actual legal 
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systems since Aristotle have arguably violated a strict Rule of Law by 
allowing judges discretion to pursue substantive justice when strict rule 
application would result in injustice (Vinogradoff, 1914:208-33). 
Use of the Rule of Law in the second sense, as describing a 
comprehensive functioning infrastructure of rules, rights, and courts to 
enforce them, runs into problems of its own, however. As a factual matter, 
modern legal systems have moved from a reliance on rules to a reliance on 
more indeterminate principles and standards in many fields of law. Nearly 
sixty years ago, Roscoe Pound wrote: 
If we look only at the precept element [ of law], that element includes 
principles and conceptions and standards as well as rules, and the 
technique of developing and applying rules, principles, conceptions, 
and standards, and the received ideals in the light of which they are 
developed and applied, are as much authoritative and as much part of 
the law, using law to mean the body of authoritative grounds of and 
guides to determination, as the rules themselves.63 
Even Justice Scalia (1989), in a recent article entitled, 'The Rule of Law as a 
Law of Rules', concedes that 'legal determinations that do not reflect a 
general rule can [not] be entirely avoided. We will have totality of the 
circumstances tests and balancing modes of analysis with us forever ... All I 
urge is that those modes of analysis be avoided where possible; that the Rule 
of Law, the law of rules, be extended as far as the nature of the question 
allows (Scalia, 1989:1186-7).' Furthermore, an independent judiciary, seen 
as necessary in this approach to prevent arbitrary state interference with 
private property rights, ensures a certain level of unpredictability in judicial 
decision-making. Judges insulated from political and economic pressures are 
arguably constrained by the positive law, by their professional training and 
culture, and perhaps in other ways, but they are not automatons.64 Thus the 
idea that one could accurately model the combined economic effects of 
statutory change and a truly independent judiciary contradicts itself. Some 
Rule of Law-economic development literature seeks to minimize this 
obvious problem by suggesting that these 'independent' judges be trained to 
apply the law in a market-friendly manner, echoing a tactic employed by 
property rights advocates in the US.65 In their admission of judicial 
discretion and open call for instrumental, results-oriented judging, however, 
these calls reflect a fundamental scepticism about the Rule of Law, as well 
as a willingness to sacrifice Rule of Law ideals to substantive economic 
aims. 
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Is the Rhetoric Likely to Contribute to the Rule of Law? 
Two claims about this rhetoric that have been raised above are i) that the 
'property rights-Rule of Law' strand tends to limit itself to an economistic 
emphasis on the creation of secure private property rights which individuals 
can trade in market transactions and can be enforced in court, and ii) that the 
strand concerned with limiting government discretion tends toward an 
opposite extreme of being so vague that the Rule of Law becomes somehow 
synonymous with good governance. Both of these facts are unfortunate for 
those concerned with the Rule of Law as an end in itself. 
The vision behind the 'property rights-Rule of Law' rhetoric seems to 
see the ideal society as one governed by two forces, the market and a 
framework of legal rules and rule-like norms, that provide clear, objective 
guidance around which, or within which, private market actors can orient 
their behaviour. In this sense the rhetoric has moved beyond simplistic 
visions of a self-regulating market, but still leaves little or no room for 
legitimate judicial or bureaucratic discretion. This is unfortunate because it 
is so obviously inaccurate as a description of any advanced economy (Davis, 
1969) that it can be easily dismissed by political leaders in countries that one 
might hope would be moving toward a Rule of Law. 
Another major problem with this approach is that it does little to prevent 
authoritarian governments ruling over market economies from claiming that 
they are Rule of Law societies, when in fact these are simply societies ruled 
by leadership committed to private property for political/economic reasons, 
but with no commitment to being governed by law themselves. This tends to 
reproduce Cold War-era attempts to distinguish Left from Right dictator-
ships, since many of the latter would enforce a Rule of Law at this level. But 
what Locke wrote of law in the absolute monarchies is instructive here: 
[T]he Subjects have an Appeal to the Law, and Judges to decide any 
Controversies, and restrain any Violence that may happen betwixt the 
Subjects themselves, one amongst another. [But] 'this is no more, 
than what every Man who loves his own Power, Profit, or Greatness, 
may, and naturally must do, [to] keep those Animals from hurting or 
destroying one another who labour and drudge only for his Pleasure 
and Advantage, and so are taken care of, not out of any Love the 
Master has for them, but Love of himself, and the Profit they bring 
him. For if it be asked, what Security, what Fence is there in such a 
State, against the Violence of Oppression of this Absolute Ruler? The 
very Question can scarce be born (Locke, 1960:371). 
Seeing the Rule of Law in terms of the enforcement of particular statutory 
regimes raises additional issues, as the experience of Northeast Asia shows. 
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The region provides an important early example of globalization in areas 
like competition and intellectual property law, whereby countries were 
pressured to adopt formal law inconsistent with their strategic economic 
policies. When this occurs the Rule of Law is bound to suffer, as subversion 
of the formal law becomes a necessary, if unstated, component of 
government economic policy. That this is at least part of the story of legality 
in Northeast Asia seems clear, and suggests that the best strategy for 
fostering the Rule of Law might include a good deal of tolerance of 
divergent substantive policies among legal regimes, so that governments are 
not forced by the internal logic of their own policies to undermine 
enforcement of the formal law. 
The prevailing vagueness in the Rule of Law rhetoric presents different 
sorts of problems. Vagueness invites objections based on critiques of the 
claimed universality of 'Western' values, one of which is the Rule of Law. 
Just as has occurred in the field of human rights, if grandiose terms are not 
broken down into specific issues, the way is left open for claims that there 
are one or more equally valid 'styles' of human rights, or of the Rule of 
Law. If, however, one raises a concrete issue, such as whether people should 
be subject to arrest or other legal harassment for peacefully criticizing their 
government, then culture-based arguments tend to lose their rhetorical 
effectiveness. If people and institutions are serious about advancing 
particular elements of the Rule of Law around the world, they should 
enunciate clearly what those elements are, so that they can be evaluated 
individually on their merits. This will have the added benefit of encouraging 
consistency in the positions of those advocating the Rule of Law, so that 
they do not undercut the credibility of the entire effort by advocating 
inconsistent positions.66 
Finally, it is legitimate to question some of the more extravagant claims 
about the Rule of Law in economic development, even if one believes that 
the Rule of Law is a worthy aspiration. One could take the position that the 
more extravagant claims do no harm, and may actually do some good, so 
why bother contesting them? There are problems with this approach, 
however. China's leadership, for example, knows perfectly well the growth 
trajectories of countries like South Korea and Taiwan, which grew 
dramatically in decades when any comprehensive Rule of Law was 
lacking.67 They may well be convinced that a certain level of legalization or 
legal infrastructure is crucial for continued economic development, but as 
people raised on Marxism they are fully cognizant of arguments that such a 
legalized society, as it develops economically, will eventually evolve into a 
liberal, rights-based society. This is what the hopes for, and fears of, 
'peaceful evolution' are all about. Exaggerated claims for the economic 
necessity of the Rule of Law could thus be seized upon by Chinese 
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conservatives as evidence that international organizations such as the World 
Bank are being used as Trojan Horses by Western opponents of China's 
political system. 
If no particular form of the Rule of Law is necessary for economic 
development, some Rule of Law is certainly a necessary condition for 
representative democracy, as aspirations of the Rule of Law seek to ensure 
that the rules and policies enacted by the legislative branch are enforced as 
intended, and that the government cannot act against a citizen except 
pursuant to authority granted to it through democratic means. But the 
argument that a Rule of Law in the limited sense of a legalized system of 
property rights will evolve into liberal, representative democracy, though 
attractive, is basically speculative, and clearly open to manipulation.68 We 
certainly want to believe the State Department when it promises that 'the 
rule of law in trade has spill-over benefits elsewhere,' but we should ask 
ourselves whether we can name a nation in which a just and democratic 
Rule of Law has evolved smoothly out of a system in which the Rule of Law 
meant only that private property rights were protected by a system of courts 
and rules. South Korea and Taiwan have made great strides toward 
democracy, but it is only possible to see this as an inevitable evolution based 
on a growing middle class, etc., if one adopts an extremely wide-angle and 
deterministic view of history, one in which the contingencies and human 
agency involved in, for example, the 1987 democracy movement in Korea, 
are ignored. And it may be that in the rush to create the private interests to 
propel this evolution we will create private concentrations of wealth that 
have no interest in a general Rule of Law, but find they are better served by 
non-legalized relations with other private parties and with the State. If the 
Rule of Law is what we care about, it might be preferable to demand less in 
the way of deregulation and privatization, but to pay more attention to the 
legalization of the relationships and procedures that tie governments to 
private actors. A functioning Rule of Law requires a civil society that is 
willing to resort to legality, and is used to doing so, in its relations with the 
State. Mass privatization and deregulation may not be the best way to foster 
such a civil society, and may in fact work against it. Again Northeast Asia 
provides a valuable example: an administrative procedure law was debated 
in Japan for decades, but it was apparently not until the 1980s or 1990s that 
Japanese business interests put their political muscle behind such a basic 
element of the Rule of Law in the modern administrative state. 
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CONCLUSION 
US Federal Reserve Board Chairman Alan Greenspan (1998) seized the 
opportunity provided by the Asian financial crisis to proclaim that '[t]he 
current turmoil in East Asia ... appears to be an important milestone in what 
evidently has been a significant and seemingly inexorable trend toward 
market capitalism and political systems that stress the rule of law 
(Greenspan, 1998).' Chairman Greenspan may be right about the trend, but 
in the light of three decades of high-speed economic growth and social 
progress in much of East Asia, how do we reconcile Greenspan's view with 
claims that the Rule of Law is necessary for economic development? This 
chapter has sought to approach this seeming contradiction by bringing up 
examples from the Northeast Asian experience that call into question the 
necessity, and in some cases the appropriateness, of a strong version of the 
Rule of Law in all areas of the economy. The point of this is not to disparage 
the Rule of Law as a political ideal, but rather to encourage intellectual 
inquiry, and to suggest why some in developed and developing East Asia 
might find the Rule of Law-economic development rhetoric unpersuasive. 
Perhaps the Rule of Law as understood by the development community 
doesn't include all aspects of the Rule of Law that are familiar to lawyers, 
but in that case perhaps institutions such as the World Bank should use more 
care when choosing their rhetoric. This suggests a corresponding 
responsibility on lawyers not to abstain from this debate, however, unless 
we are willing to see a central normative concept of our tradition trivialized. 
Weber (1968:1465, fn. 14) long ago called the idea that Roman law 
promoted capitalism 'nursery school lore.' Perhaps he would be amused that 
statements of his on the relationship between capitalism and legal formality 
have achieved the same status in the Rule of Law-economic development 
literature, as it relies on Weber, North, Olson, et al. to tell the world what 
form of legal system is 'demanded' by a market economy. 69 
In a broader sense, those who study law in Northeast Asia must be 
aggressive in using their empirical knowledge to test universalist claims in 
the social sciences generally, not simply in law, or in the relationship 
between law and economic development. Given its economic success, any 
global theory addressing economic issues must be fully compatible with the 
actual history of modem Northeast Asia. The most important task for those 
interested in the Rule of Law and economic development is to develop an 
understanding of the Rule of Law that can be effectively distinguished from 
the simple legalization of society, or from the suppression of government 
discretion in economic governance. A legal infrastructure is certainly a 
necessary precondition of any worthwhile Rule of Law, but the latter will 
not necessarily evolve out of the former. 
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NOTES 
1 '[I]t is an accepted fact that the weakness of the [Peruvian] judicial 
system has been an obstacle to that growth, discouraging investors and 
innovative economic activities while contributing to a general sense of 
insecurity' (World Bank, News Rei: No 98/1555/LAC). 
2 'The first lesson from the Asian crisis is that a government that is not 
answerable to its people will not be likely to have open markets or the 
institutions required to impose discipline to overcome a financial crisis. 
A second lesson is that guanxi, or connections, are never a substitute for 
the rule oflaw' (Lee, 1998:8). 
3 'Rules are there for a reason. In the United States, we do business under, 
a lot of annoying regulations that require company managements to 
report profits and losses accurately, that prevent banks and those they 
lend to from getting too friendly, and so on. And we also made it hard 
for government officials and businessmen to strike deals without a lot of 
lawyers present. In Asia, they scoffed. They did business on the basis of 
personal relationships, not narrow legalisms. And now we know the 
results' (Krugman, 1998:6A). 
4 'Developmental state' is used broadly here, to refer to the approach to 
state-society relations in post-World War II Japan, South Korea, and 
Taiwan pioneered by Chalmers Johnson, then enhanced and qualified by 
Alice Amsden, Richard Samuels, Robert Wade, Peter Evans and others. 
(Johnson, 1982; Amsden, 1989; Samuels, 1987; Wade, 1990; Evans, 
1995). 
5 '[T]he rule of law may not be a single concept at all; rather, it may be 
more accurate to understand the ideal of the rule of law as a set of ideals 
connected more by family resemblance than by a unifying conceptual 
structure' (Solum, 1994). 
6 The following is a list of some of these concerns according to the aspect 
of the legal process in which they arise: 
Positive Law: The positive law should be clear and knowable in 
advance, so that citizens are not held liable, civilly or criminally, based 
on legal rules of which they could not, through normal means, have 
been aware. The legal norms must be of general applicability, rather 
than being directed toward individuals. 
Judiciary: In deciding cases, the judge should have no personal interest 
in the matter, should not prejudge the matter, and should decide a case 
by applying the pre-existing law to the facts as developed during the 
proceeding. Like cases should be decided alike, and the judge should not 
be influenced by non-legal substantive or instrumental considerations. 
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Basic procedural rights, such as a right to be heard and to contest 
adverse evidence, are also presumed. 
Executive Branch: Officials of the executive branch should have pre-
existing legal authority for any action they take that affects private 
rights. This means both that officers should have been granted a general 
statutory authority to act in a particular field, and that such action, when 
taken, should not exceed the scope of any discretion that has been 
granted to the officer. 
7 Dicey' s famous mischaracterization of the French droit administratif in 
comparison to the English Rule of Law is instructive (Dicey, 1982; 
Hayek, 1960). 
8 Formalist in its assumption that the materials and methods of the law are 
sufficient to provide single correct answers to particular legal issues; 
positivist in the assumption that the materials of the law consist 
primarily of rules and rule-like social norms not subject to significant 
indeterminacy, and that these are sufficient to provide single correct 
solutions without resorting to principles, policies or purposes. 
9 This admittedly impressionistic view was gleaned from a reading of the 
Rule of Law-economic development literature cited herein, which 
makes regrettably few efforts to define the Rule of Law. One definition 
that did appear was from Hayek, 1944. ' ... this means that government in 
all its actions is bound by rules fixed and announced beforehand - rules 
which make it possible to foresee with fair certainty how the authority 
will use its coercive powers in given circumstances and to plan one's 
individual affairs on the basis of this knowledge' (Dhonte and Kapur, 
1996). Another work defines the Rule of Law as reflecting 'the degree 
to which the citizens of a country are willing to accept the established 
institutions to make and implement laws and adjudicate disputes.' 
(Knack and Keefer, 1995). Knack and Keefer take their definition from 
the International Country Risk Guide, a privately produced political risk 
guide marketed toward multinational investors, which had originally 
used the pithy 'law and order tradition' to describe this variable (Knack 
and Keefer, 1995:225). 
10 Important current examples are Douglass North (economist), Mancur 
Olson (economist), Jeffrey Sachs (economist), and Barry Weingast 
(political scientist). Two pioneers in this tradition, Max Weber and 
Friedrich Hayek, were exceptions. 
11 (North, 1990). On bounded rationality generally, see Conlisk (1996). 
12 As noted above, this chapter was prompted by the seeming general 
explosion of Rule of Law language in publications dealing with 
economic development, not simply its use by the World Bank or another 
particular institution. It seemed appropriate, therefore, to look at many 
114 
THE RULE OF LAW, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
sources, rather than simply analysing one particular document. The 
danger of this approach is that one could easily select only those sources 
that support one's argument. I can only say that I have tried to avoid 
doing so. 
13 Many of the sources consulted for this chapter discuss two or more of 
these concerns, but I have tried to separate them for purposes of 
analysis. 
14 Perhaps not surprisingly, these concerns track exactly Locke's 
explanation of how property was inadequately protected in the State of 
Nature: want of' establish 'd, settled, known Law,' want of a 'known and 
indifferent Judge, with Authority to determine all differences according 
to established Law,' and want of 'a Power to back and support the 
Sentence when right, and to give it due Execution' (Locke, 1960). 
15 A truly disturbing over-emphasis on such criminal law aspects is found 
in Posner (1998). 
16 'Property rights are at the heart of the incentive structure of market 
economies. They determine who bears risk and who gains or loses from 
transactions. In so doing they spur worthwhile investment, encourage 
careful monitoring and supervision, promote work effort, and create a 
constituency for enforceable contracts' (World Bank, 1996:48-9). 
17 '[W]ell functioning markets also need a clear sense of where the state's 
role ends. The government must itself be ruled by law and trusted by 
private entities not to intervene arbitrarily in their affairs, to follow its 
announced policy statements, and to deliver on its obligations' (World 
Bank, 1996:93-4). 
18 North (1990:139) writes, 'The security of property rights and the 
development of the public and private capital market were instrumental 
factors not only in England's subsequent rapid economic development, 
but in its political hegemony and ultimate dominance of the world.' 
Olson is no less adamant: 'With a carefully constrained monarchy, an 
independent judiciary, and a bill of Rights, people in England in due 
course came to have a relatively high degree of confidence that any 
contracts they entered into would be impartially enforced and that 
private property rights, even for critics of the government, were 
relatively secure. Individual rights to property and contract enforcement 
were probably more secure in Britain after 1689 than anywhere else, and 
it was in Britain, not long after the Glorious Revolution, that the 
Industrial Revolution began' (Olson, 1993:574). 
19 'If organizations - firms, trade unions, farm groups, political parties, 
and congressional committees to name a few - devote their efforts to 
unproductive activity, the institutional constraints have provided the 
incentive structure for such activity. Third World countries are poor 
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because the institutional constraints define a set of payoffs to 
political/economic activity that do not encourage productive activity' 
(North, 1990:110). 
20 'If political transaction costs are low and the political actors have 
accurate models to guide them, then efficient property rights will result. 
But the high transaction costs of political markets and subjective 
perceptions of the actors more often have resulted in property rights that 
do not induce economic growth, and the consequent organizations may 
have no incentive to create more productive economic rules' (North, 
1990:52). 
21 It will only be noted here that this depoliticization of the very core of 
politics - private rights, the separation of powers, and checks and 
balances - is also necessary if international financial organizations are to 
comply with prohibitions typically found in their charters against 
interfering in the domestic political affairs of their member states. 
22 'Although many of the structural reforms that the IMF included in its 
early-December [1997] program for Korea would probably improve the 
long-term performance of the Korean economy, they are not needed for 
Korea to gain access to capital markets. They are also among the most 
politically sensitive issues: labor market rules, regulations of corporate 
structure and governance, government-business relations, and inter-
national trade. The specific policies that the IMF insists must be 
changed are not so different from those in the major countries of 
Europe' (Feldstein, 1998:27-8). 
23 These rights do not differ fundamentally from those discussed in the 
previous section, and are also often justified on economic grounds. They 
are treated separately here because they tend to be advocated by 
different Rule of Law publicists, for example, the United States Trade 
Representative (USTR) rather than the World Bank, and they are often 
supported more directly by international obligations. 
24 Former USTR Mickey Kantor made this connection between IPR 
enforcement and the Rule of Law when describing the 1995 US-China 
agreement on IPR enforcement: 'The essence of that agreement, and all 
our trade agreements, is respect for the rule of law. The IPR agreement 
promotes citizen access to the judicial process, by requiring China to 
publish relevant laws, and standards, and by requiring the creation of 
guidebooks to the enforcement system. The IPR agreement applies these 
principles in a commercial sphere, but its ramifications for China go far 
beyond patents and trademarks.' Statement of Ambassador Michael 
Kantor, Prepared for Delivery to US-China Business Council, 31 
January 1996 (transcript on file with the author). 
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25 'The US Customs service, the FBI, Department of Justice, Patent and 
Trademark Office, the Department of Commerce and the US Infor-
mation Agency have all offered training - and will continue to do so. 
Chinese prosecutors and Chinese Customs officials are receiving 
training right now in facilities in the United States and China. US 
industries have been equally generous.' Statement of Ambassador 
Michael Kantor before the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on 
East Asian and Pacific Affairs and the House International Relations 
Subcommittees on Asia and the Pacific and International Economic 
Policy and Trade, 7 March 1996. 
26 Perhaps the Rule of Law in China will then 'spillover' into the State 
Department's exercise of its authority to issue tourist visas, which a 
Federal District Court found to be illegal (Bureau of Public Affairs, 
1997). See Olsen v. Albright, 990 F. Supp. 31 (D.D.C. 1997) and 
Shenon (1998:1). 
27 'Formal constraints on arbitrary state power in established market 
economies derive partly from constitutional and administrative law. 
These bodies of law ensure that all legislation is consistent with the 
national constitution and that regulations, in tum, are consistent with the 
law. They delineate the rulemaking authority of various state bodies, lay 
out the procedures for enacting laws and promulgating regulations, and 
provide individuals recourse against unlawful or capricious state action' 
(World Bank 1996:94). 
28 A useful introduction is Faber and Frickey (1991). 
29 'Uncertain rules, heavy regulation, and pervasive controls give officials 
exceptional power, many opportunities to seek bribes, and wide scope 
for appropriating public wealth' (World Bank, 1996:95). 
30 '[G]ovemments are particularly susceptible to corruption during the 
phase when the state retains both vast assets and extensive powers to 
intervene in a growing private economy. Liberalization, demonopoliza-
tion, and - if transparent - rapid privatization are key steps to reducing 
these two sources of huge economic rents and to strengthen demand for 
the rule of law' (World Bank, 1996:144). 
31 Corrupt practices could also occur in other government activities, 
including the regulation of private sector activities that do not have a 
direct impact on the budget or public finances, such as ad hoe decisions 
made in relation to the regulation of foreign direct investment. Such 
practices would be counter to the IMF's general policy advice aimed at 
providing a level playing field to foster private sector activity' (IMF, 
1997:par 10). 
32 An exception to this general pattern is, World Bank (News Rei: No. 
98/1515) 'Noting that corruption and financial crises flourish in the 
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dark, Wolfensohn said that, irrespective of political systems, public 
decisions must be brought into the light of public scrutiny. This is not a 
luxury: this is a fundamental prerequisite for maximizing growth and 
poverty reduction.' 
33 '[T]he East Asian example would seem to suggest that high levels of 
economic performance bear little or no relation to the development of a 
credible legal system' (Jayasuriya, 1999). 
34 See, Greif (1996) and Greenhalgh (1988). In an example of economic 
dogmatism, one of the IMF's prolific writers on governance and 
economic performance defines corruption as 'noncompliance with [the] 
principle of the arm's length relationship, which states that personal or 
family relationships ought not to play a role in economic decisions by 
private economic agents ... This principle is essential for the efficient 
functioning of markets.' Summary of Vito Tanzi, Governmental Activi-
ties, and Markets (IMF Working Paper WP/94/99-EA) (visited Nov. 24, 
1998) ( emphasis added). Given the importance of family businesses in 
pre-World War II Japan, and in post-World War II South Korea and 
Taiwan, Tanzi's statement can only be taken to mean that 'the efficient 
functioning of markets' is not necessary for economic development. 
35 'The monopolist cannot only do without calculable law, formal 
rationality is even a fetter to the full development of his power. The 
rational law has .. . not only the function of rendering exchange 
processes calculable, it has an equalizing function also. It protects the 
weak. The monopolist can dispense with the aid of the courts; he does 
not go to the courts. His power of command is a sufficient substitute for 
the coercive power of the state' (Neumann, 1986:282). 
36 South Korean president Kim Dae-Jung has 'called for an improvement 
in the relationship between chaebols and small companies by which 
large enterprises can no longer rule or dictate over small ones.' Hyoung-
min Kim, 'Pres.-Elect, Chaebol Owners Agree on Reform', Korea 
Times 13 January 1998. 
37 The World Bank makes strong claims in this regard. 'Most day-to-day 
contracts in market economies do not require formal enforcement. ... But 
an economy still needs credible, low-cost formal enforcement 
mechanisms to which aggrieved parties can turn when all else fails' 
(World Bank, 1996:90). 
38 'The inevitable conclusion that one arrives at in a wealth-maximizing 
world is that complex contracting that would allow one to capture the 
gains from trade in a world of impersonal exchange must be 
accompanied by some kind of third-party enforcement' (North, 1990:57) 
'The shortage of institutions to enforce contracts limits the scope of 
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transactions, makes contracting more costly, and prohibits some 
contracts altogether' (World Bank, 1996:90). 
39 This is changing in Japan and South Korea, where the legal regimes 
have been amended to make shareholder derivative actions more 
attractive to litigants. This is clearly an important change; how it will 
effect the Japanese and South Korean economies remains to be seen. 
40 Anyone trying to predict the future path of corporate governance in 
China should note that government's interest in the South Korean 
chaebol model. 'Hu Xiongfei, deputy director of the Shanghai 
Economic Commission, voices an opinion held by many Chinese 
officials: 'These chaebo/s contributed a lot in transforming Korea from 
an agricultural country into an emerging industrial one, with GNP 
increasing from US$2.1 billion in 1961 to US$480 billion in 1996' 
(Yatsko, 1998). 
41 The OECD explains the need for its proposed Multilateral Agreement 
on Investment (MAI) as follows: 'While markets are, of course, the 
main reason for investment decisions, the investment climate is also a 
major factor in decision-making. Investors need long-term stability of 
rules and procedures. They need open markets and equal competitive 
opportunities with domestic investors' (OECD Policy Brief No. 2-
1997). 
42 The International Country Risk Guide's original variable, 'law and order 
tradition,' thus seems to more accurately describe the state of affairs 
their clients value (Knack and Keefer, 1995:225). 
43 Mancur Olson, perhaps in a nod toward South Korea and Taiwan, 
acknowledges that some dictatorships have presided over periods of 
exceptional economic growth by providing secure property and contract 
rights absent democracy or the Rule of Law. He argues, however, that 
such growth cannot last because the rights provided by a dictator are not 
sufficiently secure in the long run (Olson, 1997:572-2). 
44 China's Hunan Province reportedly has a back-log of 100,000 
unenforced commercial verdicts, dating back to 1992. 'Court Delays 
Force Chinese Litigants to Tum to Gangsters' Agence France-Presse, 2 
December 1997 (quoting the Worker's Daily). 
45 The tale of foreign investment in the Chinese telecoms industry provides 
a fascinating example. The world's top telecom companies invested 
US$1,400,000,000 in China's telecoms service industry via complicated 
contractual arrangements designed to circumvent a ban on foreign 
investment in that sector. The existence of the ban was known, but 
investors relied on the 'repeated blessings of top Chinese officials.' 
James Kynge, 'Blow for telecoms investors in China', Financial Times, 
22 September 1998, at 8. 
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46 'Many European, Asian and some American lenders overlooked the 
inadequacies of the Indonesian legal system and decided to put their 
trust in their debtors' connections .. .' (Paal, 1998:6). 
47 Indeed, IMF, World Bank, and International Finance Corporation 
interest in Indonesia's bankruptcy law appears driven by a desire of 
foreign investors to limit losses on investments they have already made. 
Thoenes, Sander, 'Indonesian Bankruptcy Law Dealt Fresh Blow', 
Financial Times, 25 November 1998, at 4. 
48 The same point could be made with regard to negotiations over China's 
accession to the WTO. 
49 Government exercises of discretion here might be analysed through the 
lens of 'administrative guidance,' but discussions of administrative 
guidance in the abstract can be more confusing than enlightening. The 
propensity to regulate through informal rather than formal means is 
probably inherent in modern bureaucratic governance. For an inquiry 
into the Rule of Law in Northeast Asia the interesting questions include, 
i) whether government actors possessed means to enforce their informal 
'guidance' that are contrary to the Rule of Law, and ii) whether they 
exercised guidance over the economy that was central to the 
'developmental state.' 
50 A good discussion of the 'traditional' Japanese system, and how and 
why that system is becoming more legalized, is Masaru Mabuchi 
(1993:130). 
51 The fundamental debate concerns whether policy lending was conducted 
by relatively insulated technocrats in such a way as to exert effective 
guidance over the path of economic development, or whether such loans 
should be better understood as part of a corrupt government-business 
cycle in which loans were obtained in exchange for political 
contributions, which were obtained in exchange for loans, and so on. 
52 Economists have been more concerned with the effects of policy 
lending, and whether growth would have been even faster in Northeast 
Asia if credit allocation had been left more to market forces. 
53 In 1993, Korea's Constitutional Court held that the destruction of the 
Kukje Group was unconstitutional, invoking the Rule of Law as a check 
on government action necessary for legal security and predictability in 
the economic realm. The Kukje case and its possible implications are 
discussed in James M. West, Kukje and Beyond: Constitutionalism and 
the Market (June, 1998) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the 
author). 
54 A typically cynical 'new institutionalist' discussion of foreign 
investment screening is Thomas W. Waelde, A Requiem for the 'New 
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International Economic Order', 1 CEPMLP On-Line Journal 2 (June, 
1995) <http://www.dundee.ac. uk/petroleumlaw/html/article 1-2.htm>. 
55 '[T]hose charged with the application and enforcement of the Foreign 
Investment Law and the regulations thereunder possess virtually un-
reviewable power to control inward capital investments. Much of the 
law and regulations have left to government administrators the 
discretion to fashion the details and working policies by which 
validation applications are screened. For the most part, such applications 
are judged by current economic and political considerations rather than 
by precise standards and rules formulated in statutes, cabinet orders and 
court decisions' (Hartman, 1972:376). The OECD's proposed MAI 
would make it very difficult for any developing country to follow the 
'developmental state' model for screening foreign investment by i) 
concerning itself with the making of investments, not just the treatment 
of investments once made, ii) requiring 'national treatment' for foreign 
investors, iii) requiring 'most-favored-nation' treatment for foreign 
investors, iv) requiring that laws, regulations and procedures of general 
application be publicly available, and v) prohibiting performance 
requirements. In return, parties to the MAI 'will enjoy the benefits of a 
better investment environment' OECD (1997). 
56 Some investors are more candid than others about investing in Asia and 
the Rule of Law. Founder of the failed Peregrine investment bank, 
Philip Tose, reportedly 'went out of his way to emphasize an "Asian 
way" of doing business. This included contempt for democratic 
countries that he viewed as unlikely to make economic progress. He 
publicly preferred to deal with authoritarian governments, holding in 
contempt India, Australia and the Philippines, where democracy and the 
rule of law operated, however inadequately.' Philip Bowring, 'Wake-Up 
Call from Peregrine to Bankers Everywhere', International Herald 
Tribune, Wednesday, 14 January 1998, at 8. 
57 As one commentator notes, 'national treatment,' which like the Rule of 
Law goes to the administration rather than the scope of regulatory 
authority, 'means little to a foreign investor if the treatment meted out to 
national companies is below reasonable standards of state regulation 
('international minimum standards') in developed countries. The crite-
rium of national treatment, in our view, is therefore only a stopover .. .' 
(Waelde, 1995: par 44) (emphasis added). 
58 Typical is the report that Taiwan's tax authorities, as part of a 
government effort to defend Taiwan's currency, have threatened to 'look 
into those [financial institutions] that might have profited from 
"speculation".' Chad Rademan, 'Taipei Banker Gets Tough to Uphold 
Currency,' International Herald Tribune, 18-19 April 1998, p. 17. The 
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Rule of Law ideal would seem to demand that trading activities be 
subject to a system of rules defining what is allowed and what is not 
allowed, and that the government not be able to discourage allowed 
activities by threatening tax audits or similar measures. 
59 Discussions of administrative guidance in Japan often mention almost as 
an afterthought that those giving the 'guidance' have this tool to coerce 
compliance, as if it is less important than, for example, the identity of 
interests between regulators and regulated that is presumed to arise out 
of Japan's corporatist regulatory system (Akira, 1985:279). 
60 One standard American analysis of Japanese administrative guidance 
calls this 'collateral enforcement,' and wastes little ink on Rule of Law 
concerns (Young, 1984). This non-judgmental relativism seems to be 
the norm in academic writing on administrative guidance, at least in the 
us. 
61 Fallon (1997) identifying four Rule of Law 'ideal types' within US 
Constitutional law discourse alone. 
62 This also ignores the related problems of whether the aspirations that 
make up the Rule of Law in this approach have much to do with how 
actual cases are decided, or whether such higher level aspirations, if they 
are important in judicial decision making, are in fact neutral and just, or 
simply reflect existing social relations. 
63 (Pound, 1942). Much important twentieth century legal scholarship has 
in fact been driven by the difficulty of reconciling Rule of Law ideals 
with the modern governance. See, Neumann (1986), Davis (1969), Lowi 
(1969), and Sunstein (1990). 
64 The view of the judge implied in the Rule of Law-economic 
development literature seems inspired by Weber's implausible claim 
that 'the judge ... in the bureaucratic state with its rational laws, is more 
or less an automaton of paragraphs: the legal documents, together with 
the costs and fees, are dropped in at the top with the expectation that the 
judgement will emerge at the bottom together with more or less sound 
arguments - an apparatus, that is, whose functioning is by and large 
calculable or predictable' (Weber, 1968). 
65 Marcus (1998:A0l) describing property rights education seminars for 
US federal judges sponsored by the Foundation for Research on 
Economics and the Environment (FREE), a foundation funded by 
conservative groups that also fund legal challenges to regulatory 
limitations on absolute property rights. 
66 A notorious example of this was the US government's support for 
arguably authoritarian measures by the government of China to reduce 
IPR infringement, including the registration of all printing facilities. 
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67 The effectiveness of China's foreign investment screening system, 
which shares much with the systems employed by South Korea and 
Taiwan, is testified to by the fact that it has become a matter of political 
concern in Washington (Office of Strategic Industries and Economic 
Security, 1999). 
68 In these aspects, the argument resembles the 'deux-commerce' thesis of 
the eighteenth century, which held that 'the market and capitalism were 
going to create a moral environment in which a good society as well as 
the market itself were bound to flourish' (Hirschman, 1992). Like the 
deux-commerce thesis, current evolutionary arguments are an important 
part of a complex reality (Hirschman, 1992:139). 
69 The core 'Weberian' claim appears Weber (1968:1393-5) (Appendix II, 
ii: Bureaucracy and Political Leadership). 
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JAPAN AS A MODEL FOR LAW AND 
DEVELOPMENT IN ASIA 

CHAPTERS 
GLOBALIZATION VS. PATERNALISTIC REGULATION: 
SOME THOUGHTS ABOUT ECONOMIC SUCCESS, THE 
ROLE OF LAW.!-. AND THE REGULATION OF JAPAN'S 
~INANCIAL MARKETS 
HARALD BAUM1 
ASIAN MODEL OR ASIAN CRISIS? 
In 1997, Japan held net external assets of more than one trillion dollars; the 
United States had about the same amount of net external debt. As is well 
known, Japan is the second largest economy, its citizens have the highest per 
capita income world-wide and Japanese households hold more than 30 per 
cent of the world's savings. 
We clearly see a story of a tremendous economic success in the decades 
after World War II, which has raised the interest in many developing eco-
nomies which wish to examine the situation to discover whether Japan could 
be a model for them. In the West, the Japanese success also caused a mild 
panic in the 1980s when we saw a seemingly endless flood of articles 
concerned with a perceived threat of Japan turning the Western societies 
into technological colonies and thereby attaining its allegedly imminent 
world supremacy. 
However, the prolonged structural recession lasting for more than a 
decade after the bursting of the so-called baberu keizai, the 'bubble 
economy' in 1990 has cast growing doubt on that role. Although it took 
some time for the Western public to realize this, at least the worsening 
financial crisis in the mid-1990s worked as an eye-opener for many. 
Suddenly it has become clear that the Japanese system has not only given 
rise to world leaders like Toyota, Sony, or Kyocera - as was common 
knowledge in the heydays of the 1980s - but has also created a financial 
industry with firms like Daiwa, Yamaichi, and many others which were 
collectively responsible for one of the biggest peacetime economic losses in 
history. It became clear that Japan had a surprisingly divided dual economy: 
internationally successful exporters 6n the one hand and countless ineffi-
cient domestic firms serving the sheltered national market only on the other. 
This has changed the tune: now Japan is regarded as the country of the 
'miracle economy' which had lost its aura. 
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Quite surprising for some, but not at all surprising for others, in a significant 
change of fortune the US has returned to the stage. The American economy 
keeps growing, unemployment is at a record low, stock prices on Wall Street 
are on a constant rise and US companies have successfully seized back 
various markets long thought lost, like those for semiconductors or 
computer technology, and in the information revolution they are undisputed 
leaders. 
So, according to common wisdom, we first had the Asian model sup-
posedly based on 'Asian values,' and we now have the Asian crisis 
supposedly caused by the 'Asian malaise.' However, this seems to be an 
oversimplified and misleading perspective. It is rather doubtful whether 
there is any such thing as an 'Asian value' or an interconnected 'Asian 
crisis' - at least if that is meant to include Japan. 
DIFFERENT MODELS OF CAPITALISM 
The main reason for this is that Japan and its neighbours are at very different 
stages of economic development. Whereas the former is a matured 
economy, the Southeast Asian nations have not yet reached this point. The 
financial crisis that occurred there in the second half of the 1990s and the 
structural crisis from which Japan has been suffering for more than a decade 
have at best a very loose correlation or vague similarity. 
More interesting for gaining an understanding of the Japanese situation 
seems to be a comparative look at Germany, another matured economy. 
Like Japan, Germany too - to name but one continental European country -
is in the midst of a severe structural crisis and has problems in adapting to a 
changing international economic environment. The world-wide trend 
towards greater liberalization and globalization seems to favour more 
liberally structured, market-based economies like the US or the UK and has 
made it increasingly difficult for socially more constrained economies like 
Germany or Japan to compete successfully with their liberal counterparts. 
This indicates that Japan's troubles are not a specific Asian phenomenon 
but rather one example among others of a clash between two different social 
and economic models that occurs in Asia as well as in Europe. 
The market structures of the various successful countries differ, as they 
are embedded in social institutions and corresponding regulatory regimes. In 
practice, there is not just one most efficient market structure but, according 
to the institutional setting, different patterns at work combining varying 
strengths and weaknesses into a country-specific mould. These distinctive 
settings have developed over time, adapting to cultural and historical forces 
and they are in a constant state of flux, they are, in other words, 'path-
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dependent' (Roe, 1996; Gilson, 1996; Leipold, 1996). However global the 
world economy may become, these specific institutional arrangements will 
not easily shed their specific character and they may become a burden in a 
changed international environment. 
At a fairly abstract level, one can say that the economies in post-war 
Germany and Japan are constrained more by non-economic objectives than, 
for example, the American economy which is to a greater extent liberated 
from collective obligations to serve others. Although for different reasons 
and in varying degrees and shapes, in comparison to the US investment in 
both countries is - or at least used to be - more patient and employment 
more long-term orientated. These long-term relationships result to a greater 
degree of co-operation and mutual trust, and they are shielded against short-
term market pressures by political institutions like, for example, more 
intense and paternalistic regulatory regimes. Generally we can observe a 
greater distrust towards potentially disruptive market forces. In this respect, 
obviously some structural similarities do exist between the German and the 
Japanese economic system. However, to avoid a possible misunderstanding 
that might arise at this point: of course the two systems as such do differ 
significantly in many other aspects, for example, corporate governance and 
legal structures to name but two aspects ( cf. Baum, 1998 and 1995a). 
Although observers of the Japanese economy mostly take recourse to a 
broad description of a market-driven economy as a model, it is not a free 
market in the neo-classical sense they have in mind. It seems to be more 
what one analyst called a 'planned market' (Tabb, 1995) - regardless of the 
fact that this term is a contradiction in itself. What is meant is not 'big 
government' in the sense of the ubiquitous welfare state a la Europe, but a 
policy of constant interference in or meddling with the markets by a 
dominant bureaucracy to achieve previously stipulated goals. Chalmers 
Johnson put it clearly: 'The institutions of capitalism inherited from the 
occupation ... were modified by the government's industrial policy. Lying 
behind industrial policy is the strong Japanese State itself. It is the sine qua 
non of Japan's economic achievements' (Johnson, 1995). 
Many highly influential Japanese scholars and writers - those with 
bureaucratic background as well as those who have not - still believe in a 
model of the Japanese economy as a 'non-capitalistic market economy' 
(Sakakibara 1993). In this view, the real choice facing the world nowadays 
is not between capitalism and socialism, but between a capitalistic market 
economy like, for example in the US, and the Japanese model which is 
described as an 'extremely humanitarian economic regime' in comparison to 
capitalistic societies (ibid). And, those who hold this opinion argue, this 
owes much to the guiding and supervising role of the state or the 
administrative sector. As one critical voice puts it: 'It is an unspoken 
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doctrine in Japan that political decisions must always prevail over market 
forces' (Mikuni, 2000). 
Actually, these features of the 'Japanese economic model' seem to a 
lesser degree to be an indicator for a different kind of capitalism than rather 
simply a sign of a holdover from an earlier stage of capitalism (Katz, 1998). 
Therefore the term 'developmental-state capitalism' (Johnson, 1995) may be 
more precise. Furthermore, the idea of an allegedly 'extremely humanitarian 
economic regime' is somewhat difficult to reconcile with the fact that Japan 
is probably the only OECD country where premature death from overwork 
(karoshi) is such a widespread phenomenon that a citizens' movement 
against it was set up some years ago and courts are forcing employers to pay 
damages to the relatives of the victims. 
FORCES OF CHANGE 
Whatever the right label for it may be, the Japanese economic system has 
come under increasing pressure. Three reasons for this stick out: 
First, Japan's trading partners have stopped accepting that the Japanese 
developmentalism, used to catch up with the West, has now moved on to 
exploiting the international trading system to achieve nationalistic goals. In 
the first decades after World War II, the Japanese economy was a late-comer 
in a catch-up situation where foreign technology could be easily bought, 
where it was possible to shelter the home market at least partly against 
foreign competition while at the same time having a ready market for 
exports in the United States and Europe (Brown, 1993). All of this is well 
known - though often officially denied - and has recently been described 
with rare clarity by a former government advisor: '... paternalistic 
administrative guidance enabled [the leading industries] to strike a happy 
balance between competition at home and government support for sales 
abroad' (Tsuru, 1993). Since the days of the early post-war reconstruction, 
the governing Japanese bureaucracy has successfully implemented an 
economic policy of maximizing production far in excess of domestic 
demand. The resulting surplus together with suppressed household 
consumption - or put differently, maximized household savings - has 
allowed the financing of industrial development independent of foreign 
capital and influence which was regarded as a prerequisite of Japan's 
national safety and independence. Being part of this institutional setting, 
Japanese producers, and their financiers understood perfectly that the tight 
bureaucratic control of market forces was in their favour. Of course, such an 
economic system requires isolation from outside forces (Mikuni, 2000). One 
result was the dual economy mentioned before, where some super-strong 
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exporters contrast with a large number of hopelessly inefficient domestic 
sectors (Katz, 1998). 
However, over time there has been no alternative but to open up markets. 
This has resulted in increased competition at home, which in turn makes it 
difficult to sustain a costly social fabric that has been designed to guarantee 
stability, egalitarianism and rent seeking by favoured groups rather than 
achieving the highest allocative efficiency. Furthermore, the significant rise 
of the yen since the mid-1980s, the so-called endaka, has eroded most of the 
cost advantages Japanese industry had. Therefore, to stay competitive, 
Japanese firms are increasingly forced to produce abroad and that causes a 
further disruption to the social cohesion and trust in stable employment. 
Second, not only foreign pressure (gaiatsu), but also its domestic 
counterpart (naiatsu) is contributing to the present need to reform (Kusano, 
1999). The past goal of Japanese industrial policy, the strengthening of 
exports, has helped to shape a producer- instead of a consumer-oriented 
society. In some ways, the consumer existed for the benefit of the 
manufacturer, rather than the other way round as would be normal (Samuels, 
1989). Naturally, it was the consumers who bore the high costs of the closed 
and cartelized market. On top of this, the public was made liable for the cost 
of an increasingly expensive socialization of risks when the individual 
players responsible for failures were bailed out directly or indirectly with the 
money of taxpayers and savers (Mikuni, 1998). 
Dire as this might seem, Japanese citizens obviously participated in the 
country's economic success at least to a sufficient degree so that they did 
not object to the general policy at elections, although, without doubt specific 
features of the political system too had helped the conservatives to stay in 
power (Pempel, 1997). But during the course of the lasting recession it 
became increasingly difficult for the government to dole out favours. People 
started to feel the true price of a policy allowing for widespread rent seeking 
and discontent grew as was shown in a 1995 poll. 
On the occasion of the fiftieth anniversary of the end of World War II, 
three leading newspapers from the US, Japan, and Germany- the Wal/street 
Journal, the Nihon Keizai Shinbun, and the Handelsblatt - commissioned a 
comprehensive survey in each of the three countries (Handelsblatt/Infas, 
1995). Among facts which were unearthed, significant differences could be 
seen in the degree of satisfaction with the living conditions in the three 
countries. The polled parameters included the personal financial situation, 
cost of living, health care, provisions for old age, and job security and the 
like. On average, half of the Germans were content with their present 
situation, and the figure for the Americans was marginally but not 
significantly lower. The big surprise was the Japanese. Despite Japan's 
tremendous economic success in the past, only 15 per cent of the Japanese 
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were content with their situation. This meant that over three-quarters of 
those polled were dissatisfied with the conditions of life in Japan in early 
1995. Perhaps they were no longer willing to pay the price for development 
in the form of high prices for consumer goods and deferred consumption as 
a non-efficient financial system forces them to save an ever bigger share of 
their income to provide for their old age. 
However, recent studies show that in spite of growing discontent and a 
general preference for liberalization, consumers have in fact been less 
demanding in their calls for political and administrative reforms and less 
focused on their own interests than one might have expected. Thus reforms 
so far have been slow and have often come in the form of complex 
compromises with considerable compensation for those who are likely to 
lose from change (Vogel, 1999). 
Third, crucial technological and institutional innovations are impeded by 
some kind of 'institutional fatigue' (Nakatani, 1997). Even if industrial 
policy - rather than the vigour of the Japanese private sector, especially in 
the new sectors like cars and consumer electronics - should have been 
instrumental or at least partially useful in Japan's economic success in the 
past, this must be seen in a historical context which will not repeat itself. 
The catch-up position has long since ended. New technology must be 
developed rather than simply acquired (Brown, 1993). 
Consequently, the government has tried to foster technological develop-
ment and innovations by encouraging and financing research cartels and the 
like. But, with little success: the so-called 'Fifth Generation Computer 
Project' has failed to deliver the expected results, and the collective effort to 
develop high-definition television has turned out to be a flop in the face of 
independent American producers' advanced technology (Brown, 1993). As 
mentioned before, US companies have successfully seized back various 
markets long thought lost, like those for semiconductors or computer 
technology. In telecommunications or multimedia, the hesitant bureaucratic 
attitude has been described by Japanese industry itself as a kind of 'negative 
industrial policy' (Wood, 1994). Japan still lacks a flourishing domestic 
industry in these areas thanks to overregulation and bureaucratic 
interference in the market. It looks as if - as elsewhere and not surprisingly 
- it is competition based on a risk-taking ethic combined with an active 
venture capital industry like that in the US, rather than state-induced co-
operation which creates the optimal environment for innovation (Dunn, 
1995). 
Accordingly, the need to reform is now widely recognized by industry 
itself. Leading economists, major research institutions and important 
business associations are demanding far-reaching changes towards more 
liberalized and market-oriented economic and administrative structures (cf. 
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e.g. Carlile and Tilton, 1998; from a critical perspective Dore, 1999). A pro-
minent example is the report 'Efficiency and Trust: Creating a Market-
Oriented Economy in Japan' published by the influential Keizai D6yiiki 
(Japan Association of Corporate Executives) in 1997.2 The report calls for 
an end to the traditional 'high-price, high-cost structure' and constant 
government interventions in the markets. Instead it promotes such features 
as enhanced transparency, reduced regulation, and the build up of a market 
structure consistent with international practices. This being so changes are 
likely, but how quickly they will come, how far-reaching they will be, and 
what the precise outcome will be is still open as reformist and conservative 
forces are still in the midst of the battle ( cf. Vogel, 1999; Carlile and Tilton, 
1998; Pempel, 1997; Yamamura, 1997). 
To sum up, in spite of its past success, growing sections of the Japanese 
economic system now seem to work in a rather problematic way. In fact, it 
looks as if it was exactly those sections on which, in the past, Japan 
watchers heaped the most praise for their instrumental role in Japan's 
economic success (e.g. emphatically by Dore and Whitacker, 1994) which 
are causing problems today. The guiding hand of the state has been at least a 
partial substitute for the market forces and it is hampered by its preference 
for some kind of vague paternalism instead of clear-cut rules. As the 
prominent economist lwao Nakatani has aptly put it: '[A]n important cause 
of Japan's poor economic performance is regulation' (Nakatani, 1997). This 
view has been confinned by a recent study of the OECD on regulatory 
reform in Japan that argues that 'a sharp break with past regulatory practices 
is needed' (OECD, 1999). 
JAPAN'S FINANCIAL CRISIS 
A prime example of this is Japan's ongoing financial crisis. The financial 
sector has long been a pet industry of the Japanese bureaucracy. The 
Ministry of Finance ( Okura-sh6, hereafter MoF) with its far-reaching 
powers could easily be described as the most powerful public institution in 
Japan, regulating, guiding, and protecting almost every aspect of the 
financial industry over the last fifty years (cf. Brown, 1999; Hartcher, 1998; 
Milhaupt, 1994; Baum and Hayakawa, 1994). But was it a success for all 
actors involved? 
With respect to the policy goal stated above, the answer is clearly 
affirmative. Tightly controlled banks gave so-called strategic industries 
cheap access to household savings and helped to finance the export-oriented 
excessive production. However, although the Japanese have accumulated the 
biggest savings world-wide, they get the lowest dividend of all countries 
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(Courtis, 1997). This means, Japan's graying population has not and still 
does not get the necessary returns on their huge savings they need to provide 
for old age. So at least some players in the market might not have received a 
fair share of the spoils. 
But has the paternalistic regime at least been a lasting success for the 
industry of which it has been taking care? In their criticism of market forces 
some observers do indeed expressively quote Japan's financial system as an 
example of successful management of the markets and the positive outcome 
of bureaucratic paternalism. In this view, the financial industry in Japan is 
'more strictly and prudently governed than most others' (Sheridan, 1993). 
However, if one looks at the gigantic losses which have been 
accumulated by that industry, the idea that this has been a great success 
seems rather outlandish. In the mid- l 990s these losses had amounted to 
more than one trillion of US dollars and were caused by a mountain of bad 
loans, misguided speculation, and derivative trading that dwarfed the 
'savings & loan crisis' of the early 1980s in the US. The collapse of major 
brokers, life assurers, banks, various credit co-operatives, and nearly all 
housing loan companies (jusen) was something unheard of during the first 
five decades after World War II when the so-called 'no failure system' was 
practiced, under which the stronger institutions were forced to take care of 
the weaker ones. 
The tight control together with the feeling of being ultimately protected 
by the authorities bred complacency and gave little incentive to prepare for 
the deregulation of the 1980s and the confrontation with growing 
international competition. While during the post-war period the banks had 
mainly served as instruments for collecting and allocating scarce resources 
to the manufacturing industries based on fixed and low interest rates, by the 
1980s when industry started to make use of liberalization and to look for 
cheaper direct financing at home and abroad, the banks had increasingly 
turned to other business for which they were not prepared. Finally, the moral 
hazard caused by the implicit guarantee of no failure had become too costly 
to be sustained (Horiuchi, 1999). With the refusal of Fuji Bank to come to 
aid to its keiretsu-member Yamaichi Securities this system finally collapsed 
in 1997. 
The result of this specific paternalistic treatment is what Western 
observers have called the 'archaic' nature of Japanese finance (Wood, 
1994). Saddled with the permanent guidance of MoF and its refusal to let 
clear winners and losers emerge - as has been the case in the Japanese 
electronic industry, for example, which is significantly less guided -
Japanese banks and securities companies lag far behind their American or 
even European competitors. It is not coincidental that, though Japanese 
banks are among the biggest banks world-wide, among the list of the most 
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profitable banks one cannot find a single Japanese name. Japanese financial 
institutions have so far not been able to catch up with the impressive 
international success of the Japanese manufacturing industry; Sony, Toyota, 
or Kyocera have no counterparts in the financial world, which reflects the 
dual pattern of the post-war Japanese economy in which competitive and 
protected sectors co-existed and were bound together by numerous 
economic relationships and political bargains (Vogel, 1999). 
Especially worrying has been that the losses in the financial industry 
were for the most part inseparably intertwined with fraud, corruption, and 
other misdemeanours involving politicians and - though formerly con-
sidered sacrosanct - elite bureaucrats. Either directly or indirectly via 
subsidiaries, nearly all the big names in Japanese finance were involved in 
one way or another. In other words, in more or less all sectors of the 
financial system, severe regulatory problems surfaced in the 1990s to expose 
systemic defects ( M ilhaupt and Miller, 1997b ). This has shaken the very 
roots of the post-war financial system in Japan. Seeing the state prosecutors 
raiding the Ministry of Finance on television did not help to pacify the 
dissatisfied Japanese public that had been forced to subsidize the country's 
ailing financial industry to a significant degree. The uncovering of an 
involvement of organized crime in various scandals did not help either. Even 
worse, the considerable welfare loss caused by the financial mess was 
unnecessarily enlarged because of the severely inept mishandling of the 
crisis by a bureaucracy that wasted precious time trying to cover up scandals 
and block reforms as a means to defend its own power bases. 
Given all this it was not by chance that in the aforementioned survey of 
1995, the Japanese stated bureaucracy and state intervention as their third 
biggest problem - far more serious than unemployment (Handelsblatt/Infas, 
1995). The seemingly endless series of scandals that surfaced in the 1990s 
have thoroughly discredited politicians - even more importantly parts of the 
bureaucracy as well as. The positive aspect is that it has become difficult for 
die-hard apologists of the former system to fend off administrative and 
regulatory changes necessary to restore public confidence. This brings us to 
the question of what role law and economic regulation have played so far 
and how that role might change in the future. 
PATERNALISTIC REGULATION 
The financial crisis of the 1990s is correctly perceived as primarily one of 
governance and regulation. The paternalistic regulatory approach - some 
observers even talk of 'collusive regulation' (Schaede, 1996) - has bred 
disaster by setting wrong incentive structures and preserving a system that 
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was incompatible with the forces of globalization sweeping the international 
financial markets. 
Talking about the role of law and regulatory concerns in economic 
development, one has to distinguish between the private law aspects - civil 
bw, business law, procedural laws, a functioning court system for private 
litigation, and the like - and the era of public law and economic regulation. 
With respect to the first, without any doubt we can see a modern 
functioning legal system in Japan. Courts are working, rights can be 
enforced, and judgments are predictable. The foundations for this system 
were successfully laid in only three decades between 1868 and 1900 when 
European (mostly German) legal institutions were adopted and assimilated 
into an entirely different legal culture - a remarkable and lasting achieve-
ment. Although the legal frame is thus similar to that of other modern 
industrial nations, we do not see a litigious society in Japan. Litigation rates 
are only a fraction of those in comparable other jurisdictions (cf. 
Wollschlager, 1997). This may raise a couple of questions. How does Japan 
manage to function with a significantly lower number of judges and lawyers 
and correspondingly fewer court proceedings than for example, Germany or 
the United States? (Cf. Henderson, 1997). Are a non-litigious people 
cleverly not wasting scarce resources on lawyers and lawsuits and still 
providing for an adequate measure of intra-societal justice? (for a critical 
view cf. Miyazawa, 1997). If so, what alternative conflict-avoiding or 
conflict-solving mechanisms take the place of contentious disputes? Do we 
see some kind of bargaining in the shadow of the law, to use a common 
phrase? 
These questions cannot be answered here but it seems fairly safe to state 
that these differences seem to be more of gradual and less of a principal 
nature when compared with Western legal systems. The best explanation 
may be seen in a mixture of reasons, including path-dependent institutional 
settings as well as legal mentality and conscious political steering ( cf. 
Wollschlager, 1997; Baum, 1995a). 
However, with respect to the area of public law and economic regulation 
there seem to be more fundamental differences. Therefore, this second body 
of law seems to be of particular interest when studying what is called 'the 
Japanese regulatory system' and its contribution to economic success - or 
failure. At a first level, the written - and unwritten - public law governs the 
relationships between state and industry. At a second level, it also shapes the 
relationship between the industry and its customers, albeit more indirectly 
and to a lesser extent. Regulation and governance of the Japanese financial 
markets are a prime example of the specific ways in which industrial 
policies as well as bureaucratic and political interests are taken care of in 
Japan. 
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What are the origins of this regulatory regime? American law has heavily 
influenced economic regulation in Japan and especially the regulation of its 
financial markets after World War II. The Japanese Securities and Exchange 
Law of 1948 (SEL )3 was modeled after the US securities laws of the 1930s. 
The adoption of the law was part of the so-called 'democratization' of the 
Japanese economy by the Allied Powers after the end of the War. However, 
since then the practice under that law has been markedly different from the 
US experiences and expectations (cf. Henderson, 1991). A prominent 
example is the use respectively non-use of the antifraud provisions in both 
countries. In the US, Rule 1 0b-5 under the 1934 Act4 had been the subject of 
countless decisions by courts and a key element for regulating the American 
capital market. The contrary is true for Japan. Although the Japanese Act of 
1948 had an identical provision with the former Art. 58 for almost half a 
century, it has more or less never been evoked and therefore played no 
significant role at all - as has private litigation in general in Japanese capital 
markets regulation. 
This observation raises the question of what kind of regulatory regime is 
actually governing the Japanese financial markets. We can see a regime that 
has been adequately described as 'regulatory cartel' (Milhaupt and Miller, 
1997a and 1997b ). It is characterized by a couple of specific features: 5 
The first characteristic is - or at least has been till very recently - a 
unique concentration of power in the hands of just one institution: the 
Ministry of Finance run by elite bureaucrats most of whom graduated from 
the University of Tokyo. Under the roof of the Ministry various functions 
were combined that are located with different agencies in other countries. 
The most important are the drafting of financial laws and ordinances with 
little or no actual parliamentary control, the supervision of almost all 
segments of the financial markets from securities trading to banking and 
insurance business, the drafting of the budget, the sole authority over the so 
called Fiscal Investment and Loan Program (Zaito), a giant public sector 
financing system equivalent to some 70 per cent of the Japanese economy 
and as important as the budget, and, finally, the responsibility for the 
count~y's tax collection (cf. e.g. Hartcher, 1998). 
Second, we see a close relationship between the regulators and the 
regulated. Many former finance bureaucrats held responsible positions in 
most failed financial institutions, and some of the bankrupt Jusen were even 
headed by them (cf. Kliesow, 1996). This refers to the phenomenon of 
omakudari, the 'descent from heaven' (which, financially, might be more 
appropriately called 'ascent into heaven'), a common practice of retired 
bureaucrats in their mid-fifties taking well-paid positions in the industries 
they had formerly been supervising. Sometimes this occurs directly, some-
times indirectly via a stopover in a semi-public institution. The resulting 
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'Old Boy' network has far reaching effects on the government-business 
relations ( cf. Schaede, 1997). 
A third important aspect of the particular regulatory structure is infor-
rnal ity or situational regulation by administrative guidance (gyosei shido), 
resulting in a non-transparent character with aspects of collusive regulation. 
The laws and ordinances grant the authorities wide discretionary powers 
which are used to persuade and guide the party concerned to act in a certain 
way, in order to realize an administrative goal through that party's co-
operation. The enforcement of decisions and their translation into the 
industrial level work with the help of a pronounced carrot-and-stick 
mechanism. It is typically effective because relationships between the 
ministries and the industry are long-term and work through various 
channels. Firms know that following an 'advice' could reap rewards later. In 
case of non-compliance with administrative guidance, the ministries have a 
wide variety of options to obstruct the future business of the party 
concerned, either directly or via other governmental branches (cf. e.g. 
Baum, 1997b ). 
In the view of a prominent American observer 'administrative guidance 
not justifiable law is the predominant instrument of bureaucratic power [in 
Japanese governments]. But administrative guidance should not be regarded 
as law. It is at best a-legal, and at worst illegal' (Henderson, 1991). Another 
evaluation matches this pretty closely: 'In Japan informal enforcement is not 
a process of governing, but has become the process of governing' (Haley, 
1991). 
The fourth characteristic feature is limited competition bolstered by 
pervasive entry controls, exclusion of outsiders, and strict market 
segmentation between securities business, trust and retail banking, 
insurance, and the like. Japan's financial markets were governed till very 
recently by an important although unwritten rule: any kind of business 
activity that was not expressively allowed was forbidden. Therefore, all 
kinds of business activities, new financial products, and so forth needed to 
be licensed by the Ministry of Finance, the (in)famous 'licensing system.' 
The granting of a licence was in most cases discretionary. The pace of 
innovation used to be set by the weakest members of an industry, the so-
called 'convoy system.' 
This protected the industry in a cartel-like manner. Furthermore, in the 
securities market for a long time the MoF used the four big securities firms 
tl1at dominated the market as 'foot soldiers' to regulate the industry. The 
MoF created some kind of 'public-private joint venture' for capital market 
regulation (Milhaupt, 1994), that helped the understaffed Ministry and 
secured an overwhelming market share for the Big Four. By using the 
licensing system the Ministry restrained the entry of potential competitors. 
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Foreign financial institutions had rather painful experiences when they tried 
to enter the Japanese market in larger numbers in the 1980s. Interested 
Japanese institutions needed more than a decade of discussion and pressure 
before they finally received the chance to do business in different segments 
of the market via subsidiaries in the 1990s. The result was anti-competitive 
pricing and cartel-like allocation of rents. Examples of these are the long 
time fixed interests rates that were only fully liberated in the early 1990s and 
the fixed commissions for brokers that were fully liberalized only in 1999. 
In case of failure, there was an unwritten guarantee for help by stronger 
members of the industry or, as last resort, public money (cf. Kanda, 1997a). 
Among other things, this has led to dicing with morality and the reckless 
lending, leading to the bubble and ultimately the crash (cf. Milhaupt and 
Miller, 1997b; Schaede, 1996). 
A .fifth important characteristic is a process of pre-clearance or 'ex ante 
monitoring' that has to large degree substituted the 'ex post monitoring' by 
the courts seen in other financial markets like the US market (Kanda, 1991 
and 1997a). Parties with multiple interests participate in the administrative 
rulemaking process via advisory councils (shingi-kai). In other words, 
bureaucrats and industry are involved in the rulemaking procedure. 
Compromises reached informally with the parties concerned during that 
procedure help to promote acceptance. 
However, there often seems to be less positive co-ordination - open 
negotiations within the ministerial bureaucracy - than there is some kind of 
negative co-ordination, meaning the endeavour of leading bureaucrats to 
r~strict options a priori in such a way that there is potential consensus 
between all parties on any alternative. This constitutes the negative way of 
consensus finding by a priori exclusion of options that are deemed 
undesirable, and ensures that no one will lose face and the outcome of 
negotiations will not be totally unexpected. In any case, at least in the past, 
this mechanism has worked. There have been next to no judicial challenges 
to financial legislation or administrative rules. The process of ex ante 
monitoring promoting acceptance of specific regulatory outcome is 
reinforced by the fact that compliance with regulation in a given situation 
means in most cases compliance with administrative guidance. As that is 
considered legally 'voluntary,' there is little ground for a judicial review by 
the courts in such a case. 
The central aim of this cartel-like regulatory regime has been - and to a 
somewhat lesser degree still is - to generate and allocate rents. As Milhaupt 
and Miller (1997a) have observed, 'votes, political patronage, and bribes are 
allocated among the political elite; regulatory property rights and 
concomitant distributions of power, prestige and budgetary appropriations 
are allocated among separate ministries; similar rights are allocated among 
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intra-ministry bureaux; licenses to engage in lucrative activities are allocated 
among industries; and profits are allocated among large and small firms.' As 
always with all cartels, the consumers paid the price and the system did run 
into difficulties when outsiders started to enter the field and losses had to be 
allocated. 
This regulatory structure obviously differs - in parts to a significant 
degree - from the regulatory approaches to be observed in other inter-
national financial markets. As in more or less all sectors of the Japanese 
financial system severe regulatory problems have surfaced which have 
exposed systemic defects, taking the part for the whole we may be able to 
see some limitations of the overall Japanese regulatory model based on the 
idea of a strong state and paternalistic governance (Nakatani, 1997; 
Milhaupt and Miller, 1997b) that is still heralded by some as the future 
blueprint for regulation in advanced economies (cf. e.g. Dore, 1999). 
REGULA TORY CHALLENGES OF GLOBALIZATION 
To the extent it did work, the paternalistic and cartel-like regulatory system 
could only function as long as financial markets were closed. For the 
reasons described above (pp. 136-9) that is no longer feasible. The same 
profound impact globalization has on other financial markets and their 
regulation can now be felt in Japan, too. The result is a double challenge to 
the Japanese policy makers. They have to cope with substantial hangovers of 
the financial mess caused by the bursting of the 'bubble' and at the same 
time they have to prepare somewhat belatedly for the 'brave new world' of 
globalized finance. 
The dynamics of the internationalization of investment and finance can 
be mainly traced back to (a) innovation in information and communication 
technologies; (b) government policies easing cross-border capital flows and 
market access by deregulation; (c) the institutionalization (and professionali-
zation) of market participants; and (d) increasing importance of equity 
financing accompanied by disintermediation, securitization, and develop-
ment of new financial products (cf. Baum, 2000). 
Globalized financial markets confront national policy makers with a 
specific trilemma which can be labelled the 'impossible trinity' (Beddoes, 
1999). A policy maker may very much want to achieve three goals when 
designing a financial system: (1) continuing national sovereignty; (2) 
financial markets that are regulated, supervised, and somehow protected; 
and (3) the advantages of a globalized capital market. Unfortunately these 
three objectives are incompatible. 
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Any coherent reform cannot avoid favoring two parts of the trinity at the 
expense of the third. If the regulation of the market as well as the 
maintaining of national sovereignty is the primary objective, capital market 
integration will have to be sacrificed. If, on the other hand, capital market 
integration and global regulation are the dominant aims of reform, this can 
only be achieved at the expense of national sovereignty. If, thirdly, the 
policy maker wishes to keep sovereignty and at the same time allow the 
integration of capital markets, he has to accept an entirely free market 
structure at the global level. 
The dynamics described above have already led to significantly 
intensified competition worldwide, not only among market participants, but 
also among national markets and their regulatory systems as such. 
Globalization makes weaknesses in individual financial markets more 
transparent than before (Mailander, 1997 /98). At the same time it provides 
open markets and advanced technology institutional investors with the 
chance of a regulatory arbitrage. Internet technology especially is 
increasingly providing an extremely efficient exit option. 
A competitive market for regulatory regimes challenges not only the 
cross-border or international aspects of financial regulation, but to an even 
greater extent it confronts the domestic regulatory substance. Here lies the 
core of the 'regulatory challenge' in the financial markets for national 
legislators and administrators (Baum, 2000). To the extent that a national 
regulation only requires what the market would provide in any case, no 
difficulties will arise, but the rule seems rather pointless. If, however, 
something is required that the market would otherwise not provide because 
market participants are disinterested and not willing to pay for it, regulatory 
competition will undermine the specific market design. 
Regulators can only enforce such a market structure if they have the 
means to suppress regulatory competition successfully. The 'classic way' to 
do so is to make an agreement with your competitors not to compete (Kitch, 
1996). In a globalized market the only acceptable way to suppress regulatory 
competition is by legal harmonization. From this perspective, an inter-
national harmonization arrangement can be viewed as something similar to a 
'cartel arrangement' that limits supranational competition among national 
regulatory regimes for the sake of keeping market forces at bay. However, 
as this is not a likely option at the moment, national policy makers are better 
advised to reform their regulatory regimes in a functional and attractive way 
that maintains the right balance between de-regulation and re-regulation. 
And indeed this is what we have seen happening over the last years in most 
international financial centres. Somewhat late, the Japanese policy makers 
too have joined the race. 
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CHANGE OF THE REGULATORY PARADIGM? 
Attempts to reform Japan's financial system had cautiously got off to a start 
already in the 1980s. Those were focused mostly on a careful loosening of 
the strict market fragmentation. But in contrast to the British liberalization, 
the so called 'Big Bang' of 1986, that opened up the market and allowed 
foreign investment banks to take over weak domestic institutions, the 
Japanese refonns were structured in a way that secured the survival of 
domestic institutions and kept most foreigners out (Vogel, 1996). In the 
wake of a number of scandals including insider trading and large-scale loss 
compensating by securities firms to favored clients, the government tried to 
improve market surveillance and to create an independent supervisory 
agency. But these reform proposals met fierce resistance from the MoF (cf. 
Char, 1993). The ministry was able to defend its position and to water down 
the reforms (cf. Milhaupt, 1994). The result was the creation of a semi-
independent body, the so-called Securities and Exchange Surveillance 
Commission (SESC) in 1992. This was in effect nothing more than renamed 
bureau of the MoF stacked with people from the ministry and with no 
powers of its own to impose sanctions in case of violations of the SEL (cf. 
Keehn, 1997). 
The picture started to change somewhat in November 1996 when then 
Prime Minister Hashimoto announced a comprehensive reform package -
dubbed 'Big Bang' after the British reform of 1986 - to be implemented 
over a five year period till 2001. The reform proposals were backed by 
important advisory councils that called for a complete overhaul of the 
regulatory structure and policies governing Japanese finance towards a more 
market-oriented system with the aim of reviving the Tokyo market into a 
financial market comparable to those of New York and London (cf. 
Royama, 1998). Implementation of the various interconnected individual 
reform steps started in late 1997 and is still ongoing. Whether the planned 
time schedule can be kept to remains to be seen. The complex structure of 
the Japanese Big Bang cannot be described here in detail.6 However, the 
most important elements of the reform and the date of becoming effective 
are (cf. Kanda 2000): 
- Lifting of the ban on holding companies (December 1997); 
- Abolition of exchange controls (April 1998); 
- Setting up of new and independent supervisory and regulatory agencies: 
the Financial Supervisory Agency, FSA (June 1998), and the Financial 
Reconstruction Commission, FRC (December 1998); 
- Securing of loans, receivables, and real property (September 1998); 
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- Changing from the licensing to a registration system with respect to 
market entry (December 1998); 
- Full liberalization of brokerage commissions (October 1999); 
- Improvement in accounting (fiscal year 1999); 
Defragmentation among banking, securities business, and insurance 
industry ( ongoing). 
1 'he reforms are praised as a breakthrough and a radical change from the 
'ancient regime' (Oda, 1998) and regarded as a shift from industry to market 
protection as well as a shift from direct to indirect protection of markets 
(Kanda, 1997b). The probable impact on the Japanese economy will be a 
change from a bank-centred to a capital market-centred system in which the 
emphasis shifts from stability to adaptability resulting in a greater choice for 
investors and consumers (Kanda, 2000). 
The long-term implication for the legal system may be substantial too. 
The aforementioned ex ante monitoring will probably lose some of its 
importance over time, and ex post monitoring by courts will accordingly 
increase. The judiciary has to respond to the change towards a rule-based 
system of finance by becoming larger and one likely and necessary outcome 
wi II be a drastic increase in the number of lawyers (Kanda, 2000). 
Less clear is the future role of the financial bureaucracy. For sure, its 
powers have become diminished but to what extent remains to be seen. In 
the past, it has managed to keep its power and to stick basically to its way of 
regulating the markets in spite of obvious setbacks and strong public 
criticism by cleverly averting or, if need be, adapting reforms to its needs. 
This time it may be more difficult, but although the ministry has clearly lost 
its supervisory functions, it has retained the more important policy super-
vision and kept the exclusive right to draw up the national budget. More 
generally, it has maintained its capacity for 'steering Japanese funds to 
public ends' (Norville, 1998). Also its system of recruitment and retirement 
- 'the University of Tokyo club-type entry and the amakudari exit' 
( Hartcher, 1998) - has remained largely intact. 
A full implementation of the reforms may take longer than five years 
given the fact that so much of the ruling LOP and the bureaucracy rest on 
the support of the inefficient sectors that have most to lose by the very 
reforms.7 However, given the present state of affairs and the pressures of 
globalization, reforms will come and they will unlock Japan's enormous 
potential blocked at the moment by a straitjacket of obsolete institutions 
(Katz, 1998). At least one positive outcome is obvious: the improved access 
to the Japanese market for foreign financial institutions, which has been 
rather limited for a long time (cf. Baum, 1995b). Some such bodies were not 
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only allowed but also even encouraged to take over (ailing) Japanese banks, 
securities companies, and insurers. 
Another question is to what extent we can expect a convergence of 
Japan's political economy and regulation with the Anglo-American model. 
A far-reaching convergence can be ruled out with respect to the staying 
power of institutions and path-dependent development ( cf. Baum, 1998; 
Yamamura, 1997). But freer and more strongly market-oriented structures 
will at least partly (and gradually) replace the paternalistic cartel-like 
rngulatory regime. However, although the present reform has brought a 
liberalization of rules, it has just begun to make 'a dent in the traditional 
procedures for making and implementing financial regulation in Japan' 
(Norville, 1998). 
NOTES 
1 Parts of this article are based on Baum, 1997a. 
2 See <http://www.doyukai.or.jp/database/teigen /970624e.htm>. 
3 Shaken torihiki-h6, Law No. 25 of 1948 as amended. 
4 17 C.F.R. § 240. IOb-5. 
5 See also Kanda 1997a, Baum 1997b, Schaede 1996, Milhaupt 1994, 
Baum/Hayakawa 1994, Kanda 1991, Henderson 1991, each empha-
sizing different aspects of the regulatory regime. 
6 For a general overview and analysis see Kanda 2000 and 1997b, and 
Oda 1998. A discussion of special features of the reforms can be found 
with e.g. Hall 1999, 1998a, 1998b, 1998c, McAlinn 1999, Wiley 1999, 
Satusky 1999, Thorson and Siegfanz 1999, Sibbitt 1998, and Ruback 
1998. Reports of the advisory councils as well as information about the 
goals of the reform, details of individual segments, and the current state 
of implementation are available in English at the website of the Ministry 
of Finance <http://www.mof.go.jp>. 
7 An example is the forced resignation of the chairman of the FRC, 
Michio Ochi, in February 2000, after he publicly stated that the FSA 
might be 'unduly severe' with its inspections of the hundreds of small 
credit unions and credit associations that are also weighted down with 
bad loans. Together with the numerous agriculture co-operatives, these 
may be the worst bit of Japan's financial mess still waiting to be cleaned 
up; cf. The Economist, 4 March 2000, p. 89. Another example is the 
delay in ending the full protection of deposits by the government. This 
was scheduled for April 2001 but that date has been postponed for at 
least a year, as it would have exposed the weakest lenders to market 
forces. 
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CHAPTER6 
THE RULE OF LAW OR LAW AS INSTRUMENT OF RULE? 
LAW AND THE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF JAPAN 
WITH PARTICULAR REGARD TO INDUSTRIAL POLICY1 
RICHARD BOYD 
'Rule of law rhetoric is all around us ... in the business press, in the 
publications of the World Bank, IMF and ADB' notes Ohnesorge elsewhere 
in this volume. He further notes that, 'the rule of law is not being touted in 
these primarily for its traditional political role as a protector of human rights 
and individual dignity. Rather the new rhetoric makes the claim that the rule 
of law is a crucial element in economic development, not only in former 
socialist countries but in poor capitalist countries as well' (Ohnesorge, 
2000:2). 
Undoubtedly the observation is sound.2 It is, however, the merits of the 
claim itself that will be at issue in this chapter. Accordingly, it is worth 
saying at the outset, given that the erecting of straw men for subsequent 
demolition is not the most profitable use of the reader's time, that the 
linkage between the rule of law and economic development does not seem 
critical in the Japanese case at least. A first proximate reaction is that 
economic development was well under way in Japan and certainly predated 
the codification of law along Western lines at the end of the nineteenth 
century. A second reaction is that in so far as law figures - if at all - in the 
vast literatures concerning the economic development of Japan it is with 
respect to the possibilities it affords of administrative discretion in pursuit of 
developmental ends. That is almost the diametric opposite of the role for law 
envisioned by the institutions referred to above. As far as the 'rule oflaw' is 
concerned, particularly if this is to be understood in the strong sense as a set 
of formal, universal overarching constraints upon the actions of all players 
including government, there would seem, again at first sight, to be problems. 
Certainly there are those who would argue that the rule of law is something 
which might better be understood as a goal, than as a precondition of 
Japan's economic growth but even this could not be taken as read. An 
empirical exercise to establish whether or not and, if so, how far the 'rule of 
law' is goal or norm in Japan would be required. In short there would seem 
to be problems aplenty with the rhetoric of the rule of law in the case of 
Japan. To be blunt, the primafacie evidence suggests that the Japanese case 
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does not confirm the rule of law hypothesis. Does this matter? It should but 
there are reasons to doubt that it does or will. At issue is the way in which 
the mainstream literatures (that is literatures that have as their first empirical 
point of reference the countries of the West) deal with East Asian cases. 
Johnson (1988) and Wade (1992) are only two of the serious minded 
scholars who have come close to irritation at the willingness to downplay, to 
marginalize, or to explain away the significance of uncomfortable Asian 
cases. There is a more sophisticated but no less dubious response to the case 
study that refutes the existence or the significance of what is said originally 
to be the cause. This is the search for the functional analogue - a 'something 
else' that does the job that (in this case) the rule of law would otherwise 
have done. Quite what conditions govern and produce the 'otherwise' is not 
usually clear but seems to be a matter of culture or time. To complete the 
puzzle, a curious logic has it that if the analogue is discovered the 
significance of the supposed original is thereby confirmed. The chapter 
proceeds from the assumption that there is little profit to be derived from the 
pursuit of the 'functional analogue,' (in Japan) to the presumed role of the 
rule of law in economic development. Not least of the reasons is that the 
underlying equation proceeds as if the latter (the rule of law) was the 
preferred means of history when history was fully awake or at least closer to 
'home' but which might be substituted for when history was dozy and 
distant. The objection is simple; Japan is not a marginal case. It is one of the 
world's leading economies and remains so - notwithstanding apprehensions 
borne of the 'Asia Crisis.' Theory embraces Japan as a central empirical 
referent or is found wanting. More specifically, if theories regarding the rule 
of law and economic development are robust and persuasive they apply to 
Japan. If on close examination they prove not to, then the theory itself 
comes fundamentally into question. 
Accordingly and broadly, the approach taken in this chapter will be to 
list the claims made for the rule of law, to check how far these have figured 
in the principal explanations of East Asian growth in general, and to move 
then to an assessment of how far law has figured in the analysis of the 
Japanese case. This will entail a brief historical sketch of the place of law in 
the economic development of Japan with particular regard to the hypotheses 
of the rule of law rhetoric (does Japan seem to confirm or refute them?) 
before an argument is developed along the lines that economic growth began 
in Japan long before the codification of property rights and that there is an 
entrenched legal tradition in Japan which understands law as the instrument 
of rule, as the tool rather than the limit of office. In the second part of the 
chapter the general and historical account of the first part will be set against 
a case study to anchor discussion, a case adumbrated to be sure, but 
nonetheless a means of moving from the abstract and hypothetical to the 
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specific and empirical, from an economic context of growth to one of 
decline - a distinction of importance for the possibilities of political agency 
and equally a means of illustrating the extent to which legal and bureaucratic 
traditions persist. A particular concern will be the elucidation of the actual 
rather than the hypothesized significance of law in the management of 
economic change. 
DEFINITIONAL PRELIMINARIES 
Given the weight and importance of Japan in the world economy and even 
more so of the importance of Japan as a developmental success story, then 
the relative insignificance of law as a factor in the explanation of this case 
might prompt a degree of surprise at the attention which has been given to a 
hypothesis which falls at the first fence. The answer in part must be that for 
all its intellectual weaknesses, (problems of precision, conceptualization, 
verification, seeming incompatibility with significant cases) there are sound 
pragmatic reasons for the rhetoric. Bankers and bureaucrats in international 
organizations are practical men and they are accountable to publics for their 
management of large sums of other people's money. Fiascos such as that 
which attended the IMF's expensive and fruitless involvement with Russia 
are unwelcome and not to be repeated. They are likely to prompt a rethink-
ing of the security of investments and to predispose such organizations to 
favour investments in countries where the 'rule of law' lessens the 
likelihood that public monies will be diverted for private ends. From such a 
perspective it may well seem axiomatic that the rule of law is the 
precondition for economic development. Doubtless security and predictabi-
1 ity are a prerequisite of sustained economic performance and rare is the 
entrepreneur who does not perceive the converse as a threat to business. 
This sits easily as an intuition. It has also benefited from substantial 
empirical support. Thus the rule of law in terms of the existence of secure 
property rights is a determinant of the likelihood of the transfer of 
technology, incontestably an important element in economic development. 
Mansfield's study (Mansfield, 1994) concludes that the strength or weakness 
of a country's system of intellectual property protection has a substantial 
effect, particularly in high-technology industries, on the kinds of technology 
US firms will transfer to that country. Intellectual property rights also 
influence the extent of US foreign direct investment. This is true not only of 
property rights and not only in technology transfer. Brunetti and his 
colleagues set out to explore systematically the case studies and anecdotal 
evidence that have suggested that uncertainty about policies, laws, and 
regulations has hampered development of the private sector in many 
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developing countries. The authors present results from a cross-country 
survey that provides comparable data on local investors' problems in dealing 
with the state. The survey was conducted in 69 countries and covers more 
than 3,600 entrepreneurs. It explores investors' perceptions of such issues as 
the predictability of laws and policies, the reliability of the judiciary, 
corruption in bureaucracies, and security of property rights. Perhaps not 
surprisingly the study found that in less developed countries the majority of 
entrepreneurs constantly fear policy surprises and unexpected changes in 
rules that can seriously affect their business. They note also that 
entrepreneurs world wide feel that the cost of doing business is substantially 
increased by theft and crime and in many developing countries the business 
community feels that authorities do not adequately guarantee their personal 
safety and do not reliably enforce their property rights. Unreliable 
judiciaries are perceived as major problems in many developing countries 
(particularly in the Commonwealth of Independent States and in Latin 
American countries). Entrepreneurs in Asia have the most trust in 
government announcements of policy changes and changes in rules; 
entrepreneurs in the Commonwealth of Independent States are the most 
cynical about new announcements; and half of businessmen surveyed in 
Latin America and Central and Eastern Europe do not believe government 
announcements (Brunetti, 1997). 
At a practical level Brunetti's findings are striking but they do not 
amount to a case for the rule of law rhetoric. Quite simply because what is 
critical for the entrepreneur is predictability and while the rule of law may 
be one means of securing this it is not the only means. Trust is equally adept 
and in fact the study affords empirical support for the importance in 
economic affairs of trust in line with the claims of a rapidly expanding 
literature on this theme. The practical and pragmatic arguments for linking 
the rule of law and economic development are real enough but they fall 
short of an adequate theoretical account of the linkage. Scholarly legitimacy 
for this came in the wake of the writings of North and Thomas (1973), 
which championed the view that the right to property is a fundamental 
institutional condition for market based economic development - a view to 
which North remains committed 25 years later (North, 1998:553). The rule 
of law rhetoric has come to embrace rather more than property rights; at 
times attention shifts to the guarantee (so to both the law and to its effective 
enforcement) of economic rights, concretely intellectual property rights, and 
the right to compete, so to competition law and to competition policy. The 
former (intellectual property rights) will not figure in this discussion, the 
latter, competition law and practice will. The rhetoric also makes claims as 
to the status of law in respect of the state itself. Here the explicit normative 
concern is that the state and its agents should be subject to, constrained and 
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limited by law - a concern that moves issues of bureaucratic discretion and 
of administrative accountability to centre stage. In this second sense the 
rhetoric would have it again that the rule of law is the essential precondition 
for market based economic development. Here too discussion slips quickly 
from the abstract to the concrete and so to the institutions and procedures 
which lock private and public actors into binding legal relations the nature, 
terms and limits of which are determined not by the public actors more than 
tile private actors, not indeed by the actors themselves but by courts and 
judges. Issues of bureaucratic discretion and of the justiciability of 
administrative acts will become central. We will look now more closely at 
how far law figures in the standard explanations of economic growth in East 
Asia before turning to the particular case of Japan. In respect of Japan our 
survey will look at the economic development of Japan in general in the 
context of growth and offer a brief historical sketch of some relevant 
features of Japanese legal tradition before turning to the concrete and 
particular experience of law in the management of decline in heavy industry 
in the post-war period. 
THE PLACE OF LAW IN THE DEBATE OVER 
EAST ASIAN DEVELOPMENT 
When we turn from general considerations to the substance of East Asian 
development we find, inter alia, a body of neo-liberal writing on East Asian 
development within which it is axiomatic that a sound and reliable legal 
system which guarantees property rights is one of the essential 'public 
goods' to be provided by a government sensitive to its proper role.3 Once 
law is enforced, the argument is competitive markets will emerge to pennit 
efficient resource allocation which is the sufficient basis for long-term 
growth. This much is axiomatic. The axiom is, however, better regarded as a 
core presumption of the neo-liberal view - so obvious as to require neither 
evidence nor argument. Thus for Hughes 'Political stability and the rule of 
law are essential' (Hughes, 1988) while Riedel asserts that 'neo-classical 
principles are alive and well, and working particularly effectively in the East 
Asian countries. Once public goods are provided for ... markets seem to do 
the job of allocating resources reasonably well.4 The adequacy of the neo-
liberal explanation of East Asian development has been widely questioned5 
but it is not, in general at issue here where the concern is the rule of law. In 
so far as this has a place in the literatures on East Asian development it does 
so within the corpus of neo-liberal work where it figures as an untested 
(untestable?) unevidenced presumption of an approach that has been 
generalized to East Asia. 
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The thrust of the literature is elsewhere. Studies of the role of government in 
the provision of public goods and in the direct promotion of economic 
growth led to characterizations of East Asian growth in terms of the 
developmental state.6 This was controversial once, precisely because of its 
challenge to neo-liberal views to which it has long been empirically richer 
and historically more sensitive. It is less controversial now at a time when 
the WDB itself has seen fit to commission studies on the role of government 
in East Asian development7 we will return to these shortly. For the moment 
it is sufficient to note that law, much less the rule of law is not held to be a 
feature of the developmental state in its various guises. An early and 
influential account put it (effectively the key features of the developmental 
state) as follows: 
My contention is that the Japanese, Koreans and Taiwanese have put 
together the political economy of capitalism in ways unprecedented 
in the West ... [These are] (1) Financial control over the economy; 
(2) labour relations; (3) the degree of autonomy of the economic 
bureaucracy; ( 4) the degree to which the state has been captured by 
its main economic clients; (5) the balance between incentive and 
command in economic guidance; (6) special private sector 
organizations ... and (7) the role of foreign capital (Johnson, 
1987:147). 
Law is undoubtedly an aspect or an instrument of each of these but it is not 
an item on the list. Legislation for property rights barely merits a mention in 
the literature. The central bone of contention in the initial debate between 
those broadly supportive of the developmental state and market theorists 
was the evaluation of government intervention and of its significance for 
economic outcomes. There are signs a decade or two on that the boundaries 
between the camps are blurred and a role for government beyond the 
provision of 'pure' public goods is universally acknowledged (Aoki et al., 
1998). In so far as this is true then the implications for the rhetoric of the 
rule of law are substantial since there are moments in the literature at which 
a very wide ranging bureaucratic discretion (almost the inverse, we have 
noted, of norms envisaged by the rule of law rhetoric) is presented as the 
privileged means of successful government intervention. 
The World Bank, arguably the principal institutional support of the 
rhetoric of the rule of law, made its own authoritative contribution to the 
East Asian Development debate with the publication of its report The East 
Asian Miracle in 1993 (World Bank, 1993). The report argued that the 
diversity of experience, the variety of institutions, and the variations in the 
policies of the High Performing East Asian Economies did not permit one to 
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speak of a single model - tacit rejection of the developmental state thesis. 
However, there are lessons that might be learnt from Asia; first it is essential 
to get the fundamentals right, (and one such is the rule of law) thereafter 
high levels of domestic saving, broad based human capital, good macro-
economic management, and limited price distortions provide the basis for 
growth. The report garnered little sympathy in East Asia either in the course 
of its preparation (Wade, 1996) or consequently upon its publication. The 
Institute of Developing Economies (IDE) in Tokyo prepared its own 
counterblast because it believed that the Bank was simply wrong. 'We 
questioned whether the World Bank had actually discovered the secret of 
growth in the East Asian area' (Yanagihara and Sambommatsu, 1997:v). 
The IDE implicitly rejects the 'rule of law' approach: in their study 'law' in 
the sense of the drafting of basic market rules is subsumed under one of five 
rubrics - government policies and institutions concerning the establishment 
of the market system. Under this heading are three groups of policies and 
systems; 'i) those having to do with the drafting of basic market rules, 
including civil and commercial law, ii) those having to do with the fostering 
of various markets including such economic agents as companies and iii) 
those which complement and support economic co-ordination of private 
investment' (ibid:xv). Of these three elements only ii) and iii), and so not 
law, are said to have played important roles. A possible reason for this view 
is offered in the keynote address of Masahiro Okuno-Fujiwara. He contrasts 
the situation in communities or kinship relations of the sort which obtained 
in pre-industrial Japan where economic transactions are agreed upon by trust 
and where 'individuals violating the agreements are expelled from the group 
or penalized in some other manner, so an incentive is given to honouring the 
agreement' with the circumstances of industrial society. In the latter 
differences of scale, complexity, and mobility are such that trust based 
systems can no longer cope. These require a framework so that all members 
know what the agreements are and who has offended them. There follows 
the requirement for a fixed membership and a fairly small membership at 
that so that the costs of managing the requisite information do not become 
excessive. In industrial society power displaces trust as the basis for the 
implementation of agreements. This entails legal institutions to enforce 
social agreements, contracts in law to guarantee private agreements, courts 
and other parties to decide whether an agreement has been broken or not and 
if so to enforce the punishment. The rule of law is ideally suited to the 
challenges of scale, complexity, and mobility since it permits even complete 
strangers to enter safely into economic agreements. 
Ideally suited to the demands of industrial society this mode of enforcing 
economic agreements though the rule of law may be, it is no guarantee of 
economic growth since even if property rights systems are set up and courts, 
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police, and other authorities are established, it does not mean that the market 
mechanism will start to function immediately. Indeed the fundamental 
problem often is that either there is no market 'or what market ever there is 
does not work sufficiently' (ibid:462) - a problem which the rule of law 
discourse does not address. Simply put the rule of law tells us nothing about 
the emergence of the market, of the transformation of peasant producers into 
industrial workers, about the processes which expanded the labour market, 
endowed the labour force with the necessary and changing mix of skills for 
growth, determined the pattern of wage negotiation and gave (Japanese) 
industry its distinctive employer-employee relations (Lapavitsas, 1990). 
LAW AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN JAPAN 
The Japanese case is paradigmatic, the critical and indispensable empirical 
referent for the developmental state and equally for the thinking which 
underpins the market enhancing view endorsed by recent World Bank 
commissioned studies (see above). 
It is to Japan that we now tum. A useful starting point is a thoughtful 
piece by Raphael and Rohlen with the challenging title, 'How many models 
of Japanese growth do we want or need?' (Raphael and Rohlen, 1998). 
Property Rights and the Economic Development of Japan 
Their informed and authoritative synthesis downplays the development state 
but makes of property rights no more than an item in a list: '(the Meiji 
leadership) - they tell us - created institutions to support modem business 
(universal commercial codes and property right laws, a national banking and 
financial system, etc.) (ibid:281). In their account not only are property 
rights an item in a list (so ingredient rather than precondition) but the 
absence of the rule of law (in the sense of constraints on bureaucratic 
discretion) is more important than its presence - thus we are reminded that 
'strategic industries evolved ties between government and business that 
became the foundation of the post World War II system (involving frequent 
consultation, recourse to various instruments supporting entire sectors, 
industry compliance with "administrative guidance," and so forth)' 
(ibid:282). In fact it was not until the 1870s that property rights were legally 
protected by statute in Japan. First to be established was a property right to 
land. This entailed the identification by the government of owners of land, 
the issuance of certificates, setting land prices as the criterion of taxation, 
and the imposition of a land tax. The process of codification generalized 
property rights and transaction rules begun in 1879 on the basis of French 
(civil law) and German (commercial law) models. It was completed in 1900. 
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These facts are silent as to the relationship between property rights establi-
shed by legal statute and economic development. Okazaki and Okuno-
Fujiwara8 two prominent scholars who have present a comprehensive listing 
of the institutional foundations of growth in Japan include property rights 
but posit no causal relation between the two and provide no empirical 
evidence of such a relationship. However the temptation to assume such a 
linkage is almost too much for another contributor to the World Bank 
volume. Feeney points out that property rights were the institutional 
predicate of the new taxation system and that this perhaps (it is Feeney's 
'perhaps' not ours) provided greater incentives to increase productivity and 
possibly the new formal documentation of individual property rights 
provided security which enhanced the incentives to make long-term 
investments in land quality. From there it is a short step to the assertion that 
the Meiji oligarchs moved quickly to create institutional arrangements in the 
form of individual property rights in land that would underwrite investments 
in productivity growth as well as the transfer of agricultural surpluses to the 
financing of industrialization. Feeney provides no evidence to suggest that 
this was either the intention or the outcome (Feeney 1998). How could he? 
A moment's reflection confirms how unlikely all this is. If the evidence 
existed we could only stand back and wonder at the sagacity, far-
sightedness, and public spiritedness of these Japanese leaders to conceive 
such a strategy, marvel at their genius in implementing their strategy, and 
warmly recommend them all (posthumously) for senior positions at the 
World Bank. 
The fact of the matter is that de facto property rights existed prior to the 
legal codifications of the 1890s; that the imposition of control and regulation 
are of great urgency to a newly nascent state and that the establishment of a 
taxation system affords immediate benefits to the fledgling state which are 
first and foremost political. Haley is of the same opinion. He notes the 
existence in the Tokugawa period and prior to the interventions of Meiji law 
makers of de facto property rights. He cites with approval a contemporary 
observer who wrote that 'nearly all of the presumably new, Western derived 
.institutions of the 1890 codes with respect to property rights and commercial 
practices were analogous to pre-existing institutions and practices (Haley, 
1991 :70). Japan had also long been familiar with registry systems, complex 
procedures for adjudication, and sophisticated commercial instruments. How 
long is long? Well, at least as far back as the seventeenth century (land 
registers and personal registration) and earlier still for sophisticated 
adjudication procedures. Interestingly, the expansion of adjudication 
procedures in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries was stimulated by the 
growth of commercial activity at that time - rather than the converse. By the 
end of the eighteenth century a wide range of commercial instruments was 
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in place: shares in commercial enterprises, certification, promissory notes 
and different types of bills of exchange. 
In short de facto property rights developed during the Tokugawa era. 
This does not in itself constitute a challenge to the property rights -
economic development equation9 but it obliges one to recognize, in the 
Japanese case at least, the reciprocal nature of economic activity and the 
development of rights in property and techniques of adjudication and it 
causes one to doubt the catalytic and transformational nature of the 
legislation enacted by the Meiji state. Haley has no doubts, 'for the most 
part the new codes and statutes were responses as a means of regulation and 
control rather than catalysts to entrepreneurial activity. New legislation was 
prompted less by the desire to initiate or stimulate economic growth than a 
felt need to channel and control economic activity' (Haley, 1991 :72). And 
we might add, that the development of the taxation system was motivated 
not least by the desire to secure the fiscal foundations of the new state. In 
short legal codification was an adjunct to rule. In this respect the Meiji 
leaders construed Western law in traditional East Asian terms: that is law as 
an instrument of the state, as a privileged means of rule. At this point 
'property rights' and the 'rule of law' which have coexisted quite happily 
within the rhetoric of the rule of law come together in a highly paradoxical 
relationship; seemingly, (the claim is) the guarantee of the private realm and 
of private economic activity (the market) but simultaneously an 
endorsement of the privileges of the state over and above those of the law. 
The point is important enough to detain us a while. 
The Relationship between 'Rule' and 'Law' in the Economic 
Development of Japan 
The understanding and practice of law as the instrument of rule has been 
described as the essence of the Japanese legal tradition: 'a tradition in which 
law was no more nor less than an indispensable instrument of state control' 
(Haley, 1991:19). Self evidently traditions do not persist unchanged and 
unchanging across the centuries. In so far as they do persist it speaks more 
of their contemporary utility than of any historical inertia. Japan has known 
a long history of adaptation of its own institutions and of the importing of 
and accommodation to the (legal) institutions of China and of the West. But 
that there is a Japanese legal tradition is beyond doubt. That tradition in the 
late Tokugawa period neither recognized law as the source of authority nor 
as the determinant of the limits of rule. This is not to say that within the 
Japanese legal tradition there was no notion of law as a constraint upon the 
exercise of the power of the state. By the end of the Tokugawa period a 
complex and highly evolved set of legal institutions were in place but these 
had no more than a certain disciplinary status. Equally the understanding 
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developed that the legitimacy of rule was related to questions of law but 
here law was the emblem not the source of authority - a distinction that is 
fundamental but refractory to presentation in the legal formulae of the West. 
The conception of law as the instrument of rule governed the approach of 
Meiji leaders to the progress of legal reform in the late nineteenth century. 
Indeed the process was substantially driven by the desire to expand the 
instrumentality of the state. Haley perfectly communicates the excitement of 
Meiji leaders on discovery of the possibilities available to rulers that were 
inherent in Western legal codes. Thus, the Dutch civil code was 'an 
excellent instrument for regulating the people.' The French civil code was 
possibly even more functional for rule. 'Almost every order issued by 
Napoleon [III], the present emperor, is rooted in this code' (!) (Haley, 
1991:74). In short even with regard to private law the dominant conception 
was not of an autonomous private realm but of enhanced possibilities of 
societal regulation by the state. With the promulgation of the Meiji 
constitution in 1889 (enacted in 1890) the principle of Japan's admini-
strative law, that is an administration based on law and in compliance with 
law, was established. The arrangement was defective when viewed from the 
perspective of the rule of law (Ogawa, 1984:13). The chief limitation was 
tile 'independent order of the executive' by virtue of which the Emperor and 
his administrative agencies could enact orders or regulations without 
statutory authority. The limitations were compounded by the weakness of 
tile administrative court system. This was largely borrowed from German 
and Austrian models which separated judicial and administrative 
jurisdictions with the consequence that disputes concerning administrative 
laws were not to be dealt with by regular judicial courts. Moreover the 
actual jurisdiction of the Administrative Court was limited to 'administrative 
litigations enumerated by statute.' The net effect of these limitations was 
that the scope of administration that escaped judicial control was very large 
and became still larger with the growth of the modern economy and the 
associated expansion of bureaucratic activities. This net effect was not 
simply a consequence of, nor was it reducible to, imperfect constitutional 
design or the shortcomings of the Meiji legal and institutional architecture. It 
owed much to, and was designed to protect and to accommodate, the 
Tokugawa legacy of which we have spoken. The Emperor and not the 
people was sovereign. It was the emperor, and not the people and neither 
their agents and representative institutions, who was the legislator. It is 
difficult then to construe the administration as a public service bureaucracy 
fully subject to legal scrutiny. (A much remarked upon weakness of the 
constitutional machinery of Meiji was the rivalry of Diet and Cabinet.) The 
Meiji administration was coterminous with rule. The constitutional 
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arrangements of Meiji recognized this and cemented the practice of 
bureaucratic independence and discretion. 
The process of legal codification and the enactment of the constitution 
itself served neither to eradicate the Tokugawa legacy of law as an instru-
ment of rule nor to transform the status of law to that of overarching con-
straint which would govern and limit the actions of the rulers. Maruyama is 
not only adamant that this did not happen but equally that it was never likely 
to given the highly informal nature of pre-war understandings of sovereignty 
or 'the national order.' The latter was a very powerful notion that reached its 
apogee in the ultra nationalist period. It alluded to the emperor and to the 
gods. It was simultaneously evocative of a quintessential Japan, the people 
and the place itself. Equally, it was a highly nebulous notion and one that 
did not lend itself to formalization and as a taboo even resisted 
formalization. Accordingly, what determined the behaviour of the 
bureaucrats and of the military was not primarily a sense of legality, but the 
consciousness of some force that was higher than they were, in other words 
that was nearer the 'ultimate entity.' Inasmuch as the formal quality of the 
national order was not recognized, it was inevitable that the concept of 
legality should be poorly developed. The law was not regarded as some 
general body of regulations that collectively circumscribed the ruler and the 
ruled, but simply as a concrete weapon of control operating in the hierarchy 
of authority of which the emperor was the head. In a society in which every 
element was judged according its respective connection in a direct vertical 
line with the ultimate entity the exercise of bureaucratic discretion was not 
only likely but also 'legitimate' (Maruyama, 1964). 
This situation obtained for more than fifty years and was, at the very 
least, compatible with extremely fast rates of economic growth. If we date 
the beginnings of modem industry in Japan as somewhere around 1885 then 
we can say that Japan witnessed a century of uninterrupted economic growth 
which saw it transformed from a feudal agricultural economy to a fully 
fledged industrial power on a world scale without the benefit of the rule of 
law if the latter is understood in terms of a framework of overarching legal 
constraint upon the exercise of bureaucratic power. 
Promulgation and enactment of the Showa constitution represented a 
considerable advance both in terms of the rule of law, 'The Rule of Law is a 
fundamental principle underlying the present Constitution' (Oda, 192:35) 
and the development of administrative and judicial remedies for adminis-
trative actions. This is also the period of economic reconstruction, of post-
war recovery and, in the 1960s, of spectacularly high growth. How far was 
this attributable to the constitutional advances initiated by the occupation 
authorities in the establishment of the rule of law? Here caution is in order. 
Many factors other than law were present in a complex equation. So for all 
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that the country knew the bitter taste of defeat and the prodigious damage of 
war, Japan in the post-war period enjoyed enormous advantages compared 
to newly developing countries in face of the challenge of economic 
development. Material losses were enormous but the collective riches of a 
century of industrial experience, the hard won knowledge of what it was to 
be industrial, to work, to profit, familiarity with the challenge of entre-
preneurship and of innovation, of manufacture and distribution, of finance, 
commerce and trade remained in place imprinted on the minds of men and 
women. International circumstances were also propitious; post-war recon-
struction in many lands meant booming markets; economic opportunities 
were presented by new wars which for all their horrors stimulated trade and 
production and in the case of the Korean war renewed confidence in the 
business class; world trade grew exponentially; and to some extent Japan 
had the field to itself, at least competition from the NICs was an anxiety yet 
to be borne. 
Equally any constitutional innovation would have to prove its worth in 
overcoming indigenous resistance. Traditions change of course, but they do 
not surrender lightly particularly when institutionally entrenched and 
championed by powerful interests. And in this case there was reason to 
believe that constitutional arrangements were defective from the first. 
Advances undoubtedly there were. The new constitution requires that the 
Cabinet administer the law faithfully (Article 73 paragraph 1) and ends the 
'independent administrative order.' Henceforth orders that emanate from the 
administration are confined to delegated orders authorized by laws or 
instructions for the execution of laws. 
The Administrative court was abolished and substituted for a system of 
judicial review by the regular courts (see Article 73, paragraph 6 of the 
Constitution, Article 11 of the Cabinet Law and article 12 of the National 
Government Organisation Law and Article 3 of the Court Organisation law). 
A shortcoming of the new arrangements was the absence of legislation for 
general administrative procedures. In the absence of such legislation the 
possibility of effectively monitoring the bureaucratic exercise of power and 
discretion and its conformity to substantive law was decreased (Ogawa, 
1984:13-19). 
As in all other areas of legal and constitutional revision in Japan (much 
as elsewhere) the new arrangements had necessarily to accommodate 
themselves to earlier traditions, arrangements, and understandings. Quite 
what accommodation was to be effected in the post-war period between the 
recently constitutionally entrenched rule of law and the tradition that since 
law is the instrument of rule the 'ruler' is to enjoy a wide margin of 
discretion was suggested by the history of article 14 of the Public 
Prosecutors Office Law (1947). The article in question specified that 'The 
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Minister of Justice may control and supervise public prosecutors generally 
in regard to the functions provided for in articles 4 and 6. However in regard 
to the investigation and disposition of individual cases he may control only 
the Prosecutor General.' Of the functions listed under articles 4 and 6 of 
particular relevance to the current discussion is the prosecutor's function in 
requesting that the courts properly apply the law, in supervising the 
execution of court judgments, investigating cases, and charging crimes. 
Article 14 was widely understood to be a rock upon which the rule of law 
was built from its enactment in 1947. It seemed to guarantee public 
prosecutors from political interference and so helped ensure that all levels of 
rule would be subject to legal scrutiny. This was the understanding at least 
until the eruption of the Shipbuilding scandal in 1954. To be brief 0 more 
than thirty senior officials from the Ministry of Transportation and a number 
of senior politicians received bribes from shipping and ship building 
companies in return for favourable legislation and large government loans 
designed to bail them out of the business downturn at the end of the Korean 
War. Among those implicated was Sato Eisaku, then the Secretary General 
of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party. Had he been arrested, charged, and 
tried the balance between 'rule' and 'law' would have shifted so decisively 
in favour of the latter that it may well have proved possible to speak of the 
rule of law in Japan. It did not happen. Mr Yoshida, the Prime Minister, 
used his authority under article 14 (which is how it now came to be seen) to 
order the postponement of Sato's arrest. The result was a significant 
diminution of the power and political independence of the procuracy. The 
damage to the rule of law was commensurately great. 
What are we to make of this open collision of the interests and privileges 
of rule with the exigencies of the rule of law? It would be wrong to pretend 
that it was a clear-cut matter. Yoshida's decision triggered a furore and 
prompted the resignation of the Minister of Justice. But the furore ultimately 
died down, Yoshida remained in place and the procuracy backed off. It is 
hard to escape the conclusion that even in the full flush of democratic 
reform, (the constitution was not yet ten years old) the norms and 
assumptions of Japanese society favoured a degree of flexibility when rulers 
and the law collide. This is certainly the understanding of a leading authority 
upon Japanese politics who, reflecting upon the axioms and procedural 
assumptions of Japan's political life and with the Shipbuilding scandal of 
1954 very much in mind, echoed the traditional view: 
Political professionals (in Japan) are expected to base their behaviour 
and perform their functions in accordance with law. It is understood 
that the preservation of the Constitution and the legal structure are 
their professional responsibilities. However acting according to the 
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law and performing one's job in accordance with law cannot be 
approved unconditionally ... Political authorities are expected to use 
their discretion in applying the law, taking into consideration 
common understandings as an unwritten law. On the one hand, 
legally unauthorized bureaucratic intervention in the form of adminis-
trative guidance is demanded, and when the political authorities go 
against these expectations they are criticized for being hard headed. 
On the other hand compassionate justice that ignores the legal codes, 
the kind that was shown by Ooka, a famous magistrate in the city of 
Edo during the Tokugawa period is sought, and when this is not 
displayed by the authorities, they are criticized for being inhuman and 
devoid of blood and tears (Kyogoku, 1987:139-40). 
Jt is a long quote from a brilliant observer of the Japanese polity whose 
book, (the source of the quote) Nihon no Seiji (Kyogoku, 1983) was a best-
seller in Japan. Suffice it to say that a) its predicate is an understanding of 
legitimacy which demands the exercise of discretion and which makes of the 
rule of law a mikosh/1 to be borne by the political elite which confirms but 
does not derive its authority in the process and that b) Showa 
constitutional ism has not expunged the tradition of law as the instrument of 
rule and as the badge rather than the source of authority. In short we can say 
that Japan has known a legal tradition, seemingly to the present, in which 
law is understood as the necessary adjunct or legitimating seal of rule but in 
which law is understood neither to be the source of rule and authority nor 
the final determinant of the limits of rule. At its strongest law is seen as the 
instrument of rule, at its weakest (and again to the present) the under-
standing is that the rule of law must be flexible and may be even suspended 
if it conflicts with the exigencies of rule. 
Before we turn to concrete cases let us summarize the argument so far. 
i) A rhetoric in which the rule of law is central is close to establishing 
itself as a hegemonic discourse for the discussion and explanation of 
economic development; 
ii) In so far as the discourse is sanctioned by bodies such as the World 
Bank, the IMF and the ADB it becomes the authoritative basis upon 
which policy is made, projects are approved, and funding is 
determined; 
iii) Such is the significance of the development that the persuasiveness and 
coherence of the rhetoric merits careful examination and, it is to be 
hoped, empirical testing. The need for caution is the greater because a 
decade of official analyses of East Asian development have proved 
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highly controversial. The East Asian Miracle report of the World Bank 
is a case in point; 
iv) The developmental state literature is a useful vantage point for a 
preliminary consideration of the place of law in development - not 
least because this is arguably the empirically richest source of writing 
on East Asia. When the matter is considered from this perspective it is 
readily apparent that the rule of law has not usually been seen as a 
pivotal moment in the economic development of East Asia; 
v) Japan furnished the empirical foundations for the original notion of the 
developmental state where the concept of property rights has not been 
central to underlying explanations of economic development. Indeed a 
highly developed system of de facto property rights significantly 
predated modern economic growth. Whether or not these are seen as 
the foundation or precondition for subsequent economic growth it is the 
case that de facto property rights were long compatible with vigorous 
but much lower levels of economic activity; 
vi) The late nineteenth century writing of civil and commercial codes 
under Western influence established property rights on a new legal 
basis but did this in a manner not readily consistent with the rule of law 
if this is to be understood as an overarching constraint upon the state 
and its officials and rather more readily compatible with a traditional 
Japanese and East Asian_understanding of law as the instrument of rule, 
as a tool of the state. We might more accurately speak of 'law as rule' 
than of the 'rule of law.' This legal tradition persisted until at least the 
end of the Second World War and (at a minimum) coexisted with a 
hundred years of sustained economic growth. There is moreover little 
good reason to believe that it was expunged by defeat in war and the 
promulgation of the Showa constitution. Indeed, defining moments in 
the shaping of the limits of law in respect of the privileges of office in 
the 1950s argue that the primacy of the political over the legal was 
conceded, albeit not without question well into the period of post-war 
recovery and through to the high growth of the 1960s. 
From Rhetoric to Reality, the Role of Law in the Management of 
Economic Change in Japan: Some Reflections on Industrial Policy 
in the 1970s 
Our discussion to this point affords very little comfort to the rule of law 
rhetoricians. Modern economic growth in Japan significantly predated the 
establishment and systematization of property rights along Western lines. 
Industrialization and growth knew extraordinary successes for a hundred 
years before the constitutional revisions of 1947 set in place institutions and 
procedures intended to secure the rule of law. The revisions were 
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incomplete, their design, we have suggested, was defective. Moreover the 
accommodation of the new legal institutions to local practice as evidenced 
in the history of article 14 of the public prosecutors law suggested that 
Japanese society preferred a qualified approach to the rule of law. This 
should not finally be allowed to threaten the stability and integrity of a rule 
which should itself be allowed (or even required) to exercise a large degree 
of discretion to the extent of not applying the law. All this at precisely the 
moment Japan knew its greatest economic successes. 
Thus far discussion has been concerned with what law is not. Plainly, we 
cannot leave matters here and it is time to move beyond rhetoric to consider 
what law is - that is to the actual rather than the claimed role of law in 
economic matters. The focus will be the role of law in the management of 
economic change and specifically in the conduct of industrial policy in 
Japan in the 1970s. Something will be said later about the choice of this 
case. But first we need to return to the notion of the developmental state 
since this for all its shortcomings is a more suitable vehicle for consideration 
of the place of law in the economic life of East Asian nations than the 
overgeneralized abstractions of the rule of law rhetoric. Indeed the hope is 
that examination of the place of law in the management of the post-war 
Japanese economy will contribute to a more detailed specification of the 
legal dimensions of the developmental state. The linking of law and the 
'developmental state' is more than a convenience, since, as we argue, law is 
close to the heart of government endeavours to manage economic change in 
Japan. Even so there are problems in making and in justifying the linkage. It 
is useful to delineate the legal dimensions of the developmental state in so 
far as law is an important aspect of the developmental state. More 
fundamentally still it is useful in so far as the notion of the developmental 
state is itself powerful and persuasive - since the initial concern of the rule 
of law rhetoricians is the delineation of the legal conditions for economic 
development. The phrase 'developmental state' has proved to be useful and 
popular so much so that its use has broadened so as to denote any 
government with developmental policies, ambitions or minimally, develop-
mental rhetoric - at which point the analytic utility of the phrase is lost. 
While there is little further that need be said in respect of this unfortunate 
slippage it is important to recognize that even where the phrase is used with 
caution it remains an analytic convenience, a concatenation of hypotheses 
about the developmental process. In short, for all its ubiquity the phrase 
should not be taken for the fact. The sources of economic growth are 
debated as hotly as ever even in Japan and a critical caveat attends the 
impact and efficacy of industrial policy itself. Given the looseness of the 
usage and the fact that the developmental state remains a contentious and 
contested notion it is all the more important to ground the discussion 
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empirically. A related further aim is to note how law seems to have been 
understood and used in the industrial policy process by key players and 
above all by the economic bureaucrats in the difficult economic 
circumstances of the 1970s. But first the caveat. 
The Impact and Effectiveness of Industrial Policy 
The impact and effectiveness of industrial policy is not the first concern of a 
volume concerned with the place of law in the processes of development. It 
is, for all that, of no little significance if the link between law and 
development is effected through the concept of the developmental state. As 
was said at the outset the specification of the legal dimensions of the 
developmental state is of interest in so far as the concept is itself of use. This 
depends in turn upon estimates of the effectiveness of policies developed by 
the developmental state. In short, what is at issue is the developmental 
efficacy of government policy, specifically industrial policy. This might 
seem odd and inappropriate. Chalmers Johnson has written an excellent, 
popular, and influential work that is seen to have made the case for a third 
way to successful industrialization (Johnson, 1982). State-led economic 
development is all but an axiom. The Japan model is pored over by 
economic bureaucrats and their academic peers in Latin America and 
Southeast Asia. But there are reasons to wonder at all of this. Johnson's 
account is a lively institutional biography of the Ministry of International 
Trade and Industry (MITI). It details convincingly and entertainingly, the 
evolution ofMITI's ambitions and pretensions. It charts accurately the legal 
developments that articulated those pretensions and ambitions. We can even 
live with a sometimes cavalier equation of law with policy. However, 
Johnson is all but silent on the questions of implementation and impact. It is 
as if all that is required is for MITI to formulate a position, that this then 
becomes law, the law is implemented exactly as MITT intends and produces 
all and nothing but the anticipated consequences. This is doubtful to say the 
least. David Friedman looked at one set of MITI's prescriptions, those for 
the machine tool industry, and subjected them to an empirical analysis and 
concluded that MITI's plans, policies, and laws had failed to achieve their 
goals. 12 An elite group of more than twenty leading Japanese economists 
broadened the scope of inquiry. They engaged in a wide-ranging review of 
industrial policy, of how far it was implemented, and of its impact. The 
report of their findings has become the standard text on industrial policy in 
Japan. The report was written after Johnson's publication and with full 
knowledge of his views. It makes no explicit criticism of Johnson's work. It 
is however, quietly but firmly dismissive of the commonplace 'Westerners 
misunderstandings and misinterpretations of Japanese industrial policy' 
(Komiya, 1984, 1988). Later works by Trezise, Hadley, and Patrick are we\-
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corned as correctives to western ignorance. These authors, Trezise, Hadley 
and Patrick - all Japan specialists in their own right - do not regard 
industrial policy as a core element in the economic development of Japan. 
Their position is as follows: 'All participants in this project recognize that, 
excluding the brief period immediately after the end of the war, the 
foundation of growth was competition operating through the price 
mechanism and a flourishing entrepreneurial spirit ... It can even be said, 
(they continue), that the course of the history of industrial policy in the 
principal postwar periods (in particular the 1950s and 1960s) has often been 
that the initiative and vitality of the private sector undermined the plans of 
the government authorities to try to utilize direct intervention in the nature 
of controls.' 13 In short, they simply do not see state intervention as the 
defining characteristic of Japan's post-war economic experience and still 
less as the prime cause of successful economic development. They are not 
insensitive to the difficulties of measuring the impact of policy upon the 
economy and they are not entirely negative about government intervention 
in industry. Indeed they have good things to say about industrial policy but 
at their very best their evaluation is that industrial policy is at best marginal 
and even then subordinate to, and supportive of, the price mechanism and 
good only for a time, a limited time. 1 Two features of industrial policy are 
said to be effective, namely, the use of trade restrictions to protect and 
nurture new industries and the various mechanisms that functioned to 
effectively transmit information valuable for the activities of private 
enterprise. The first of these is a characteristic of the pre-1973 watershed 
and of rapidly diminishing importance since then. Law was often an 
important instrument in the development of such industrial promotion 
policies. The second successful feature alluded to, namely, the generation, 
collection, and transmission of information from firms and to firms has 
continued to be of significance across the watershed of the mid- l 970s. Law 
is a significantly less important instrument in this respect. 
As for the third dimension of industrial policy, the kind of direct 
interventionist policies which characterized attempts to manage the 
problems of industries in decline - the key policy challenge of the decade 
after the oil crisis - these our Japanese colleagues note, have been relatively 
successful. Law played a part in the management of decline - this will be 
taken up below. 
What is the significance of the critique of industrial policy? We should 
not exaggerate. The position of Komiya and his associates is not universally 
conceded. There are Western commentators who refuse to accept their 
judgment. But let us be frank. Many ofus in Europe, in North America, in 
Latin America, and in Southeast Asia are strenuously engaged in making 
general and generalizable sense of a particular experience - that of Japan -
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where neither the facts nor their significance is conceded by the relevant 
academic authorities. The Jury is still out on this one while scholars search 
for models which more happily reconcile 'market' and 'state led' 
approaches. At a minimum caution is advisable in our use of the term 
1· developmental state. ) 
LAW AND INDUSTRIAL POLICY IN JAPAN OF THE 1970s 
It is legitimate to ask at the outset, 'why the 1970s?' since this is neither the 
heyday of industrial policy nor a decade which justifies attention in respect 
of topical concerns. Arguably it is the period of post-war reconstruction and 
high growth until the end of the 1960s that is the high point of industrial 
policy. In contrast the focus of concern in the 1990s has been the efforts of 
the state to disengage from the economy, a decade in which 'liberalization' 
not intervention has been the watchword. However it can be argued that the 
likely success of industrial policy is the greater in times of world growth 
than at a time of recession. In that respect the 1970s, a time at which the 
world economy had to absorb the consequences of the oil crisis affords a 
more realistic perspective on both the possibilities and limits of government 
intervention. Particularly vulnerable at that time were the old manufacturing 
industries, iron and steel, shipbuilding and such like, labour intensive, 
energy guzzling industries which faced the double jeopardy of higher fuel 
prices and low cost competition from the newly industrializing countries of 
East and Southeast Asia. If market theorists were to be believed then the 
prospect which greeted these industries was lingering decline with all of the 
attendant social and economic costs. The Japanese experience held out the 
hope that the problems of industrial decline and of restructuring might be 
amenable to government policy. It was the message from the 1970s that 
'Japan has demonstrated an ability to face major issues of industrial policy 
squarely' (Magaziner and Hout, 1980) and the associated hope that there 
was something that other governments could do to manage and ease the 
transition to the technological high ground which justifies our concern. 
The principal rubric (one is reluctant to say 'instrument' for reasons 
which will become apparent) for the management of economic decline in 
Japan in the 1970s was a law, two laws in fact: the Depressed Industries 
Laws of 1978 and 1983. The first of these was a reaction to the oil shock of 
I 973 that increased energy prices made critical raw materials much more 
costly and reduced demand for Japanese manufactures. Industries in the 
middle of the production cycle were particularly hard hit, trapped as they 
were between rising input costs and declining demand. The belief was 
widespread in government and industrial circles that these industries could 
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not survive without state help to promote their fundamental restructuring. 
Economic anxieties were critically underpinned by political concerns. Hard 
hit industries such as the shipbuilding industry were not only labour 
intensive but also geographically concentrated, characteristics which served 
to dramatize the political dimensions of industrial crisis and sharpen the 
governmental appetite for legislation. The result was the Law of Special 
Measures for the Stabilisation of Specific Depressed Industries (Tokutei 
Fukyo Sangyo Antei Rinji Sochi ho) (hereinafter the Depressed Industries 
Law). The law was designed to help 'designated' industries reduce excess 
capacity, to encourage diversification into more value added products, to the 
development of new technologies, and to the streamlining of distribution 
and marketing channels. The law was seen by it authors as a short to 
medium term response to crisis and so by its own terms required the Diet to 
reinvestigate industrial restructuring and the effectiveness of the law after 
five years. This was duly done. The problems had not passed and further 
legislation was deemed necessary. The Law of Special Measures for the 
Structural Improvement of Specific Industries (Tokutei Sangyo Kozo Kaizen 
Rinji Sochi ho) (in brief, the Structural Improvements Law) was a modified 
version of the earlier law which sought to extend the number of industries 
which might benefit from its provisions and to permit designated industries 
to organize cartels for capacity reduction and to promote a further 
rationalization of their marketing and distribution. The detailed story of the 
passage and use of these laws has been told elsewhere (Boyd, 1989; Boyd 
and Nagamori, 1991; Uriu, 1996; Yonezawa, 1988; Young, 1986, 1991). 
Here attention will focus upon the general significance of law in the 
industrial policy process as revealed in respect of the first of these two laws, 
the Depressed Industries Law of 1978. 
A number of conclusions present themselves in the body of research on 
this exercise in economic management. 
i) Formal written law is of great importance in the industrial policy 
process - notwithstanding the conventional wisdom concerning the 
relative unimportance of law in Japan and the competing explanations 
(cultural and procedural) of that unimportance. However, its import-
ance is not readily evoked by the notion, 'rule of law' as used 
elsewhere in this study. Indeed, it is more accurate to think of law as an 
instrumentality or resource available to the policy maker than as a 
single and uniform, transparent, and overarching constraint. Something 
to be thought of in terms of usage rather than interpretation - since if it 
is not deemed useful it will not be applied; 
ii) The Japanese legislature cannot be regarded as a 'rubber stamp.' In the 
case considered here it proves itself to be a significant and effective 
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forum for debate and the passage of laws with which the bureaucrats 
would have to work and which they did not always favour. In short one 
at least of the major institutions, the existence of which is implied by 
the rule of law rhetoric is alive and well in Japan; 
iii) The body of fonnal law functions in close parallel to practices borne of 
legal informality which continues to be of great practical importance 
and which are justified by reference to particular legal statutes; 
iv) The notorious weaknesses of Anti-Trust Law in Japan are a cones-
quence of specific structural and procedural incompatibilities between 
the economic bureaucracies and the values enshrined in the Anti-Trust 
Laws. To exacerbate matters the bureaucratic culture is profoundly 
anticompetitive in economic matters; 
v) Bureaucratic culture has changed relatively little despite the 
constitutional revisions of 194 7 and is supportive of a legal philosophy 
that sees law as an instrument of rule. 
THE IMPORTANCE OF LAW 
Much has been made of the relatively small number of lawyers in Japan, of 
a culture which favours consensus and which has been described as non-
1 itigious. Equally a Western excitement about legal informality - the 
reliance upon informal procedures and in the case of the business-
government relation of administrative guidance has encouraged some 
observers to argue the relative unimportance of law in Japan. 16 In the case of 
the state bureaucracy and industrial policy, as evidenced by our work on 
legislation for declining industries, nothing could be further from the truth. 
The officials in question are overwhelmingly lawyers, graduates from the 
elite university law faculties. They have on their desks volumes of their 
industry laws, plastic bound in flexible covers so as to withstand constant 
use and reference, the laws are printed upon special tough paper for the 
same reason. This is not to suggest that the bureaucrat is constrained to 
proceed daily according to the letter of the law - even if this were either his 
wish or a normative requirement the characteristically general wording of 
the industry law would make it impossible. In much the same way that 
wording obviates the need for the niceties of legal interpretation. If the law 
has as its goal the 'best interests' or the 'smooth running' of the industry the 
challenge is not to understand the law but to understand the industry. This is 
particularly apparent at times of crisis. When 'something must be done,' 
when a solution must be found then particular laws are viewed as resources 
to be mobilized, to be combined, to be implemented selectively and with 
discretion so as to confect a solution. The operational code of the bureaucrat 
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is to seek post hoe (legal) authorization for actions he may wish to make in 
the name of the community of policy makers, once those actions have been 
agreed. 
In the particular case of the shipbuilding industry the responsible MITI 
official or Ministry of Transport (MOT) official (shipbuilding is in MOT's 
bailiwick), confronted by the problems of decline in his industry is 
surrounded by a forest of legislation. We can talk about the legislative 
framework but this implies too high a degree of coherence and stasis. We 
can pick our way through on one or more paths: one path, neatly mapped for 
us by Frank Upham (1987:166-204) departs from the statutory basis of the 
ministry's authority and the administrative law doctrines that define its 
limits. Thus in the case of MITI: at the foundation ofMITl's authority is the 
MITI Establishment Act that defines MITI's jurisdiction, goals, and 
structure. On the next level are statutes like the Foreign Exchange and 
Foreign Trade Control Law (FECL) that give MITI responsibility for broad 
areas of economic policy. At a third level of specificity are statutes like the 
Petroleum Industry Law that give MITI general authority to promote 
particular industries, and statutes like the depressed industries law that give 
MITI specific authority to deal with economic conditions affecting a number 
of industries. 
Two characteristics of these statutes are worth noting: firstly the wide 
scope of authority delegated to MITI and secondly the vagueness of the 
standards by which MITI is to exercise that authority. Upham is surely right 
when he says that economic statutes are better viewed as identifying an area 
or a problem (for example the decline in the competitiveness of industries 
after the oil crisis) and delegating legal authority to MITI to deal with it as it 
sees fit. So broad are the terms of the statutes that when it comes to how, 
when or to what end that legal entitlement should be used the statutes are so 
broad as to be all but meaningless. This is not unusual: the shipbuilding law 
by means of which the jurisdictional competence of MOT for the 
shipbuilding industry is constituted defines the goal of the legislation as 'the 
smooth functioning of the shipbuilding industry.' This is the sole criterion to 
guide the bureaucracy's exercise of many of the specific powers granted by 
the law. 
We might here add an important rider to Upham's assessment: it is not 
only that MITI or MOT or any other agency responsible for industrial policy 
is empowered to handle problems as it sees fit but also to do this 'as best it 
can.' Why as 'best MITI can? Because typically MITI's broad jurisdictional 
competence is not matched by matching specific statutory authority. This 
can mean that to discharge its responsibilities MITI is obliged sometimes to 
stitch and mend and make do as best it can. As it does so it benefits from a 
set of circumstances that effectively insulate it and its actions from judicial 
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review - the relevant circumstances are the governing notions of 
justiciability, standing, and scope of discretion. Bureaucratic action in the 
realm of industrial policy is almost always informal. And so it does not 
create legal rights and duties - it is not then in terms of Article 3 of 
Administrative case litigation law - justiciable. It is not only a matter of 
informality: supervisory orders, agency plans or regulations, permissions, 
approvals within an agency and even within a public body such as the 
advisory councils are internal governmental acts and so not subject to 
review; unless they immediately and concretely affect a specific person's 
legal rights and obligations. The doctrine of standing has been so narrow as 
to strictly limit entitlement to persons having a legal interest in an 
administrative disposition. Injury to factual interest is not grounds for 
standing. 17 In the case of industrial policy convincing a court that an 
administrative action is illegal is perhaps the hardest obstacle of all and a 
major barrier to judicial review. To be illegal the act must escape the 
agency's scope of discretion. Usually in this realm at least this would mean 
showing that the agency used incorrect criteria or procedures in making the 
challenged decision or that the decision breached the statute on which it was 
based. If the goals and purposes of the statute are detailed and precise this is 
not impossible - as we have seen the court is more likely to be faced with 
standards as broad, vague, and open to interpretation as 'the smooth 
functioning of industry X.' _ 
In sum then in the realm of industrial policy the competent authorities 
benefit from very broad competence couched in very general terms and 
often without commensurate specific statutory powers. This constrains the 
agency to favour negotiation and compromise and reliance upon informal 
arrangements. If the agency confines itself to informal actions then it 
benefits from enormous freedom from the risk of judicial review because of 
the current understandings and practices of justiciability and standing and 
the difficulty of demonstrating that an act exceeds the legitimate scope of 
discretion of the agency and is at variance with the purposes of the relevant 
enabling statute. This is an enormous incentive to the agency to reach agree-
ment with its more powerful private sector partners. From the perspective of 
the latter - the ubiquity of the partner agency (born of the broad jurisdictio-
nal competence) is such as to encourage negotiated non-legal agreements. 
LEGAL INFORMALITY 
Legal informality is a fact of economic life in Japan. Administrative 
guidance remains a critical means of steering the economy - although of 
lesser importance after the 1970s than during them (see below). Japanese 
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and Western commentators argue that legal statutes are the sine qua non of 
administrative guidance and that legal informality is the preferred means of 
exercising broad legal responsibilities which are couched in general terms. 
The evidence confirms the first of these propositions: administrative 
guidance in the industrial policy process is exercised by explicit, often 
written, reference to legal statutes. The second of these propositions is more 
doubtful. Administrative guidance is not synonymous with the 'informal 
enforcement' of legal statutes - although Haley is surely right to point to the 
ubiquity of informal enforcement and of voluntary compliance to legal 
statutes in the domain of public policy (Haley, 1991). What is enforced is 
not the law but the positions and agreements of the industrial policy 
community. These compromises are the result of no easy and readily 
emerging consensus but of sometimes protracted and difficult negotiations if 
the problems are not readily tractable. It is the bureaucratic challenge and 
also the bureaucratic genius to ensure that there is no great gap between 
these positions and agreements and the law - a task greatly facilitated by the 
general terms of the law. It might be said that this is not fundamentally at 
odds with the legal practice of bureaucrats in the US, the UK, and the 
Netherlands and elsewhere which habitually effects a fit between preferred 
practice and the law. This would be to underestimate the significance of 
broad and general formulations of the goals of a law and of the brevity of 
reference to its ways and means. In the case of the shipbuilding industry law 
a goal such as that of the smooth running of the industry sets a huge 
premium upon the judgment of those charged with the implementation of 
the law, a judgment which is constrained rather more by the politics of the 
policy community than overarching norms of legal equality, universality, 
and uniformity. 
Let us look a little more closely at the meshing of law and legal 
informality in the confection of policy. To deal with adjustment in declining 
industries the 1978 Law on Temporary Measures for the Stabilisation of 
Specified Depressed Industries was passed. Other dimensions of the 
adjustment crisis were approached through the Law on Temporary Measures 
for those Unemployed in Specified Depressed Industries, the Law on 
Temporary Measures for those Unemployed in Specific Regions and the 
Law on Temporary Measures for Small and Medium Enterprises in 
Specified Depressed Regions. It would be wrong to exaggerate the 
coherence and integrity of this kind of legislative effort. More often than not 
these were piecemeal ad hoe responses to rapidly evolving political and 
economic circumstances. It would be wrong equally to think of these 
measures as evidence of a coherent and sufficient policy response to the 
problem of industrial decline. The challenge facing the official was to draw 
upon the body of law which constituted the authority of his agency and the 
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functional non-sector specific legislation defined in line with the visions so 
as to confect, to weave together a policy solution. The volume of basic 
legislation for the industry runs to more than one thousand pages. The 
Shipbuilding bureau within the MOT enacted thirty-two major laws in the 
post-war period. Three of these are of particular importance in constituting 
the authority of the Bureau. These are the Shipbuilding Law of 1950, the 
Temporary Law on Regulation of Shipbuilding 1953, and the law on 
Temporary Measures for Rationalisation of Production of Small and 
Medium Sized Ships ( 1959-64, 1964-6) subsequently the Law Concerning 
the Production and Operation of Small Ships ( 1966-). A range of non-
shipbuilding specific ancillary legislation could also be drawn upon in the 
confection of policy. Of relevance here is the permanent legislation such as 
the Small and Medium Scale Enterprises Organisations Law of 1957, the 
Small and Medium Enterprise Modernisation Promotion Law of 1963 as 
well as the temporary response to crisis inter-sectoral legislation we have 
glimpsed above: including: the Law on Temporary Measures for Business 
Conversion of Smal I and Medium Enterprises (1976-86), the law on 
Temporary Measures for the Stabilisation of Specified Depressed Industries 
( 1978-83), the Law on Temporary Measures for Small and Medium 
Enterprises in Specified Depressed Regions (1978-83), and the Law on 
Temporary Measures for Assisting Small and Medium Enterprises to cope 
with Yen Appreciation (1978-80). The direct controls of the MOT over the 
industry and specifically its detailed licensing powers by virtue of the 
Shipbuilding law were an additional and critically important policy resource. 
If we trace the legal and legally informal instruments the agency 
mobilized in its development of a policy response to the difficulties of the 
industry following the oil crisis when the index of demand for ships in terms 
of orders received fell from one hundred in 1973 to twenty in 1975 and to 
ten in 1978, firms began to lay off workers and the profitability of the 
industry collapsed. We find the following sample: 
i) Invoking its licensing powers - sanctioned ultimately by the 
shipbuilding law which does not specifically and explicitly authorize 
the MOT to ban parallel construction, MOT used its discretionary 
powers to ban side by side construction of medium sized ships in large 
docks in Spring 1975, that is, it implicitly threatened not to issue 
construction licences for the ships which were to be built in pairs; 
ii) Invoking its licensing powers - sanctioned ultimately by the 
shipbuilding law that does not authorize the MOT explicitly and 
specifically to set prices, the Ministry of Transport initiated price 
guidance after autumn 1975; 
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iii) As the crisis intensified the range and variety of ships subject to price 
guidance was increased and the terms of the price guidance became 
more comprehensive (to include specification for the price of the ship's 
body section, the machine section, the electric section, etc. as well as 
the different cost structures of small medium and big shipyards). 
Guidance was informal but the ultimate point of reference was the 
shipbuilding law; 
iv) Joint administrative guidance was announced by MITI and MOT to set 
quotas and price levels for ship exports so as to satisfy Western 
demands for the curtailment of what was claimed to be the dumping of 
Japanese ships in Western markets; 
v) On the basis of article 7 of the Shipbuilding Law that permits the 
ministry to issue guidance to individual firms, the Ministry of 
Transport recommended curtailment of operations by major firms on 
the shipbuilding law in November 1976; 
vi) A domestic ship price guidance standard was 'formalized' and fixed by 
administrative guidance in February 1977; 
vii) Following the bankruptcy of Hatohama Shipbuilding in December 
1977 the MOT sent out 'advice' (administrative guidance) concerning 
'Measures which must be taken by the regional shipping bureaux 
concerning the bankruptcy of shipbuilding as well as shipbuilding 
related companies;' 
viii) From 1976 to 1978 as unemployment developed and the problems of 
the small and medium companies increased MOT applied for 
designation of the shipbuilding industry as a designated depressed 
industry able to benefit from a raft of 'countermeasures' based on new 
statutes; the law for the Conversion of Small and Medium Enterprises 
( 1976-86), the law on Temporary Measures for the Stabilisation of 
Specified Depressed Industries (1978-83) the Law on Temporary 
Measures for Small and Medium Enterprises in Specified Depressed 
Regions (I 978-83) and the Law on Temporary Measures for Assisting 
Small and Medium Enterprises to cope with Yen Appreciation (1978-
80); 
ix) In December 1978 MOT changed the terms of operations curtailment 
which required a move to direct controls. Again this was an instance of 
administrative guidance (kankoku sootan) with the ultimate sanction of 
MOT's detailed licensing powers enjoyed by virtue of the shipbuilding 
law; 
x) The Fair Trade Commission noted that MOT guidance might constitute 
an infringement of the Anti-Monopoly Law but agreed that MOT's 
guidance be viewed as a depression cartel which would then be beyond 
180 
RICHARDBOYD 
the jurisdiction of the Anti-Monopoly Law. MOT renewed its 
guidance; 
xi) The shipping industry complained to the FTC about the cartel system 
since this put upward pressure on prices. The FTC approved an 
extension of the cartel in April 1980. MOT renewed its administrative 
guidance in view of cartel formation; 
xii) Following criticism from the FTC, MOT desisted from administrative 
guidance in the guise of kankoku sotan and instead issued 'guidelines' 
with very similar effect although a remove further from the law. 
The above is no more than a glimpse of the battery of formal and informal 
acts of the Ministry of Transport as it endeavoured to manage an economic 
crisis. It is suggestive of the potency of the licensing powers enjoyed by 
MOT by virtue of the shipbuilding law to buttress its use of informal 
agreements in areas and with respect to matters that are not specifically 
sanctioned by the shipbuilding law. The importance and equally the binding 
nature of administrative guidance are evident. Academic lawyers are 
inclined to deny that its importance derives from its legal status and are 
I ikely to suggest that it is not binding legally because it is not itself a source 
of law. 18 On the other hand they note that it is binding in fact and so point to 
the goods and services (licences, permissions, and other benefits) access to 
which is controlled by ministries and others. We are emphatically not 
lawyers and reluctant to play the part of the fools who rush in where (legal) 
angels fear to tread but simply put a de facto/de Jure distinction does not do 
justice to what it is that makes guidance binding. Undoubtedly politics is a 
part of the equation and the licences and so forth are important but so is law. 
Indeed throughout the difficult negotiations between MITI and MOT over 
how to make policy and to implement it for industries that fell variously into 
their jurisdictions a constant refrain was that 'we (MOT) don't need you 
(MITI) because we've got a law - the Shipbuilding law' that we have seen 
affords the ministry a broad competence to act. Without a shadow of doubt 
(it seems to us) that administrative guidance is the more comfortable the 
closer it is to law. The interface between law and policy is equally tricky. 
The sketch hints at the gap between law and policy as MOT is constrained to 
resort to its own use of whatever legal and legally informal arrangement are 
available to it to spin the policy web. The success or failure of the endeavour 
is decided finally neither by the courts, if the matter is viewed from the 
perspective of the rule of law nor immediately, by the performance of the 
industrial sector, if the matter is viewed from the perspective of the develop-
mental state but by the ability of the ministry to carry with it the industrial 
sector, (the individual companies, informal and formal associations of the 
big, the medium, and the small companies, the whole industry association, 
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the whole industry advisory councils and the labour unions.) Of course the 
ability of the ministry to do this does relate finally to the economic 
performance of the sector. If the ministry's efforts are not seen to improve 
matters they are resisted. 
The exercise of discretion is constrained on the same basis. Initially, 
authority for the exercise of discretion was sanctioned by the national 
legislature that is in the case of the Depressed Industries Law of 1978, 
resolutions passed in the standing committees of the Diet explicitly invite 
the responsible ministry to exercise administrative guidance in pursuit of a 
specified end at which point administrative guidance comes to resemble 
'delegated legislation.' Subsequently, if a player or players in the policy 
community 19 believes that the ministry's exercise of discretion offends the 
rules of the game or simply is against their interest they cry 'foul!' Thus the 
shipping companies were worried lest MOT's administrative guidance to 
curtail production and to stabilize prices would mean that the shipping 
industry would have to pay higher prices for ships. Their response was to 
lodge a formal complaint to the FTC and to MOT itself (Yonezawa, 
1988:439). 
When no other remedy is available they will appeal to politicians ever 
alert to the possibility of recruiting new clients - regional politicians ensured 
that the interests of the smaller shipbuilders were not threatened by MOT's 
activities. In addition local shipbuilders organized themselves into 'national 
lobbying groups' to ensure that their problems were well known and that the 
machinations of MOT were transparent (Boyd and Nagamori, 1991: 184; 
Uriu, 1996:195; Nihon Zosen Shinko Zaidan, 1983:5). The bureaucracy is 
keen to avoid such developments that compromise the ability of the minister 
to 'deliver' the sector in inter-ministerial councils, that make ministers angry 
and officials embarrassed. These pressures and anxieties are encapsulated in 
the rule of the game 'let there be no outsiders' by which is understood that 
MOT, the advisory council, and the trade associations were constrained to 
carry with them all of the principal players. This is clearly revealed in two 
intriguing developments in the management of the shipbuilding industry. 
Given the fact of substantial over-capacity some firms had to leave the 
industry. Accordingly it was agreed that the capacity reductions would be 
borne by groups of firms which would collectively bear the exit costs of 
individual firms constrained to cease business, that is the costs of the 
'losers' would be shared amongst the 'winners' so as to lessen the distance 
between winning and losing. To minimize those costs it was important that 
redundant shipyards be sold. The financial institutions were not sanguine 
about the marketability of these assets and were reluctant to support the 
industry in the absence of a guarantee against loss. To resolve the problem 
groups of firms signed a nensho or memorandum, ('pledge' is what it 
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amounted to) 'guaranteeing' to protect the institutions from losses. It is 
tempting to argue that satisfying the requirement that there be no outsiders 
was a prerequisite for MOT's legally informal problem solving. Actually 
there were outsiders. Although the trade unions were represented in 
discussions and sat as members in the advisory councils the obligation to 
carry them with the mainstream was less obviously constraining. Indeed, 
many were vociferous in their dismissal of the depressed industries law as a 
'sacking bill.' That employment countermeasures came to figure in the 
policy solution owes much to the Japanese media and to the Diet itself (see 
below). Finally, we can note that the dramatic reduction of a huge labour 
intensive industry such as shipbuilding which has the added problems of a 
very high degree of geographical concentration that enables one to speak of 
shipbuilding towns is a tortuous and painful business. As the MOT picked 
its way through this minefield and endeavoured to find solutions it proposed 
arrangements and initiated acts, offered guidance, advice, instructions, 
recommendations, decisions on price, tonnage, market share, permissible 
orders, cost structures, and exports on the basis, ultimately, of a body of 
legislation which made little specific reference to these matters but which 
afforded the MOT a broad competence for the running of the industry and 
the ultimate sanction of withholding license to build. To the best of our 
knowledge there was no legal challenge to the MOT throughout (but see the 
involvement of the FTC below). 
THE DEVELOPMENTAL EFFICACY OF ADMINISTRATIVE GUIDANCE 
In a chapter concerned at least in part with the legal dimensions of the 
'developmental state' it is hard to avoid a brief comment upon the develop-
mental efficacy of administrative guidance. Johnson's position seems to be 
that the flexibility and discretion which administrative guidance affords is 
not in itself developmentally efficacious - if we can forgive an ugly phrase. 
(Johnson, 1982) The key for him seems to be the combination of a talented, 
insulated, elite, and responsible bureaucracy, and administrative guidance. 
The latter effectively empowers the official elite - symbolized for some by 
MITI, which is then free to pursue and to implement its privileged vision of 
the economy. This seems more than a little naYve particularly in the wake of 
the economic crisis in East Asia of the late 1990s. If we did not know it then 
we know now that 'informality' in the absence of other not as yet specified 
conditions is as functional for rent seeking, cronyism, and outright 
corruption as it might be effective and efficacious for economic 
development in different but equally unspecified conditions. Moreover, even 
were we to concede the incorruptibility, the high intelligence, the wisdom 
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even of the Japanese official we would still need to recognize that MITI is 
not a single monolithic intelligence. It is no less than a political system itself 
in which and through which the interests and demands of hundreds of 
industrial sectors, thousands of industry associations and who knows how 
many firms are articulated, aggregated, and argued for. Accordingly it 
would be unwise indeed to expect that the output whether in the form of law 
or administrative guidance would be anything like an economically rational 
policy position rather than a political compromise with the characteristics 
rather of incoherence, facing both ways at the same time and so on. Indeed it 
is no secret that MITI has recruited academic economists to produce 
rationales in economic theory post hoe for policies it finds convenient for 
other reasons (Komiya, 1988). The Depressed Industries Law of 1978 was 
very much a product of a messy, political process in which economic 
rationality was no more than one of a number of interests in play. 
THE ROLE OF THE DIET 
The stranglehold of the ruling Liberal Democrat Party (LOP) on the Diet 
was broken a decade ago. The absolute majority over the opposition parties 
commanded by the LOP throughout the preceding forty years had 
encouraged the view in the West that the Diet was no more than a legislative 
rubber stamp for decisions reached elsewhere - notably in the inner councils 
of the Liberal Democrat Party itself. Notwithstanding the popularity of the 
view it was never the whole case. The opposition parties have long been 
ingenious in articulating their views and in developing the ways and means 
to parlay opposition into influence and the power to bargain for amendments 
to government sponsored legislation. The case of the passage of the 
Depressed Industries Law very much confirms this view of the Diet as a 
forum for genuine debate and stands as a corrective to the old Western 
stereotype. The depressed industries bill was submitted to the Standing 
Committee on Commerce and Industry in both the upper and lower houses. 
It was debated six times at the Lower House and seven times in the upper 
house. The joint investigation committee of the respective standing 
committees also discussed it on commerce and industry, social and labour 
affairs, agriculture, forestry and fisheries, and transport in the Lower House 
and in the upper house. The Fair Trade Commission also investigated the 
bill. The bill received serious amendments - in article 1 that dealt with the 
fundamental purpose of the bill and in the articles geared to its 
implementation. New articles were added as a direct consequence of 
interventions in the Diet - which proved itself to be very much other than a 
rubber stamp. This is of interest and importance in itself. It also has a 
184 
RICHARD BOYD 
theoretical relevance since the developmental state model is predicated upon 
the marginality of elected parliaments as the condition for bureaucratic 
autonomy. That autonomy is conditional in part upon the insulation of the 
bureaucracy from societal demands - atrophied parliaments are one means 
to this.20 
INDUSTRIAL POLICY AND THE FAIR TRADE COMMISSION 
Much has been made of the relative ineffectiveness of Anti-Trust Law in 
Japan. Given the reach and extent of the law itself, it is sometimes held as 
evidence of bad faith (particularly in trade negotiations and Western appeals 
for market opening) that the anti trust-law has had relatively little impact 
upon the conduct in practice of industrial policy. The evidence suggests that 
the problem is less one of faith and more one of deep-seated structural and 
procedural incompatibilities that undermine the effectiveness of the law. Let 
us consider the organization and preparation of industrial policy.21 The 
principal architect of industrial policy is the genkyoku, that section of the 
bureaucracy that has the primary responsibility for developing and 
supervising policies for a given industry. MITI is the single most important 
genkyoku ministry. In the 1970s five of MITI's bureaux acted as genkyoku: 
the Chemical Industries Bureau, the Coal and Mining Bureau, the Heavy 
Industries Bureau, the Public Utilities Bureau, and the Textile and Light 
Industries Bureau. The bureau is internally divided into sections with 
industry specific responsibilities: thus, within the Heavy Industries Bureau 
there is an iron and steel section, an automobiles section, and so on. 
Shipbuilding (as we have seen) is the responsibility of the shipbuilding 
bureau of the Ministry of Transport (MOT). The genkyoku is responsible for 
devising policy and drafting all of the basic legislation concerning its 
industry. The prime policy goal of the genkyoku is neither growth nor profits 
so much as the smooth running and good order of its industry. It guards its 
prerogatives jealously and dislikes nothing more than the spillage of conflict 
into the public arena with the associated risk of intervention and mediation 
by 'politicians.' Disputes are to be avoided and if unavoidable to be settled 
'in house.' These values have led to a particular policy style: distrust of too 
intensive competition, ('excess competition' in the bureaucratic vernacular), 
of restructuring, of uncontrolled entry to 'its' industry and, on the other 
hand, the open embrace of integration, inter-firm operating agreements, 
mergers, vertical and horizontal firm groupings, and cartels. In short, the 
preferred modus operandi of the genkyoku bureaucracy sets it on collision 
course with the Fair Trade Commission with its responsibilities for the 
implementation of the Anti-Monopoly Law. Typically, the FTC, faced with 
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such a concentration of bureaucratic muscle has been the loser. This has 
changed somewhat. The Anti-Monopoly Law was revised and strengthened 
in 1977. And a landmark judgment in the 1980 petroleum cartel case has 
made it much harder since then to restrain competition by means of cartels 
created by administrative guidance. Indeed, a feature of the Law on 
Temporary Measures for Structural Improvement of Specified Industries 
enacted in May 1983 to provide assistance for industries caught in the wake 
of the second oil crisis, is the requirement of the agreement of the FTC for 
implementing measures that restrict competition (such as the designation of 
cartels for capacity reduction, inter-firm tie ups and so on) and further, a 
legal requirement for the reduction of such measures within an agreed time 
limit. 
BUREAUCRATIC CULTURE: 
CONTINUITY AND ANTI-COMPETITIVE PRACTICE 
Where the scope for official discretion is broad the values, preferences, and 
procedures of officialdom are commensurately significant because these 
govern how discretion will be exercised subject to the limitations we have 
noted above. One very senior insider believes that the bureaucratic culture is 
deeply rooted in the pre-war values we have described. Former deputy prime 
minister Gotoda Masaru while reflecting on his life's work in the national 
bureaucracy (where he served as director general of the national police 
agency and as deputy chief cabinet secretary) observed that despite a fifty 
year experience of the constitutional reversal of the bureaucrats' position in 
194 7 from that of agent of the emperor to that of public servant 'bureaucrats 
have had a hard time changing their mind set ... ' What are the core elements 
in that 'mind set'? They include a strong urge to govern, based on a feeling 
that they are an elite. 
They are convinced that they always have the national interest at 
heart; but that national interest is a very subjective thing. They 
attempt to distance themselves from private sector pressure groups 
and special interests. In this sense, we cannot say that they are not 
impartial. But they are also insulated from public criticism ... they 
gaze at the world through the windows of their offices. As a result, 
they are liable to see the ministry's interests as the national interest.22 
Kyogoku makes a similar point about the way the bureaucracy looks after its 
personnel both publicly and privately from the time they are hired until they 
retire and sometimes literally until they are in their graves. These are 
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conditions conducive to a strong sense of unity and esprit de corps which 
leads to the identification of the ministry interest with that of the nation ... 
the expansion of functions, competence, personnel, and budgets of the 
various ministries' bureaux, departments and sections are the meaning of 
1 ife so far as bureaucrats are concerned. Planning and advocating new 
policies and getting the required personnel and funds give those involved 
meaning as well as a sense of participation and satisfaction (Kyogoku, 
1987). 
The ministerial interest is not exclusively a matter of the expansion of 
functions, competence, personnel, and budgets important as these are. There 
are other facets to the culture of the ministry and other dimensions of the 
assumptive universe of the Japanese bureaucrat which are significant for his 
approach to and understanding of competition. 
Suggestive is a highly critical piece by a former bureaucrat from the 
Ministry of Health and Welfare (Miyamoto, 1994) who identifies core 
values in the MHW. Relevant here is the following: 
i. The harmony of the ministry is more important than reality; 
11. The major task of the ministry is the protection of the industry not the 
protection of the public; 
iii. Continuity is a core value and more important than crisis management; 
1v. Seniority is a value that leads to the muting of criticism and tends to 
obscure the existence of problems; 
v. Amakudari - bureaucrats joining related industries in the field upon 
retirement fosters the status quo and sustains pre-existing regulations. 
None of this will astonish students of Japan's bureaucracy.23 Harmony of the 
ministry: a close identification of the bureaucrat with his ministry is not 
peculiar to the Japanese bureaucracy whereas arguably the priority attached 
to the harmony of the 'ministerial home' is. The bureaucrat is encouraged to 
see his ministry as his family in an exercise which obscures public/private 
distinctions. The means by which this is done are multiple but perhaps best 
encapsulated in the ministry marriage club. Quite literally, to reiterate the 
words of Kyogoku, the ministry looks after its personnel both publicly and 
privately from the time they are hired with due regard to whom they wed (a 
bureaucratic senior will typically preside over the ceremonial itself) until 
they retire and sometimes literally until they are in their graves. The dutiful 
bureaucrat in turn has as his first concern the harmony of the ministerial 
family and accordingly a preference for regulation over competition. 
The protection of the industry is more important than the protection of 
the public. The ministry has direct, close, personal, and long standing 
relationships with its industry partners organized in trade associations and 
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advisory councils which are staffed by ministry bureaucrats and often 
headed by an ex bureaucrat. The harmony of the ministry itself is dependent 
upon the harmony of these relations between government and industry. The 
ministry is responsible to politicians who themselves benefit from massive 
campaign contributions from industry. The public is a distant and abstract 
entity in this skein of relations. This practical, de facto subordination of the 
public to the industry interest is celebrated in a national policy that has 
throughout the twentieth century placed production before distribution. The 
importance of continuity in such a bureaucratic universe can readily be 
imagined. The internal harmony of the ministry and the 'good order' of its 
relations with industry are underpinned by a complex of relationships, a web 
of agreements and understandings which have been evolved over the long 
run relationship between business and ministry. These have been 
substantially untroubled, changed, or disturbed by electoral or other 
fundamental political change over a period of nearly fifty years. In such 
circumstances a break with continuity is a threat to harmony and good order 
and to the ministry itself. The practice of post retirement recruitment of civil 
servants to peak positions in the company hierarchy (amakudari) is an 
important adjunct to these relationships which further encourages continuity 
as the retiree educates his company in the ways of the ministry and enjoys a 
privileged vantage point from which to communicate to the ministry the 
nature of the 'industry interest.' 
Paradoxically perhaps, a notoriously ingrained, institutionalized, and in-
eradicable bureaucratic sectionalism is energetically favourable to competi-
tion in the politico-bureaucratic market place but profoundly anti-
competitive within the industrial sector. In the realm of bureaucratic politics 
intense bitter competition, protracted turf wars, struggles over jurisdiction, 
anxieties about who gets the best recruits, the bigger budget, the best post-
retirement jobs are the norm and the detailed abstruse calculus of the 
position of the home agency in any number of pecking orders is paramount 
- the very stuff of life. The coin has an opposite side: it is a culture 
profoundly anti-competitive within the industrial sector for which the 
ministry is responsible. If the ministry or agency is to be effective in the 
politic bureaucratic market place it must be able to deliver 'its' industry. 
Accordingly the ministry has an additional reason for valuing the peace and 
stability of the industrial sector to the extent that order is always likely to be 
valued over competition. Within the complex of agency and sector, we have 
suggested, harmony, continuity, and good order are the priorities and, we 
can add, regulation the preferred means and the cartel the archetypal and 
emblematic institution. Inevitably, these values fundamentally inform the 
use made by the bureaucracy of law. This is the more significant because (as 
we have seen) the enabling laws which grant the ministries responsibility for 
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their sector(s) are loosely worded and afford the responsible agency great 
scope for the exercise of its discretion. The unsurprising consequence is the 
legal containment of what is perceived to be 'competitive excess.' 
CONCLUSION 
Notwithstanding the current prominence of a rule of law rhetoric, law does 
not figure prominently in accounts of East Asian economic development. 
Much the same can be said of the long run economic development of Japan 
where growth predated the codification of property rights and where the rule 
of law was challenged by an entrenched tradition which viewed law as the 
instrument of rule. The legislative efforts of the Meiji period confirm the 
persistence of this tradition. These were geared at least as much to political 
as to economic ends as the fledgling state sought to secure its own fiscal 
foundations, to enhance its capacity and institutional competence and sought 
more effectively to control and to regulate economic activity. There is little 
reason to believe that this tradition24 and the associated practice of law were 
seriously eroded in the first half of the twentieth century. It proved then 
compatible with a century or more of sustained economic growth. The 
constitutional revisions of 1947 undoubtedly went some way to ground the 
rule of law understood in more conventional terms but here too there is good 
reason to believe that a very different understanding of the relationship 
between law and rule, one more readily understood in traditional terms 
persisted well into the post-war period. When we turn to the conclusions we 
derive from the sketch of law and industrial policy in the 1970s these 
prompt a nuanced, complex, and paradoxical account of the significance of 
law in the promotion and management of economic change in Japan in 
which property rights, the rule of law and the legal safeguarding of the 
possibility of economic competition appear to be of substantially less 
significance than legal instrumentality, legal informality and emblematic 
and associative usages of law in the embellishment of authority. On the 
other hand it seems that institutions anticipated by a rule of law discourse 
are more vital than has often been conceded, here we have in mind above all 
the Diet and latterly the Fair Trade Commission. At the same time there is a 
persistent anti-competitive thrust to the organization and values of the 
industrial bureaucracy in the industrial sector which is offset by an equally 
insistent, and in a highly regulated economy, an equally significant 
competitive pulse in the politico-bureaucratic market place. Finally we have 
suggested that whereas the margin for the exercise of official discretion in 
the application of the law to industry is very considerable it is not 
unconstrained and that it must, in fact, secure the support of, or risk 
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challenge by, the principal players (typically firms and their associations) in 
the relevant policy area. This last requirement guarantees a certain linkage 
between the official exercise of legal informality and economic outcomes. 
NOTES 
Research on the shipbuilding case to which the second part of the 
chapter makes reference was funded by the Economic and Social 
Research Council of the United Kingdom to which we are grateful. 
Participation in the Workshop was Law and Development in East and 
Southeast Asia (January 1998) was made possible thanks to the 
generosity of Leiden University. In so far as I understand the Japanese 
shipbuilding industry thanks are due to my colleague Professor Seiichi 
Nagamori ofKokugakuin University. 
2 The rule of law has been a constant theme in the 1990s publications and 
conferences of the World Bank. It was a central theme in the Annual 
World Bank Conference on Development Economics in 1996, see 
Bruno Michael and Boris Pleskovic (eds), (1997), in the subsequent 
conference, see Boris Pleskovic and Joseph E. Stiglitz (eds), (1998). 
Competition law and policy was a theme in the 1998 conference, see 
Boris Pleskovic and Joseph E. Stiglitz (eds), (1999). The Bank together 
with the OECD ran a project 'Framework for the design and 
implementation of competition law-policy' which led to a publication of 
the same name in 1998. On the rule of law in central and Eastern Europe 
see Cheryl W. Gray and associates (1993). Ohnesorge perhaps 
understates how common is the call currently for rule of law also on the 
traditional grounds of human rights and individual dignity even from 
within the World Bank. See for example Dakolias (1999), Sured and 
Malik (1999). 
3 Eight years ago Robert Wade wrote, 'over the past two decades a 
literature big enough to fill a small airplane hangar has been produced 
on the causes of East Asian economic success' (Wade 1992:270). Well, 
now you would need a large airplane hangar to house it all. A good 
place to catch up on the literature of the 1990s is Aoki et al. (1998), 
Hayami and Aoki (1998), and Yanagihara and Sambommatsu (1997). 
4 Cited by Wade (1992:273) 
5 For the arguments of the late 1980s Wade (1992) is helpful. See also 
Yanagihara and Sambommatsu (1997). 
6 Johnson (1982) remains the standard work. See also a useful review 
article by Onis ( 1991 ). On the deployment of the concept in a Latin 
American context see Smith (1998). 
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7 Aoki et al. (1998), Hayami and Aoki (1998), and see also the 1997 
World Development report, The State in a Changing World published 
by the World Bank. At a minimum this might be taken as evidence that 
the Bank has come to recognize the inadequacy of a sharply dichoto-
mized state/market approach in favour of the 'market enhancing' view 
which looks to state action not only to provide 'pure' public goods but 
actively to secure market activity. 
8 Okazaki and Okuno-Fujiwara (1998). 
9 Indeed Okazaki and Okuno-Fujiwara (1998:494) speak of de facto 
property rights 'serving as the basis' for early industrialization and 
agricultural development in Japan. 
I O For a fuller account see David Johnson (1997) on which the present note 
is dependent. 
11 The mikoshi is a portable shrine carried by adherents from the neighbour-
hood, a guild or trade and so on in the course of festivities. It is a burden 
to carry which symbolizes and sacrilizes those who shoulder the burden. 
It has been used by Maruyama the doyen of Japan's political 
commentators to capture the Japanese notion of authority (see 
Maruyama 1964). 
12 Friedman (1988). There are problems with Friedman's work which is 
not as empirically rigorous as it might be. Equally one could be accused 
of requiring from Johnson a second book on implementation as good as 
the first on MITI itself. For a different perspective on the machine tools 
industry and industrial policy see Calomiris and Hielberg ( 1995). 
13 Trezise (1983), Hadley (1983), and Patrick (1983). 
14 Mention might also be made of an economist who set out to answer 
precisely this question of the effectiveness of industrial policy. He notes 
with admirable sang froid that, 'Assessments of the effectiveness of 
Japan's industrial policies are not very numerous' and concludes, 
borrowing the phrase of Trezise, that 'Ultimately, ... any final 
assessment will remain ... "an expression of faith'" (Boltho I 985: 188). 
More recently still and in the context of Japan's tussle with the World 
Bank over the justice of its analyses of East Asian growth a consultancy 
fee of US$10,000 was paid to John Page the author of the resultant 
report- the East Asian miracle study (World Bank, 1993) with a view to 
correlate industrial policy with productivity growth in East Asia. The 
exercise in regression analysis that resulted revealed no significant 
match between policy and productivity (Terry, 1995:6). 
15 In order to clarify our position so that the reader can make his/her own 
judgments we are sympathetic to the developmental state idea in so far 
as this asserts that the economic development of Japan is not explicable 
exclusively in terms of market forces. However doubts remain about 
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how adequately we understand the role of the state and the precise 
meshing of the economic and the political. 
16 For a range of perspectives see Ramseyer (1985), Haley (1991 ), and 
Upham (1987). 
17 In recent years there has been some loosening of standing requirements 
away from the practice of limiting standing to those individual interests 
that an administrative agency has been specifically charged with 
protecting by statute. 
18 'Administrative guidance by government agencies and local authorities 
plays a significant role in Japan, although it is usually not regarded as a 
source of law' (Oda, 1992:61), see also Shiono (1984:204), and Young 
(1984). 
1 9 Y asunori Sane' s usage of the term gyokai closely parallels the idea of 
the policy community. Boyd and Nagamori (1991) have also worked 
with the notion of gyokai. See Sone (1993). 
20 Caution is in order. Curtis (1993) suggests that the depressed industries 
law was an exception and that the Diet has not significantly revitalized 
itself. 
21 Here we closely follow Kamiya (1988) 'Introduction.' 
22 Gotoda (1994). The quote is as translated in Mikuriya (1997). 
23 Here too the literatures are enormous particularly in Japanese. A useful 
starting point of relevance to questions of economic development is 
Kim, Muramatsu, Pempel, and Yamamura (eds) (1995). 
24 Doubtless Upham is right to question 'the easy assumption that the 
particularism and informality of Japanese law are the result of the 
continued strength of traditional values. I have argued that these values 
are maintained, if not created, by legal rules and institutions as well as 
by social inertia and that this legal structure is the result of conscious 
choice' (Upham, 1987:220). But note he does not question the fact of 
such practices. 
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CHAPTER7 
INDUSTRIAL POLICY AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN 
JAPAN AND BEYOND 
CHRISTOPHER HEATH 
At the end of the twentieth century, a good part of the Asian continent 
seemed to have lost confidence in itself. 'Asian values' were not only 
sceptically discussed in the US and European circles, but also within Asia 
itself. 1 Even earlier, the limits of Japan's formula of success as one based on 
bureaucratic intervention were meticulously exposed.2 While it would be 
wrong to try to insulate one single factor responsible for the success or 
failure of industrial development, the system of intellectual property rights -
or the absence of such - should not be underestimated, particularly when 
analysing the Japanese experience. 
THE CASE OF JAPAN 
Development of Intellectual Property 
Being a country of sparse national resources, Japan had to rely on 
entrepreneurial ingeniousness and the promotion of inventive efforts 
through intellectual property rights. 3 Turning to intellectual property rights 
to achieve its goals of 'fakoku kyohei' (a rich country and a strong army) and 
'shokusan kogyo' (increase industrial productivity) was by no means a 
foregone conclusion for the Meiji state. After all, in 1721 the military 
Tokugawa regime that ruled the country between 1603 and 1868 had 
proclaimed a law that prohibited technical innovations.4 Nevertheless, patent 
systems that the Japanese had seen operating in the United Kingdom, the 
United States, and France, were soon identified as the motor of industrial 
development. During a visit to the US Patent Office around the turn of the 
century the first President of the Japanese Patent Office, Korekiyo Taka-
hashi, reportedly stated: 
We have looked about us to see what nations are the greatest, so that 
we can be like them. We said: 'What is it that makes the United States 
such a great nation?,' and we investigated and we found that it was 
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patents, and so we will have patents (US Department of Commerce/-
Patent Office 1972 :20). 
Yet the first Japanese patent law, the Sembai ryaku kisoku, enacted in 1871, 
had to be scrapped when after one year not a single patent application had 
been made. Just as well, since there would not have been any properly 
trained examiners for examining patents: 
If someone requests a patent for a supposedly new invention, it is 
extremely difficult to determine to what extent the invention is really 
new. In order to conduct a thorough examination, one would have to 
employ 50 foreigners. In employing 50 foreigners, it would be 
necessary to employ the same number of translators. This is certainly 
very expensive. But were there really so many inventions? The only 
invention that people talked about in these days was the invention of 
the rickshaw (Tsusansho (Ministry of Trade and Industry) 1964:558). 
Undeterred, the subsequent Patent Monopoly Ordinance (Sembai tokkyo 
j6rei) was promulgated on 18 April 1885, and was revised in 1888, 1899, 
and 1909. Only in 1921 and upon the introduction of the first-to-file system 
had Japanese patent law found a structure similar to that of the Patent Act of 
1959, which is still in force today. 
So important was the post of President of the Patent Office that Korekiyo 
Takahashi5 later on became Minister of Finance and for a couple of months 
even Prime Minister. In 1885, in the first year of its existence, 425 
applications were filed under the new Patent Act, of which 99 were granted. 
Already in the following year, the number of applications had doubled to 
1,384, while 205 patents were granted (Tokkyo Kyoku (Patent Office) 
1934:59). In 1900, for the first time the number of patent applications 
exceeded 2,000 (actually 2,006). In 1920, the 10,000 mark was surpassed 
(11,017); in 1966, the number for the first time exceeded 50,000 (55,970); in 
1972, the 100,000 mark was passed (102,948); and in 1993, a peak was 
reached with 361,985 patent applications.6 
An example of successful legislation complying with the domestic needs 
of a still fledgling industry was the introduction of a utility model system in 
1905.7 After the accession to the Paris Convention, it had become clear that 
only foreigners were filing inventions that were novel worldwide. Japanese 
inventive activity, on the other hand, was seriously hampered by the fact 
that no special protection could be sought for minor improvements. 
Competitors were keen to imitate any such improvements, with the result 
that the quality of goods often deteriorated. Thus, the first Utility Model Act 
(also termed Petty Patent Act, or Sub-Patent Act, depending on the legal 
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system) of 1905 allowed exclusive rights over 'useful developments 
concerning the shape, arrangement or concept of a commercial object.' With 
a protection period of six years and the novelty requirement limited to 
Japan, the Act satisfied domestic needs for short-term, low-level protection 
without choking the patent register with long-term monopolistic rights over 
minor improvements. According to statistics, the utility model system has 
been a success. Unlike patents, utility models never appealed much to 
foreigners, and over the years less than two per cent of the applications came 
from abroad. In Japan, the number of filings rose from 2,011 in 1906 to 
more than 180,000 in 1980. Only by the late 1980s, had the number of 
patent applications exceeded the number of utility model applications. This 
in turn led to a significant change in the utility model system in 1994 (Law 
No 116, 1994). Since utility model protection had apparently outlived its 
purpose of serving domestic industry, the term of protection was shortened 
and rights granted without examination. However, examination is still 
necessary before raising an infringement suit. In effect, the changes have 
been the death knell of the utility model system (Tamai, 1992), as is also 
indicated by the application figures which dropped by more than 80 per 
cent. 
The exact application figures are as follows: 
Year Avvlication Granted 
1906 2,011 985 
1910 14,057 4,358 
1920 18,543 3,584 
1930 33,111 12,060 
1940 30,105 16,535 
1950 22,426 6,365 
1960 68,102 18,208 
1970 124,170 29,264 
1980 185,455 44,600 
1990 138,294 43,300 
1993 77,101 53,400 
1995 14,886 63,966 
No less interesting is the gradual expansion of patentable subject matter. 
Only in 1975 was patent protection for pharmaceutical substances 
introduced; as of 1979, micro-organisms were deemed patentable; during 
the 1980s, resistance against granting patents for genetically engineered 
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products was overcome; and in 1988, the first patent for animals was 
applied. In 1997, new guidelines of the Patent Office were issued to 
facilitate the patenting of computer software and biotechnology. 
Rules on Technology Transfer 
Apart from legal structures, Japan advanced and refined its system of IP 
rights by institutional structures and administrative competencies. From the 
start the Patent Office, and thereby the responsibility for preparing 
legislation in the field of IP rights, fell into the competency of the Ministry 
of Agriculture and Trade. Subsequently it was the famous or infamous 
Ministry of Trade and Industry (MITI), rather than the Ministry of Justice 
that was responsible for preparing legislation in the field of civil law in 
general. 
Institutional control of intellectual property policy has been particularly 
important for Japan in the field of international technology transfer. The 
institutionally responsible Fair Trade Commission (FTC) published its first 
Guidelines on International Licensing Contracts in 1968, 8 and subsequently 
revised them in 1989 (lyori and Uesugi, 1994:467) and 1998.9 Until 1992, 
all international contracts had to be notified, and until 1997 the notification 
requirement continued for exclusive licenses only. 10 The FTC was 
particularly concerned with so-called grant-back clauses, whereby licensees 
were obliged to transfer improvement inventions to the licensor without 
• 11 proper remuneration. 
Both the FTC and the courts have done much to encourage the so-called 
parallel importation of foreign made goods in order to lower the price level 
f · 12 o imports. 
Inherent Weakness of Enforcement 
According to a survey conducted in 1996, Japan is not a popular place for 
initiating patent infringement suits. It is placed among the last five countries, 
along with Italy, Spain, Argentina, and India. Even Indonesia and Brazil 
enjoyed a better reputation than Japan (The World Patent Survey, 1996: 19 
(20)). Several reasons have been made responsible for this outcome: 
1. Due to a very narrow interpretation of the function of the judiciary, very 
seldom do judges engage in what would be called 'social engineering' in 
order to solve a case. Rather it is viewed as the task of bureaucratic 
administration to balance conflicting interests before proposing lefislation -
the abstract, ex ante control is favoured over the ex post control. 1 It is thus 
no coincidence that court decisions discuss the facts of a case very broadly, 
but attach much less importance to their legal deductions (Rahn 1990:32lff). 
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2. Access to training for the legal profession is severely limited, thus 
creating a shortage of attorneys and judges (Henderson, 1997 :27). 
3. Due to the lack of specialized courts in matters of intellectual property 
and the frequent transfer of judges, interpretation tends to stick to the letter 
of the law due to inexperience and uncertainty. And again, granting 
protection beyond the letter of the law would mean upsetting the industrial 
policy the law-making bureaucracy had in mind. 
Fuzzy Logic and International Obligations 
Japan joined the Paris Convention in 1900. Despite pressure from foreign 
nations, particularly France and the United States, Japan at first did not give 
foreigners access to its intellectual property system. Japan was well aware 
that investment would flow into Japan nevertheless.14 Japan thus used the 
accession to the Paris Convention as a bargaining tool in revising the so-
called 'unequal treaties' the Shogunate had entered into with several 
Western powers (Russia, the United States, France, and the United 
Kingdom) in 1858. This exempted foreigners from these nations from the 
allegedly 'barbaric' Japanese jurisdiction (Rahn, 1983:461). Only upon a 
revision of the unequal treaties did Japan join the Paris and Berne 
Conventions. However, Japan refused to join the Madrid Arrangement for 
the Repression of False or Deceptive Indications of Source on Goods 
concluded in 1891, despite repeated requests from the French Government 
to do so, for the following reasons: 
Most Japanese exports go to countries that have not joined the 
Agreement, while on the other hand misleading indications of origin 
from member countries are rare. The main export markets of Japan, 
that is China, the US, and Germany (the latter being the country 
where most misleading indications of origin have become known, 
particularly earthenware from China), have not yet joined the 
Agreement. Japanese industry is still at the stage of copying and 
imitation. The average domestic consumer prefers foreign goods, for 
which reason a number of domestic producers label their goods 
misleadingly as foreign. Japanese industry is still in its infancy and 
has little experience of exporting, so confidence in its products is low 
and it is very difficult to find markets for goods labelled as 'Made in 
Japan'; therefore, misleading indications of origin are not infrequent. 
For these reasons, to join the Arrangement would be of very little 
practical use for promoting [the] Japanese economy. On the contrary, 
it would rather be an impediment. 15 
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Only upon the conclusion of the San Francisco Peace Treaty in 1952, was 
Japan obliged to ratify the Madrid Arrangement. 
Given this historical background, it is quite obvious that Japan had 
joined the Paris Convention for political and economic reasons, rather than 
for the conviction that 'the inalienable right of the inventor should be 
protected by the laws of aU cultured nations,' as was the driving idea behind 
the Paris Convention (Ladas, 1930:74). Rather, Japan has always taken the 
view that 'unlike fundamental human rights, intellectual property rights are 
not inherent; rather, they are granted in line with certain policy objectives, 
such as the promotion of industrial development and the stimulation of 
cultural activities. Because of this, current intellectual property rights 
protection systems are not absolute in nature; they change as the policy 
objectives change. However, the present system is based on granting 
proprietary rights over intellectual property.' 16 
The first unwelcome obligation under the Paris Convention came in 
1925, when under the Hague Revision Conference all Member States were 
obliged to enact measures against unfair competition. 17 Japan was thus put 
in a quandary because it had always tolerated acts of unfair competition, 
particularly the copying of foreign goods and piracy applications of foreign 
trademarks, because these practices were considered to be advantageous to 
Japanese industry (Tokkyo Cho (Patent Office) 1955:101). When Japan 
finally appeared to comply with Art. 1 Obis Paris Convention by enacting an 
Unfair Competition Act in 1934,18 the Act proved inapplicable due to the 
requirement of intentional contravention against fair competition. In 
addition, one provision exempted acts under registered industrial property 
rights - most likely a provision to protect trademark pirates. 19 
Until 1950, only one reported case under the Unfair Competition Act 
went up to the Supreme Court.20 Japan had thereby found the perfect fuzzy 
logic formula by enacting laws to avoid foreign sanctions, but declining to 
apply the law in order to avoid unwelcome results at home (Rahn and Heath, 
1994:345). Regarding trademark_ piracy in particular, Japan was very much 
against the adoption of Art. 6sept,es Paris Convention (misappropriation of a 
trademark by an agent or representative) at the Lisbon Revision Conference 
in 1958.21 With regard to piracy applications of trademarks, a Japanese court 
as late as 1989 held that 'deft use of another's achievements without 
compensation cannot normally be considered unlawful.' 22 Part of the 
relative ease with which trademark pirates have been able to avoid 
persecution in Japan is the apparent incompetence of Japanese courts to 
recognize bad faith where it so obviously exists. In the above-quoted 
'Popeye' case, a Japanese party in 1965 had registered a mark almost 
identical with the Popeye drawings from Chrysler-Seager. Despite this fact, 
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even the Supreme Court did not find this was a misappropriation in bad 
faith. 23 
Another contentious issue has always been the proper remuneration 
particularly of foreign owners of copyright and neighbouring rights in Japan. 
Although a member to the Berne Convention as early as 1899,24 collection 
of user fees did not begin until the mid- l 930s. This was when a German 
lawyer was requested by several collecting societies, both from the US and 
Europe, to enforce Japan's copyright provisions with respect to foreign 
musical works such as Ravel's Bolero or the works of Puccini.25 More 
recently, Japan was brought before the WTO, because she had refused 
retroactive protection of neighbouring rights for phonogram producers.26 
The issue has now been settled due to a change in Japanese legislation.27 
ASIA BEYOND JAPAN28 
Using Japan as a Blueprint: Korea 
The intellectual property system of Korea is closest to the Japanese not 
merely because of geographical proximity, but also because of Japanese 
colonisation between 1908 and 1945. Bureaucratic structures were either left 
in place or else adopted from a country whose language was fairly familiar 
to those shaping the country after the devastating Korean War in 1953. As in 
Japan, the Ministry of Trade and Industry (MITI, now METI) is responsible 
for shaping not only industrial policy, but also industrial property. On the 
legal side, the Korean Unfair Competition Act is little different from the one 
the Japanese enacted for Korea in 1935. Also other industrial property laws 
have been closely modelled after those of Japan.29 
However there are two aspects which distinguish Korean industrial 
policy from the Japanese. Korea had much less time to develop structures 
which were not in accordance with international obligations due to 
increasing pressure from industrialized countries to grant proper protection. 
A typical example might be the so-called pipeline protection for 
pharmaceuticals that was first granted to the US and subsequently to 
E I. 30 uropean app 1cants: 
In addition, due to a more litigious legal culture in Korea, the Supreme 
Court is far more active and assertive in its ruling than its Japanese 
counterpart. In one decision in 1995, the Korean Supreme Court ruled it 
unconstitutional that there were no proper channels to appeal decisions of 
the Patent Office.31 This led to setting up a Patent Court (by the Law of 14 
July 1994), which took up its work on 1 March 1998. 
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Mighty Mandarins: China, Taiwan, and Singapore 
The above parameters of the Japanese model of success - viewing intellect-
ual property protection as a chance for the development for domestic 
industry, while trying to give only limited domination to foreign right 
owners - have also been adopted in countries whose bureaucratic mandarins 
were savvy enough to see not only the downside but also the merits of 
intellectual property rights. Particularly in China, three attributes of the 
Japanese system, that is, setting up an intellectual property system for the 
sake of domestic industrial development, preference of bureaucratic 
institutions over independent courts, and an institutionalized weakness of 
enforcement, can also be detected: 
As usual, enforcement is not so much a matter of law as of will. At 
the top, Chinese leaders understand that the country must protect 
intellectual property rights if it hopes to attract foreign technology 
and develop its own industry. But enforcement is complicated by 
what we call the rule of law with Chinese characteristics: Who is 
going to order the police on raids for the police report to the guilty 
parties? The interests of the various laws read: 'In These Pirate Firms 
Further Explain the Lack of Enforcement Here.' We would note 
however, that China knows how to enforce the law when it wants. 
Last year, Reebok worked with the Chinese administration for 
industry and commerce, leading to raids of 45 factories, the 
confiscation of some 120,000 pairs of counterfeit shoes. China has 
officially urged consumers to boycott pirated disks and books, the 
software and entertainment industry losing some 900 million dollars 
each year to Chinese piracy where demand requires to go after 
suppliers .... Finally while the world can do only so much to change 
China's behaviour, it cannot least maintain the standards of groups 
like the World Trade Organisation, a powerful reminder to China that 
while membership has its privileges, it also has its responsibilities.32 
From 1985, China put enormous efforts into developing an intellectual 
property system. Apart from having processed 400,000 applications for 
patents and designs, the Chinese Patent Office amassed 30 million patent 
documents from twenty different countries in the first ten years of its 
existence. At the end of 1993, about 400,000 trademarks have been 
registered in China, while there were about 5,000 qualified patent attorneys. 
It comes as no surprise that compliance with international obligations has 
not been China's first priority: practicing lawyers, for example, complain 
about unrealistically short deadlines for responses particularly under the 
Madrid Agreement for the Protection of Trade Marks. 
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While Taiwan overhauled her intellectual property system between 1992 
and 1996, a similar preference for administrative enforcement and lack of 
proper judicial control can be found. Taiwan and China, and to a lesser 
degree Hong Kong, are the main offenders when it comes to the application 
of piracy trademarks, either domestically or in other Asian countries. 
Due to the fact that registering patents in the United Kingdom was 
unattractive to domestic industry, Singapore revamped much of its industrial 
property system in 1995. Not unlike Japan, Singapore has attached much 
importance to promoting industrial development through allowing parallel 
imports. 
intellectual Property is Theft: The Case of Developing Asia 
Other countries in the Asian region have viewed intellectual property rights 
rather as a tool of industrialized countries to dominate their economy 
(Adelman and Baldia, 1996; Kanan et al., 1995:9-12, 13). Opposition 
against any sort of intellectual property protection has been particularly 
strong in the most populous Asian countries, such as India and 
Indonesia.(Antons, 2000; Kaehlig, 1993) The negative approach might have 
prevented foreign right owners from exploiting their intellectual property 
rights in general, but has not assisted in developing the certainly vast 
potential of domestic industry. It may not be completely far-fetched to argue 
that the ruling classes in these countries have had little interest in upsetting a 
status quo that was quite favourable to their economic interests. In 
Indonesia, India, Brazil and a number of African countries, an oligarchy of a 
few influential families is in many cases primarily interested in perpetuating 
tile structures for political power and self-enrichment. 
The Legacy of Colonialism 
The former colonial powers, Great Britain and France, dominated different 
countries in the Asian region. Britannia ruled the waves and valleys of 
Malaysia, Singapore, Brunei, and India, while the French colonized 
Vietnam,33 Laos, and Cambodia. Thailand,34 through clever diplomacy, 
remained the uncolonized buffer country between these two. Indonesia was 
the most important colony of the dwindling Dutch Empire, while the 
Philippines rid themselves of centuries of Spanish mismanagement in 1898, 
only to be colonized by the Americans until 1946 (Hooker, 1988). The 
Japanese occupied Korea, Taiwan, and parts of China, not particularly to 
these countries' liking. 
Colonization had more influence on legal than on religious structures. In 
many cases, this led to imported legal systems, which clashed with 
traditional social or religious beliefs. This phenomenon can also be detected 
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in countries that remained uncolonized. Japan and Thailand adopted western 
legal systems that were ill fitted to their cultural beliefs. 
Due to colonization, most Asian countries had no choice when 
introducing intellectual property rights, as their colonial masters dictated the 
decision. This was more the case in some countries than in others. While 
Indonesia was particularly fervent in cutting all links to the legal system of 
her previous masters, the common law countries of Asia not only retained 
the system, but even accepted - and in some cases still accept - filings 
effected in London and having validity in their respective countries. The last 
remnant of this system is the system of design protection in Malaysia that 
was governed by 1949 British legislation on that subject until September 
1999. 
The Remains of Communism 
In China and Vietnam, the traditions of intellectual property protection, if 
any, were discontinued by the advent of Communism. Re-introduction of 
intellectual property systems that only followed principles of private 
property and international dialogue had been re-established at the beginning 
of the 1980s. China joined the WIPO in 1980 and introduced legislation to 
protect intellectual property rights between 1984 and 1990. Vietnam 
introduced the first legislation for patent protection in 1981, for trademarks 
in 1982, and for copyrights in 1986. 
WTOITRIPs - Lead Vest or Silk Gown? 
Quite significant numbers of academics view the WTO/TRIPs Agreement as 
an act of American Imperialism 'overwhelmingly likely to re-instate and 
perpetuate dependence. ' 35 The way the Agreement was rammed through 
despite fierce opposition from developing countries certainly smacks of 
imperialism. What is often overlooked, however, are the chances for 
developing countries to enact a system of intellectual property protection 
and technology transfer control that serves as an encouragement to domestic 
industry as well. With due brevity, the following means can be mentioned: 
I. enhancing protection of natural and indigenous resources; 
2. introducing a utility model system to encourage small and medium-sized 
enterprises; 
3. narrowing interpretation of patent claims so as to enhance legal certainty 
and prevent the development of improvements; 
4. joining international conventions for the particular purpose of reducing 
the workload of domestic patent offices. The PCT may be cited as the 
foremost example in the field of patents; 
5. increasing awareness as to the professional training of patent attorneys; 
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6. preventing abuse of intellectual property rights by, e.g., permitting the 
so-called parallel importation of patented and trademarked products and 
a tight control of clauses detrimental to technical progress, particularly 
the limitation of the licensee's freedom to develop improvements. 
It would be a pity if the chances the WTO/TRIPs Agreement offers to 
developing countries is lost due to ignorance or neglect on the side of 
developing countries and undue pressure from the side of the developed 
countries, particularly the United States. 
There are some developments in the right direction, however. The 
enhanced protection of natural and indigenous resources, deserving 
particular mention is the Philippine Act No. 8371 of 28 July 1997, that is 
meant to 'recognize, protect and promote the rights of indigenous cultural 
communities/indigenous peoples.' A Plant Variety Protection Act, that 
includes protection for 'local indigenous plant varieties,' 'common 
indigenous plant varieties,' 'wild plant varieties,' and any sort of 'genetic 
material,' was promulgated in Thailand in 2000. 
As to a utility model system, after a good deal of deliberation, Thailand 
with its Patent Amendment Act of 27 March 1999 ( enforced since 27 
September I 999), introduced a petty patent system in Sec. 65bis_65decem 
Patent Act. While this is a step in the right direction, Thailand still lacks a 
proper curriculum for technically trained patent attorneys, a problem that it 
shares with many other countries in the region. 
Intellectual Property as Power to the People 
Proper introduction and enforcement of intellectual property rights may also 
offer opportunity beyond the sphere of industrial development. It may even 
be a catalyst for social change. As has been mentioned above, reluctance to 
introduce intellectual property protection in developing countries was often 
rooted in patterns of power sharing in oligarchic societies. In many Asian 
countries democratic shortcomings were seen as a trade-off to fast industrial 
development and sold as 'Asian values.' 
When the economic crisis hit Thailand, its first victim back in July 
[1997], it was possible for South East Asia's authoritarians to argue 
that Democracy was part of the problem. They could claim that those 
Asian countries with short-lived, unstable governments were ill 
equipped to cope with a crisis and to impose the harsh measures 
needed to end it. Six months later, the opposite appears to be true: the 
more democratic countries seem to have the best chance of successful 
economic reform'(The Economist 17 Jan 1998). The grand old man 
of legal anthropology, Wolfgang Fikentscher, has convincingly 
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argued that the advent of intellectual property rights may well 
spearhead the consciousness for subjective, human rights in general. 
Intellectual property rights from a tool of industrial policy to a 
catalyst for human rights awareness - Asia comes full circle to the 
driving motives for drafting the Paris Convention in 1883. 
NOTES 
Periodicals were ripe with titles such as 'Are Asian Values Finished?' as 
discussed in Far Eastern Economic Review, 22 January 1998, p. 32. 
More to the point, The Economist, 17 January 1998, p. 58 could write: 
'Indonesia is an extreme case of a phenomenon seen in several Asian 
countries, where a government derives its legitimacy from its ability to 
deliver economic success rather than from a truly Democratic mandate ... 
"Asian values" were alleged to place greater weight on social order and 
deference to authority than did values of the decadent western variety.' 
2 Particularly in Baum (ed.) 1997. 
3 The emergence of the Zaibatsu-Groups from the 1880s onwards owes 
less to governmental patronage than to tough competition, hard work 
and commercial astuteness: Hidemasu Morikawa, 1992, pp. 1-55. 
4 Shinkihatto no ofuregaki (Ordinance Prohibiting Innovations), Ordi-
nance of the Military Government of July 1721, reprinted in Tokkyo 
Cho (Patent Office), 1955, p. 36. 
5 On Takahashi, see Etsuji Kotani, [1979). An interesting insight into the 
exchange between the American and Japanese Patent Office is also 
given by the exchange of letters between Korekiyo Takahashi and 
Schuyler Duryee, as reprinted by Kazuto Sakamoto [ 1989). 
6 Figures by Tokkyo Cho, 1955, p. 134, Tokkyo Cho, 1985, p. 756, and 
Tokkyo Cho, 1995, p. 345. 
7 Jitsuyo Shin'anh6 as of 15 March 1905, Law No. 21. An analysis is 
provided by Nobuo Monya, 1973, p. 159. 
8 Reprinted in English in Nakagawa, 1984, p. 124. 
9 The 1998 Guidelines can be found in English at the FTC's homepage, 
http://www.jftc.go.jp. 
10 The changes were mostly due to US pressure. 
11 According to Iyori/Uesugi (p. 305), about 20 per cent of all 
contraventions concerned grant-back clauses. The concern is 
understandable insofar as such improvement inventions were the forte of 
Japanese industry (see above). About one fifth of all contracts were 
found faulty by the FTC. 
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12 The courts have allowed parallel importation of trade marked goods as 
early as 1970: Osaka District Court, 27 February 1970, 2 IIC 325 [I 971] 
- 'Parker'; the parallel importation of copyrighted goods is permissible 
unless the copyrighted work enjoys special distribution rights: Tokyo 
District Court, 1st July 1995, 27 IIC 570 [1996] - 'Beauty and the 
Beast.' The importation of patented goods is permissible unless notice 
of the contrary has been given by the patentee: Supreme Court, 1 July 
1997, 29 IIC 331 [1998] - 'BBS Car Wheels III.' The FTC has 
repeatedly taken action against attempts to prevent lawful parallel 
imports by warning sole import distributors of: Old Scotch Whiskey, 
Apple Computers and Feinberg Airguns. 
13 This has basically been the view in the presentations in Baum, 1997, and 
in particular: Kono, ibid, p. 69. 
14 The connection between foreign investment and intellectual property 
protection may have been overstated for political reasons. As the 
Economist, 22 January 1994, 62/63 could write in an article: Intellectual 
Property is Theft: 'In the past, multinationals have invested heavily in 
countries long before their secrets were safe there. Investment decisions 
will continue to have more to do with national laws on ownership, 
market size, and the state of domestic industry than with intellectual 
property protection.' This, of course, is not what multinationals, 
particularly pharmaceutical companies, would be keen to admit. 
15 This reply is reprinted in Tokkyo Cho, 1955, p. I 03-4. 
16 Commission on intellectual property rights in the 21st century, Towards 
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17 Actes de la Haye, Den Haag 1925, p. 475: Attempts by the French 
government to agree to an even more forceful wording of the provision 
of Article 1 0bis Paris Convention were rejected particularly by Japan. 
18 Law No. 14 of 27 March 1934, in force since 1 January 1935. 
19 Joseph Koe Toyosaki, [1971]. Already Yoshinobu Someno, [1959] 
voiced doubt about the use of this provision. Particularly foreign brand 
names and brand goods were clad with the image of high class also 
because of the high tax duties levied on them. It is fair to say, however, 
that in most cases the application of the provision was rejected as an 
'abuse of rights.' 
20 Decision of27 August 1942, 14 Tokkyo Kenkyu 24 [1992]. 
21 See, e.g., Stephan Ladas, 1975, II, p. 1264. 
22 Osaka High Court, quoted and overturned by the Supreme Court, 20 
June 1990, 25 IIC 118 (129) [1994]- 'Popeye Scarves III.' 




24 Incorporated into the Copyright Act of 4 March 1899, Law No. 39. 
25 Dr Wilhelm Plage (1888-1969), who forced particularly Japanese radio 
stations to pay-up adequate fees, threatening to sue otherwise. Plage 
(very aptly, the German name means plague) was such a pain in the 
neck for the Ministry of Culture that it swiftly amended its laws to 
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to establish a Japanese Collecting Society in order to outlaw Dr Plage's 
activitites. For details, see Shigeo Ooie, 1981. 
26 The matter was of particular economic significance to Japan because of 
the high number of foreign phonograms circulated. The discussion 
centred around the interpretation of Art. 18(3) Berne Convention, that 
according to Japanese interpretation left the question of retro-activity to 
national legislation. A similar stance had been taken by the US upon 
accession to the Berne Convention in 1988 and more recently by Russia 
in 1994. For details see, Christopher Heath, 1996, p. 677. 
27 By Law No. 117 /1996 (26 December 1996), the supplementary 
provisions of the Copyright Act dealing with retro-active protection 
were amended. Protection now extends retro-actively to the last 50 years 
insofar as such protection had not already expired under the old 
Copyright Act (before 1970). However, the amendment does not permit 
claims for user fees for phonograms sold hitherto, or for phonograms 
already produced. 
28 Brief overviews are provided by Christoph An tons, [ 1995] and Michael 
Blakeney, 1996, p. 544. The following books can be mentioned: 
Wineburg (ed.), Intellectual Property Protection in Asia, Butterworth 
1991 et seq., loose-leaf. The volume contains a brief general 
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Singapore, Taiwan, Thailand, Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos. 
Gutterman/Brown (ed.), Intellectual Property Laws of East Asia, Hong 
Kong/Singapore I 997. General introduction on IP rights in general, and 
particular country reports on Cambodia, Hong Kong, Indonesia, 
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Malaysia, China, the Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, 
Thailand and Vietnam. 
UCLA Pacific Basin Law Journal, Special Issue: Intellectual Property 
in East Asia, Fall I 994, Vol. 13/1. Aspects of IP protection in Japan, 
Taiwan, Korea, and China. 
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Utility Model Act in 1994. 
30 Basic agreement with the United States as of 28 August 1986, and a 
subsequent list of products that should receive the benefit of such 
protection as of 28 February 1990 (US) and 27 September 1991 (EC). 
31 Korean Supreme Court, decision of 28 September 1995, No. 92 Hunga 
11. 
32 Pirates Kidnap Walt Disney, Far Eastern Economic Review of 19 
January 1995, p. 5. 
33 For an overview over the intellectual system of Vietnam, see Heath, 
[1999]. 
34 For new intellectual property developments in Thailand, see Ariya-
nuntaka, [1999]. 
35 McGrath, 1996 and in similar fashion: Oddi, 1987 and 1996, and many 
others. 
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CHAPTERS 
JAPAN ASA MODEL? 
COMP ARING LAW AND DEVELOPMENT IN 
JAPAN, SINGAPORE, AND INDONESIA 
CHRISTOPH ANTONS 
The subject of this book is the development of commercial law as a regulatory 
framework for industrialization in East and Southeast Asia. The region has 
gone from being praised as an 'economic miracle' 1 through a period when it 
was condemned as plagued by collusion, corruption, and nepotism2 back to 
recognition for reforms and renewed promises of a bright future.3 In July 1997, 
at a time when the first signs of the Asian crisis were already visible, the World 
Bank still recommended in its World Development Report (1997) a careful 
study of many aspects of the Asia-Pacific approach to development. What 
then, if anything, is so peculiar about this approach? The constituting elements 
of the' Asian developmental state' have been summarized by political scientists 
as follows: long-term economic planning by an efficient bureaucracy, 
administrative guidance of economic behaviour, the strategic support and use 
of large conglomerates and weak labour movements (see e.g. MacIntyre, 
1993a:253-4). The theoretical question whether there is anything specifically 
'Asian' about this approach cannot be raised within the limited space of this 
chapter. In fact, comparisons with other nineteenth and twentieth century 'late 
developing countries' ranging from Bismarck's Germany to the likes of 
Fujimori' s Peru are likely to reveal many similarities. Furthermore, to a certain 
degree industrial policy is also practiced in the EU and even in that high temple 
of free market economies, the USA (Erber et al., 1997). 
This chapter departs from the assumption that developmental policies will 
be mirrored in the legal systems of the countries concerned. Therefore, rather 
than to engage in a theoretical debate about terminology, an attempt will be 
made to look at some of the key strategies used during the industrialization 
process of Japan, Singapore, and Indonesia and the laws that were used to 
implement these strategies. The choice of these three countries over others 
demands an explanation. First, to a varying degree all three countries represent 
excellent examples of attempts at corporatist development under strong 
guidance of the state. The experiences of Japan and Singapore have also often 
been presented as models for other developing countries. Second, the analysis 
of an OECD country, a so-called newly-industrializing country (NIC) and a 
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large developing country brings the factor of time into the discussion. It allows 
an examination as to which of the specific elements of these countries are 
likely to be only temporary features typical of developing countries and which 
ones are more likely to remain at least for the foreseeable future. The 
weaknesses of the regulatory framework which were exposed by the economic 
crisis has added a further aspect: with the more or less stable situation in each 
of the countries prior to the crisis, the question can be asked which elements of 
the regulatory framework have contributed to the crisis. 
The chapter presupposes that strategies during the industrialization process 
of the three countries can be related to key areas of commercial law in the 
following way: 
• Enlisting a co-operative workforce: labour law and industrial relations; 
• Mobilizing capital: banking laws, financial market and foreign investment 
regulation; 
• Nurturing national enterprises: company and securities legislation; anti-
monopoly legislation; 
• Technological upgrading: intellectual property law; 
• Privatizing successful state companies: company and securities legislation.4 
No attempt is being made at achieving a complete picture and some of the 
fields play a role in different stages of the process, e.g. company and securities 
legislation cannot be separated from foreign investment and capital mobiliza-
tion. The investigation is confined to a few snapshots of fields of commercial 
law with both public and private character and cannot cover all of these areas 
for lack of space. In particular, the intellectual property issue has been omitted 
because two other chapters in this volume already deal with this topic. 
Nevertheless, the picture could easily be extended to cover administrative and 
other laws supporting these strategies, e.g. the role of land law, provision of 
housing and social security legislation in 'enlisting a co-operative workforce' 
and at the privatization stage and the provision of educational facilities in 
'technological upgrading.' However, in view of the large number of areas 
discussed, the survey can only be very brief. The aim of the survey is to show 
that it is advantageous to analyse single fields of law in the context of the 
political and economic framework of the respective development strategy and 
that the different fields are, therefore, strongly interrelated. At the same time it 
needs also to be added that this is not an assessment of the success rates of 
these policies, which has interested many political scientists and economists 
(e.g. Hill, 1998:297-323). Legislation is about the 'ought' rather than the 'is' 
and it allows conclusions about the intentions of those governments that 
introduce it. Whether these intentions achieve their aim is obviously another 
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matter. However, some comments about the different success rates of these 
three countries will be made at the end of the chapter. 
ENLISTING A CO-OPERATIVE WORKFORCE: 
THE REGULATION OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 
At the initial stages of their development, all three countries surveyed here 
have relied on abundant cheap labour. This is particularly true for Japan and 
Singapore, who hardly had other resources to rely on, but to a lesser degree 
also for Indonesia as a country rich in natural resources. In all three countries 
surveyed, labour legislation was used to mobilize and pacify the work force in 
the interest of industrial production. 
Japan: The Rise of Enterprise Unions 
During the 1980s, the Japanese industrial relations system became the envy of 
Western managers because of its flexibility. The system is a good example of 
the manner in which Asian governments often mingle formal and informal 
mechanisms to achieve strategic purposes. As with anti-monopoly law, the 
formal labour law of Japan is largely a result of the American occupation and it 
is often more significant for what it fails to regulate than for what it regulates. 
This, however, was not always the case. In the early days of industrialization, 
Japan relied on similar methods to achieve a compliant workforce as her 
nineteenth century European contemporaries. Attempts to organize skilled 
labour and strikes were prohibited and prosecuted under the Public Peace 
Police Act (Matsuzaki, 1994: 12). Those relatively few craft guilds that existed 
and could serve as a basis for the development of a union movement were 
prohibited in 1872. The 1885 Trade Association Ordinance constituted a 
further attempt at controlling and discouraging organized labour. Nevertheless, 
a few unions began to be formed from 1897 on. They were weak and mostly 
formed as part of a company. However, even these were suppressed under the 
further Public Peace Police Act of 1900 (Matsuzaki, 1994:14-15; Fukui, 
1992:201 ). Only from I 912 on, the moderate Yuaikai (Friendly Society) was 
allowed to exist, which finally developed into Sodomei, the Japanese 
Federation of Trade Unions, in 1921 (Matsuzaki, 1994:16). 
By this time, the attitude of the government had changed from suppressing 
organized labour movements to encouraging so-called 'factory councils' as 
rivals of independent unions (Matsumura, 1994:42-3). Other attempts at 
harmonizing industrial relations included the Factory Law of 1911 which 
prohibited employment of children under the age of twelve, night work by 
women and minors while limiting the workday to twelve hours. Additional 
measures for the protection of employees health and welfare were introduced in 
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the early 1920s. However, when it came to organized unionism and strikes, the 
government continued to act swiftly. The Peace Police Act of 1900 was 
replaced in 1924 by a Peace and Security Maintenance Law that was even 
stricter than the previous legislation (Fukui, 1992:201-2). Especially Marxist 
influenced organizations were the target of the 1925 Peace Preservation Law 
which banned all organizations that denounced the principles of imperial 
sovereignty or private property (Fukui, 1992 :206). After the invasion of China, 
the National Mobilization Law was passed in 1938 giving the government 
emergency powers to control human and material resources in time of war. 
Under the umbrella of this law, the government passed ordinances in 1939 
which limited labour mobility and controlled wages. Also in 1939, the National 
Registration System was introduced which required particularly skilled persons 
to register with the government. A National Workbook Law of 1941 required 
all workers to carry workbooks which were registered with the Employment 
Agency and which contained a detailed history of their employment, their 
current status and wages. This was followed by an anti-turnover ordinance of 
1942 which made it almost impossible for workers in heavy industry to move 
from one factory to another (Matsumura, 1994:44-5). Already in 1940, 
Sodomei had been forced to dissolve itself into the Sanpo Federation, a semi-
governmental organization which was soon to come completely under the 
wings of the Welfare Ministry. According to Kazuo Nimura(l994:65)this was 
not merely a war-related emergency measure but a conscious early effort to 
carve out the structure of Japanese post-war industrial relations. 
After the defeat in World War II, the American occupation brought a 
thorough reform of the industrial relations legislation. The Trade Union Act 
and the Labour Relations Act of 1946 and the Labour Standards Act of 1947 
gave workers the right to organize, to bargain collectively, and to strike. The 
legislation improved labour standards, introduced a number of welfare 
provisions, and set up mechanisms for conciliation and arbitration (Allen, 
1981 :21; Nimura, I 994:67), in particular the Labor Relations Commission 
(Komatsu, 1994:120). However, the government once again succeeded in 
marginalizing the union movement and achieving an industrial relations system 
that emphasizes harmony. In contrast to the pre-war situation, this was largely 
achieved through informal means and compromises. The national unions were 
marginalized through the important role given to 'enterprise unions' so that the 
national unions became mere co-ordinating bodies at the national level. Wages 
are split into different sorts of fringe benefits and bonuses for which the unions 
bargain at the level of the individual enterprise (Allen, 1981 :220). The leader-
ship of such 'enterprise unions' is often appointed by the company 
management and recruited from the ranks of loyal white-collar workers 
(Nagasawa, 1996:662; Nimura, 1994:81). 
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Other frequently celebrated features of Japanese industrial relations were 
lifetime-employment and a wage-system based on seniority. These benefits 
were important in the eyes of union leaders and they reinforced the trend 
towards enterprise unionism (Ishikawa, 1998:179). But apart from the fact that 
these privileges apply only to the increasingly smaller fraction of'established 
employees' (Allen, 1981 :221; Nimura, 1994:81 ), 5 the system works in favour 
of the management in so far, as it allows the shifting of employees in a flexible 
way to a number of different positions and production sites during the period of 
their employment (Nimura, 1994:83; Nagasawa, 1996:662, 665-6). The 
importance of the seniority wage system has waned since the 1970s and it is 
currently undermined by an increasing stress on meritocracy as a basis for 
promotion (Nimura, 1994:86-7; Nagasawa, 1996:666). Lifetime employment 
has also come under pressure because of the economic crisis. Restructuring and 
staff redundancies are an important prerequisite for Japanese banks to receive 
government bailout funds (McAlinn, 1999:33 fn. 5). So far, major Japanese 
companies have attempted to cut their workforce mainly in overseas branches, 
to transfer excess employees to subsidiaries, or to offer early retirement 
incentives (McAlinn, 1999:32 and 34 fn. 31 and 32). However, an increasing 
reliance on temporary contract workers and on foreign workers could herald 
the end of the Japanese lifetime employment system (McA!inn, 1999: 33 and 
34, fn. 15). Since lifetime employment and the seniority based wage system 
was the price for the smooth relationship with the unions and since an ever 
decreasing number of employees is unionized (Ishikawa, 1998: 191 ), 'enterprise 
unionism' as the third pillar of the Japanese industrial relations system might 
also come under threat and industrial conflicts might become more frequent. 6 
Singapore: Industrial Adjustment via Wage Policies 
As in Japan, 'harmonious' industrial relations played an important role in the 
development strategies of the city-state of Singapore. These have been 
achieved mainly through a strong government supervision of the trade unions, 
the establishment of a National Wages Council (NWC) to recommend wage 
increases, a controlled inflow of foreign workers from the surrounding ASEAN 
countries and a legislation that leaves considerable discretion to the 
administration in matters of industrial relations. Similar to the developments in 
Japan, the Singaporean government initially destroyed confrontational, pro-
communist unions and established co-operative, pro-government unions 
(Anantaraman, 1990: I O 1-5; Lee, 1987:175-6). The links between government 
and unions was then intensified by appointing politicians of the ruling People's 
Action Party (PAP) to leading positions in the union movement and vice versa 
by recruiting union leaders for top level government positions (Anantaraman, 
1990:34; Legett, 1993:124; Chew and Chew, 1996:135). Once government 
domination of the union movement was secured, two omnibus unions were 
220 
JAPAN AS A MODEL? 
split into nine industry-wide unions which were also given new non-traditional 
tasks to secure their membership (Anataraman, 1990: 111; Lee, 1987: 176-7; 
Tan, 1990:43-4). Finally, Japanese management practices are reflected in the 
most recent push for enterprise based 'house unions,' a more flexible wage 
policy that allowed for more differentiation between individual companies, and 
for an improvement in management-labour relations (Chew and Chew, 1996: 
133-5; Lee, 1987:177; Wong, 1992:144-5; Tan, 1990, 46-7). 
To break the resistance of confrontational, left-wing unions, Singaporean 
governments continued to use a strict registration system that was first 
introduced by the British colonial administration in the Trade Unions 
Ordinance 1940 (Anantaraman, 1990: 101) as amended in 1959. The amended 
ordinance gave a wide discretionary power to the Registrar whether to register 
a trade union or not. Under s. 19 of the Ordinance, unregistered unions became 
unlawful associations and had to be dissolved. Furthermore, the Registrar was 
also given wide powers to deregister a union, if it was used for unlawful 
purposes, against the interests of the workers, or if the union 'has failed to 
show cause ... or which, having shown cause, has failed to satisfy him' 
(Anantaraman, 1990: I 06-7).7 The current Trade Unions Act still allows an 
appeal against the decision of the Registrar only to the Minister for Labour, 
whose decision is final and does not have to be accompanied by reasons 
(Anantaraman, 1990: I 07-8). A residue from the days of the Emergency8 are the 
powers of Registrar and Minister for Labour to freeze union funds (NTUC, 
1994:45; Anantaraman, 1990:112-3). During the Emergency, these provisions 
were used to prevent pro-communist unionists from disappearing with the 
union's funds (Anantaraman, 1990: 102). A further 1966 amendment extended 
the definition of 'industrial action' which required a secret ballot to include 
'any practice, procedure or method of doing work which would limit output or 
production in any trade, industry and occupation' (NTUC, 1994:42). This 
extended definition was introduced to cover such practices as go slow and 
work to rule which would be damaging but not suffice to be regarded as an 
illegal strike (Ananataraman, 1990:109-10). Finally, s. 2 of the 1982 
amendment to the Trade Unions Act shows the current emphasis on improved 
labour-management relations by defining the purposes of a union as follows: 
(i) To promote good industrial relations; 
(ii) To improve the working conditions of workmen or enhance their 
economic and social status; and 
(iii) To increase productivity for the benefit of workmen, employers and 
Singapore's economy. (NTUC, 1994:39; Anantaraman, 1990:114-15). 
After successfully using the Trade Unions Act and the Preservation of Public 
Security Ordinance to achieve a co-operative union movement, the governing 
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PAP introduced a further set of legislative measures in 1968 which aimed at 
disciplinizing the workforce in order to increase the attraction of Singapore to 
foreign investment in low-value added, labour-intensive industries. The 
Employment Act 1968 for example made fringe benefits dependent upon 
disciplinized behaviour at the workplace (Anantaraman, 1990:124-5) and the 
Industrial Relations (Amendment) Act 1968 precluded the unions from 
bargaining in such areas as retrenchments, promotions, task allocation, 
recruitment, and transfer of employees (NTUC, 1994:31-2; Tan, 1990:43; Lee, 
1987:176; Anantaraman, 1990:127-8). 
As important as the legal mechanisms mentioned above was the setting up 
of the National Wages Council (NWC) in 1972, a tripartite body consisting of 
unionists, employers, and government representatives. During a period offull 
employment in the early 1970s, the initial task of the NWC was to recommend 
policies of wage restraint (Anantaraman, 1990: 173-5). While the NWC wage 
guidelines are actually not legally binding and cannot be legally challenged due 
to their informal character, they are nevertheless used as guidelines also by the 
Industrial Arbitration Court (Chew and Chew, 1996: 130-1) and achieve 
thereby a quasi-legal role. After keeping wages low during the 1970s, the 
NWC's recommendations became an important instrument in forcing 
employers to technologically upgrade their production as part of Singapore's 
so-called 'second industrial revolution' starting in 1979. A short period of 
high-wage recommendations was combined with the creation of an employer-
funded skill development fund to train and educate employees for the industries 
of the future (Wong, 1992:145-6; Lee, 1987:179; Tan, 1990:45; Leggett, 
1993: 119). 9 Once this shift was achieved, the government concentrated its 
efforts on achieving better labour-management relations along the lines of the 
Japanese example. This included the encouragement of enterprise unions, 
quality control circles and work excellence committees (Lee, 1987: 177; Wong, 
I 992: 146-7; Tan, 1990 :46-7). Strict recommendations by the NWC now began 
to be regarded as limiting the flexibility of management. Consequently, the 
NWC began to adopt much wider margins in its wage recommendations which 
were sometimes left deliberately vague (Chew and Chew, 1996: 133-5). A 1984 
amendment of the Employment Act supported these measures by allowing the 
management far more flexibility in the organization of the work pattern of their 
employees (Leggett, 1993: 120; Anantaraman, 1990: 131-6). 
Reacting to the Asian crisis, the Committee on Singapore's Competitiveness 
(CSC) recommended in a report of 1998 in particular to re-position the Skills 
Development Fund (SDF) to encourage employers to train their workers in 
certifiable skills to enhance employability and to elevate the Skills 
Redevelopment Programme (SRP) to a national programme to help minimize 
the threat of structural unemployment. Further recommendations were made to 
attract foreign talent through greater flexibility in the eligibility criteria of 
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employment pass holders. It can be assumed that these recommendations are 
designed to attract especially talented Indian and Chinese information 
technology workers to Singapore. To make Singapore more attractive to 
domestic and foreign workers, the CSC also recommended facilitating the use 
of Employee Stock Option Programmes (ESOPs) (Committee on Singapore's 
Competitiveness, 1998:81-3). 
Indonesia: Pancasila Industrial Relations 
In Indonesia, the unions played an important role in the anti-colonial struggle 
in the first half of this century (Adiwinata et al., 1974:45; Shamad, 1997:52-3). 
During the Soekarno period, unions tended to be affiliated with political parties 
(Rinakit, 1999: 143). Particularly strong during this period was SOBS! (Sentral 
Organisasi Buruh Seluruh Indonesia), the All Indonesia Workers Organization. 
This union was dissolved after the events of 1965 and the rise of the 'New 
Order' Government under Suharto, because of its links to the Indonesian 
Communist Party (PIG) (Shamad, 1997:57). The 'New Order' swiftly 
established the Indonesian Workers Joint Action Front (KABI) in 1966, whose 
pro-Government and developmental outlook is recognizable in its programme: 
1. To help to develop the New Order while actively dissolving the Old Order, 
Sobsi-PKI, Communism, and the teachings ofSoekarno and his supporters, 2. 
To develop a democratic life for labourers and cultivate co-operation among 
the labourers supporting the New Order; 3. To increase production by helping 
to make the programme of the Ampera Cabinet a success, especially in the 
field of economics (Adiwinata et al., 1974:46-7; see also Dittrich and Chalid, 
1998:282). 
Government plans to simplify the structure of the union movement were 
supported by the Indonesian Workers Consultative Assembly (Majelis 
Permusyawaratan Buruh Indonesia), which was set up in 1969 and during a 
seminar in May 1972 drafted the 'vow to reform and perfect Indonesian labour 
organization' (Adiwinata et al., 1974:48-9). This led to the dissolution of the 
principal unions into a single All-Indonesian Labour Federation (Federasi 
Buruh Seluruh Indonesia-FBSJ) (Shamad, 1997:57-63; Adiwinata et al., 
1974:49; Nayar, 1996:3) and to the adoption of the so-called 'Pancasila 
Industrial Relations.' In 'Pancasila Industrial Relations' the stress is on social 
and industrial harmony and increased productivity in the interest of economic 
development. 10 The former Director for Industrial Relations and Director for 
Wages and Social Security in the Ministry of Labour, Yunus Sharnad 
summarizes some of the main principles as follows: ' ... Pancasila Industrial 
Relations strive to eradicate differences and to develop similarities for the 
creation of harmony between the workers and the employers. In the Pancasila 
Industrial Relations it is believed that every difference of opinion and dispute 
must be settled through consultation and deliberation and must not be settled 
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through pressure by one party upon the other' (Sham ad, 1997 :7). To achieve 
this aim ... the workers and the employers are partners in the production 
process; this means that both have to co-operate for mutual assistance to 
smoothen the business of the company and to increase the welfare and 
productivity' (Shamad, 1997:8). Finally, 'the government ... has the role of the 
guardian, guide, protector, and peacekeeper which in short means a role as the 
defender and custodian for all parties related in [the] production process' 
(Shamad, 1997:9; see also Dittrich and Chalid, 1998:278-80; Rinakit, 
1999:144-5). 
A further centralization of the Indonesian trade union movement occurred 
in 1985 when the federalized FBSI changed into the unitary All Indonesian 
Workers' Union (Serikat Pekerja Seluruh Jndonesia-SPSI). Also in the middle 
of the 1980s the now abolished Ministerial Decree No. 342 gave the military a 
role in suppressing labour unrest (Nayar, 1996:3-4 and 10; Dittrich and Chalid, 
1998 :280). However, with rising international scrutiny of Indonesia's labour 
conditions, the government began to encourage the formation of enterprise 
unions, which are now regulated in the Regulation of the Minister of 
Manpower No. 1/1994. Such enterprise unions can be set up in companies with 
at least 25 workers (art 4 of the Regulation). That such enterprise unions are 
once again guided by the spirit of Pancasila Industrial Relations is emphasized 
in the preamble of the Regulation and in art 3, where the aim of the enterprise 
union is defined as 'promoting the quality of workers and the welfare of 
workers and their families; creating a peaceful atmosphere of work and 
ensuring business continuity; increasing the productivity of work.' An earlier 
regulation of 1993, which also allowed other unions to receive Ministerial 
recognition, had little practical impact because of the strict requirements for 
such a recognition (Nayar, 1996:6 in particular fn. 12; Dittrich and Chalid, 
1999:282). 
With the most recent Law on Manpower ( UU Pokok Ketenagakerjaan), the 
Government is finally giving its concept of Pancasila industrial relations a 
legal basis. Indonesian Unionists and representatives of international labour 
organizations have criticized the law not only for this reason. The development 
of a registration system for unions, the creation of a National Tripartite 
Commission, the centralization ofunion power in the hands of the SPSI and the 
prohibition of demonstrations have also attracted criticism (Gantra and Raditya, 
1997:30; Rahmanto, Anggraeni, and Gunawan, 1997:70). With the National 
Tripartite Commission, the system for maintaining harmony in industrial 
relations has been developed further. It complements already existing bipartite 
and tripartite co-operation at enterprise level (Shamad, 1997: 10-11) and the 
dispute settlement mechanism ofUU No. 22/1957 which foresees compulsory 
conciliation, mediation and arbitration involving civil servants of the Ministry 
of Manpower as well as the Regional and Central Labour Dispute Settlement 
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Committees (Sham ad, 1997: 12; Uwiyono, 1997 :3 7-8). Given the fact that a 
strike cannot take place before the acceptance of a strike declaration has been 
confirmed in writing by the Regional Labour Dispute Settlement Commission 
(Uwiyono, 1997:38, fn. 8; see also Surowidjojo, 1999:27), the possibilities for 
a legal strike remain very small. Even this small chance is probably thwarted 
by the lack ofindependent funding of unions, since only very few workers can 
afford to pay union fees (Gantra and Raditya, 1997; Nayar, 1996:7). 11 
However, the law has also been criticized from a formal point of view as its 
details are regulated in not less than eight further laws and thirteen 
administrative regulations, thereby giving wide discretionary powers to the 
administration and to the govemment. 12 The new law was originally due to 
come into force on 1 October 1998, but because of the political upheaval in 
Indonesia its implementation has been postponed and it will now become 
effective on 1 October 2000 (Surowidjojo, 1999:24). 
THE MOBILIZATION OF CAPITAL: FOREIGN INVESTMENT AND 
CAPITAL MARKET REGULATION 
Japan: the Peculiarities of the Japanese Banking System 
From the early days of her industrialization during the Meiji period, Japan had 
been relatively hostile to foreign direct investment and suspicious of foreign 
capital. Lockwood remarks about this period: 
A ware of political events elsewhere in Asia, the early Meiji leaders 
frowned on direct foreign investment in Japanese mining, industry, or 
agriculture. Even a German farmer who had established a model farm in 
Hokkaido at the invitation of the Shogunate was immediately bought out 
by the new regime. Foreigners were restricted by law from owning land 
or operating mines. Although this did not bar them from participating in 
Japanese companies so engaged, such investments appeared none too 
secure under Japanese law (Lockwood, 1954:321-2; cf. also Howe, 
1996:153). 
Instead, the crucial factors in mobilizing capital for the industrialization 
process became taxes, the high rate of savings and the peculiarities of the 
Japanese banking system. The predecessors of the post-war financial system of 
Japan were created during the 1880s and 1890s after a brief and unsuccessful 
period of experimenting with national banking. Japan established a central 
bank in 1882 and a few special banks which were entrusted with tasks such as 
foreign exchange transactions, mobilizing the savings of the poorer parts of the 
population, and providing long-term loans for industrial and agricultural 
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development against the security of immovable property. They were soon 
closely linked to the zaibatsu, so that the zaibatsu in fact had a financial and an 
industrial branch at the same time (Allen, 1981 :54-7). Besides these, a large 
number of commercial banks developed. The supervision of these banks by the 
Bank of Japan was very loose, so that big businesses could easily get finance 
from banks within the same group. The Bank of Japan confined itself more or 
less to stepping in in emergency cases (Allen, 1981 :60) Around the same time 
the tax system was reformed and substantially improved and the income from 
the taxation of land was particularly high (Allen, 1981 :49). 
One of the few channels for foreign investment was the Industrial Bank of 
Japan, which dealt with government debentures (Allen, 1981 :56). Only in the 
period from the early 1890s to 1914 was foreign borrowing substantial as Japan 
had to finance the wars with China and Russia and the colonization of large 
parts of the Asian mainland which she acquired as a result of these wars 
(Howe, 1996: 153-8). But even then the impact of foreign investment remained 
limited. Howe states: 
The Japanese carefully selected foreign partners to max1m1ze the 
favourable effects of technology transfer in Japan, and structured their 
activities in ways that minimized foreign interference in the economy. 
So much so that foreigners sometimes complained bitterly of the 
Japanese sharp practice of taking over foreign investments once the key 
technologies had been mastered (Howe, 1996: 157). 
After World War II, the Allied Occupation Authority separated the zaibatsu 
banks from the industrial undertakings and ordered the closure of the special 
banks (Allen, 1981 :204). However, the Cold War interfered and as the 
relationship with the USSR deteriorated and Communism advanced in China as 
well, the Occupation Authority became more interested in a speedy economic 
recovery of Japan than in fundamental structural changes (Allen, 1981 : 189-99; 
Pape, 1979:464-5). Slowly, successors to most of the special banks were 
established, though the concentration in the banking sector remained much 
smaller than it had been before the war (Allen, 1981 :204-5). What emerged 
finally were the keiretsu of the last several decades, which again were large 
groups of manufacturing companies centred on a bank. The share of the 
manufacturing companies within such groups was usually rather low and the 
percentage of ownership by the financial institutions varied during the 1970s 
and early 1980s between 37 per cent and 41 per cent (Thom, 1987: 19; Caves 
and Uekusa, 1976:38-9; Argy and Stein, 1997: 113). Equally, manufacturing 
companies in such groups had comparatively little assets and high ratios of 
borrowing (Thorn, 1987: 17). This and the marginal role of the equity stock 
market (Hamada and Horiuchi, 1987:233-4) allowed the Bank of Japan and the 
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Ministry ofFinance (MOF) to strictly supervise the financial market during the 
period of high growth that ended in the early 1970s (Hamada and Horiuchi, 
1987:235-45). This control over capital markets became the perhaps most 
important tool of Japanese industrial policy until well into the 1980s (Eads and 
Yamamura, 1987 :431 ). 
However, a combination of growing hostility to Japanese exports abroad, 
American pressure, and the phenomenon of globalizing financial markets led 
since the 1970s to a slow liberalization and opening of the Japanese financial 
market. Important initial steps in this liberalization process were the passing of 
the amended Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Control Law in 1979 and 
the new Banking Law of 1981. The Banking Law 1981 introduced a number of 
new instruments, patily removed the formerly rather strict compartment-
alization between banks and securities companies, and put foreign banks on 
equal footing with domestic banks (Thom, 1987 :28; Matsushita and 
Schoenbaum, 1989: 177). Earlier, the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade 
Control Law had liberalized foreign investment and exchange transactions. 
Capital transactions, however, were free only in 'ordinary cases' and the 
authorities retained the right to intervene if ( 1) the foreign exchange market is 
chaotic, (2) in case of a deteriorating balance of payment or (3) if there is 
'financial confusion.' 13 Licensing requirements also remain for so-called 
'special methods of payment' (Matsushita and Schoenbaum, 1989:118). The 
Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Control Law reversed the earlier position 
under which foreign investment, etc. were generally prohibited unless 
specifically approved by the government authorities. However, as Matsushita 
and Schoenbaum pointed out in 1989, the various ministries administering the 
law retained a great deal of discretion: 
There is virtually no case of a formal acceptance or rejection of an 
application to undertake a transaction under the Control Law. Rulings 
are generally made by means of the technique of administrative 
guidance (Matsushita and Schoenbaum, 1989: 116-17). 
As described by Baum in the preceding chapter, the struggle over the 
1 iberal ization of Japan's financial market continued during the 1990s. A 1992 
reform amended the Securities and Exchange Law, the Banking Law and other 
related financial statutes and the Securities Fairness Law created a Securities 
and Exchange Surveillance Commission (Satusky 1999:293), which Baum 
views as a 'semi-independent body' and 'nothing more than a renamed bureau 
ofMOF staffed with people from the ministry' (Baum, in this volume). Baum 
described the elements of the Japanese version of the 'Big Bang' in a previous 
chapter in this volume and it is likely that Japanese financial market and their 
legal regulation will look more familiar to Western observers in the future than 
227 
CHRISTOPH ANTONS 
they have in the past (Satusky, 1999:299). Nevertheless, as a Japanese based 
observer concluded his survey ofrecent reforms: 
The one reasonably certain thing is that any solution will be a' Japanese 
solution' which will work in this environment even if it confounds the 
logic of its outside observers (McAlinn, 1999: 10). 14 
Singapore: Foreign Investment Plus High Savings 
Within ASEAN, tiny Singapore in 1987 was second only to Indonesia in the 
amount of foreign investment it attracted and in 1986, foreign companies 
accounted for 58 per cent of employment, 68 per cent of valued added and 87 
per cent of direct exports (Regnier, 1987 :62-4 ). This emphasis on foreign 
investment was a feature of Singaporean industrial policies from the start and it 
was already recommended in three influential reports commissioned by the 
government between 1955 and 1961. As a result of the 1955 report of the 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), an Industrial 
Promotion Board with still limited powers and resources was set up in 1957. 
The Lyle Report of 1959 and the election victory of the People's Action Party 
in the same year led to the Pioneer Industries (Relief from Income Tax) 
Ordinance 1959 and the Industrial Expansion (Relief from Income Tax) 
Ordinance 1959 with considerable tax exemptions for expanding companies 
and those in pioneer industries (Cheng, 1991:188-9; Chong and Yeoh, 
1990:103-4). The result of the 1961 Winsemius Report was the first State 
Development Plan and the creation of the Economic Development Board in 
August 1961, which was provided with an initial capital of $100 million. It 
consisted at first of the divisions of Investment Promotion, Finance, Projects 
and Technical Consultation Service, and Industrial Facilities (Cheng, 
1991:191; Low, 1993a:33-5; Hughes, 1993:6-7; Low, 1993c:86-9). These 
divisions were later partially replaced and partially supplemented by the 
Development Bank of Singapore (DBS), the Singapore Institute of Standards 
and Industrial Research (SISIR), and the Engineering Industries Development 
Agency (Cheng, 1991 : 191 ). In line with new tasks, current sub-divisions are 
the Industry Development Division, the Services Development Division, the 
Enterprise Development Division, the International Manpower Division, and 
the Strategic Business Units (Davidson and Ciambella, 1995:189-99). 
Immediately after the split from Malaysia in 1965, Singapore embraced an 
export-oriented strategy which was supported by tax relief for export 
enterprises and concessionary financing. From 1983 onwards, export strategies 
were further co-ordinated by the Trade Development Board (Davidson and 
Ciambella, 1995:199 and 210; Abraham, 1985:331-2, 352-3; Woon, 1986:266). 
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Tax incentives for foreign investors are nowadays provided via the Economic 
Expansion Incentives (Relief from Income Tax) Act and the Income Tax Act.15 
While some of the incentives require a 50 per cent local ownership and some 
others are restricted to locally incorporated companies, what is most 
remarkable about the tax incentive legislation is the large administrative 
discretion given to different ministries in deciding whether to confer the 
benefits or not. The decision about the incentives is made by the Minister of 
Finance who grants them 'if he considers it expedient in the public interest to 
do so' and 'subject to such conditions as he thinks fit.' However, details about 
the benefits and industries to be encouraged are decided by the Ministry of 
Trade and Industry and the Economic Development Board (Fordham, 
1988:57). Margaret Fordham sees as common feature of the different parts of 
the tax incentive legislation: 
The rather vague wording of the basis for granting the benefits (and, 
where relevant, for dealing with objections to applications) means that it 
is quite possible for a company which appears to satisfy all the 
requirements laid down in the Act to be refused a benefit or for an 
objector's argument to be rejected without explanation ... The Govern-
ment wishes to retain complete control over its policies for economic 
development, and over the areas of manufacture or service to be 
encouraged, without it having to face the possibility of being required to 
supply detailed explanations of, or justification for, such policies 
(Fordham, 1988:58).16 
Closed to foreign investment in Singapore are the sectors of arms and 
ammunition, air transport, and public utilities. Singapore Telecom's monopoly 
over telecommunication services was recently phased out seven years earlier 
than originally projected and the government paid Telecom $1 billion in 
compensation (Cooper Maysami et al., 1999:65). Licences of the Monetary 
Authority of Singapore are required for banking, financing, and insurance 
businesses. They have allowed the government to differentiate between 
international and domestic financial intermediation (Bryant, 1989:347), as 
different licences allow for different scopes of activities (as to the details see 
Cooper Masyami et al., 1999:60). Furthermore, participation of foreigners in 
the ownership and management of newspapers is narrowly restricted by the 
Revised Newspaper and Printing Presses Act 1991. Finally, apart from a few 
exceptions with government approval, foreigners are precluded from owning 
residential property and commercial real estate (Davidson and Ciambrella, 
1995:200-1; Abraham, 1985:329; Woon, 1986:276). Although the Exchange 
Control Act remains in force, all controls on the transfer of funds and currency 
have effectively been lifted since 1978 (Woon, 1986:275; Davidson and 
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Ciambella, 1995: 199). The Asian financial crisis and the competition with 
Hong Kong to become the leading financial services centre in the region (for a 
comparative analysis see Montes 1999) has led to a further reform of the 
regulation of Singapore's financial markets with the aim to raise bank 
disclosure standards, to standardize the reporting of undisclosed reserves and 
the choice of accounting policies and adopt what has been called a risk-focused 
approach to bank supervision. This means that the Monetary Authority of 
Singapore (MAS) will allow greater flexibility for institutions with strong 
internal control mechanisms while it will continue to strictly supervise 
institutions without such mechanisms (Cooper Masyami et al., 1999:62-5). 
While the Committee on Singapore's Competitiveness recommended greater 
regulatory flexibility, it also requires from domestic financial institutions 'to 
gear up for greater foreign competition' (Committee on Singapore's 
Competitiveness, 1998: 140-2). Statements by leading government figures such 
as Deputy Prime Minister, Lee Hsien Long, indicate that the Singaporean 
government aims to nurture a limited number of internationally competitive 
banks by encouraging bank mergers and concentrating foreign and domestic 
talent in these institutions (Cooper Masyami et al., 1999:65-6). 
Besides foreign investment, the government has also always encouraged 
domestic savings, in particular via the Central Provident Fund (CPF). The 
Central Provident Fund was introduced by the CPF Ordinance of 1953 and 
started to operate in 1955. Initially established as a fund for security in old age, 
it is meanwhile used for a variety of objectives including the funding ofhome-
ownership, investments in non-residential properties, approved investments in 
shares, unit trusts and the like, to finance educational tuition fees and medical 
insurance. Contributions to the CPF rose from a mere 10 per cent of the 
monthly wage in 1955 to 50 per cent in 1984 and has since been maintained at 
a level around 40 per cent (Tay, 1992:264-81 ). In 1998, investment 
opportunities for these pension funds were further expanded (Montes, 
1999:163). The Committee on Singapore's Competitiveness has further 
recommended to allow private pension funds to exist alongside the CPF and to 
offer their services to senior executives with salaries above the CPF limit and 
to foreign executives who do not contribute to the CPF (Committee on 
Singapore's Competitiveness, 1998:136). 
Indonesia: Shifting Policies and ad hoe Approaches 
Besides Korea, Indonesia has been hardest hit by the financial crisis in Asia, 
exposing severe weaknesses in the financial sector and the regulatory 
framework. To experienced observers of the political economy oflndonesia, 
however, these developments have not come as a complete surprise. Andrew 
MacIntyre, for instance, wrote in 1993: 
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The flood of new entrants into the banking sector after 1988 gave rise to 
intense competition as banks struggled to attract depositors and 
borrowers. Competition for market share is thought to have led a 
number of banks to overextend themselves and to have assembled loan 
portfolios of dubious quality. Concerns about the stability of the 
banking industry were accentuated by the discovery in 1990 that a 
leading private bank had suffered massive losses through foreign 
exchange dealings and mismanagement. In these circumstances, a 
shake-out of the industry seems quite possible (MacIntyre, 1993b: 162). 
The different swings in the economic policy of the Indonesian government 
before this crisis have been described elsewhere in great detail (Robison, 1986; 
MacIntyre, 1993b; Hill, 1988; Hill, 1996). They can be mentioned here only 
briefly as far as they are relevant for the current regulatory framework 
regarding foreign investment and the financial market. In general, Indonesian 
policy as to foreign investment and financial market regulation has fluctuated 
in accordance with the availability of other sources of revenue. Oil and gas in 
particular financed a large part of the Indonesian budget until the middle of the 
1980s. Inheriting the tightly state controlled economy of the final years of the 
Soekarno government, a period ofliberalization followed which lasted roughly 
until 1973. This was followed by a period of stronger reliance on state 
intervention after the sharp rise of the oil price, lasting from 1974 to 1982. The 
oil price began to decline in 1983 and prices fell sharply in 1986 and 1987. 
Again, a reversal oflndonesian economic policies followed and the accent has 
since been on liberalization and deregulation. The rise and fall of these 
different strategies was usually also reflected in the influence of different 
political camps advocating more liberal or more state interventionist policies. 
The stronghold of the so-called technocrats centred around a group of US 
trained economists in the Ministry of Finance and the National Economic 
Planning Board, whereas state interventionists have been influential in the 
Ministry oflndustry, the Ministry of Science and Technology, the central bank, 
and the capital investment board (MacIntyre, 1993b: 154-5). 
As a result of new banking legislation in 1967, the status of Bank Indonesia 
as central bank was reaffirmed. A number of state-owned commercial banks 
were given the task to provide services for different sectors of the economy. 17 
Compared to the state-owned banks, private and foreign banks played only a 
minor role. The state kept a strong influence through preferential loans to 
priority borrowers, a central bank control of the deposit and loan rates of the 
state banks and preferential refinancing of loans extended by state banks to 
priority sectors (Mac! ntyre, 1993b: 136-9). The financial sector was, therefore, 
from the beginning heavily politicized and the system was used for supporting 
indigenous and small-scale entrepreneurs in competing with Indonesian-
231 
CHRISTOPH ANTONS 
Chinese, for co-opting political allies, and for subsidizing rice farmers to 
prevent rural discontent. The regulatory mechanisms to oversee the system 
were weak. For example, Bank Indonesia did not have the administrative 
capacity to control whether information provided by the commercial banks 
about the allocation of preferential credits was correct or not. The system 
invited corruption by bank officials who would allocate preferential credits to 
non-priority borrowers and share in the difference in interest. Non-indigenous 
and large scale borrowers manipulated the system with silent approval of the 
banks by using domestic personnel as straw-men to apply for preferential loans 
(MacIntyre, 1993b: 151-2. For a rather humorous description of these various 
practices see K wik K ian Gie, 1999b ). The hierarchical structure oflndonesian 
society facilitated many of these practices as bank employees often felt that 
their jobs depended more on satisfying their political clients than on the 
financial performance of their bank. Bennett (1999:21) uses the term 'memo 
lending' for loans extended to such clients as banks would often decide to grant 
a loan merely because of a memorandum sent by a high-ranking official or a 
person in an influential position. 
State control of the financial system still increased during the years ofhigh-
income from oil18 until falling revenues from oil showed the need to improve 
the efficiency of the banking sector and sparked the deregulation of the 1980s. 
First reform steps were taken in 1983 when credit ceilings were abolished, 
refinancing and direct commercial lending by the central bank was reduced and 
restrictions on state bank interest rates were removed. The number of 
categories of preferential borrowers was also reduced substantially (MacIntyre, 
1993b:145 and 158; Sabirin, 1993:67-8).19 This was followed by the so-called 
'Pakto 1988,' the deregulation package of27 October 1988 that facilitated the 
licensing of new and foreign banks and the establishment of small-scale credit 
banks and joint-venture banks. Foreign bank activities were allowed in 
provincial capitals and, importantly, the minimum reserve ratio was reduced 
from 15 per cent to 2 per cent. 20 Indonesia's conglomerates set up many of the 
new private banks as an easily accessible source of finance for their business 
groups. Bennett (1999:22) calls these banks a 'captive funding source for the 
conglomerate's businesses.' As a consequence, there was excessive lending to 
affiliated companies. 
A new banking law replaced the 1967 legislation in 1992. The new law 
distinguished between general or commercial banks and small-scaled credit or 
rural banks. Only Indonesian citizens or entities were allowed to establish 
general banks. Foreign banks could form joint ventures with Indonesian banks 
as long as their participation was limited to 85 per cent of the paid-up capital. A 
licence of the Ministry of Finance was required for all banking activities in 
Indonesia. State banks became limited liability companies with shares held by 
the state. General banks were also allowed to go public and to register their 
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shares at an Indonesian stock exchanfe' as long as the participation of 
foreigners remained under 50 per cent.2 The 1992 legislation also improved 
legal lending limits to affiliated parties that were originally imposed as part of 
the 'Pakto 1988.' Under the revised legislation, a bank was not allowed to lend 
more than 10 per cent of its issued capital to commissioners, directors and 
other related parties or more than 30 per cent to a group of related parties 
(Tabalujan, 1999:5). In fact, contraventions of these rules were common. In a 
report of 1997, the ten worst offenders had lent to related parties between 85 
per cent and 345 per cent of their respective paid-up capital (Tabalujan, 
1999:6). 
Hal Hill summarized the effects of the deregulation of the banking sector as 
follows: 
Breaking out of the straitjacket of heavy central bank control, few banks 
had much experience of project appraisal and loan assessment. There 
was an acute shortage of qualified staff, leading to very high salaries 
and frequent 'hijackings' of personnel. Accounting and auditing 
standards continued to be very poor. The closed nature of many of the 
major business conglomerates and the fact that in many instances they 
were really lending back to themselves, put further strain on the system. 
Finally, Bank Indonesia's monitoring and supervisory capacity was still 
rudimentary. Over this period, there were frequent allegations that 
sizeable proportions of outstanding loans were either in arrears or in 
outright default. Yet the central bank appeared not to have accurate data 
on the extent of these problems (Hill, 1996:37). 
As the minimum paid-in capital under the 1992 legislation was only US$5 
million (Bennett, 1999:27), the Indonesian banking sector developed an 
unusually large number ofundercapitalized banks.22 At the beginning of the 
Asian crisis, Indonesia had over 230 banks whereas Thailand for example had 
only fifteen and Malaysia and Korea had less than thirty commercial banks 
(Bennett, 1999:54-6; Tabalujan, 1999:4 ). Indonesia has also maintained a free 
foreign exchange system since 1970. Following the deregulation, this led to 
extensive borrowing by private companies and by the new private banks 
abroad. Because much of this borrowing was unhedged and with the value of 
the Rupiah falling, banks and private companies carried an increasingly heavy 
debt burden (Bennett, 1999: 12-16). Once again, Hal Hill has pointed out that 
many of the 'private sector' projects that had necessitated this external 
borrowing had in fact a strong government connection and often received 
preferential access to finance because of real or apparent government 
guarantees (Hill, 1996:249). 
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After the onset of the Asian crisis, the Indonesian government announced the 
closure of the sixteen weakest private banks in November 1997 (Bennett, 
1999:31; Tabalujan, 1999:5-6). In January 1998, the Indonesian Bank 
Restructuring Agency (!BRA) was formed to oversee the reform of the banking 
system, to administer the government's guarantee programme for bank debts, 
to take over non-performing assets from banks that were to be liquidated or 
merged with stronger banks, and to collect the amounts that private banks owed 
Bank Indonesia in connection with liquidity support received by them (Bennett, 
1999:35; Tabalujan, 1999:6). Depending on the amount of liquidity support 
received from Bank Indonesia, the IBRA divided the most troubled banks into 
two categories. Category A banks were to be liquidated. Their performing 
assets were transferred to other banks under IBRA control, whereas their non-
performing assets were transferred to an Asset Management Unit (AMU) that 
the !BRA had established. The operations often such banks were suspended in 
August 1998. In addition, the IBRA took over the management of four 
somewhat less troubled category B banks (Bennett, 1999:36-7). As a result, at 
the end of 1998 either !BRA or Bank Indonesia directly controlled about 70 per 
cent of the total assets held by Indonesia's banks (Bennett, 1999:51). 
Also in November 1998, the 1992 Banking Law was amended. 
Amendments introduced a deposit insurance scheme and relaxed bank secrecy 
regulations. They broadened the scope of the legal lending limits and required a 
stricter assessment of prospective borrowers. The tasks of licensing and 
supervising banks, which were formerly divided between the Ministry of 
Finance and Bank Indonesia, became now the exclusive responsibility of Bank 
Indonesia. Foreign Ownership ceilings were abolished and the IBRA's role W<fi 
formally endorsed by the new law. In January 1999, the closure of another 38 
private banks followed (Tabalujan, 1999:7-8). 
The field of foreign investment regulation has experienced similar swings 
of economic policy as the regulation of financial markets. The Foreign Capital 
Investment Law of 1967 as amended by Law No. 11/1970 re-opened Indonesia 
to foreign investors by offering tax incentives and assurances against 
nationalization or foreign exchange restrictions. Joint ventures became the 
usual vehicles for such investments. At first they were merely encouraged 
through the granting of tax incentives, but with the more restrictive policies of 
the I 970s a Resolution of the Cabinet23 of 22 January 197424 made them 
compulsory. The law attempted to safeguard Indonesian interests by 
demandin~ the employment oflndonesian labour, the provision of educational 
facilities,2 and a certain Indonesian equity participation, which was originally 
left to the discretion of the administration, but after the resolution of 197 4 was 
deemed to be 51 per cent. The Decision of January 1974 also began the 
discrimination between pribumi and non-pribumi with regards to equity 
participation without providing a definition of these terms.26 
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Foreign investments are subject to approval by the Capital Investment Co-
ordinating Board, which prior to 1977 required on average more than fifty 
weeks to reach a decision (Himawan, 1980:286-7). In 1977, two Presidential 
Decrees turned the Capital Investment Co-ordinating Board into a 'one stop' 
agency for foreign investors by authorizing it to issue most of the necessary 
permits (Gautama, 1995:367-8).27 In the same year, the Board issued its first 
scaled list of priorities for investments. The List distinguished between priority 
activities, non-priority activities which attracted tax incentives, non-priority 
activities without such incentives and prohibited activities (Gautama, 
1995 :368). The criteria for these different designations remained vague and 
included the ability of the venture to increase production or to absorb 
employment and a consideration of the location of the venture to ensure an 
even spread of industrial activities in Indonesia (Himawan 1980:293). Hill cites 
an Indonesian official with the following remark on the investment legislation: 
'The [Foreign Investment] Law is brief and simple, though one should not look 
at [it] only, but at the 328 kinds ofrelated legislation as well' (Hill, 1996: 100). 
Major reform of the field began in 1988, when the priority list of 
investments was replaced by a negative list, automatically allowing all 
investments not mentioned there (Hill, 1996: 100). Important new regulations 
were introduced in 1994 by Government Regulation No. 20/1994 on 
Ownership of Shares in a Company established in the Framework of Foreign 
Investment and in the Decree of the Minister for Investment 
Procurement/Chairman of the Investment Co-ordinating Board (BKPM) No. 
15/SK/1994. The Regulations allowed, among other things, foreign individuals 
to be shareholders in 100 per cent foreign owned companies or joint venture 
companies, permitted a maximum of 95 per cent foreign shareholding in 
companies operating in special sectors of particular interest to the state, 
dropped the requirement of a minimum investment, and of a divestment to 
Indonesians in the first fifteen years of the investment, allowed the sale of 
shares of I 00 per cent foreign owned companies without prior approval by the 
BKPM, and substantially facilitated the acquisition of shares by foreign 
companies and citizens (Gingerich, 1994:11-15; Mills, 1996:9, 15-19). 
NURTURING NATIONAL ENTERPRISES: 
COMPANY, SECURITIES AND ANTI-MONOPOLY LEGISLATION 
Immediately after setting upon the path of industrialization, all three countries 
surveyed here attempted to nurture successful national companies that would 
be able to compete on a world market. However, Japan transferred successful 
state companies into private hands as early as during the 1880s (Lockwood, 
1954: 15) and from then on relied on its influence over the state banks and on 
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administrative guidance to ensure that its economic policies were followed by 
the private sector. To strengthen the competitive position of national 
companies, Japan initially used the usual means of tariffs and subsidies for 
strategic industries. With foreign direct investment tightly controlled and the 
lack of anti-trust legislation, the powerful Japanese cartels, the zaibatsu, 
developed. The state encouraged the formation of cartels in particular during 
the 1920s and 1930s, occasionally even to the point of enacting laws that 
provided for compulsory membership in a cartel (Pape, 1979:464; Matsushita 
and Schoenbaum, 1989: 139; Caves and Uekusa, 1976:48-9). The important 
role of these groups in the wartime economy of Japan was one of the reasons 
why they became targets of the Allied Authority after World War II. After the 
dissolution of forty-two of the largest holding companies in 1946 and of a 
further nineteen in 1947, an Anti-Monopoly Law modelled on US lines was 
introduced to prevent a reemergence of the zaibatsu (Pape, 1979:464-5). 
However, cold war reality quickly led to an overriding concern to strengthen 
the new ally Japan. In the process, the provisions of the anti-monopoly 
legislation became di luted. After first amendments in 1949, important changes 
were introduced in 1952. The general prohibition of cartels was liberalized and 
so-called 'depressed industry cartels' and 'rationalization cartels' exempted 
from the legislation. Some further exceptions, e.g. for import and export, were 
made in additional legislation. The process resulted in the emergence of the 
keiretsu, the post-war successor to the zaibatsu. Since then, the Japanese 
Ministry oflndustry and Trade (MITI) and the Fair Trade Commission (FTC) 
have often been on collision course as to whether to encourage or prohibit 
mergers. Commentators have argued that MITI' s views have mostly prevailed 
(Pape, 1979:465-6; Matsushita and Schoenbaum, 1989: 139-40; Sonneville and 
Jagtenberg, 1995: 159-60). However, as Boyd points out elsewhere in this 
volume, the strengthening of the Anti-Monopoly Law in 1977 and a landmark 
judgment of 1980 that made the restraining of competition by means of cartels 
more difficult should not be overlooked. 
Another means to discourage foreign participation in the Japanese economy 
was the system of interlocking companies by cross-shareholding, which led to 
the effective withdrawal oflarge quantities of shares from the stock market (as 
to this phenomenon elsewhere in Asia see Bowring 2000). In addition, the 
Securites and Exchange Commission was abolished in 1952 and the securities 
business was placed under the direct control of the Ministry of Finance. 
Finally, take-overs could be avoided by issuing additional shares to 'friendly 
third parties,' ifnecessary at 'especially advantageous' prices. Only in the latter 
case would such an allotment need the approval of the shareholders under the 
Japanese Commercial Code (Sonneville and Jagtenberg, 1995: 160, 165-6). 
As a result ofliberalization measures during the 1980s and 1990s, the stock 
market has become much more attractive. This has led to a number of revisions 
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of the Securities and Exchange Law and to the re-installment of a Supervisory 
Commission on Securities Transactions. The Anti-Monopoly Law was again 
revised in 1992 and in 1997. The revised law allows holding companies in all 
industries with the exception of banking and finance. Guidelines of the Fair 
Trading Commission will contain details about those holdings that will 
continue to be prohibited. 
In Indonesia and Singapore, state enterprises have continued to play an 
important role, in spite of liberalization measures in other sectors of the 
economy (Hill, 1996:101-7; Tan, 1992:12-19). In Singapore, new strategies 
have in the past been spearheaded by the statutory boards, in particular the 
Economic Development Board, the Jurong Town Corporation, the 
Telecommunication Authority of Singapore, the Public Utilities Board, and the 
Housing and Development Board. From these have branched off hundreds of 
private companies, controlled by three major holding companies (Temasek, 
Singapore Technologies, and MND Holdings) (Tan, 1992:13-16; Pillai, 
1983:77-95).28 Formal compliance with the company law requirement of at 
least two shareholders is achieved by having two civil servants taking up one 
share each (Pillai, 1983 :89). Directors are appointed by the Ministry ofFinance 
with a relatively small group of permanent secretaries and high level civil 
servants holding cross-directorships in many government-owned companies 
(Richardson 2000b). In accounts presented to parliament, investment in state-
owned companies is listed as 'other investments' and not further specified. In 
case of defence related companies, balance sheets and accounts would not even 
be available to shareholders (Pillai, 1983: 116-21 ). However, following recent 
criticisms of the role of Singapore's government-linked companies, which 
account for 10 per cent of economic output and 25 per cent of stockmarket 
capitalization in Singapore, the government has announced a unit trust to sell 
more shares in such companies to the Singaporean public (Richardson 2000b ). 
In Indonesia, the distinction between public corporations and state-owned 
private corporations was abolished with the State Enterprise (Perusahaan 
Negara) Law No. 19/1960. This law said that 'a Perusahaan Negara is any 
enterprise (perusahaan) the capital of which is State's property or belongs to 
the State's Treasury, except when otherwise stated by law.' The law led to a 
bewildering implementing legislation to re-introduce differentiation and to the 
extension of civil servant status to all employees of such companies (Gautama, 
1995:336-8). A Presidential Decree of 1967 and the subsequent law No. 9 of 
1969 re-established the former distinction, with the perusahaan umum (public 
corporation) still covered by Law No. 19/1960 and the perusahaan perseroan, 
a limited liability company under the Commercial Code, whose shares are 
wholly or partially owned by the state. Besides this, the Law provided for the 
possibility of special state enterprises created by statute, as in the case of the 
state oil-company Pertamina (Gautama, 1995:339-40). 
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Privatization in Indonesia has been slow. In comparison to Singapore or Japan, 
it encounters the additional difficulty of taking place in an economy that is 
divided along ethnic lines (Low, 1993b:168-83; Hill, 1996:106-7). As a result 
of the Asian crisis, the Indonesian government enacted an Anti-Monopoly and 
Unfair Competition Law in 1999, that came into effect in March 2000. 
Responsible for the investigation of monopolistic practices and acts of unfair 
competition is a new Business Competition Supervisory Committee consisting 
of seven members that are appointed by the President and approved by the 
House of Representatives. The new law has been criticized because of the 
influence that the President retains and because it fails to specify what sort of 
business practices will be deemed to be 'unfair' or 'detrimental' to society 
(Abdurrachman and Ryan, 1999). 
CONCLUSION 
A number of conclusions might be drawn from this survey that concern both 
content and form of these Asian business laws. While all three countries have 
to a varying degree relied on cheap labour in the early stages of the 
development process, it is really at the capital formation stage, that significant 
differences appear between the 'late developer' Japan and the 'late late 
developers' in Southeast Asia. Japan remained hostile to foreign investment 
during that period and relied on a substantial tax burden and the peculiarities of 
her banking system. In contrast, Singapore developed a peculiar mix of greatly 
facilitating foreign investment, on the one hand, and maintaining a fairly large 
state-controlled sector in 'strategic industries' on the other. The high rate of 
compulsory savings generated by the Central Provident Fund was partly 
channelled into these sectors. Indonesia's embrace of foreign investment was 
much more hesitant and the greater available revenue from oil made it possible 
to maintain a state-centred policy well into the 1980s. 
A difficulty of the comparison between Japan and Southeast Asia is the 
great difference in time between the beginnings of industrialization in the 
different countries. Japan was often saved by peculiar historical circumstances, 
beginning with a silk worm disease in Europe early in the Meiji period to the 
Cold War and Korean War of the 1950s, when the victorious powers of World 
War 11 allowed her a quick comeback as a new alley against communism. The 
genius of Japan has been to seize these opportunities to greatly enhance her 
technological and educational foundations. The same must be said of 
Singapore that made the best of its strategic location during a boom period and 
successfully anticipated future requirements at an early stage. In the case of 
Indonesia, the government alternated between quite different development 
strategies, often relying on ad hoe solutions to particular problems. 
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All three countries to a certain extent instrumentalized their imported 
commercial laws for development purposes. In Japan, Western law was 
introduced to revise the unequal treaties and litigation for individual goals was 
never encouraged. Singapore impresses with its formal legal system, but some 
essential parts of the development strategy have been removed from judicial 
scrutiny. In Indonesia, the court system has been largely unreliable and 
Western derived business laws served to appease foreign investors and to 
justify developmental policies of the government. As far as form is concerned, 
a few similarities have emerged: the most striking feature of business laws in 
these three countries has been the explicit or implicit incorporation of the 
developmental ideology as part of the laws. Judges and administrators were 
required to assess individual claims taking into account 'the state of the 
national economy,' 'the interest of development,' etc. even in fields 
traditionally belonging to private law. The classical distinction between private 
and public law was, thereby, blurred. There was also a tendency to rely on 
administrative guidance and to shift essential parts of the legislation to be 
regulated in a large number of administrative decrees. As these are often 
difficult to obtain, public scrutiny has remained a problem, especially as these 
regulations are also easily and frequently changed. Finally, the administration 
retained a large discretion and there has been at times little hesitation to bend 
the law and divert from the original purpose, if this was 'in the interest of 
development.' 
With a similar emphasis on a strong state and administrative guidance in the 
implementation of business laws, success becomes then dependent on the 
quality of the administrators. Here it is absolutely essential to minimize 
corruption.29 This in turn requires that the salaries of administrators and judicial 
personnel are kept at least as attractive as those in the private sector.30 This is a 
major factor that explains the 'English public servant ethos' in the Singaporean 
public sector and the 'samurai spirit' of its Japanese counterpart. While cases 
of corruption have been exposed in Japan, too, in comparison to Indonesia's 
KKN (korupsi, kolusi, nepotisme) the lavish entertainment of Ministry of 
Finance officials must be regarded as petty corruption. Indonesia's failure to 
develop a coherent industrial policy has also been explained by the constant 
struggle between competing approaches and interest groups or, as Hal Hill has 
put it, between Indonesia's character as a hard and as a soft state (Hill, 
1998:319-21). What has been missing in Indonesia is what Eads and 
Yamamura (1987:429), using the analytical framework developed by Zysman 
(1983) have called 'a prior agreement on basic goals of industrial policy.' 
Japan's and Singapore's history has been characterized by fear: fear of foreign 
domination in the case of Japan and fear of invasion by hostile neighbours in 
the case of Singapore. This has created a constant state of emergency that the 
government used in cases of economic crisis to make sacrifices more palatable. 
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While this consensus from fear seems to be waning, it has never existed in the 
pluralist archipelago of Indonesia, which always had to contend with 
dissatisfied provinces and vastly different ideological approaches and religious 
views. 
NOTES 
Most famously in The World Bank (1993). In a similar vein e.g. Root 
( 1996) and Rowen ( 1998). 
2 In particular in Indonesia 'KKN' the acronym for 'korupsi, kolusi, 
nepotisme ' ( corruption, collusion and nepotism) is usually referred to when 
it comes to discuss the reasons for the crisis (see K wik Kian Gie 
1999a:287-3 l 6). 
3 Lim (2000:36). 
4 For a similar picture covering different areas of law and economic 
development see Pistor and Wellons (1998 :31 ). 
5 Nagasawa ( 1996 :665) puts the percentage of not permanently employed 
people among the Japanese workforce as high as 20 per cent. Ishikawa 
(I 998: 194 fn. l) estimates that only about 20 to 25 per cent of all 
employees in Japan are covered by the so-called 'three pillars' of the 
Japanese industrial relations systems (lifetime employment, seniority based 
wage system, company-based unionism). These are mainly employees in 
large firms and in the government bureaucracy. 
6 As to the substantial drop in the number oflabour disputes between 1970 
and 1989 see the statistics in Ishikawa (1998: 190). 
7 Cf. also the current text of the legislation in National Trade Union 
Congress 1994:45-6. 
8 As to the Emergency and the Emergency Regulations declared in 1948 to 
fight the armed insurrection of the Malayan Communist Party see Yeo and 
Lau (1991 :123-4). 
9 As to more background information about the 'second industrial 
revolution' see Rodan 1989: 142-88. 
10 Pancasila Industrial Relations were created at a National Seminar in 1974 
with the following proclamation: 'To carry out the ideals of the 17 August 
1945 Independence Proclamation of the Republic of Indonesia in the 
national development, in order to materialize a just and prosperous society 
based upon Pancasila and to take part in implementing the world law and 
order based upon freedom, eternal peace, and social justice through the 
creation of tranquil, peaceful and orderly atmosphere of work and of 
tranquil atmosphere of business, to increase production, and to promote 
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workers' welfare and status in conformity with man's dignity,' cited after 
the translation by Shamad 1997:5-6. 
11 Rinakit ( 1999: 146) also alleges that only a small fraction of the actual fee 
payments of SPSI members is forwarded to SPSI. 
12 'Pokok-Pokok Pandangan Komisi Pembaharuan Hukum Perburuhan 
Terhadap Rancangan Undang-Undang Pokok Ketenagakerjaan,' in: 
Diponegoro 74, 20 January 1997, p. 7. 
13 See Thom, at 28, who remarked in 1987: 'One of these three conditions 
has been deemed to exist ever since the passage of the law.' 
14 As to the speed of reforms see also Delhaise (1998:191): 'The reforms 
will eventually take place, but their impact - in terms of disclosure more 
perhaps than in real terms - on some banks will be so severe that it would 
not be surprising to see the schedule stretched somehow beyond the target 
dates.' 
15 ASEAN Law Association (1995), 351; as to the different tax incentives cf. 
also Fordham ( 1988). 
16 It nevertheless seems that the tax benefits have been awarded very 
generously, ibid, 59. 
17 A SEAN Law Association (1995), p. 43. 
18 Cf ASEAN Law Association (1995), p. 44. 
19 A SEAN Law Association (1995), p. 44; MacIntyre (1993b ), pp. 145 and 
158; Syahril Sabirin, 'Money Market Policy in Indonesia,' in: Ministry of 
Law/Singapore Academy of Law/Faculty of Law, National University of 
Singapore, Proceedings of the First Indonesia-Singapore Law Seminar: 
Business & Investment Laws in Indonesia, 26-27 February 1993, pp. 67-8. 
20 ASEAN Law Association (1995), pp. 44-5. 
21 See ASEAN Law Association (1995), pp. 45-6. 
22 Bennett (1999:55) compares the total assets of only US$500 million of the 
average Indonesian bank with the figures in Korea, where the smallest 
commercial bank had assets in access ofUS$2 billion and Thailand, where 
12 of the 15 commercial banks had total assets in excess ofUS$4 billion. 
23 Referred to as National Stabilization Council Decision of January 22, 
1974. 
24 As to the legally doubtful step of overriding the Foreign Capital 
Investment Law by means of a mere Cabinet Resolution, see Charles 
Himawan, The Foreign Investment Process in Indonesia, pp. 266, 278-88. 
25 In the majority of cases, foreign investors preferred to pay a fine instead, 
see Himawan, p. 272. As to the safeguarding of Indonesian interests see 
also Gautama, Indonesian Business Law, PT Citra Aditya Bakti, Bandung 
1995, 371-3. 
26 Later decrees preferred to speak about the 'economically weak' and the 
'economically strong,' see Himawan, 283-4. 
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27 Himawan, p. 286, however, mentions a few permissions which cannot be 
granted by the Foreign Capital Co-ordination Board and require a second 
step. 
28 According to a recent report, such government-linked companies (GLCs) 
account for 10 per cent of economic output and about 25 per cent of stock 
market capitalization in Singapore, see Richardson (2000b ). 
29 See also the recent report of the Political & Economic Risk Consultancy 
Ltd., as reported in The International Herald Tribune of 23 March 2000 
(Richardson, 2000a). The report found Indonesia to be the most corrupt 
country of those surveyed, whereas Singapore, Hong Kong, and Japan 
were the least corrupt. 
30 In an effort to fight corruption, the Indonesian government this year 
increased the basic salaries of civil servants by 30 per cent, see Richardson 
(2000a). 
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CHAPTER9 
POLICY AS LAW AND LAW AS POLICY 
THE ROLE OF LAW IN CHINA'S DEVELOPMENT 
STRATEGY 
JIANFUCHEN 
Since 1978, the growth of law in China, like that of the economy, has been 
remarkable. When the post-Mao reforms began in 1978, there were virtually 
no law or any functioning legal institutions in China; the only 'laws' were a 
few statutes and some provisional regulations or orders drawn up in the 
1950s. Today, a relatively independent legal system exists and functions 
throughout China. In terms of lawmaking, from 1979 to the end of 1998, the 
National People's Congress (NPC) and its Standing Committee had 
promulgated 351 statutes and resolutions. During the same period of time, 
the State Council had adopted more than 800 administrative regulations 
while over 6,000 local rules were issued by local people's congresses and 
their standing committees (People's Daily, 1999). 
Government by law has been a constant and consistent theme in post-
Mao China. The Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh Central Committee 
of the Communist Party of China (CPC) in 1978 was seen by Chinese 
officials and scholars as a new epoch in modern Chinese history and a 
turning point in legal development in China. It declared not only that large-
scale nationwide mass political campaigns should be stopped and 'the 
emphasis of the Party's work should be shifted to socialist modernization as 
of 1979 ,' 1 but also that a legal system was a necessity for socialist 
modernization (Liu and Wu, 1986:569). Such a need for economic develop-
ment and for law was summarized by Deng Xiaoping as a 'Two-Hands' 
policy. On the one hand, the economy must be developed; and on the other 
hand, the legal system must be strengthened (Wang et al., 1996:7). 
This new policy under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping, and now under 
the third generation of leadership of the CPC, contrasts sharply with the 
practice under the leadership of Mao Zedong who was reported to have 
declared that '[we must] depend on rule of man, not rule of law' (Leng, 
1977:356). This apparent difference in policy and practice raises an 
important question: is the role of law in China today fundamentally and 
qualitatively different from that during Mao's leadership? 
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In this chapter I will argue that the changing fate of law in China is 
inexorably tied to the need, as perceived by the Party leadership, for national 
development. In this regard, law serves as a tool and tool only; its usefulness 
depends largely on the Party's policy of the time. The Rule of Law per se is 
not seen as having much value. While this may be so, after twenty years of 
reform and practice, legal discourse in the 1990s in China is qualitatively 
different from those in the first forty years of the People's Republic of China 
(PRC). If legal theories developed by Chinese scholars are to be translated 
into practice, there is hope that China may abandon the ideology of legal 
instrumentalism and begin to see law as more than a means to an end. To 
support this argument, I will first briefly examine the troubled fate of law 
under Mao's leadership. I will then focus on analysing the changing 
perceptions of the role of law in present China and the broad trends in the 
rapid legal development in the 1980s and 1990s. 
POLICY AS LAW - THE ROLE OF LAW UNDER MAo's LEADERSHIP2 
The PRC' s legal system was established on the basis of the pre-1949 
experience of communist justice and on the Soviet model (Chen, 
1999a:ch.2). Although the pre-1949 communist legal developments were 
largely experimental and localized in nature, certain features of 'people's 
justice' were emerging and being shaped during these years. To start with, 
the Marxist concept of law as being a tool to remould the society and to 
suppress class enemies, to enforce party policy rather than protecting 
individual rights, was taking its root. Secondly, justice was politicized (such 
as the enforcement of class justice in which distinction was made according 
to the class elements in administering justice) and popularized (such as the 
implementation of a mass line under which mass trials were organized not 
so much for the administration of justice but for political education and 
indoctrination). Thirdly, extra judicial organizations and procedures and 
extralegal measures were often utilized to impose sanctions and to settle 
disputes (Leng, 1967:ch.1; Tay, 1969:165-72; Brady, 1987:ch.4). 
It is then clear that the legal system of the PCR under Mao's leadership 
was established on a rather shaky foundation. It is also well recognized that 
Soviet influence or Marxist theories of law did not lead to any significant 
activities in lawmaking or institution-building in China. Instead, the main 
features of law in the first thirty years of communism in China differed little 
from those of the pre-1949 communist experiences (Tay, 1969, 1973, 1976; 
Butler, 1983; Leng, 1967; Leng and Chiu, 1985). There was, however, 
another face to the experience, one that has not been well recognized. 
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The first three to four years was a period for the new government to 
consolidate its newly gained powers and gain control of China through 
political campaigns. However, the need to make new laws and to establish a 
new judicial system was recognized by the new government from the 
moment the Six Codes of the Nationalist Government (the KMT) were 
abolished.3 Indeed, no less than 376 'legal documents' were issued by 
various central government departments and commissions during that period 
of time (Wu, 1983:8). 
Towards the end of 1952 when the period of consolidation had passed, 
the Party began to shift its focus towards economic construction. Mao first 
proposed a general line for the transitional period to the Central Committee 
of the CPC, and elaborated this in June 1953 at the Politburo of the CPC. 
This stipulated that: 
During the transition the general line and fundamental task of the 
Party is to bring about, step by step, over a fairly long period of time 
the socialist industrialization of the country and to accomplish, step 
by step, the socialist transformation of agriculture, handicraft and 
capitalist industry and commerce (Mao, 1986:704). 
This policy was first adopted by the Pa~ in 1953 and then incorporated 
into the 1954 Constitution of the PRC. The conditions necessary to a 
planned economy and a gradual transition to socialism were deemed to have 
been created after large-scale political campaigns in the previous three years 
(Preamble to the 1954 Constitution). The first Five-Year Plan was thus 
adopted in 1953. 
More important for legal development was the official recognition of the 
inadequacy of the pre-1949 experience of law for the establishment of a 
socialist legal system by the Party. Liu Shaoqi, then the President of the 
State, in his Report to the Eighth National Congress of the CPC in 1956, 
declared: 
Now, ... the period of revolutionary storm and stress is past, new 
relations of production have been set up, and the aim of our struggle 
is changed into one of safeguarding the successful development of 
the productive forces of society; a corresponding change in the 
methods of struggle will consequently have to follow, and a complete 
legal system has become an absolute necessity (Liu, 1985:253). 
In the same Report, Liu stressed that one of the urgent tasks of the state was 
to start systematically making laws and perfecting the legal system (Liu, 
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1985:253). The then President of the Supreme People's Court, Dong Biwu, 
in his speech to the same Congress, specifically pointed out that: 
The problem today is that we still lack several urgently-needed, fairly 
complete basic statutes such as a criminal code, a civil code, 
procedural laws, a labour law, a law governing the use of land and the 
like (Dong, 1986:481). 
The first serious efforts to rebuild a legal system and to draft comprehensive 
codes began,5 marking the commencement of what the Chinese scholars 
called the 'golden period' of the 1950s. 
With this policy in place, the Constitution, organic laws for courts and 
procuracy as well as regulations covering arrest and detention were duly 
adopted in 1954. Drafting work on major codes, including the civil code and 
criminal code, also started. And before the completion of these major codes, 
no less than 4,072 individual laws, regulations, and decrees, though 
unsystematic, incoherent, and inconsistent, were issued from October 1949 
to October 1957 (Tay, 1976:411). 
This first effort to draft comprehensive codes was, however, abruptly 
ended by what are now termed 'leftist errors' or 'communist wind' by 
scholars in China, i.e. the Anti-rightist Movement of 1957 and the 'Great 
Leap Forward' of 1958 (Wu, 1983:11; Zhang and Wang, 1989:328; Zhao, 
1990:232).6 
After these upheavals the political climate changed again in 1961. After 
the disaster of the 'Great Leap Forward' of 1958, a policy of 'readjusting 
(Tiaozheng), consolidating (Gonggu), strengthening (Chongshi) and 
enhancement (Tigao)' - a policy basically advocating a better controlled and 
more realistic economic plan for national economic development, and in 
today's terminology, economic reform - was adopted by the Party's Central 
Committee in early 1 961. More importantly, at an enlarged meeting of the 
Central Committee of the CPC in February 1962, the necessity for the 
development of a commodity economy was recognized (Gu, 1989: 102). In 
Communist ideology, this means the need for law and social order (Hazard, 
1975:145-75). With it, again, was the demand for law. It was under these 
circumstances that Mao was reported to have said in 1962 that '[l]aw was 
needed - not only a criminal code, but also a civil code' (Gu, 1989: 102; 
Zhang and Wang, 1989:328). 
The second effort to make laws and rebuild a legal system was fated to 
share a similar fate as the first attempt.7 It was first interrupted by the so-
called 'Four Clean-ups' Movement of 1963-5 (clean up of politics, the 
economy, organization, and ideology, also called 'Socialist Education').8 
This was then followed by the so-called 'Cultural Revolution' of 1966-76 
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during which virtually all laws and the legal system were destroyed (Tay, 
1976:417-23). The words of individual leaders and policies of the Party, as 
Chinese scholars often reminded us, acquired binding force and took the 
place of that of law in running and ruling the state. 
LAW AS POLICY - THE ROLE OF LAW UNDER DENG'S LEADERSHIP 
Under Deng's leadership in the 1980s and 1990s, China has witnessed 
massive and rapid enactment of laws and regulations, particularly laws and 
administrative rules regulating economic and commercial relations, as well 
as a swift re-establishment of legal institutions including the courts and the 
procuracy. 
One must however not be misled by the apparent difference between 
Mao and Deng. The different attitudes must be understood in their 
'historical' context. When Mao occasionally advocated for law, it was at the 
time the 'storming revolution' was perceived as being over and an orderly 
economic development was considered necessary. When he repudiated law, 
it was at the time when he was advocating the 'uninterrupted revolution' 
which aimed at destroying 'old' orders. When Deng took over leadership, 
the 'uninterrupted revolution' had pushed the Chinese economy to the verge 
of collapse; the legitimacy of the Party leadership had to be rebuilt upon 
economic development. For him, therefore, law must be used to establish 
stability and order for economic development (Deng, 1984:335-55; Liu and 
Wu, 1986:574). It was against this background that the Party declared in 
1978 the now famous phrase: 
There must be laws for people to follow; these laws must be 
observed; their enforcement must be strict; and law-breakers must be 
dealt with ... 
From Deng's various speeches on law, it is clear that both Mao and Deng 
unambiguously regarded law as an instrument of the Party policy; neither 
has taken the establishment of the Rule of Law as an end in itself. One of the 
most prominent and influential jurists, Zhang Youyu, once clearly spelt out 
the rule oflaw in the PRC: 
Socialist democracy and the legal system [fazhi, sometimes translated 
as 'Rule of Law'] are inseparable; both of them are [to be used] to 
consolidate socialist economic bases and to enhance socialist 
development. At present, they are powerful tools for promoting the 
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Four Modernizations. Neither of them is an end but both of them are 
means (Zhang, 1984:41). 
If law is to facilitate economic development, an obvious question then 
arises. Why does China need law in addition to Party policies since it is the 
Party policy that decides the direction of economic reform? Well, according 
to Peng Zhen, then the Chairman of the Standing Committee of the NPC, 
law is an important and necessary tool for implementing Party policies: 
Law is the fixation of the Party's fundamental principles and policies, 
that is the codification of the Party's fundamental principles and 
policies. These fundamental principles and policies are those that 
have in practice proven effective and correct (Peng, 1984:160-1).9 
That is, policy is the foundation of law and law is the mature form of policy 
(Keller, 1989:658; Foster, 1982:395-413). In other words, law is, to a large 
extent, to be used to generalize and institutionalize Party and state economic 
reform policies and measures. To many Chinese lawyers and scholars, law is 
only a better tool than policy, capable of securing and institutionalizing ad 
hoe policies in a more universal manner; of providing stability and order 
through state coercive forces for economic development and of defining 
rights and duties in relation to the state as represented by various 
administrative authorities (Law Department of Beijing University, 
1984:212-21; Wu and Shen, 1987:165-77). Rule of Law per se has no 
virtue. As such. the nature and the extent of legal developments essentially 
depend on the parameters set by the reform programme. 10 
As the economic reform had no clear direction, 11 it was not surprising 
that legal development had taken an ad hoe and piecemeal approach. This 
then produced a large system of law consisting of many individual statutes, 
decisions and orders, and administrative regulations and rules made under 
different ad hoe policy orientations. 
In short, Party policies were to be transformed into state policy through 
legislative procedures. Law, as such, embodies only vague and general 
principles; it lacks the fundamental elements of clarity, certainty, univer-
sality, and stability. 12 It offers few solutions to legal and practical problems; 
and its enforcement has been lar~ely selective and various, depending on the 
prevailing policy consideration. 3 The difference between law and policy 
under Deng is thus more a matter of formality than of substance. 
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A RULE OF LAW FOR A MARKET ECONOMY? 
Although law was ruthlessly used by Deng as an instrument for political 
domination, particularly in the immediate aftermath of the 1989 Tiananmen 
Square event, and for economic development, 1992 appeared to show 
evidence of the start of an apparent new period in legal development in 
China. In that year, the Party decided on a long-term direction of economic 
reform - to establish a 'socialist market economy.' 14 The adoption of such a 
policy then began to change the practice in legal construction, at least in 
rhetoric. 
As I have argued elsewhere (Chen, 1999d:73-6), there is little new in the 
notion of 'socialist market economy' as far as reform measures are 
concerned; the real significance lies with the justification for introducing the 
notion, rather than with the notion itself. That is, the significance lies in the 
abandonment of the requirement for ideological correctness in introducing 
reform measures. Hence, the notion of 'socialist market economy' 
introduced a practical licence to use capitalism in the economic sphere and 
to introduce capitalist mechanisms and measures (including legal measures) 
that will facilitate economic development. 
It is under the new policy parameters that we have seen some bold 
theoretical discussions in Chinese legal circles, arguing for a rights-based 
approach towards legal construction, the separation of public and private 
law, equal treatment of all economic participants, universality of legal 
norms, and freedom of contract (Chen, 1999d:73-6). Market economy, for 
Chinese scholars, means an economy under the Rules of Law and demands 
'rational' law in the sense defined by Max Weber. 
This 'new' understanding of the role of law in society then soon led to a 
renewed discussion and debate on the difference between Rule by Law and 
Rule of Law. 15 
The recent discussions began in early 1996 when Jiang Zemin initiated a 
seminar, given by prominent Chinese scholars to Party and state leaders, on 
the topic of 'Ruling the Country by Law' (Yifa Zhiguo). At the conclusion 
of the seminar, Jiang made a speech entitled To Rule the Country By Law 
and To Guarantee Long-Term Stability of the Country. 16 Thereafter, the 
Ninth Five-Year National Economic and Social Development Plan and the 
Long-Term Goals to the Year 2010, first proposed by the Party and then 
dutifully adopted by the Fourth Plenary Session of the 8th NPC on 17 
March 1996, formally decided that 'Ruling the Country by Law' is to be a 
long-term development strategy. 17 More importantly, the notion was further 
elaborated in the Political Report to the 15th Party Congress in September 




Developing democracy must go hand in hand with the efforts to 
improve the legal system so that the country is ruled by law. Ruling 
the Country by Law means that the broad masses of the people, under 
the leadership of the Party and in accordance with the Constitution 
and other laws, participate in one way or another and through all 
possible channels in managing state affairs, economic and cultural 
undertakings and social affairs, and see to it that all work of the state 
proceeds in keeping with law, and that socialist democracy is 
gradually institutionalized and codified so that such institutions and 
laws will not change with changes in the leadership or changes in the 
views or focus of attention of any leader. Ruling the Country by Law 
is the basic strategy employed by the Party in leading the people in 
running the country. It is the objective demand of a socialist market 
economy, an important hallmark of social and cultural progress, and a 
vital guarantee for lasting political stability of the country. The Party 
has led the people in drawing up the Constitution and other laws, to 
which it confines its activities. In ruling the country by law, we can 
unify the adherence to Party leadership, development of people's 
democracy and doing things in strict accordance with the law, thus 
ensuring, institutionally and legally, that the Party's basic line and 
basic policies are carried out without fail, and that the Party plays the 
role of the core of leadership at all times, commanding the whole 
situation and coordinating the efforts of all quarters (Political Report 
(1997)). 
There was little discussion of democratization, political reform and the 
protection of human rights. 
The adoption of the terminology of 'Ruling the Country by Law' (Yifa 
Zhiguo), and hence the change of terminology from 'legal system' (fazhi) to 
'ruling the country by law' apparently has aroused great enthusiasm and 
strong interest among scholars in China. To Chinese scholars, such a formal 
adoption of the phrase 'Ruling the Country by Law' means the final 
acceptance of the notion of Rule of Law and, thus represents a new 
landmark in legal construction (Liu et al., 1996:73). Official propaganda 
machines also emphasize that the adoption of such a term indicates a deeper 
understanding of the socialist political system, imposes a higher standard for 
socialist democracy and a socialist legal system, and signifies a new era in 
socialist democracy and legal construction (People's Daily, 1997; Lin, 1997; 
Xue and Wang, 1997). 
The discussions on the phrase 'Ruling the Country by Law' have all been 
based on the Western notion of Rule of Law. It embraces the concepts of 
supremacy of law, judicial independence, equality before the law, separation 
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of powers, checks and balances, a parliamentary system, and the protection 
of human rights (Liu et al., 1996). Thus one scholar argues that the 'Rule of 
Law' is not just a means to rule the country; 'Rule of Law' demands judicial 
fairness as well as power control and supervision (Lin, 1999). Other scholars 
declare that to establish a 'Rule of Law,' supremacy of law, judicial fairness 
and impartiality, and protection of human rights must be first firmly 
established as its fundamental principles (Zhao and Guo, 1998). Clearly, the 
language in legal discourse is qualitatively different from those embodied in 
the Party policy statements. 
The renewed discussion seems to indicate that Chinese scholars have 
now finally admitted that China under Deng Xiaoping was a country under 
the Rule by Law. Their suggestion that present-day China under the 'Third 
Generation of Community Party Leadership with Jiang Zemin as Its Core' is 
moving towards a Rule of Law is dubious. The Chinese scholars seem to 
have forgotten that the term 'Ruling the Country by Law' was not an 
invention of Jiang Zemin nor indeed was first used by him; other leaders 
(including Deng Xiaoping) and official documents had on occasion used this 
term (Liu et al., 1996:46-7). In reality, however, the Party's Political Report 
says little about Rule of Law: the supremacy of law (over and above the 
Party and its policies), the independence of the judiciary, and checks and 
balances are all missing from the Political Report. The Report was talking 
about Rule by Law, not Rule of Law. The Chinese scholars' belief, it seems 
to me, is divorced from reality and, at best, wishful thinking without much 
foundation. 18 
Despite all these ambiguities inherent in the phrase 'Ruling the Country 
by Law,' it was formally incorporated into Article 5 of the Constitution 
during the 1999 revision of the Constitution. 19 The incorporation of this 
phrase is emphasized as being an important guarantee for the country's 
long-term stability (Tian, 1999). 
SOME CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Under the banner of the 'Socialist Market Economy,' the Chinese legal 
discourse and legislative practice accord more with Max Weber than with 
Karl Marx. However, one again must not be misled by appearances. In 
terms of the movement towards the Rule of Law, it is important to 
distinguish the role of law in economic development and that in political 
domination. In modernizing Chinese law and building a legal system for a 
socialist market economy, Chinese scholars and lawmakers are constantly 
reminded not to forget the 'Four Fundamental Principles' in making and 
implementing laws (Gu, 1989:42-3). The implications of upholding these 
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principles should not be underestimated. Under these principles, as 
explained by Gu Angran,20 firstly, important principles of all legislation 
have to be approved by the Party and secondly, the Party line, its guiding 
principles and policies, must be written into law (Gu, 1989:42; Gu, 1999). 
Under the guidelines for establishing a 'socialist market economy,' Marxism 
may be out of fashion, 'socialism' is not, at least when it is useful. Indeed, 
as some Chinese scholars have argued, the socialist 'Rule of Law' demands 
that 'ruling the country by law' must be carried out under the leadership of 
the Communist Party and through the principle of 'people's democratic 
dictatorship' in which democracy is allowed to the people and dictatorship 
exercised on the enemies (Sun and Huang, 1998: 12-13). 
Nevertheless, the present search for 'rational' law and jurisprudential 
discussions have clearly moved Chinese law away from the dogmatic 
ideologies imported from the former Soviet Union and made the Chinese 
legal theories much more sophisticated. It has accelerated the law reform 
processes and facilitated the mutual understanding of legal cultures inter-
nationally (though not without a real danger of mutual misunderstanding). It 
also has the potential of leading the Chinese reform to some fundamental 
political changes and the establishment of a Rule of Law in China.21 
However, the strong instrumentalist approach still taken to law has 
ensured that the Rule of Law is far from being established after half a 
century of struggle. The core problem is that it has never been seen as an 
end in itself. In other words, under the name of upholding the Party 
leadership has been a clear authoritarian attitude towards reforms. The 
obvious and constant lag between political and economic reforms, the 
reluctance to participate in international human rights dialogue by hiding 
behind the shield of national sovereignty, and the insistence on human rights 
as being a Western idea are just a few of the examples of the instrumental 
and authoritarian approach to law.22 The fundamental danger of such an 
approach to law is to use law cynically as a weapon both to 'legitimate' and 
to enforce repressive policies against attempts at democratization. The 
declaration of martial law 'according to the Constitution' in May 1989 in 
Beijing is only one of the recent examples of this cynical use of law. The 
insistence by the Chinese Premier, Li Peng, and the Party Secretary-
General, Jiang Zemin, that the 1989 Beijing Massacre was a correct measure 
follows this instrumentalist and authoritarian logic closely.23 Similarly, the 
massive crackdown on the Falun Gong - basically a non-political 
organization - carried out in the first half of 1999 clearly revealed the role 
of law in China, that is, it is simply a powerful tool for the ruling elite. With 
this attitude towards law prevailing, Chinese scholars are rightly concerned 
that China might end with a Rule by Man in the name of Rule by Law (Guo, 
1994:2). Chinese scholars are also rightly concerned that, without rejecting 
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the ideology of legal instrumentalism, it would be very difficult for the Rule 
of Law to be realized in China (Yu, 1989; Xie, 1994). 
One of the serious consequences resulting from such an approach to law 
is the lack of respect for law. The tremendous difficulties being experienced 
by Chinese courts in enforcing court judgments or decisions are but one 
example of such consequences. If law cannot be enforced independently, as 
one Chinese scholar has questioned (Zhao, 1994:5), it is doubtful whether it 
is important to have law at all. 
On the whole, it seems to me that the notion of 'socialist market 
economy' is one under which an ideological breakthrough can be made by 
adopting measures for economic and hence legal development. It has 
however not led to a fundamental departure from legal instrumentalism as 
an ideology and from the practice of using law as a tool, and tool only, for 
political domination and economic development. What remains hopeful is 
the current theoretical effort being made by Chinese scholars, as evidenced 
in the present jurisprudential discourse. If legal theories developed by 
Chinese scholars, instead of party policies, are to be translated into practice, 
there is hope that China may abandon the ideology of legal instrumentalism 
and begin to see law as more than a means to an end. If the experience in the 
1980s provides any guidance, 24 it might be reasonable to be optimistic that, 
once academic discussions and debates start, they may well gain their own 
momentum. With the increasing involvement of legal experts in lawmaking, 
such a translation of theories into practice may not be a mission impossible. 
Let us hope that day will not be too far away. 
NOTES 
See the Communique of the Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh 
Central Committee of the CPC. An English translation of the 
Communique appears in Liu and Wu (1986), pp. 564-77. 
2 In this chapter, we take 'law' to mean normative documents adopted and 
promulgated by legislative authorities through formal legislative 
procedures, whereas 'policy' means normative documents, issued, 
publicly or otherwise, by other authorities having no fonnal legislative 
power. In the Chinese context, in which legislative powers are granted 
to many authorities (including administrative authorities) and 'law and 
regulations' are issued by a variety of authorities (not all of them having 
the formal legislative authority), the difference of the two notions also 




3 See the Common Program of the Chinese People's Political 
Consultative Conference, which served as a provisional constitution 
until 1954. An English text can be found in Blaustein (1962:34-53). 
4 See the Preamble to the 1954 Constitution. An English text of the 
Constitution can be found in Blaustein (1962:1-33). The only change in 
the Constitution was the word 'State,' replacing the word 'Party.' 
5 As the pre-1949 experience was seen as inappropriate to the prevailing 
circumstances, Soviet models were taken as the main sources. Indeed, 
many young students were sent to study in the Soviet Union and many 
Soviet scholars came to lecture in China. A large number of Soviet law 
textbooks and codes were also translated into Chinese. By 1957, 165 
foreign legal texts and monographs had been translated into Chinese. 
Among them, the great majority were from the Soviet Union. See Zhang 
and Wang ( 1989:5). 
6 For a brief discussion of these movements, see Brugger (198la:174-
206); and Liu and Wu (1986:215-43). 
7 No significant laws were issued during this period of time, though some 
provisional measures or regulations on technical standards, forest 
protection, and economic contracts were issued by the State Council. 
See Lan (1982:5-6). 
8 For a brief discussion of the political situation during the period 
between 1962-5, see Brugger (1981 :21-42). 
9 Identical views were echoed by prominent Chinese scholars. See e.g. S. 
Chen (1988:196). Chen was one of China's most prominent scholars. 
His article was originally published in Chinese in Studies of Law (Faxue 
Yanjiu), (no. I, 1980), and later reprinted in A Collection of Articles on 
Chinese Legal Science, Beijing: Press of the Masses (1984), pp. 13-31. 
See also Yu (1989:46-7). 
10 I have discussed elsewhere, in detail, the relationship and interaction 
between legal development and economic reform in the context of civil 
and commercial law. See Chen (1995a:ch.3). 
11 This is characterized by the Chinese phrase 'Crossing the river by 
touching the stones underneath (Mozhuo Shitou Guohe).' 
12 Few Chinese laws issued in post-Mao China contain sufficient details 
for implementation purposes. Almost without exception, laws are 
supplemented by various 'implementing rules' issued by different 
administrative or judicial authorities at a later stage according to the 
prevailing policy considerations. Such supplementation frequently 
fragments Chinese basic laws, making these laws truly 'policy 
guidelines.' The most comprehensive codes in China today are the 
comprehensively revised Criminal Procedure Law (1996) and Criminal 
Law (1997). However, in less than three years, both codes have been 
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supplemented several times by various authorities, such as the 
Provisions on Certain Issues relating to the Implementation of the 
Criminal Procedure Law (1998), Supreme People's Court, Supreme 
People's Procuratorate, Ministry for Public Security, Ministry for State 
Security, Ministry of Justice, Legal Affairs Committee of the Standing 
Committee of the NPC), Provisions on Determining Names of Crimes in 
Implementing the Criminal Law (1997), Supreme People's Court. 
Similar provisions were also issued by the Supreme People's 
Procuratorate), Interpretations on the Supreme People's Court of 
Relevant Issues concerning Specific Application of Laws for Hearing 
Criminal Cases involving Fraudulent Purchasing and Illegal Trading of 
Foreign Exchanges ( 1998), Decision on Punishing Crimes of Purchasing 
Foreign Exchange by Cheating, Evasion of and Illegal Sale and 
Purchase of Foreign Exchange (1998), Standing Committee of the 
NPC), Explanations of the Supreme People's Court on Certain Issues 
concerning the Implementation of the Criminal Procedure Law (1998), 
Interpretation of the Supreme People's Court on Relevant Issues 
concerning Concrete Application of Laws in Handling Criminal Cases 
Committed by Units (1999), Provisions on Certain Issues Relating to 
Bails (1999), Supreme People's Court, Supreme People's Procuratorate, 
Ministry for Public Security, Ministry for State Security, Provisions on 
Standards for Filing and Investigation of Cases Directly Conducted by 
People's Procuratorates (1999), Supreme Procuratorate, and many other 
individual implementing rules. With practices like this, there is little to 
talk about certainty, clarity, universality, and stability of Chinese law. 
13 Political and legal campaigning targeting specific 'crimes' has been a 
constant feature in both Mao and post-Mao China. During these 
campaigns, severe and quick 'justice' is often applied to the targets 
according to policy guidelines, as the Chinese law frequently leaves 
large scope for discretionary powers in the law for implementation and 
enforcement purposes. 
14 For detailed discussion on the evolution of economic reform policies 
and the background in which the policy to establish a 'socialist market 
economy' emerged, see Chen (l 995a:Ch.3 and pp. 280-6); Gao 
(1993:40); People's Daily (1992:1 and 3). 
15 This debate is not new, it was one of the contentious issues extensively 
debated in the late 1970s in China. That debate, however, did not lead to 
any substantial consensus among scholars nor did it provide much 
guidance for legal development. More recently, the debate and 
discussions have resumed. Nevertheless, the phrase Fazhi (which 
literally means: legal system) began to be used in official documents 
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and by scholars fairly consistently, referring to efforts for establishing a 
legal system in China. See Keith (1994). 
16 The Speech has not yet been formally published, but the main contents 
were published in People's Daily (Renmin Ribao), internet edition, 9 
February 1996. 
17 The text of the Ninth Five Year National Economic and Social 
Development Plan and the Outline of Goals by Year 2010 can be found 
in Guangming Daily (Guangming Ribao), 20 March 1996, p. 1. 
18 This divorce of theories from reality has not passed totally unnoticed by 
some Chinese scholars. See e.g. Ma (1999:29). 
19 For a discussion on the 1999 constitutional revision, see Chen ( 1999b ). 
20 Gu is the Chairman of the Legislative Affairs Committee of the 
Standing Committee of the NPC. 
21 The rapid development of an administrative law system, including the 
recent adoption of the Law on Administrative Penalties (March 1996), 
and the recent comprehensive revision of the Criminal Procedure Law 
(March 1996) and the Criminal Law (March 1997) which now 
incorporates some fundamental 'due process' principles (such as the 
presumption of innocence) and abolishes certain controversial 
provisions (such as the counter-revolutionary crime provisions) carry a 
great potential to cause some fundamental changes in the Chinese legal 
system, for the protection of human rights, and for establishing a Rule of 
Law in China, if they are to be properly implemented. Also, the above-
mentioned jurisprudential debates present unequivocal evidence of a 
strong rebellious flavour against authoritarianism and totalitarianism. 
For detailed studies on these aspects, see Chen (1997, 1999c, and 
1999e. 
22 For further detailed studies on inconsistent Chinese international 
behaviour, see Feinerman (1995). For the Chinese official attitude 
towards human rights and international human rights dialogue, see the 
White Paper issued by the Information Office of the Chinese State 
Council, Human Rights Situation in China, 1991. For a recent analysis 
by Amnesty International on China's human rights policies and legal 
aspects of the violation of human rights, see Amnesty International, No 
One Is Safe, Al Index ASA 17/01/96. 
23 Li Peng made this insistence during his visit to Germany in July 1994. 
See 'Li Peng defends '89 crackdown,' The Age, 7 July 1994, p. 9. A 
similar statement was made by Jiang Zemin during his talk with 
Malaysian Prime Minister, Dr Mahathir, in Beijing in May 1994. See 
People's Daily (Renmin Ribao) ( overseas edition), 13 May 1994, p. 1. 
24 I have discussed, in detail, the relationship between theoretical efforts 
and legal development in Chen (1995a:Ch.7). 
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CHAPTER10 
THE CLONABILITY OF THE SINGAPORE MODEL OF LAW 
AND DEVELOPMENT: 
THE CASE OF SUZHOU, CHINA* 
CONNIE CARTER 
The re-emergence of the 1960s' Law and Development movement (LAD) in 
the 1980s accelerated after the demise of Soviet communism and the end of 
the Cold War. However, as discussed elsewhere (Carter, 2000) this rebirth is 
more than a reworking of the old American paradigm, which was abandoned 
- at least in part - in the early 1970s after it suffered criticisms for being 
ethnocentric, naYve, and imperialistic (Trubek and Galanter, 1972; Merry-
man, 1977). In its 1990s' guise, and in the model set for notoriety in the 
twenty-first century, the movement has metamorphosed into an instrument 
wielded by supra-national institutions, 1 regional aid agencies such as the 
Asian Development Bank, various non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs),2 and individual countries seeking to enhance their trade preference 
or leverage in emerging economies. One such country is Singapore. Indeed, 
Singapore's entry into this field is, in itself, evidence of a departure from the 
1960s' model, which was a purely north-south dialogue between the US and 
west European countries on one side and newly decolonized nations in 
Africa, Asia, the Caribbean, and Latin America, on the other. As a 
successful late-industrialized country, Singapore's rapid economic 
development during the past four decades can be said to have benefited from 
aspects of the first LAD movement, while in the 'new' movement Singapore 
is a facilitator rather than a recipient. Thus the experience analysed in this 
chapter is probably one of the first examples of a professional south-south 
dialogue in law and economic development. 
This chapter explores aspects of the economic development programme, 
which the Singapore government, at the invitation of the Chinese 
government, sought to introduce into a small, clearly defined geographic 
area of China: the China-Singapore Industrial Park in Suzhou. It argues that 
legal transplants or Singapore 'software' and 'technical assistance' seem to 
be resulting in the emergence of a new species of local administrative and 
regulatory legal measures within the Chinese national legal system. In the 
pragmatic day-to-day hubbub of life in the Suzhou Industrial Park, this sub-
system of laws seems to be taking on a life of its own although none of the 
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measures purport to establish a legal regime which is separate or distinct 
from China's national legal system. However, it is clear that the Singapore 
model of law and development is neither the same as its western 1960s' 
predecessor nor the reborn, post-Cold War, 1990s' version.3 This chapter 
first characterizes the nature of the Singapore model of law and 
development. It argues that far from converging with laws of the west and 
becoming a replica of western law, the Singapore model has diverged from 
its western roots into a more holistic and communitarian version in response 
to local political, economic, and developmental imperatives. The nature of 
Singapore law may also be described as 'westemistic' and syncretistic.4 
First, because it seeks to give an appearance of a western form in order to 
assuage the possible apprehension of foreign investors. Secondly, because it 
borrows from far and wide, combining the characteristics and practices of 
differing legal systems to form its own. The chapter then explores aspects of 
the 'transfer' that seems to be taking place in Suzhou and concludes by 
speculating on whether the Suzhou experience is evidence of the 
replicability of the Singapore model of law and economic development. 
SINGAPORE'S MODERN SYNCRETISTIC LEGAL CULTURE 
The roots of Singapore's legal culture are planted firmly in the tradition of 
the English Common Law. For when Stamford Raffles (later 'Sir') alighted 
there in 1819, he transported with him, as his birthright, all the laws of 
England. This custom, entrenched in the Common Law (e.g. Cooper v 
Stuart (1889) 14 AC 286), was further supported by colonial legislation, a 
sophisticated English court system and administration, which ensured 
formal reception (Bartholomew, 1985:3-24). However, the English law 
which took root in Singapore was not necessarily Lord Ellenborough's 'law 
of liberty,' of respect for the dignity of the individual, her entitlement to life, 
liberty, and property. Arguably what had taken root was a particular species 
of English law designed primarily to facilitate the smooth running of a 
profitable colonial regime. Law became a set of rules and practices that 
underpinned the predominantly economic goals of the colonial state. 
The development of this variant of English law accelerated and was 
transformed into a development tool after Singapore won self-rule in 1959 
and particularly after independence in 1965 following Singapore's expulsion 
from the Malaysian Federation. Indeed the failure of the Federation was the 
catalyst that created modern Singapore, for it dictated the potent strategy to 
'go it alone' and fight for economic survival at any cost. From 1965, the 
development of law in Singapore was determined by the decision of 
Singapore's leaders, led by Lee Kuan Yew, to embrace a pragmatic 
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ideology, which prioritized economic development and nation-building as 
their sole strategic focus. All government policies and actions were 
harnessed towards achieving these goals. 
Acknowledging its vulnerability as a small nation lacking in profitable 
natural resources, except for its large natural harbour, its geographic location 
at the crossroads of Asia and the industriousness of its predominantly 
Chinese but multiracial population, the Singapore government opted for 
export-oriented foreign investment as its ticket to economic development. It 
was a courageous decision at a time when just about every newly 
independent nation sought to free itself as much as possible from the 
perceived greed and tyranny of foreign actors. To implement this policy the 
government set out to nurture a degree of social discipline, socio-cultural, 
political, and racial cohesion, and work ethic among its multiracial 
population, which it considered would be conducive to making the nation an 
attractive manufacturing paradise for foreign investors. Consequently, from 
a conceptual point of view, both Singapore's colonial and post-colonial 
experiences coincide with Damaska's proposition that the nature of a state's 
ideology and its political organization plays a crucial role in shaping the 
development of its legal institutions (Damaska, 1986). In both the colonial 
and the post-colonial states, economic success was the all-consuming, if not 
the sole objective. Economic prosperity was the state's raison d'etre. Indeed 
during the 1980s, and perhaps earlier, Singapore technocrats began to refer 
to the venture as 'Singapore Inc.' 
Singapore's experience of law and economic development therefore also 
mirrors relationships that Oakeshott (1975) recognized in the distinction 
between rules in civic societies and those in enterprise associations. 
According to Oakeshott, the rules of a civic association derive their 
authority from the association itself and not from any goal outside of the 
association or their use to create desirable outcomes. In contrast, the rules of 
an enterprise association [such as Singapore Inc.] gain their validity not 
from the association itself but from its goals or purposes [self-reliance and 
economic prosperity]. Since the government defined economic success as 
the only option for Singapore, this enterprise association also gave rise to 
and provided legitimacy for the rules which were necessary for achieving 
this goal. 
Economic Development and Singapore Law 
Singapore is probably the best example of a successful, modern, growth-
oriented, interventionist, capitalist state (World Bank, 1993, 1996, 1997). In 
terms of economic prosperity and quality of life, Singapore remains among 
the top rank of developed societies irrespective of which measuring tool is 
employed. For instance, in 1995, per capita GNP was US$24,800 against 
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US$18,700 for the UK, Singapore's past colonial masters. Scores for life 
expectancy, infant mortality, persons per physician, literacy rate, and so on 
are equally impressive (see Statistics Singapore: www.singstat.gov.sg). All 
these have been achieved within three to four decades of independence. 
Naturally, the regional economic setback from 1997 to 1999 took its toll. 
But true to form, the government took radical steps to minimize the effects 
f . 5 o contag10n. 
Economists, development theorists, and others vie to posit theories that 
might explain 'the economic miracle'. An apt summary might be that, right 
from the start and consistently for the four decades of its life so far, the 
Singapore government6 resolutely promoted economic development through 
an eclectic mix of: 
• Providing selected free market access; 
• Establishing and maintaining efficient infrastructure; 
• Orchestrating and investing in key export-led sectors of the economy; 
• Disciplining and educating the workforce; and 
• Creating an ideology and delivering social justice and tangible benefits 
that secure the acquiescence of the people to the activities of the state 
and its elite group ofbureaucrats.7 
The scenario that has unfolded during the decades is an example of what 
Wade (1990) called 'governing the market,' although Singapore, which he 
dismissed as a minnow state, was not included in his study. 'Law,' as 
mature government policies, seems to have been the facilitator, the glue that 
bound these disparate elements together and helped supply the discipline for 
sustainable growth (Carter, 2000). Legislation, both primary and an 
abundance of secondary or subsidiary rules, was the main vehicle. It is 
therefore apt to refer to Singapore's law as administrative in nature (Thynne, 
1990). However, it is more than that. For at the core of the emerging species 
of developmental law one finds the government's determination to shape the 
lives and behaviour of the people so that they conform to the larger goals of 
the community as a whole rather than to individual whims and private 
privilege. During the years, law was used to nurture, build, and coerce a 
communitarian ideology in which individuals as well as associations (like 
labour unions) were urged to sacrifice individual rights in the name of the 
public interest. Among the areas of law that clearly demonstrate this 
philosophy are those that regulate labour and industrial relations, land and 
housing, education and industry-specific skills training, investor incentives 
and so on. Legal regulation was deemed necessary even in areas that many 
westerners would regard as private, sacrosanct, or petty. Indeed, nothing that 
the PAP government perceived as a mischief - however small - was left 
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unregulated: from adverse comment by NGOs, lawyers, church leaders or 
foreign journalists (Maintenance of Harmony Act, No 26 of 1990, ss8-19; 
Internal Security Act, cap 143, 1985 rev ed., ss8-19; Newspaper and 
Printing Presses (Amendment) Act, No 22 of 1986) to having too many 
children, but later for having too few (failure of the educated elite to 
perpetuate their genes); failure of career women to marry and settle down; 
smoking in public; drug-trafficking; firearms possession; secret societies; 
silent defendants; traffic jams in the city; crooked lawyers; traditional Malay 
villages (kampong); official and corporate corruption; litter; chewing gum; 
graffiti; failure to look after one's parents; and even unflushed public toilets 
(Harding, 1996). Harding calls these 'smart laws' by which he seems to 
mean laws which are designed to produce not just in general, but rather 
precisely, the exact result desired by their creators. 
But precision is a characteristic of Singapore's social engineering and 
other regulatory laws, even though some are drafted widely to enable 
discretion in interpretation. Overall, many of them have succeeded in 
providing highly desirable consequences. For instance, the virtual abolition 
of corruption, the provision of affordable, universal public housing, health 
care and education, the reduction of environmental pollution, high levels of 
savings, disciplined labour relations, and social and political stability. The 
latter were considered necessary to attract and retain foreign investors, 
which help maintain the island-state's economic prosperity. The former 
were vehicles for providing a more equal distribution of the rapidly 
accumulating national wealth. However, as Harding argues (ibid) these 
benefits might have been achieved at the expense of freedom of speech, 
judicial passivism, individual civil liberties, and true democracy. 
It is, however, noteworthy that when asked what kind of government 
they have, many Singaporeans unhesitatingly reply 'democracy'. This is 
factually correct as it reflects the existence and practice of the procedures of 
free, regular elections, unencumbered by vote buying or fraud, and a 
Westminster-style parliament. Besides, although statutes may limit some 
individual rights, there is, in general, due process of law, equality of 
opportunity and social justice. Nevertheless, viewed through western eyes, 
Singapore's legal and political systems with their emphases on law and 
order, communitarianism, corporatism, and conformity are more 
authoritarian and instrumentalist than the establishment would find 
acceptable. Ironically, these are likely to be the very qualities that attracted 
the admiration of Deng Xiaoping, China's supreme leader from 1976 to 




THE CHINA-SINGAPORE SUZHOU EXPERIMENT 
During his famous south China tour in 1992, Deng Xiaoping had openly 
praised Singapore's 'good social order' and its management style. He seems 
to have considered Singapore's model for rapid economic development 
more disciplined and thus superior to the extreme, laissez faire free-for-all 
adopted from Hong Kong by the early 1980s' special economic zones 
(SEZs) in nearby Guangdong and Fujian provinces. In the spirit of 'crossing 
the river by feeling for stones under foot,' Deng urged yet another 
experiment, this time the Singapore model. The undisclosed bilateral 
economic development agreement, which was signed by Deng Xiaoping and 
Singapore's senior minister, Lee Kuan Yew in February 1994, suited Deng's 
wish for rapid, vigorous but more disciplined economic growth as well as 
Singapore's ambitious regionalization policy. China was a natural candidate 
in this deliberate push to go beyond the Malaysia-Indonesia-Singapore 
triangle. 
Suzhou is an ancient imperial city in Jiangsu province, lying in the 
Yangtse Delta some 80 km west of Shanghai along the rail line to Nanjing. 
The China-Singapore Suzhou Industrial Park is located a few kilometres 
west of the old city of Suzhou. The Park comprises a gross development 
area of 144 square km2, with a projected core business and residential area 
of 70 km2 (against 178 km2 for the old city). The express intention of the 
joint venture partners was to build a modem industrial 70 km2 town capable 
of supporting a population of 600,000 and one that essentially would 
replicate Jurong, Singapore's 1980s model town. If successful, the model 
could then be cloned in suitable areas of the mainland's inner provinces, 
acting as 'stones' for crossing the river from command to capitalist 
economy. 
The accessible project descriptions8 do not refer explicitly to the Suzhou 
experiment as an exercise in legal transplantation. Nevertheless joint 
documents continually refer to the transfer of Singapore 'software' and 
'technical assistance' in contexts that leave one in no doubt that the 
successful implementation of a 'Jurong-clone' involves the borrowing of 
well-tried, enabling statutory laws, rules, procedures and regulations. 
China's Eclectic Experimental Legal Culture 
Following Deng's unprecedented announcement of a comprehensive 
economic reform programme in 1978, the so-called 'Open-door Policy,' 
China enacted a raft of laws which aimed to stabilize society and initiate the 
development of a socialist market economy based predominantly on foreign 
trade and investment. These laws also signalled the re-establishment of 
China's legal institutions after their forced absence during the decade of 
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chaos, the Cultural Revolution, which lasted from 1966-76 (Gellhorn, 1987; 
Dicks, 1989). The new laws borrowed heavily from western jurisprudence 
as well as from earlier Chinese laws. For instance, the 1979 Criminal Law, 
the Criminal Procedure Law and laws for reorganizing the People's Courts 
and the People's Procuracies drew heavily on 1950s Chinese laws, which in 
turn were based on Kuomintang laws. The latter had been inspired by Soviet 
laws, which were borrowed from European codes, particularly German Civil 
law. Commercial laws, such as the 1981 Economic Contract Law, laws for 
protecting trademarks, the environment, joint ventures, and the 1986 
General Principles of Civil Law were inspired by both European and North 
American laws. Thus civil as well as common-law influences were 
combined to form a new species of Chinese domestic law. 
The enactment of these and later laws, especially during the late 1980s, 
marked the beginning of China's transformation from a strict command 
economy to a mixed market economy, albeit with Chinese characteristics. 
Right from the start China's leaders rejected the neo-classical Big Bang 
approach to economic development, which was touted by economists such 
as Sachs (1993:44-8). Instead China's leaders chose an incremental, some 
would say a trial-and-error approach, in which law was used as a step-by-
step restructuring of institutions designed to underpin the move from 
command to market economy. Thus far, the results contrast starkly with the 
Russian scenario, which has suffered greatly from the chosen Big Bang 
shock method (Nolan, 1995). The Sino-Singapore experiment in Suzhou is 
an example of the implementation of an incremental approach to economic 
development. The sections below describe the experiment's political and 
administrative platform, before analysing key aspects of the implementation 
of Singapore software and technical assistance in the Park. 
Political and Administrative Platform 
At the basis of the support and administrative structure of the government-
to-government project is a holding company, China-Singapore Suzhou 
Development (CSSD), which was incorporated at the project's inception. 
Shares were held in the ratio of 35 per cent-to--65 per cent by two 
companies, China-Suzhou Industrial Park Corporation (CSIPC) and 
Singapore-Suzhou Trade and Development (SSTD), each representing the 
China and Singapore authorities, respectively. 
The Suzhou Industrial Park Administrative Committee (SIPAC) is the 
project's governing body. The Major of Suzhou City heads this body. 
Members of SIPAC include representatives of Singapore's Economic 
Development Board (EDB), which has a special office at the Suzhou Centre, 
and the Singapore Software Project Office. A Joint Working Committee, in 
which the EDB chairman and the Suzhou Mayor also sit, supports this 
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governing body. Finally, there is a Joint Steering Council compnsmg 
representatives from ministries of both governments, headed by Chinese 
Vice-president Mr Li Langing and Singaporean Deputy PM Lee. 
The main areas covered by the bilateral agreement include: 
• Land use planning and development; 
• Environmental planning and regulation; 
• Building construction management; 
• Planning and management of industrial estates; 
• Management of new towns and public utilities; 
• Labour management; and 
• Social security. 
According to Singapore's Economic Development Board (1995:np)9 the 
bilateral agreement 'involves a "software transfer" co-operation project 
between the two countries'. Furthermore (ibid), 
software transfer refers to the sharing of Singapore's successful 
public administration and economic management experiences ... so 
that [the Chinese] authorities can formulate and implement pro-
business policies in the China-Singapore Suzhou Industrial Park. 
To assist in this transfer, a Singapore Software Project Office (SSPO) under 
the jurisdiction of Singapore's EDB has been established in the Park. 
Together, the Park's governing body SIPAC and SSPO identify the relevant 
type of 'software' which is to be shared. Both agencies decide on how the 
software designated for transfer is to be adapted. Adaptation is effected 
mainly through visits and training projects in which Suzhou and the Park's 
officials are taught the procedures in Singapore. The Singapore government 
also sends officials to Suzhou to assist in this adaptation process. SSPO is 
itself staffed mainly by Singaporeans and is supervised by the EDB's 
established office in Suzhou. The responsibility for drafting and redrafting 
the transferred software is shared by SSPO, under the guidance of SIPAC 
and the Singapore EDB. 
SIPAC has established special departments or bureaux, which are 
responsible for project approval, administration, implementation and 
control. The eight main bureaux comprise Economic and Trade Develop-
ment, Planning and Construction, Finance Taxation, Social Development, 
Local Development, Organisation and Personnel, Secretariat and Foreign 
Affairs, and a controlling Council for Economic and Social Development. 
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Facing the Legal Challenges in Suzhou, China 
The legal challenges facing the Park, and indeed the rest of China, can be 
summarized by the complaints expressed by foreign investors. 10 The 
majority of these reflect the state and nature of laws in China. The most 
frequent complaints are that Chinese laws are often either incomplete or 
secret (neibu), that they lack transparency, they are often vague and 
ambiguous, and there are uncertainties and inconsistencies between 
substantive provincial and national laws and their interpretation. 
Furthermore, inconsistencies and uncertainty are increased by the wide 
discretion given to administrative agencies, and the traditional Chinese 
practice of guanxi or favouring of personal connections. The result is a 
larger than usual opportunity for and practice of corruption, graft, confusion, 
bureaucratic red tape, lack of predictability in decision-making and 
interference in corporate management autonomy. These are the ills which 
the Singapore 'transfer' and home-grown experiences are meant to cure in 
the Park. In addition, the Singaporeans are responsible for creating and 
improving overall infrastructure, including human resources, and for 
packaging and marketing the Park so that it attracts investment of US$20 
billion, within I 0-15 years. 
So far the Singapore magic seems to be working. After five years, the 
Park has attracted in excess of US$3.76 billion invested by 133 projects 
(Straits Times, 29 June 1999:1). About 8 km2 have been built and occupied. 
American corporations dominate (39 per cent of the total), followed by 12 
per cent Singaporean and I 0 per cent from Europe (EDB, I 999). The 
electronics industry is represented by the largest share of investments (36 
per cent) followed by chemicals (23 per cent) and food and beverages (20 
per cent). Furthermore, unscientifically conducted interviews with foreign 
investors in the Park reveal that Singapore's EDB has managed to simplify 
application procedures for project implementation so that they are on a par 
with those in Singapore: a one-stop shop is able to process business licenses 
in one month. This includes the usually onerous environment impact 
assessments and site location stipulations. The reason for the ease and speed 
is that written environmental guidelines incorporate a self-assessment 
regime adapted from Singapore, and site location is regulated through an 
agreed master plan, that is, 'zoning' rather than the whim of bribable 
administrators. Customs can be cleared in Suzhou instead of at the Shanghai 
port. And happily, all administrative fees are published. They have also been 
reduced from over 300 to only 27 items! The rules about how, when, and 
why fees are levied have also been published. 
Social security reform has also been modernized and made transparent 
by adopting a scheme that is similar to Singapore's Central Provident Fund. 
The introduction of this compulsory savings element into the wage package 
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seems to benefit both employees and employers in the Park. At the time of 
writing it seems to be unique to Suzhou and is not practised elsewhere in 
China. Like all the other 'software transfers,' laws or rules were required to 
implement and legitimize them. 
But laws in China are a complex affair, and the law-making process even 
more so (Seidman et al., 1997; Chen, 1999). First, most laws in China are 
categorized as administrative law. They are designed to serve many 
purposes, among them to regulate behaviour, promote economic 
modernization, and preserve the one-party political system. Special 
commercial laws, which are adapted from the West, are called economic 
laws. They form a sub-set of administrative law. Foreign investment laws 
are a sub-set of economic law. Secondly, in theory, the sole source of 
national administrative law is legislation passed by the Standing Committee 
of the National People's Congress (NPC). However, in practice, other legal 
bureaucracies such as the State Council's Legal Affairs Bureau, the NPC's 
Legislative Work Committee, the Ministry of Justice, and law departments 
in various State Council ministries and commissions also have legislative 
powers. In turn, they are all dominated by the Party's political-legal 
committee system (zhengfa xitong). During the first thirty years of the 
People's Republic of China (PRC), the NPC acted mainly as a rubber stamp, 
which gave legislative form to Communist Party policy directives (Potter, 
1999:675). In line with Deng's modernization policy, the NPC's legislative 
duties were extended by the 1982 Constitution to include the enactment of 
basic national statutes, amendments to the Constitution and review of 
decisions made by the State Council and the NPC's Standing Committee. 
The powers of the latter were also expanded to include supervision of the 
State Council's work as well as supervision of other administrative bodies. 
But the crux, as far as the Singapore-China Suzhou experiment is concerned, 
is that the State Council and the NPC's Standing Committee also are 
empowered to delegate administrative law-making powers to local, regional 
bodies either in an 'authorized administrative law-making capacity' 
(shonquan xingzheng lifa) or an 'entrusted administrative law-making 
capacity' (weituo xingzheng lifa). 
Thus the Park's governing body, SIPAC, received, from the State 
Council, powers to create rights and obligations and other legal norms that 
have never been touched by state organs. The only limitation seems to be 
that these rules and regulations must not infringe 'the spirit of national 
applicable law and the Constitution,' and they must be reported to the 
authorizing body (the State Council). In addition, the Constitution confers 
inherent legislative power (zhiquan lifa) on regional entities, which must 
comply with similar conditions about not infringing the spirit of national 
law. 
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Consequently, the rules and regulations that relate to administrative matters 
in the Park, whether locally formed or adapted from Singaporean 'software 
transfer,' are recognized as 'law' in their own right as long as they do not 
infringe the spirit of China's national laws or the Constitution. In 
considering the content and nature of these rules and regulations, the imprint 
of Singapore's developmental law is evident. One of the most obvious cases 
is the Central Provident Fund Act (cap 36, 1997 ed.) which governs social 
security and aspects of labour relations. But other areas such as 
environmental protection, town planning, and personnel skills training also 
reveal 'software transfer'. In general, these regulations are more narrowly 
drafted than their Chinese counterparts, which are usually very broadly 
drafted and intentionally ambiguous to allow flexibility, discretion and weak 
implementation. The Singapore 'software' -inspired regulations reflect 
greater clarity and precision. They are less ambiguous and aim to achieve 
precisely defined economic goals, as desired by their creators. They exhibit 
the communitarian, syncretistic, and westernistic characteristics of 
Singapore law as discussed above. They are also the kind of rules that are 
limited by a general ambivalence towards the full liberal norms of western 
economic law that protect individual property rights and the restraint on 
state power which inform true western law - or the rule of law. However, 
there is sufficient 'transfer' to ensure that western investors, especially 
American investors, feel comfortable about their investment commitments, 
despite the obvious gaps and instrumentality of law. This interpretation of 
the nature of modern Chinese law is underpinned by a 1999 amendment to 
the Chinese Constitution. According to Potter (1999:674) to denote the 
concept 'rule of law' the amendment incorporated the Chinese characters 
that express the tenn 'yifa zhiguo'. The phrase actually denotes 'rule 
through law' whereas scholars prefer the characters that express 'fazhi 
grojia' to convey the 'rule of law' ideals. However, even the term 'yifa 
zhiguo' is met with resistance in many circles because it implies the 
potential autonomy oflaw and subservience of the state to law. 
As is also the case in Singapore, the version of the rule of law that the 
local Chinese authorities prefer does not extend to making law exert limiting 
powers on the state. Rather, law, as Singapore has shown, is used to 
entrench the powers of the state. It seems more apt to call this version 'rule 
by law'. 
REPLICABILITY OF THE SINGAPORE MODEL 
It is clear from the foregoing that the Suzhou project has enjoyed a great 
degree of success. It has provided the right infrastructure and conditions that 
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have attracted foreign investments in excess of US$3.76 billion. But all is 
not well in Suzhou. In June 1999, it was announced that: 
the Singapore Government will hand over control of the Suzhou 
Industrial Park (SIP) project to the Chinese government in eighteen 
months' time ... Singapore will cut its stake in the massive project to 
35 per cent from 65 per cent and hand over the management of the 
park on Jan 1, 2001 (Straits Times, 29 June 1999: 1 ). 
The explanation that has been given involves Singapore's displeasure with 
the fact that the Suzhou municipal government got involved in the 
development of a rival park nearby, the Suzhou New District The 
Economist, 3 January 1998:55.). 
But other issues may also have played a role. For instance, the political 
climate might have changed after the introduction of the new Chinese 
administration under Jiang Zemin following Deng's death in 1997. Even 
more significantly for this study, changes in China's national laws might 
have affected the project. For example, the 1997 Administrative Supervision 
Law authorized the amendment or repeal of regulations that were deemed 
inconsistent with laws and regulations issued at higher levels. Could any of 
the transferred software have fallen into this category? Also, the 
Administrative Procedure Law enacted in 1998 allows for the challenging of 
bureaucratic rule-making, just as the earlier Administrative Litigation Law 
1991 provided for judicial review of administrative decisions. At the time of 
writing, a Legislative Law remains in the drafting stage, as its progress has 
been thwarted by bureaucratic conflicts concerning rule-making authority in 
China (Potter, 1999:677). Thus the potential curtailment of the ability to 
'transfer' and implement 'software' freely might have played a role in the 
joint venture's partial failure, or at least the variation of the contract. This is 
pure speculation as there are no published facts. However, it is hoped that 
the authorities of both China and Singapore will co-operate and allow legal 
and economic analyses of the entire experiment at a later date. Useful 
lessons can be learnt by both parties as well by as others seeking to engage 
in south-south dialogue. 
CONCLUSION 
At the outset, it would appear that Singapore's model of law and economic 
development suited well the aspirations of China's supreme ruler Deng 
Xiaoping in the early 1990s. The model followed a soft authoritarian 
approach, 'governing the market' with a brand of legal instrumentalism, 
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which was dedicated to the primacy of state power, an incremental approach 
to economic growth, low or no corruption, and social justice in which the 
fruits of the rapidly accumulating national wealth would be shared equitably 
among the wealth-creators. 
The joint venture between China and Singapore required Singapore to 
transfer 'software and technical assistance,' which would enable Suzhou 
Industrial Park to attract foreign investment and transform it into a Jurong-
clone. As discussed in the foregoing, 'software and technical assistance' are 
euphemisms for key elements of the special brand of regulatory laws and 
rules, which comprise the Singapore model for law and economic 
development. The study finds that some of these were transferred 
successfully. The reasons for Singapore's premature variation of the contract 
and the apparent failure of the idea of the Park are unknown. Officially, the 
reason seems to rest on unclear objectives regarding competing interests in 
Suzhou municipality. However, other reasons might also have played a part, 
including changes in the political climate, new national laws restricting local 
law-making processes, and the difficulties of 'two systems not being able to 
completely mesh with each other' (Lee Kuan Yew, Straits Times, Overseas 
Edition, 2 October 1999:24). According to Lee (ibid) the Singapore 
government 'will continue to train Chinese officials on software in 
Singapore for as long as Suzhou deems it useful'. As the governments have 
agreed to terminate the experiment in mid-flow, it is premature to say with 
certainty that the Suzhou experience is evidence of the replicability of the 
Singapore model of law and economic development. Even though, at the 
time of writing, the 8 km2 of fully functioning industrial park work 
unmistakably as if they were located in Singapore. It is therefore hoped that 
both governments will allow academic researchers to uncover freely the 
lessons that might be learnt from their experience for the benefit of both 
parties and of others seeking to engage in south-south economic 
development dialogues. 
NOTES 
* I am grateful to Dr Andrew Harding, Professor of Law in the University 
of London and Head of the Law Department at the School of Oriental 
and African Studies (SOAS), who commented on this chapter and gave 
unstintingly of his time and enormous regional knowledge. 
For instance, the western-dominated financial aid agencies like the IMF 




2 NGOs such as the Ford Foundation, the American Bar Association, and 
the Asia Foundation. 
3 For information about the 1960s-70s Law and Development movement, 
including discussions of the l 970s-80s issue about an international right 
to development, see A. Carty (ed.) (1992), S. Adelman and A. Paliwala 
(eds) (1993). For a discussion of the role of law in Asian economic 
development (selected countries not including Singapore), see K. Pistor 
and P. Wellons ( 1999). As yet, there seems to be no anthology of the 
1990s' movement. In comparison with the 1960s' movement, the 
agenda of the 1990s' movement is more explicitly the transplant of the 
rule of law and democracy (sometimes called 'good governance'). 
These are often packaged as conditions for financial aid, whereas in the 
1960s' model they were regarded as the result of economic 
development. The chief protagonists of this 1990s' model are the United 
Nations organizations: the World Bank, the IMF, UNDP, etc., the 
European Union, and individual Western countries such as the US. 
4 This term probably derives from Buzan and Segal (1998). 
5 For a discussion of the Asian economic setback, see A. Booth (1999). 
6 The People's Action Party (PAP) has formed Singapore's governments 
ever since 1959, when the island-state gained self-rule from the British. 
Lee Kuan Yew was its Prime Minister until 1990, when he made way 
for Goh Chok Tong, and became Senior Minister in the new PM's 
office. 
7 The content of this mix is synthesized from the work of economists, 
development theorists, and others. I am particularly indebted to Mirza 
(1986), Tan Chwee Huat (1989), Tan Kong Yam (1995), Hanna et al. 
(1996), Huff(J997), the World Bank (1993, 1997), and Low (1998). 
8 Neither an MOU (Memorandum of Understanding) nor a bilateral treaty 
was available. However, I gained access to comprehensive commercial 
materials written by Singapore's Economic Development Board (EDB) 
and project descriptions, press releases and guides published by the 
China-Singapore Suzhou Industrial Park Development Co. Ltd. (CSSD) 
and/or the Suzhou Industrial Park Administrative Committee (SIPAC). 
9 This section draws heavily on commercial literature and press releases 
distributed by the EDB and/or SIPAC from 1994 to 1998. As a rule, the 
pages of this literature are unnumbered. All literature is on file with the 
author. 
l O For a comprehensive overview, see Foreign Investment Consultancy 
Corporation (199 I). 
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PROSPERITY AT A PRICE: 
REGULATION OF ORGANIZED LABOUR IN MALAYSIA 
JESSE WU MIN AUN 
Since attaining independence in 1957, 1 Malaysia's relentless drive towards 
economic prosperity has been remarkable by any standard. A productive and 
inexpensive labour force is, among other things, an important contributing 
factor. In 1999, most reports suggest that the Malaysian economy is emerging 
from the financial and economic convulsion that had engulfed Asia. Malaysia 
adopted some home-grown remedies rather than seek assistance from the 
International Monetary Fund. The home-grown measures included the 
imposition on I September 1998 of the much criticized regime of capital 
controls to ward off currency speculators and the easing ofinterest rates to help 
over-leveraged companies. 
The unorthodox medicine is showing results. Gross domestic product is 
expected to grow by more than 3 per cent in 1999, albeit from a low base after 
the economy contracted by 7.5 per cent in 1998. The GDP growth rate may 
touch 5 per cent in the year 2000. Remarkably, the result has been achieved 
without the initial pains experienced by other stricken Asian countries. 
Indonesia, Thailand, and South Korea, were compelled to shut down 
companies and lay off workers as part of the mandated policies demanded by 
the International Monetary Fund which co-ordinated the multi-billion-dollar 
rescue packages (Toh, 1999). 
Malaysia has largely used the breathing space provided by capital controls 
to effect some restructuring in the economy, particularly in the banking sector. 
A newly created asset management company, Danaharta, mopped up non-
performing loans in the system, while a recapitalization agency, Danamodal, 
injected funds into weak financial institutions.2 
On the road to post-independence prosperity, the availability of reliable and 
inexpensive labour played a pivotal role in attracting foreign direct investment 
to selected industries although it came at a price. Now, labour appears even 
'cheaper' following the 1998 financial crisis, which resulted in a dramatic 
plunge in the value of the ringgit. Once again, the country is attracting the 
attention of foreign investors eager to capitalize on any advantage. It is 
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reported, for instance, that a US company, KOMAG Inc., is so eager to tap the 
cheap Malaysian work force that it is shutting two plants near its headquarters 
in San Jose, California, and re-locating all of its production to Malaysia. The 
maker of parts for computer disk drives says the move will slash payroll costs 
by 67 per cent, or US$80 million (S$ l 34 million) a year. While Malaysia 
became something of a pariah in international financial markets because of 
slapping controls on capital flows in September 1998, it is now quietly luring 
more_foreign investors li~e KOMA? to make their rroducts in Penang and 
even m the town of Kuchmg, on the island of Borneo: The country's move to 
peg its currency, the ringgit, at 3.8 to the US dollar, appears to be the key 
motivation for the foreign investors; it has made Malaysia one of the cheapest 
places in the region to make almost anything.4 The cost of workers, land, and 
buildings has fallen, relative to its neighbours - effectively giving Malaysia a 
competitive advantage compared with countries such as Thailand and the 
Philippines, where currencies have strengthened. 
Economic prosperity owes much to the availability of a cheap and 
compliant labour force secured mostly by severe regulation of industrial 
activities often justified on the grounds of either national integration or 
economic imperative. Laws governing industrial behaviour are largely 
restrictive and keenly enforced, with the government and the bureaucracy often 
quick to intervene in the face of a perceived threat to economic prosperity. 
Central to this paper is an account of the regulatory framework of organized 
labour and the exercise of discretionary power by authorities to ensure that 
capital is well supported, by the availability of reliable and generally 
inexpensive labour for developmental goals. Particular attention is given to the 
legal regulation of trade unions and their ability to take industrial action in 
protection of their interest, highlighting, where relevant, the unusually wide 
discretionary power of the executive and public servants with respect to these 
matters. Particular attention is given to the two principal instruments of legal 
regulation, namely the Trade Unions Act 1959 and the Industrial Relations Act 
1967. 
BACKGROUND 
The initial character of trade unions and their activities were largely moulded 
by considerations of security, politics, and race relations during the colonial 
and early post-colonial periods. The following significant events dictated the 
direction of the trade union movement and industrial relations: 
I. Violent communist upheaval that erupted in colonial Malaya (as it was then 
called) in 1948. It led to a declaration of emergency by the colonial authority, 
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the imposition of restrictions on civil liberties, a ban on the Malayan 
Communist Party and its activities and the enactment of laws providing for 
detention without trial. These and related events impacted heavily on the labour 
movement which was then closely associated with communism. The law 
relating to detention without trial has remained in the statute book in an 
extended version ever since and on one occasion, was utilized in an industrial 
strike.5 
2. Ethnic tension, in particular the racial riots of 1969, caused a change in 
socio-economic strategy. On the political front, the federal government 
imposed restrictions on various freedoms, including the ability of workers to 
freely organize. Racial polarization is exacerbated by religious differences, 
where race is often identified with religion, and in employment. To be classed a 
Malay, one must also be a Muslim. In relation to employment, the public sector 
(public service, defence forces, and police) is dominated by Malays largely 
through a race-based preferential system. Chinese predominate in private 
enterprises and small businesses. Despite the ostensible appearance of ethnic 
harmony, tensions do surface from time to time. The New Economic Policy 
introduced in the aftermath of the racial riots of May 1969 was in part intended 
to redress the identification of race with economic activities, in particular to 
promote greater Malay ownership and participation in the private sector. 
Unfortunately, the preferential policies and their implementation have also 
fuelled resentment among non-Malays who perceive an injustice, given that 
they continue to be shut out of the public sector and public tertiary education 
while inroads are made into their traditional areas of activities.6 
3. Laws prohibiting trade unions from participating in or financing political 
parties and their activities and vice versa isolating organized labour from the 
political arena. 
In the immediate post-war period, organized labour in the form of the General 
Labour Union (hereafter referred GLU), was heavily infiltrated by communists. 
rt opened its head office in Singapore soon after the Japanese ended their 
occupation of Malaya and Singapore in 1945. The GLU quickly assumed a pre-
eminent role in the labour movement through rapid expansion into all major 
towns in Malaya to the north of Singapore. The immediate postwar period was 
plagued by chronic inflation and acute food shortages - ideal breeding 
conditions for labour disputes. The grievances were genuine enough. The 
newly liberated territories were engulfed in a state of socio-political sickness 
stemming from a lack of economic planning, absence of democratic labour 
institutions and the mistrust of communalism in a multiracial society. The GLU 
skilfully exploited the situation by taking on the pre-eminent role ofleader and 
291 
JESSE Wu MIN AUN 
organizer of workers. A state of intensified general unrest soon ensued. The 
colonial administrators, through either general indifference or ineptitude, had 
unwittingly caused workers to fall victims to the political ambition of the GLU. 
Strikes and demonstrations intensified and coupled with popular demands for 
more rice, freer movement of food, exemption from water and electricity bills, 
higher prices for tin and rubber, etc., the territories slowly descended into chaos 
and industrial strife. 
Trade union laws in Malaya lagged well behind those of the United 
Kingdom. No trade union legislation existed in Malaya until 1940. The colonial 
view was that unlike home, there was no need for such laws in the territories. 
After all, employed labour was largely comprised ofimmigrants and any labour 
unrest could be quickly dealt with by a combination of police action, arrests, 
and banishment, if a migrant participated. The local police could always be 
relied upon to break strikes. The colonial authority, influenced mostly by local 
British interests, did not see the need for trade union law in that environment. If 
anything, organized labour was regarded as a pain and promptly discouraged. 
What was desirable in the mother country was not necessarily regarded as 
appropriate in colonial possessions. 
The first trade union law enacted in 1940 was motivated largely by financial 
considerations. The United Kingdom Parliament had earlier passed the 
Colonial Development and Welfare Act 1940, which contemplated various 
schemes for long term financial assistance by the mother country to the 
colonies, on the condition, that there were laws protecting trade unions, fair 
wages, children in employment, and related matters. The lure of money seems 
to have stirred the minds of an otherwise lethargic colonial authority in Malaya. 
The Trade Union Enactment 1940, originally enacted for the Federated 
Malay States, was not at the time implemented as the Japanese invaded the 
territories soon after. Upon British reoccupation, the law was extended in 1946 
to cover the whole of the Malay Peninsula which had been reconstituted7 into a 
new political entity called 'Malayan Union.' It consisted of9 Malay States and 
the colonies of Penang and Malacca. Singapore was excluded from the short-
lived Union. 
The law introduced a scheme of compulsory registration for all trade 
unions. A Department of the Registrar of Trade Unions was created for the 
purpose of registering and supervising trade unions and their activities. A Trade 
Union Adviser's Department was added, whose purported duties were to foster 
the growth of trade unions, to assist them in negotiations with employers and to 
advise them on how best to build up their membership, finance, and leadership. 
In respect of employers' organizations, the Adviser's responsibility was limited 
to providing assistance upon request in respect of negotiating procedures and 
settlement of disputes. 
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Compulsory registration of trade unions under the law began in earnest in 
1947. By the end of the year, the figures revealed the existence of289 unions 
with a total membership of 195,113. It was estimated that nearly half the 
membership was under communist control exercised through the successor of 
GLU, the Pan-Malayan Federation of Trade Unions ('PMFTU') (ILO Report, 
1962:30). Communist and trade union activities in the private sector were 
largely associated with the Chinese community with a smattering of Malays 
and Indians8 but in the public sector communist influence was relatively 
insignificant. 
The year 1948 marks the turning point in the Malayan trade union 
movement. Heightened frequency and momentum of strikes, many of which 
had political overtones, caused the colonial government to react with repressive 
measures, presumably in the conviction that British colonial interests were 
under threat. Control over trade unions and their activities was tightened 
through amendments to the Trade Union Enactment in June 1948. Registration 
of federations of trade unions became compulsory and their membership 
restricted to trade unions whose members were employed in similar trades, 
occupations, or industries.9 The restriction of membership to similar trades, 
occupations or industries spelt an end to federations of a general nature - in 
practical effect, an end to large federations of trade unions. Henceforth, they 
would be broken up into smaller units. Another amendment made it 
compulsory for trade union officials, other than the secretary, to have at least 
three years' experience in the industry of their unions. The intent being to 
remove outside influences and 'infiltration,' thus ensuring that only genuine 
workers would hold office. 
The PMFTU reapplied for registration as required by the new law. Along 
with about a hundred other unions, their applications were predictably rejected 
given the requirement that a federation must also be comprised of trade unions 
whose members were employed in similar trades, occupations or industries. 
The rug was swept out from under their feet. The new law ended their agenda 
of using trade unions as a front for securing political power. 
The Malayan Communist Party, finding its activities through trade unions 
drastically curtailed, altered strategy and embarked upon a violent campaign of 
guerilla warfare. That strategy changed the course of Malaysian contemporary 
history, which had, until then, been relatively free of violent political activities. 
Prior to taking to the jungle, the Malayan Communist Party quietly spirited 
away whatever trade union funds it could lay its hands on. In response to the 
growing violence, the government banned the Malayan Communist Party and 
declared a state of emergency on 16 June 1948. The impact of the events on 
trade unionism may be summarized from the Report of the International 
Labour Office on the trade union movement: 
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... their sudden disappearance left thousands of the rank and file 
leaderless, bewildered and disillusioned. Realising that many of their 
sacrifices had been in vain and that they had been made the plaything of 
political parties, a large percentage of the workers began to lose faith in 
trade unionism and all it stood for. As the Emergency dragged on, this 
attitude became more widespread and it was a long time before the 
effects of the 'let down' began to wear off(ILO Report (1962). 
Although Malaya attained Independence in 1957, the state of emergency 
declared by the colonial authority remained in place. It did not formally end till 
1960 but self-rule effectively ended the main communist platform of anti-
colonialism. Despite the formal ending of the state of emergency in 1960, 
pockets of insurgency continued for a while, particularly in the regions 
bordering Thailand. It was only in 1993 that the communists formally 
abandoned their struggle and signed an agreement in return for certain 
amnesty. 
Given that background, it is not surprising that successive post-
independence governments were suspicious of trade unions. They adopted a 
fiercely anti-communist policy. While recognizing the need for trade unions, 
they took the view that labour policies should not be liberal, given that until the 
end of the Cold War, the nation had remained under the threat of communism, 
and in light of their past experience with communists. 
Apart from the communist factor, two other major events in the 1960s 
impacted heavily on the nation and came to dominate its life. The first event 
was the merger in 1963 of the States of Sabah, Sarawak, and Singapore with 
the Federation of Malaya into an enlarged federation, renamed 'Malaysia.' It 
triggered Indonesia into hostility in an undeclared war ( called 'Konfrontasi '), 
publicly proclaiming the new federation as neo-colonialism. That undeclared 
war went on from 1964 to 1967. The second event was the 1969 race riots 
when race relations were shattered. Both events caused successive emergencies 
to be declared. The 1969 emergency has remained in force since, despite the 
cessation of the circumstances of its declaration. New laws that were 
introduced during this period diluted various freedoms, including that of 
organized labour. 
With respect to industrial relations, these events mapped out its future 
direction. The already strict legislative controls over trade unions were further 
tightened in several areas. The government hardened in its view that trade 
unions must continue to be isolated from political activities, their main function 
limited to the protection of workers for economic advancement. In political 
speak, it intends to ensure a compliant labour environment for developmental 
goals. 
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The restrictive nature of industrial relations law in contemporary Malaysia 
owes much to this backdrop. Since independence, Malaysia has taken a 
relentless path towards the twin objects of nationalism and economic 
prosperity, and in respect of the latter, the attainment of a fully industrialized 
status by the year 2020, 10 despite the setback of the 1997/1998 recession. 
REGULATION OF TRADE UNIONS 
Trade unions affairs and industrial conflicts are tightly regulated. The 
government exercises wide administrative discretion, to support legislative 
controls, in its efforts to secure industrial harmony. The regulation of trade 
unions and industrial activities is relatively simple because federal law and not 
a plethora of state laws govern trade unions and industrial relations. Two pieces 
of federal legislation, viz the Trade Unions Act 1959 (hereinafter referred to as 
TUA) and, to some extent, the Industrial Relations Act 1967 (hereinafter 
referred to as the IRA), cover the whole area. 
The TUA was first enacted as FM Ordinance No. 23 of 1959 and revised 
on 21 November 1981 as Laws of Malaysia Act 262. Since its revision, 
substantial amendments have been made to the Act from time to time. 11 
REGISTRATION OF TRADE UNIONS 
The right of both employers and employees to form trade unions and to engage 
in their legitimate activities are embodied in the IRA. In particular, s 4(1) of the 
IRA declares: 
No person shall interfere with, restrain or coerce a workman or an 
employer in the exercise of his rights to form and assist in the formation 
of and join a trade union and to participate in its lawful activities. 
The right exists in respect of registered trade unions. Unregistered trade unions 
are treated as illegal organizations so that persons involved in their activities 
become liable to criminal sanctions. 
Strict statutory guidelines govern the process ofregistration. An application 
for registration must be made to the Director General within one month from 
the date of the establishment of a trade union although this period may be 
extended at the Director General's discretion, but such an extension must not 
exceed six months in the aggregate (TUA s 8). A trade union is deemed to have 
been established on the first date on which any employees or employers agree 
to become or create a trade union (TUA s 9(1 ). This necessarily assumes that 
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the body is established in furtherance of any one or more objects specified in 
the definition of a trade union contained ins 2(1 ). 
For the purpose of prosecution for non-registration, unless proven 
otherwise, the date of establishment is presumed to be: 
(a) the date on which any person is proved to have been accepted or admitted 
as a member of that trade union; or 
(b) the date on which any act is proved to have been done by that trade union 
in furtherance of any one or more objects of a trade union; and 
(c) in a case where proof is available of both dates referred to in items (a) and 
(b) above, the earlier of such dates TUA s 9(2). 
Upon registration, a trade union is entitled to certain rights, immunities, and 
privileges, for example, it could bargain for and withdraw labour without the 
threat of such common law action as breach of contract of employment or other 
tortious actions. 
To be eligible for registration, trade unions must be organizations 
(permanent or temporary) that consist wholly of either employees or employers 
of one establishment or of one or more descriptions. Unions of a general nature 
are not registrable under the Act except perhaps within a particular 
establishment. Any association of employees or employers that is caught by the 
statutory definition is regarded as a trade union even though it may not have 
been registered under the law as such. 
Membership of a trade union is restricted to workers or employers, as the 
case may be, 'within any particular establishment, trade, occupation or industry 
or within any similar trades, occupations or industry.' 12 A prospective union is 
not registrable if its membership includes unrelated establishments, trades, 
occupations, or industries. In other words, unions of a general nature are not 
registrable except in a particular establishment. 
The same rule applies in respect of federations of trade unions where 
membership consists of constituents or affiliations of trade unions. Each 
federation must consist only of trade unions whose members are employed in a 
similar trade, occupation, or industry. 13 
The restriction was first enacted, by the colonial authority, in 1948 in 
respect of federations of trade unions as part of a wider strategy to break up and 
control the labour movement. The same was later extended to trade unions in 
1959. The application of this provision has both a positive and a negative 
impact on the trade union movement: Positive in that membership of particular 
trade unions is largely homogeneous but negative in that trade unions are 
generally fragmented, small and resources rather limited. Emerging also is an 
increasing number of in-house unions. Their strength as bargaining units is 
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relatively weak by comparison with trade unions in industrialized nations and 
the weakness seems to serve the purpose of government public policies. 
Regulation through Administrative Discretion 
The exercise of administrative discretion in public affairs is a familiar theme in 
Malaysian administrative law. Its application in relation to trade unions and 
industrial relations fits snugly into this pattern. As mentioned earlier, to qualify 
for registration (whether of workers or employers, as the case may be) a trade 
union must be 'within any particular establishment, trade, occupation, or 
industry or with in any similar trades, occupations or industry.' The decision as 
to whether a trade, occupation, or industry is 'similar' is vested in the Director 
General of Trade Unions. According to the TUA s 2(2), for the purposes of the 
definition (and several other purposes) the word 'similar' means 'similar in the 
opinion of the Director General.' 14 Although any person dissatisfied with the 
opinion of the Director General on the issue of similarity may appeal to the 
Minister within thirty days from the date of the opinion, the exercise of power 
in the negative amounts to a veto by a public servant. On appeal, the decision 
of the Minister is 'final and conclusive' (TUA s 71A). 
The Act is silent on the question of judicial appeal or review in relation to 
an opinion of the Director General or the Minister on the similarity or 
otherwise of a trade, occupation or industry. It would appear that the intention 
is to shut out the courts. Under current practice, courts will not normally 
intervene before statutory procedures are exhausted, and even when they do 
intervene, it is on rather limited grounds. This judicial approach in respect of 
the former is well illustrated in the case, Metal Industries Employee Union v 
Registrar of Trade Unions [1976] 1 MLJ 80, where the Registrar expressed an 
opinion under s 2(2) of the 1959 Ordinance. That opinion was challenged in the 
High Court by way of an application for a declaration. Though the High Court 
agreed that there was a question of interpretation, it declined to intervene on a 
procedural ground; that there was an alternative statutory remedy by way of an 
appeal to the Minister. 
How the Director General applies his or her mind to the test of 'similar 
trade, occupation, or industry' is far from clear. One can only hazard a guess, 
that the process for its determination involves interpretation of facts. 'Similar' 
is a question of degree. It is a subjective determination, and ordinarily, it is 
made by reference to the trade, occupation, or industry and the membership 
rules of the union concerned. In Tanjong Jag a Sdn Bhd v Minister of Labour & 
Manpower [1987] 1 MLJ 124, the argument was put that it was incumbent on 
the Registrar (as the officer was previously referred to) to make due inquiry by 
considering evidence from both sides. Abdoolcader SCJ, rejecting that 
suggestion, said: 
297 
JESSE Wu MIN AUN 
There is no provision or requirement for due inquiry as such and all that 
was necessary was a fair and reasonable decision arrived at by the 
Registrar in the exercise of his discretion .... In exercising his functions 
in this regard, the Registrar had an unfettered discretion which was 
subject to a duty to act responsibly (p. 129). 
His Lordship, however, conceded that a decision could be challengeable but 
only if the ' ... decision making body comes to its decision on no evidence or 
comes to an unreasonable finding so unreasonable that a reasonable person 
would not have come to it-then the court will interfere' (In TanjongJagaSdn 
Bhd V Minister of Labour & Manpower [1987] 1 MLJ 124 p. 129). 
In the electronics industry, the Director General seemed to take a narrow 
view and ruled that employees could not be represented by a union of electrical 
workers. In his view, the electronics industry is not similar to the electrical 
industry. Lee Hun Hoe CJ in Electrical Industry Workers Union v Registrar of 
Trade Unions [ 1976] 1 MLJ 177 p. 179 said: 
Whether a person in a related or similar industry becomes a member of 
a particular union is squarely a matter for the decision of the Registrar of 
Trade Unions. If a particular union could say it is for the union to decide 
whether those in another industry might be absorbed as members of the 
Union, a dangerous situation would develop whereby each and every 
union in the country would do the same ... It is for the Union to satisfy 
the Registrar of Trade Unions that the Monsato Electronics Workers 
Union belongs to the same or similar industry as the Union (Electrical 
Industry Employees Union). 
The electronic industry has traditionally been dominated by direct foreign 
investments. Close control of trade union activities certainly gives encourage-
ment to foreign investors given that the workforce will be largely docile and 
free of industrial strife. Investments in such industries fit neatly into official 
perception of national interests. 
Restriction of Trade Union Activities 
The TUA limits the range of trade union activities, for example, political 
activities are banned. Restriction is achieved by listing a number of objectives 
and requiring a trade union to have, among its objectives, one or more of them 
and nothing else. These objectives are enumerated ins 2(1)(c) as follows: 
1. The regulation of relations between employees and employers for the 
purposes of promoting good industrial relations between them, improving 
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the working conditions of employees or enhancing their economic and 
social status, or increasing productivity; 
2. The regulation of relations between employees and employees, or between 
employers and employers; 
3. The representation of either employees or employers in trade disputes; 
4. The conducting of or dealing with trade disputes and matters related 
thereto; 
5. The promotion or organization or financing of strikes or lock-outs in any 
trade or industry or the provision of pay or other benefits for its members 
during a strike or a lock-out (TUA s 2(1)). 
It may be noted that none of the above objectives relate to political or related 
activities. By way of comparison, in some European countries such as Sweden, 
the relationship between political parties and trade unions are so close that the 
latter would have political wings. Malaysia has deliberately isolated trade 
unions from political parties and their activities. In practical terms, political as-
pirations are prohibited in the trade union movement. In addition, TUA s 52(1) 
expressly provides that trade union funds 'shall not be applied directly or 
indirectly in any payment whatsoever to a political party or in furtherance of 
any political object.' That rules out political donation. 
The expression, 'political object,' is comprehensively defined ins 52(2), 15 
culminating in a 'catch all' clause - 'any object which the Minister may by 
notification in the Gazette specify.' The Act is silent on criteria, norms, or 
standards that may provide a guide to the Minister in the exercise of his 
discretionary power in this area. It is a classic case of unfettered executive 
power. 
Such unfettered executive power may seem extraordinary to the uninitiated. 
In Malaysia, it is unremarkable given its regular use. The Malaysian statute 
book is littered with clauses conferring discretionary power to be exercised by 
the executive or his/her delegate. One is inclined to question why the 
legislature has provided such wide powers on the executive. The answer behind 
s 52 is easily traceable to the emergence of strong executive government. 
Moreover, in the past, trade unions outside the public sector have more often 
than not supported opposition parties rather than the ruling coalition for a 
variety of reasons, which it is not necessary to speculate upon for the purpose 
of this chapter. Given that the same coalition party in different permutations 
has governed since independence in 1957, the motivation for insisting that 
trade union activities be totally separated from political activities becomes 
obvious. It should also be recalled that in the early development of the labour 
movement in peninsular Malaysia, trade unions were heavily infiltrated by 
communists. Despite the ending of the Cold War, the government remains anti-
communist. Consciously or otherwise, it is much influenced by the old spectre 
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of communist dominated organized labour. Until 1955, trade unions were 
allowed to use funds for political purposes. So why should this right 'be 
abolished in 1980, when the Government is freed ofCommunistthreats.' 16 The 
answer lies not in the strength of the question but in the fact that a government 
long used to exercising power is not likely to surrender it or see it wrestled 
away by its opponents. 
It may also be noted that s 28(1) of the TUA prohibits an officer-bearer or 
employee of a political party from holding office in a trade union, including a 
branch and a federation of trade union. Where the Director General certifies in 
writing to the executive of a trade union, or a federation of trade unions, that a 
member of the executive is disqualified from holding office, the person 
immediately ceases to be a member of such executive. There appears to be no 
provision in the Act for appeal against the decision of the Director General. 
Persons may be exempted from the operation of the above disqualification 
but such exemption is granted by the Minister through an order exempting 
either the trade union or officers of a trade union (TUA s 30). 
Disqualification of office bearers and employees of political parties from 
holding offices in trade unions had its origins in the 1969 Essential (Trade 
Unions) Regulations, a law made under emergency powers in the wake of 
racial riots. These provisions have since become entrenched. They are now 
sections 28 and 29 of the Act. Prior provisions for separate political funds in 
trade unions were repealed. In the result, it is now unlawful for any union to 
use any of its funds for political objectives (TUA s 52). The overall impact of 
the change means that political parties and trade unions have become almost 
completely separated 17 with no formal links between them. 
Public Sector Union 
Trade unions in the public sector are also separated from those in the private 
sector. Employees of statutory authorities are prohibited from joining or 
becoming members of any trade union 'unless the membership of that union is 
confined exclusively to persons employed by that particular statutory authority' 
(TUA s 3(a)). This restriction means that employees of a statutory authority 
cannot join private sector unions even if they belong to the same trade or 
occupation. In addition, they are restricted to a union of 'that particular 
statutory authority' (Essential (Trade Unions) Regulations 1969). It would 
seem that 'in-house' unions are the only type of organized labour allowed in 
statutory bodies (A 732 Trade Union (Amendment) Act 1989). 
As an exception, an employee of a statutory authority may join an outside 
union provided that the trade union's 'membership is confined exclusively to 
employees of one or more financially autonomous local authorities' and only 
with approval of the Minister of Human Resources. It is intended as a 
concession to statutory authorities too small to form separate bodies. There 
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appears to be no guideline provided to the Minister in considering an 
application for such approval. Presumably, the Ministerial authority is 
completely discretionary in nature. 
Given the various legal constraints, it is not surprising that statutory 
authority employees unions are generally small in membership. 
The general rule as stated ins 27 of the TUA prohibits public officers from 
joining or becoming members of any trade union unless exempted by the Yang 
di-Pertuan Agong (the King). The Yang di-Pertuan Agong may allow an 
exemption by notification in the Gazette but subject to such conditions as may 
be specified. Such exemption was given by the Trade Unions (Exemption of 
Public Officers) Order 1971 which permits public officers to organize on the 
condition that union membership is confined to public officers within a 
particular occupation, department or ministry. 
Ministerial Power to Suspend a Trade Union 
The Minister of Human Resources possesses the power, exercisable at his 
'absolute discretion,' to suspend for a period not exceeding six months any 
trade union, or any class or description of trade unions, which 'in his opinion' 
is or is being used for purposes prejudicial to or incompatible with the interests 
of the security or public order of Malaysia orany part thereof (TUA s 18). The 
discretionary power is exercisable subject to certain constraints, namely: 
a. the concurrence of the Minister responsible for internal security and public 
order; and 
b. the publication of the suspension order in the Gazette. 
The need to publish is merely procedural and a condition precedent to its 
enforcement. Its real value is illusory, given that the procedure may be 
dispensed with 'where in the opinion of the Minister the exigencies of the 
situation so require.' Hence the Minister may suspend a trade union 
immediately upon an order being made and before its publication but 'after 
publicising it in such manner as the Minister thinks fit,' for example, by a press 
statement or an announcement in the mass media. It is indeed an extraordinary 
discretionary power. 
It is also provided in the Act that the Minister's order is 'final and 
conclusive' (TUA s 18(7)). In practical terms, it is not normally amenable to 
judicial review except perhaps for the most blatant error of law. It has been 
argued that the power is needed to meet grave situations that are likely to 
threaten security or public order. It is an unconvincing argument. In reality, it is 
yet another illustration of an authoritarian approach to government taken 
through force of habit. Such power is superfluous given the extraordinary 
powers that already exist under Articles 149 and 150 of the Federal 
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Constitution, and the laws made thereunder, to deal with activities that have the 
potential to threaten security or public order. 18 
The Minister's authority to suspend is not restricted to a particular trade 
union. It is exercisable in respect of any class or description of trade unions. It 
is conceivable that a Minister, for instance, may decide to suspend all trade 
unions in the whole industry, if he/she is of the view that they are being used 
for purposes prejudicial to the interests of public order. Such suspension may 
occur despite the legitimacy of trade union claims and the fact that they have 
followed all procedural requirements prior to industrial action. The power of 
government over trade unions seems almost limitless. 
Upon the making of an order of suspension, the Minister has authority at 
any time to give further directions of an ancillary or consequential nature as he 
may deem necessary or expedient. A direction so given is valid, notwith-
standing anything inconsistent with the TUA and it is also 'final and 
conclusive.' Again, no guideline or criterion is prescribed for the exercise of 
this power. The most significant aspect of a ministerial direction is the fact that 
it is 'valid and have full force and effect' even though it may be contrary to the 
statute from which the power originates (TUA s 18(4)(b)). In a democratic 
society, it must surely rank as one of the most undemocratic of powers. It 
would seem that the legislature has abdicated its responsibility. 
The current state of the law is a demonstration of blatant executive power 
over trade unions and their activities. 
The tendency of the legislature, under executive direction, to confer wide 
discretionary powers to administrative authority to decide matters according to 
its subjective satisfaction is now legendary. From the foregoing discussions, 
this approach is amply illustrated. The discretionary nature of the power is 
demonstrated by the use of such terms as 'he is of the opinion,' 'if he is 
satisfied,' and 'in his absolute discretion.' All the above expressions are found 
in the TUA. While it is administratively efficient, it also erodes democratic 
principles and creates a climate conducive for abuse of power, particularly 
where the traditional authority of courts to review is ousted at the same time. 
Clearly when an administrative authority is vested with discretionary powers to 
be exercised according to its subjective satisfaction, the courts are loath to 
inquire into the merits. Generally it is regarded as a non-justiciable matter. 19 
REGULATION OF STRIKES 
A strike is perhaps the most dramatic manifestation of overt industrial conflict. 
In a civil society, the freedom of workers to combine and to withdraw their 
labour is widely recognized as a legitimate form of industrial action. It is seen 
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as the ultimate safeguard against the inherent imbalance of power between 
capital and labour. 
A strike involves a concerted temporary withdrawal oflabour by a group of 
workers for the purpose of protecting or promoting their interests. Workers' 
interests normally relate to the terms and conditions of employment of the 
strikers or in an industry but in countries with a liberal democracy such as 
Australia and the United Kingdom, other interests that may be sought to be 
protected or promoted through strikes and other industrial actions do not 
necessarily relate to employment matters alone but may involve other issues 
such as political or environmental concerns. Modern trade unions often take on 
wider agendas, including politics, but in the case of Malaysia, that is not the 
practice given that the law prohibits workers from engaging in strikes unrelated 
to their employment. In consequence, their concerns are far narrower and 
limited. 
Control of Strikes 
Embarking on strike action in Malaysia is similar to running the marathon. It is 
long, hard, and a test of endurance. 
Strike is strictly controlled by legislation through various techniques. In the 
first instance, the word 'strike' is given an expansive statutory meaning; thus 
snaring a multitude of actions that might be employed by trade unions in 
furtherance of industrial conflicts, within the ambit of strike laws. Section 2 of 
the IRA and s 2(1) TUA define a 'strike' in similar terms to mean: 
The cessation of work by a body of workmen acting in combination, or 
a concerted refusal or a refusal under a common understanding of a 
number of workmen to continue to work or to accept employment, and 
includes any act or omission by a body or workmen acting in 
combination or under a common understanding, which is intended to or 
does result in any limitation, restriction, reduction or cessation of or 
dilatoriness in the performance or execution of the whole or any part of 
the duties connected with their employment. 
Three elements are present in the above definition: (a) cessation of work; (b) 
action less than cessation of work but which results in a limitation, restriction, 
reduction, or dilatoriness in the performance of work and (c) concerted action. 
Thus industrial acts such as 'go slow,' 'work to rule,' overtime ban, and so 
forth, which do not involve a complete cessation of work, are caught by s 2. 
They are regarded as strikes and therefore subject to various controls. Trade 
unions cannot resort to 'go slow' or 'work to rule' and claim that they are not 
on strike. Given this wide definition of what constitutes a strike, not 
surprisingly strike action in general is not particularly widespread. 
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Is there a Right to Strike? 
There is no statutory provision expressly conferring on workers the right to 
strike. The right to strike is inferred from several provisions of both the TUA 
and IRA. The relevant provisions are as follows: 
1. TU A s 2( 1) provides amongst the objects of a trade union 'the promotion 
or organisation or financing of strikes or lock-outs in any trade or industry 
or the provision of pay or other benefits for its members during a strike or 
lock-out;' 
2. TUA s 21 provides a registered trade union with legal immunity from civil 
suit in respect of any act done in contemplation or furtherance of a trade 
dispute. Trade disputes include strike action; 
3. TUA s 25A provides for a mandatory procedure, including the taking ofa 
secret ballot, before strike action can commence; 
4. IRA s 4(1) provides that 'No person shall interfere with, restrain or coerce 
a workman or an employer in the exercise of his rights to form and assist 
in the formation of and join a trade union and to participate in its lawful 
activities.' The lawful activities of a trade union include the promotion, 
organisation and financing of a strike as indicated in item (1) above; 
5. IRA s 42(1) and (2) prevents persons acting in combination in 
contemplation or furtherance of trade unions from being prosecuted or 
sued for their actions; 
6. The Employment Act 1955 s 8 provides that nothing in any contract of 
service must restrict the right of any employee from participating in the 
activities of a registered trade union. Such activities would presumably 
include strikes. 
The right of workers to strike is supported by judicial pronouncements. For 
instance, Raja Azlan Shah FJ in South East Asia Fire Bricks [1976] 2 MLJ 67 
p. 19, citing with approval a statement of Lord Wright, which says: 
It is declaratory of present day industrial relations that management 
should encourage workmen to join a union and to play an active part in 
its work, ... such as the freedom to strike. 'The right of workmen to 
strike is an essential element in the principle of collective bargaining' 
per Lord Wright in Crofter Hand Woven Harris Tweed Company, Ltd 
and Ors v Veitch & Anor. That is a truism. There can be no equilibrium 
in industrial relations today without the freedom to strike. If workers 
could not, in the last resort, collectively withhold labour, they could not 
bargain collectively. 
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His Lordship elaborated, 'the freedom to strike appears in the form of 
immunities from criminal prosecution and from civil action,' provided the 
actions are taken in contemplation or furtherance of trade disputes. The same 
case is also authority for the proposition that workers who go on lawful strike 
have not terminated their contracts of service but are merely suspending it for 
the duration of the strike. Consequently, an employer cannot, by issuing 
warning notices, convert the absence from work of those workers, who are on 
strike, into abandonment of their service contract. 
Mandatory Requirements for Lawful Strikes 
While the right to strike seems settled, the road towards it is long and arduous. 
Firstly, only registered trade unions may go on lawful strike, and second, the 
strike must be in contemplation or furtherance of a trade dispute between the 
workers on strike and their employer. A strike in support of other workers is 
illegal, given that a trade dispute must involve a dispute with their employers. 
Thirdly, strikes for political, economic, social, or related purposes such as 
environmental concerns are illegal and persons so participating are liable to 
prosecution. 
Sections 25A and 40 of the TUA impose certain compulsory procedures to 
be observed before a trade union can commence a lawful strike (or a lock-out 
in the case of an employer). Failure to observe the prescribed procedures can 
lead to prosecution and, in the event of a prosecution for infringement, the 
burden of proof is reversed. 20 
In a criminal case, the prosecution is normally required to prove the guilt of 
the defendant beyond reasonable doubt. It is quite puzzling that in relation to a 
breach of the law relating to strike, the burden of proof is reversed. Surely 
industrial disputes are not a greater threat to the community as a whole than 
criminal activities. Shifting the burden of proof to a defendant places a heavy 
burden of responsibility on trade unions, their officers and members. The 
government conveys the impression that it is less tolerant ofunlawful industrial 
action than of other criminal activities. Given the already tight regulation of 
strikes, it is draconian to treat industrial law violators more harshly than 
criminal offenders. 
Among the several mandatory procedures of a lawful strike is the taking of 
a secret ballot in a decision on 'all matters relating to strikes and lock-outs' 
(TUA s 40(1)). It is a condition precedent to a lawful strike (or lock-out). 
Secret ballot is an issue of union democracy and reduces incidence of 
intimidation. By and large, it is generally agreed that it is an appropriate 
procedure: for a decision to strike being tested democratically on the floor 
through a secret ballot. Other methods of determining support such as a show 
of hands and associated methods at open forums are not satisfactory. 
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However, before a secret ballot can be taken in relation to any matter 
concerning a strike or lock-out, a proper resolution must be circulated setting 
out clearly the issues leading to the proposed strike or lock-out and a 
description of the nature of the industrial action, which is contemplated, in the 
course of such a strike or lockout. A secret ballot not conducted correctly is 
invalid and ofno effect, and 'no strike or lock-out shall be carried out on the 
basis of such secret ballot.' It is clear that industrial actions such as wildcat 
strikes, where members walk out off their jobs without notice, are illegal. 
A strike decided by secret ballot must be supported by at least two-thirds of 
the total number of union members, who are entitled to vote, and in respect of 
whom the strike is to be called. The same is required of employers in the case 
of a lock-out (TUA s 25(l)(a)). A simple majority of members in support ofa 
strike is insufficient. 
Role of the Director-General in Strikes 
The Director General of Trade Unions plays a major role in matters relating to 
strike action. Pursuant to s 40(5) of the Act, the results of a secret ballot on a 
strike or lock-out must be submitted in triplicate by the secretary of the trade 
union to the Director General within fourteen days of the taking of the ballot. 
The secretary is under a legal duty to take all steps to ensure that all ballot 
papers and documents used in connection with the secret ballot are kept at the 
registered office of the union for a period of not less than six months after the 
completion of the ballot (TUA s 40(7)). 
Upon receipt of the results of a secret ballot calling for a strike or a lock-
out, the Director General is empowered bys 40(6) of the Act to 'carry out all 
such investigations as he may deem necessary.' For the purpose of satisfying 
himself that a secret ballot taken by a trade union has been properly conducted 
according to law and the rules of the union concerned, he may act in the 
following manner: 
I. require any person to deliver to him any ballot papers, envelopes, lists, or 
other documents, which have been used in connection with the secret ballot; 
2. inspect any such documents; and 
3. retain them for such period as he deems necessary. 
Other than the Director General, as provided in the rules of the union, no other 
person 'shall be allowed to inspect or copy any document relating to a secret 
ballot.' 
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The Director General may decide as follows: 
I. take note of the secret ballot calling for strike or lock-out; 
2. declare the secret ballot taken to be invalid if he is satisfied that the union 
has contravened any provision of the Act or its regulations, or any of its 
own rules in carrying out such secret ballot (TUA s 40(9)); or 
3. direct the union not to commence any strike or lock-out where he is 
satisfied that the proposed action if carried out would contravene the Act or 
any other written law (TUA s 40(6)). 
The power of the Director General under item (3) above is exercisable at his 
subjective discretion. It is unclear whether the Director General can direct that 
a proposed strike be aborted because in his subjective view, the proposed strike 
would contravene the Act or 'any other written law,' regardless of a secret 
ballot in favour of a strike or lock-out, with no ostensible flaw in its conduct. If 
the answer is affirmative, the Director General's power is indeed far reaching. 
Is the Director General an appropriate person to decide subjectively whether an 
industrial action has contravened or is likely to contravene a written law? 
Surely that is a function of the court rather than a public servant. The provision 
as it stands gives far too much authority to a public servant. 
Cooling Off Period 
A 'cooling off period is also prescribed by law. Following the submission of 
the results of a secret ballot in favour of a strike to the Director General, at least 
seven days must elapse before a strike or lock-out can actually commence 
(TUA s 25A(l)(b)). A strike or lock-out carried out or declared in 
contravention of s 25A(l) is illegal. Any trade union and every member of its 
executive who commences, promotes, organizes, or finances such illegal strike 
or lock-out is liable, on conviction, to a fine not exceeding two thousand 
ringgit, or to imprisonment for a term not exceeding one year, or to both. There 
is a further fine of one hundred ringgit for every day the offence continues 
(TUA s 25A(2)). This prescribed 'cooling off period is probably intended to 
provide some breathing space for both protagonists to reach a settlement. 
Restriction of Strikes in Certain Circumstances 
In certain circumstances, strikes are completely prohibited, namely: 
1. Recognition of trade unions: s 10( 1) prohibits a worker from taking strike 
action for 'whatever reason during the pending of proceedings under 
section 9, or after the decision of the Minister thereunder by reason of any 
dissatisfaction with such decision.' Section 9 concerns a claim by a union 
for recognition from an employer. It would appear that once a trade union 
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has served a claim for recognition on an employer, a statutory process is put 
in train and during that period, workers are prohibited from going on strike. 
Employers are likewise prohibited from declaring a lock-out or from 
terminating the services of their employees; 
2. Essential industries: s 43 places restrictions on strikes and lock-outs in 
'essential industries.' A prescribed period of notice is required before a 
strike can commence; 
3. Other miscellaneous circumstances: s 44 prohibits workers and employers 
from resorting to strikes and lock-outs respectively in any of the following 
circumstances: 
( a) during the pendency of the proceedings of a Board oflnquiry appointed 
by the Minister in respect of a trade dispute involving such workers and 
employer, and seven days after the conclusion of such proceedings; 
(b) after a trade dispute or a matter involving such worker or employer has 
been referred. to the Industrial Court for settlement, and the parties 
concerned have been notified of such reference; 
( c) in the case of a trade dispute relating to any public service or the service 
of a statutory authority, after the Yang di-Pertuan Agong has withheld 
consent to a reference of the dispute to the Industrial Court under s 
26(2), and the parties concerned have been notified; 
( d) in respect of any of the matters covered by a collective agreement that 
has been taken cognizance of by the Industrial Court in accordance with 
s 16 or by an award; and 
( e) in respect of any of the matters pertaining to management's prerogatives 
that are not to be included in a union's proposal for a collective 
agreement covered by s 13(3). 
Where a trade dispute relates to the public service or a statutory authority, 
workers may have no means of redress if the Yang di-Pertuan Agong or the 
relevant state authority refuses to give its consent for a dispute to be referred to 
the Industrial Court. In practical terms, these workers are denied the benefits of 
either compulsory arbitration or the right to strike in order to force a settlement 
of their grievances. In this respect, workers in the public sector are at a relative 
disadvantage in comparison with their counterparts in the private sector. By 
virtue of s 45(1), strikes and lock-outs are deemed to be illegal if they are 
carried out in contravention of s 43 ors 44 or 'of any provision of any other 
written law'; likewise, if strikes have any objective other than the furtherance 
of a trade dispute between the workers and their employer. A strike that is 
declared in response to an illegal lock-out is not deemed to be illegal (IRA s 
45(2)). 
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Penalties for Unlawful Strikes 
In general, penalties imposed on workers participating in illegal strikes 
including instigators and financial supporters are severe. They include 
imprisonment for up to a year. Offences relating to illegal strikes (and lock-
outs) are treated as 'seizable' offences for which a person may be arrested 
without a warrant. Bail may not be granted to an accused person or a person 
charged if the 'Public Prosecutor certifies in writing that it is not in the public 
interest to grant bail to such accused person' (IRA s 50). A prosecution cannot 
be instituted except with the consent of the Public Prosecutor but the proviso 
does not affect the rule with respect to arrest, remand, or bail other than the fact 
that the case 'shal 1 not be further prosecuted until that consent has been 
obtained' (IRA s 51(1)). 
Punishment extends beyond mere prosecution. Any member of a trade 
union of workers who commences, participates, or otherwise acts in 
furtherance of a strike in contravention of TUA s 25A(l) 'shall forthwith cease 
to be a member of the trade union, thereafter such member shall not be eligible 
to become a member of any trade union except with the prior approval of the 
Director General in writing' (TUA s 25A(3)). The trade union of which he is no 
longer a member must remove his name from its membership register, inform 
the Director General of Trade Unions and the member concerned of the 
removal, and exhibit conspicuously in its registered office a list of members 
whose names have been removed. In certain situations, widespread 
participation in an unlawful strike can wipe out the whole union. 
Again, the Director General possesses almost unbridled power to order the 
removal of members' names from the membership register, regardless of a 
prosecution or conviction for an offence (TUA s 25A(5)). By virtue of section 
25A(4) the Director General may, 'where he is satisfied' that a contravention 
has occurred and the trade union concerned has failed to remove the names or 
where there is undue delay, order the union concerned 'to remove forthwith the 
names of the members concerned from its membership register' (TUA s 
25A(4)). The power is discretionary although exercisable only after he has 
conducted 'such investigation as he deems necessary.' It is remarkable that 
such power is conferred on a public servant; a power that is exercisable despite 
the insufficiency of evidence to bring a person to court for trial. A failure to 
comply with the order of the Director General is an offence. 
PIONEER COMPANIES 
Direct foreign investments are attracted to industries in Malaysia where they 
are able to secure pioneer company status under the Promotion of Investments 
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Act 1986. The conferment of such status gives rise to certain privileges, 
including tax advantages and strict statutory control of labour. 
The Employment Act 1955 contains minimum conditions of employment of 
workers. It is provided in the IRA s 15 that no collective agreement in relation 
to pioneer companies 'shall contain provisions with regard to terms and 
conditions of service that are more favourable to workmen than those contained 
in Part XII of the Employment Act 1955' with the qualification that the 
Minister may approve any variation. Clearly, the intention is to encourage 
investments in certain industries and one of the incentives is to ensure that 
labour costs associated with employment are sufficiently attractive for 
investors. Lower labour cost is achieved at the expense of workers in this 
instance when an artificial lid is imposed on conditions of employment, 
including wages for a period of 5 years which may be extendable by the 
Minister. 
In the longer term, manipulation of labour costs is bound to affect the 
competitiveness of the company or industry when market forces are restored 
after the expiry of the 5-year honeymoon period. Of course, the honeymoon 
period may be indefinite given that it is elastic. The Minister may extend it 
'from time to time by notification in the Gazette' and 'for such further period 
or periods.' 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Hallmarks of Malaysian industrial law include tight regulations of trade unions, 
their activities and the conduct of industrial relations. Control is secured mainly 
by restrictive laws and vesting wide discretionary powers in the Minister and 
the two Director Generals (the Director General of Trade Unions and the 
Director General of Industrial Relations). The absence of statutory direction for 
the exercise of these powers, coupled with a diminished ability of the judiciary 
to intervene, leads inevitably to a very timid trade union movement often 
unable to adequately protect the legitimate interests of its workers. The law as 
it currently stands is loaded in favour of employers. The current low level of 
industrial strife is predictable enough given the legal controls engineered by the 
government. It is not a reflection of a genuine partnership between employers 
and workers. 
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NOTES 
First as Federation of Malaya comprising 11 states and later as 
Malaysia in 1963 to include the states of Singapore, Sabah and 
Sarawak. Singapore left the federation in 1965 and became a sovereign 
nation. 
2 The Deputy Finance Minister reportedly informed Parliament that 
Danaharta had taken over non-performing loans worth 39.3 billion 
ringgit (10.3 billion US dollars) from financial institutions as of 15 
October 1999. 
http://www.afp.com/ext/english/nst/malaysia/99 l 025083313.qivD0qm 
.html 
3 Reported on 16/10/99 in http://business-times.asia l .com.sg/6/nmsia/-
nmsia0l .html 
4 For an account of capital controls, see R. Gengatharen (1999) 
Destablishing Financial Capital Controls: Are Capital Controls the 
Solution, Lawasia Journal, 12. 
5 In 1978 in response to industrial action by employees of Malaysian 
Airline System, the Minister of Home Affairs detained several union 
officers under the Internal Security Act, which was a law enacted 
under Article 149 of the Federal Constitution. The Act provides for 
detention without trial. The minister said that he had detained them on 
the grounds, amongst others, that some employees were tampering 
with airplanes belonging to the airline. In any event, detention of the 
employees broke the back of the industrial action. 
6 A limited study by Associate Professor Sheela Abraham reported in 
late 1999 that racial polarization at Universiti Malaya, Malaysia's 
oldest University, has reached a level where there is almost no 
interaction among the communities outside classes. While it is 
common knowledge that the level of social interaction among Malay, 
Chinese, and Indian students has decreased over the years, the paper 
says that racial segregation on campus is now almost complete. The 
survey found that 98 per cent of Malay students did not mix socially 
with students of other races. The figures for Chinese and Indian 
students were equally alarming: 99 per cent and 97 per cent, 
respectively. See http://straitstimes.asia l .com.sg/reg/mal 1. Also 
reported in The Sun, 12 October 1999. 
7 The Malayan Union was created after British reoccupation and 
comprised of 11 states. It was soon abandoned in the face of strong 
Malay opposition, to be replaced by the Federation of Malaya. 
8 The government of contemporary Malaysia remains staunchly anti-
communist but adopts a pragmatic approach in its dealings with 
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communist or ex-communist countries in matters relating to trade and 
commerce. 
9 That provision has been carried over to the current law and in 
consequence caused the federations of trade unions to remain small 
and weak though homogenous. 
10 For an account of industrial relations law generally, see Wu Min Aun 
(1995) The Industrial Relations Law of Malaysia. Petaling Jaya: 
Longman Malaysia. 
11 By the Act A 717 Trade Unions (Amendment) Act 1989; Act 732 Trade 
Unions (Amendment) Act 1989 and Act A 798 Trade Unions 
(Amendment) Act 1991. 
12 See Part xii of the Trade Unions Act 1959 in respect of the legal 
requirements of trade unions. S 75 of the TUA makes it clear that the 
law relating to trade unions applies equally to a federation of trade 
unions. It reads: 
The provisions of this Act relating to trade unions (including the provisions 
as to penalties) shall apply, so far as the same may be applicable, to a 
federation of trade unions as if such federation were a trade union. 
13 See Part XII of the Trade Unions Act 1959 in respect of legal 
requirements of federation of trade unions. Section 75 of the TUA 
makes clear that the law relating to trade unions applies equally to a 
federation of trade unions. It reads: 
The provisions of this Act relating to trade unions (including the 
provisions as to penalties) shall apply, so far as the same may be 
applicable, to a federation of trade unions as if such federation were a 
trade union. 
14 The power to determine similarity also applies for the purposes of s 32 
(amalgamation of trade unions). s 33 (transfer of trade unions), s 72 
(formation of federation of trade unions) and s 74 (affiliation with 
registered federation of trade unions). 
15 'Political objects' referred to includes: 
1. The payment of expenses incurred either directly or indirectly by a 
candidate or prospective candidate for election to either Houses of 
Parliament; 
2. The holding of any meeting or the distribution of any literature or 
document in support of any such candidate or prospective 
candidate; 
3. The maintenance of any person who is a member of either House 
of Parliament; 
4. The registration of electors or the selection of a candidate for 
membership of either House of Parliament; and 
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5. The holding of political meetings ofany kind or the distribution of 
political literature or political documents of any kind. 
16 See Sharifah Suhana Syed Ahmad (1992) Trade Unions in Malaysia: 
Organs with 'Bark or Bite?' Developments in Malaysian Law, Petaling 
Jaya: Pelanduk Publications 358. 
17 Reported in the Star (22 May 1991) the Minister of Human Resources 
emphasized that trade unions should not involve themselves in politics 
as there would be a danger of them 'losing of sight of their original 
objectives,' p. 4. 
18 See note no. 5. 
19 See Loh Chin v The Registrar a/Trade Unions [1957] MLJ243 and 
Electrical Industry Workers Union v Registrar a/Trade Unions [1976] 
1 MLJ 177; in Minister of Human Resources Ors v National Union of 
Hotels, Bar and Restaurant Workers, Semenanjung Malaysia and 
Another [1997] 3 MLJ377 the Court of Appeal held that the Director 
General of Trade Unions was under no duty to provide reasons for his 
decision; i·n Petaling Jaya v Lee Kian Chan [1994] 1 SCR325 the 
Supreme Court reaffirmed the well established principle that judicial 
review is available in respect of jurisdictional error despite the 
presence of an ouster clause. For recent case law on judicial review, 
see Roma Chandran v The Industrial Court of Malaysia & Anor 
[1997] 1 MLJ145. 
20 Section 25A(7) provides that 'in every prosecution for an offence 
under this section the onus of proving that the requirements specified 
... have been complied with shall be on the trade union, the member of 
its executive or the member of the trade union, as the case may be.' 
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CHAPTER12 
THE LEGAL REGULATION OF TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER 
ARRANGEMENTS WITHIN ASEAN 
MICHAEL BLAKENEY 
THE ASEAN FRAMEWORK AGREEMENT ON INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY CO-OPERATION 
On 15 December 1995 ASEAN member countries' adopted a Framework 
Agreement on Intellectual Property Co-operation (Framework Agreement Z, 
1996 35 ILM 1072). Emulating the European model, the Framework 
Agreement envisages the establishment of an ASEAN patents and 
trademarks system, including ASEAN Patent and Trademarks Office 
(Framework Agreement Z, Art 1.4 and 1.5). Intellectual property co-
operation is envisaged for the fields of 'copyright and related rights, patents, 
trademarks, industrial designs, geographical indications, undisclosed infor-
mation, and layout designs of integrated circuits (Framework Agreement Z, 
Art 3.1). The Framework Agreement recited the obligations of Member 
States to implement intra-ASEAN intellectual property arrangements in line 
with their international intellectual property obligations, in particular, their 
obligations under the WTO Agreement on Trade Related Intellectual 
Property Rights (Blakeney, 1996). Among the co-operative measures to 
enhance the enforcement of intellectual property rights, the Framework 
Agreement proposes co-operation in cross-border protection and the 
networking of ASEAN judicial authorities and enforcement agencies 
(Framework Agreement Z, Art. 3.3.1). Additionally, the Framework Agree-
ment proposes the networking of training facilities and the exchange of 
personnel (Framework Agreement Z, Art. 3.3.4). Prior to the 1995 Bangkok 
Summit, ASEAN had hesitated to involve itself in intellectual property 
matters, taking the view that intellectual property rights tended toward the 
perpetuation of trade imbalances between developed and developing 
countries (Sirat, 1997). 
The Bangkok Declaration was accompanied by expressions of the 
importance of the interrelationship between trade, investment and 
intellectual property. The first proposal for co-operation on intellectual 
property was made to the ASEAN Senior Economic Officers Meeting 
(SEOM) in Jakarta in August 1994. Thailand chaired the first meeting of 
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ASEAN's Working Group on Intellectual Property, which met at Chiang 
Mai in September 1994. Thailand as chair, proposed the first draft of the 
Framework Agreement. The Framework Agreement was proposed in the 
context of the establishment of an Asian Free Trade Area ('AFTA'). The 
Bangkok Summit Declaration, which accompanied the Framework 
Agreement, acknowledged 'the importance of intellectual property in intra-
ASEAN and world trade' (Bangkok Summit Declaration 1995 Art 8 35 ILM 
1067). 
In the Special Meeting of ASEAN in July 1997, which welcomed the 
admission of Laos and Myanmar into ASEAN, the intention of members to 
establish an ASEAN intellectual property union, as part of a commercial 
union, was reiterated. The First Infonnal Leaders' Summit, held in Jakarta 
on 30 November 1996, endorsed the Basic Framework of the ASEAN 
Mekong Basin Development Co-operation, to promote the economic 
integration of economies of the ASEAN and non-A SEAN riparian states. 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CO-OPERATION BETWEEN 
MEKONG RIVER BASIN COUNTRIES 
Parallelling the Thai intellectual property initiatives within ASEAN, have 
been comparable initiatives by Thailand among the countries of the Mekong 
Valley Basin: Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, and Vietnam, as well as with 
China. This initiative commenced with a Memorandum of Understanding on 
Bilateral Co-operation in the Field of Industrial Property, which was signed 
by Thailand and Vietnam on 22 AJ)ril 1994. This MOU, which predated 
Vietnamese membership of ASEAN,2 contained many of the ingredients of 
the Framework Agreement. It proposed bilateral co-operation in the 
exchange of infonnation and staff, comparative studies of procedures and 
practices, and the use of automation and dissemination of information on 
industrial property (Weeraworawit, 1996). The MOU was followed by a Co-
operation Programme, which was promulgated on 17 February 1995 and 
which was initiated with a joint working group to detennine common 
criteria on well-known marks. On 7 December 1996 Thailand and Vietnam 
signed an MOU on Copyright and Neighbouring rights, which proposed a 
plan of co-operation, similar to that proposed for industrial property. 
Similar bilateral arrangements in relation to industrial property were 
made between Thailand and Laos by memorandum in 1994. A Plan of 
Actions on Industrial Property was agreed between Laos and Thailand on 30 
January 1996 proposing infonnation exchanges and linkages between the 
Thai Department of Intellectual Property and the Lao Science, Technology 
and Environment Organization. Preliminary consultative meetings have also 
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been held between Thailand and Myanmar and between Thailand and 
Cambodia to establish arrangements for intellectual property co-operation. 
Thailand has also been conducting negotiations on intellectual property 
co-operation with the People's Republic of China. Memoranda of Under-
standing were signed between Thailand and China in the fields of 
trademarks (6 April 1995), patents (7 April 1995), and copyright (1 
December 1995). A major objective of these MOUs was the promotion of 
regional co-operation in intellectual property. 
The Thai architect of these bilateral intellectual property arrangement 
identified it as 'the most significant development,' the 'clear determination 
to co-operate closely and endeavour to reach common positions in both 
bilateral and ASEAN contexts' (Weeraworawit, 1996). The various bilateral 
arrangements which Thailand has negotiated with the Mekong Basin group 
of countries will no doubt strengthen its position as the leader in this field in 
ASEAN. For example in the 1996 meetings of the Paris and Berne Unions, 
Thailand was elected Chair of the Asia group of developing countries. A 
regional consultative meeting convened by Thailand in Chiang Mai 
formulated an Asian position for the WIPO Diplomatic Conference on 
copyright in December 1996. The leadership which Thailand has assumed in 
regional intellectual property arrangements will inevitably enhance its 
position in the negotiations which will ensue concerning the location of the 
ASEAN patent and trade mark offices. 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER 
The close inter-relationship between intellectual property and technology 
transfer underpins most national and international legislative regimes 
(Blakeney, 1989). For example, a principal objective of the ASEAN 
Framework Agreement is the exploration by Member States of 'appropriate 
intra-ASEAN co-operation arrangements in the field of intellectual property 
contributing to ... the transfer and dissemination of technology (Framework 
Agreement Art. 1.3).' Among the principles animating the Framework 
Agreement is 'the adoption of measures necessary for the promotion of the 
public interest in all sectors of vital importance to the Member State's socio-
economic and technological development, which are consistent with 
international obligations (Framework Agreement Art. 2.4).' To this end, Art. 
2.5 refers to the necessity for Member states to 'adopt appropriate measures 
to prevent the abuse of intellectual property rights by right holders or the 
resort to practices which unreasonably restrain trade or adversely affect the 
international transfer of technology.' 
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Similar provisions are contained in the TRIPs Agreement.3 The preamble to 
the Agreement recognizes 'the underlying policy objectives of national 
systems for the protection of intellectual policy, including developmental 
and technological objectives.' Article 7 recites the objective that: 
The protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights should 
contribute to the promotion of technological innovation and to the 
transfer and dissemination of technology, to the mutual advantage of 
producers and users of technological knowledge in a manner 
conducive to social and economic welfare, and to a balance of rights 
and obligations. 
Article 40 permits Members to enact measures to eliminate provisions in 
intellectual property licences which 'may have adverse effects on trade and 
may impede the transfer and dissemination of technology.' 
The assumption of the efficacy of intellectual property protection in 
promoting the transfer and acquisition of technology is reflected in the 
priority which ASEAN has given to the introduction of intellectual property 
and technology transfer regimes. However, ASEAN, particularly with the 
admission of Laos, Myanmar, and Vietnam and the proposed admission of 
Cambodia, comprises a group of countries at diverse developmental stages 
and with diverse political and legal traditions. Consequently, the approaches 
within ASEAN to the regulation of technology transfer reveal this 
background diversity. Within ASEAN, these approaches range from the 
laissez faire attitude of Singapore, which allows an unregulated free market 
in technology, through the partial regulation which applies in Indonesia and 
Malaysia, to the comprehensive technology transfer code enacted in 
Vietnam. For countries such as Cambodia, Laos, and Myanmar, emerging 
from periods of recent isolation and turbulence, technology transfer 
legislation is yet to be enacted, as only preliminary intellectual property 
arrangements are in place. 
Surveyed below, as a recent exemplar of the detailed prescription of 
technology transfer arrangements within ASEAN, is the technology transfer 
regime adopted by Vietnam. This is contrasted with the recent legislation of 
the Philippines, which considerably dilutes the formerly prescriptive 
technology transfer regime. 
Vietnam 
Doi Mai and Technology Transfer 
A central aspect of the policy of Doi Moi, or modernization of the 
Vietnamese economy, which was inaugurated in the late 1980's was the 
encouragement of the importation of foreign capital and technology. Three 
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legal instruments were promulgated to facilitate the transfer of technology. 
An Ordinance on the Transfer of Foreign Technology to Vietnam was 
promulgated by the State Council in December 1988. This was accompanied 
by an interpretative Decree on Licensing which was promulgated by the 
Council of Ministers. In March 1991, a further Decree on the Transfer of 
Foreign Technology was promulgated by the Council of Ministers and this 
was amplified in January 1994 with a Circular on Transfer of Foreign 
Technology into Vietnam which was issued by the Ministry of Science 
Technology and Environment (MOSTE), which was the Government 
authority entrusted with the administration of technology transfers. A 
subsequent Circular on Licensing Contracts was issued by MOSTE in April 
1994 to provide guidelines for the implementation of regulations on the 
approval and registration of the licensing of industrial property and know-
how. 
In addition to these technology transfer instruments in February 1989 an 
Ordinance on Industrial Property Rights was promulgated by the State 
Council and this was supplemented by an Ordinance on Author's Rights, 
which was promulgated in February 1987 and substantially amended by a 
similar Ordinance in December 1994.4 Finally A Law on Foreign 
Investment, which was promulgated in December 1987 and amended in 
June 1990 and December 1992 contained provisions dealing with 
technology transfer in the context of foreign investment projects. 
By the mid 1990s it was perceived that there were a number of problems 
with the implementation and appropriateness of these technology transfer 
laws. These included the following: 
• The various statutory instruments were overlapping and inconsistent in 
effect. Different regimes were established for technology transfer 
transactions and for licensing agreements and for the transfer of 
technology within the context of foreign investment transactions; 
• Different evaluation authorities administered technology transfer 
agreements applying different approaches to the approvals process. 
Technology transfer and licensing fell within the purview of MOSTE, 
but the evaluation of foreign investment projects was undertaken by the 
State Committee for Co-operation and Investment, an instrumentality of 
the Ministry of Finance; 
• A number of the regulations were considered to be unnecessarily harsh 
on transferors. For example, clause 6 of the Licensing Circular made 
licensors responsible for intellectual property breaches of third parties. 
Also the 1994 Circular provided that the recipient of technology within a 
foreign investment project could defer payments until such time as the 
project became profitable. The obligation of transferors to transfer 
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improvements free of charge to transferees was perceived to be 
particularly unrealistic;5 
• Some regulations were considered to be confusingly vague, for example 
the 1991 Technology Transfer Decree in Article 4.2 required transferor's 
to guarantee that technology would not result 'in any effects which may 
be detrimental to the environment such as" ... damage to the cultural and 
social aspects of populated areas;'" 
• Another problem was that a number of provisions were considered to be 
commercially unrealistic in that they mandated contract terms which 
were usually the subject of negotiation between commercial parties. For 
example the 1994 technology Transfer Circular stipulated the precise 
content of conditions and warranties; 
• The remuneration provisions of the various instruments were considered 
to be unnecessarily complex, as well as conflicting; 
• The gradual liberalization of the Vietnamese economy following Doi 
Moi rendered inappropriate some of the restrictions placed upon the 
permissible forms of commercial organization. For example, the 
prohibition against the appointment by a transferor of a sales agent and 
distributor was recognized as being an obstacle to manufacturing 
arrangements; and 
• Finally, the difficulties which foreign investors experienced with the 
technology transfer regime was reflected in the declining number of 
approvals of foreign investment projects in the country. For example, in 
Hanoi 62 projects were approved for 1994; 59 in 1995; and 35 for the 
first 10 months of 1996, a rate of decline of 38 per cent (Viet Nam News 
15 November 1996). 
During 1995 and 1996 Vietnam prepared three drafts of a Memorandum of 
Understanding to support its application for membership of the WTO. As 
the corollary to this membership was the obligation to conform its 
intellectual property laws to TRIPs standards, the time was opportune for a 
review also of the technology transfer laws of Vietnam.6 On 28 October 
1995, a Civil Code was promulgated by the National Assembly of Vietnam. 
In Part 6 of the Civil Code, chapters were included on the subjects of 
Copyright, Industrial Property and Technology Transfer. The Civil Code, 
which came into force in July 1996, replaced the scheme of technology 
transfer and intellectual property laws which preceded it. As the Civil Code 
is a necessarily general pronouncement on these subjects, supplementary 
explanatory legislation is required. 
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Intellectual Property Under the Civil Code 
( 1) Copyright 
The first copyright protection measure in Vietnam was the 1994 Ordinance 
on Copyright. This was replaced from 1 July 1996, with the copyright 
provisions of the Civil Code. Protection is given under chapter I of Part Six 
of the Code to the creators of original literary, artistic, scientific, and 
technical works. However in the technology transfer provisions, contained 
in chapter lH of the Part, copyright is not identified as an object of 
technology transfer, beyond the reference in that chapter to computer 
software and drawings (Civil Code Art.806.1.b). 
(2) Industrial property 
Article 781 identifies as the objects of industrial property protected by the 
State: 'inventions, utility solutions, industrial designs, trademarks and names 
of origin of goods.' Systems for the registration of these industrial property 
objects is established under the Code and Art.806.2 provides that 'if the 
objects of industrial property are protected as objects of industrial property, 
then the transfer of ownership or the right of use thereof must be carried out 
in accordance with the law before the technology is transferred.' 
Technology Transfer under the Civil Code 
Technology 
Article 806 of the Civil Code identified the objects of technology transfer as: 
(i) objects of industrial property attached to or separated from the machines 
or equipment permitted by law to be transferred; 
(ii) know-how, technical knowledge in the forms of technology processes, 
technological solutions and processes, computer software, drawings, 
formulas, technological data, technical plans with or without attached 
machines and equipment; 
(iii)technical services, training of technicians and information concerning 
the transferred technology; 
(iv) methods for rationalizing production. 
A criticism which had been made of the earlier technology transfer regime is 
that it was confined to objects of industrial property and had not included 
technology embodied in copyright, such as computer programs and 
technology which was contained in sui generis intellectual property 
categories such as the layout designs of integrated circuits and plant variety 
rights. The principal expansion effected by Article 806 of the Civil Code is 
through the inclusion of computer software in the list of items of know-how 
and technical knowledge which are objects of technology transfer. 
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Article 806 also requires that if the relevant technology involves the use 
of an industrial property right, its transmission or use must comply with the 
industrial property laws of Vietnam. 
The Technology Transfer Decree seeks to expand the Code provisions by 
supplying a definition of 'technology' as meaning 'a systematic combination 
of solutions generated by the implementation of scientific knowledge' being 
used to settle problems 'arising in production and business activities.' This 
definition is in line with that recommended by the World Intellectual 
Property Organization in its Licensing Guide for Developing Countries 
(WIPO 1977 Geneva 28). 
Transferable Technology 
Article 5 of the Decree prescribes the requirements of transferable 
technology. In summary, these include the requirement that: the technology 
has to enhance production capacity, create new jobs, increase product 
quality, reduce production costs, facilitate import substitution or assist in the 
expansion of exports. Improved environmental protection and production 
safety, are also included as criteria. 
Prohibited from transfer are: 
• technologies which do not meet legal requirements on labour safety, 
labour sanitation and environmental protection; 
• technologies with negative impacts with respect to culture, society and 
security; and 
• technologies prohibited by law from transfer 
The Approvals Authority 
Article 31 of the Technology Transfer Decree provides that MOSTE is the 
primary body entrusted with the approval of technology contracts under the 
Decree. A potential source of confusion is the fact that where the transfer of 
technology occurs within the context of a foreign investment project, as a 
contribution towards the capital of a joint venture under the Vietnamese 
Law on Foreign Investment, it may be the subject of an over-riding approval 
from the Ministry of Finance. This problem can be resolved if Vietnam 
adopts a solution similar to that in the Philippines where the approval of 
technology transfers is entrusted to an approvals body which comprises 
representatives from all relevant ministries, government and non-
government authorities, and from universities and research institutes. In this 
way the limited pool of approvals expertise in the country can be shared by 
relevant ministries. 
Article 3 3 .3 of the Decree provides that contracts with a value of below 
US$50,000 do not have to be submitted to MOSTE for approval, unless they 
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are funded from the State budget. Otherwise, Art. 33.1 requires that MOSTE 
approves technology transfer contracts: 
1. with a value above US$500,000; 
ii. involving the transfer of foreign technology to Vietnam; 
iii. involving the transfer of Vietnamese technology outside the country; 
iv. involving industrial property rights; and 
v. management contracts with training and technical support and a foreign 
investment component. 
The Approvals Process 
The application for consideration and approval of technology transfer 
contracts by MOSTE requires the submission of a dossier comprising the 
form of application, the contract with relevant appendices, and an 
explanation of the objectives and feasibility of the relevant technology. 
Article 34.3 of the Decree suggests that this explanation can comprise a 
feasibility study, a justification of the contract, analyses of the market, raw 
material requirements, and financial and efficiency aspects of the tech-
nology. 
An application fee for consideration and approval of a technology 
transfer contract is levied under Art. 30 of the Decree. This is graduated 
according to the value of the project and ranges between US$100 and 
US$ l 0,000. Where the technology transfer involves a contribution to 
foreign investment capital it is exempt from this fee. 
The approvals body is obliged by Art. 35 to issue its decision within 30 
days. It may require amendment of documents under the Article and a 
further 60 day period is prescribed within which this has to be achieved. 
This limitation of the time during which the approvals process must be 
finalized, will, if achieved, involve a significant improvement in Vietnamese 
practice in this regard. The experience of transferors to date is that delays in 
obtaining approvals have been extremely lengthy. 
The Technology Transfer Contract 
Article 809 of the Civil Code requires that all technology transfers be 
effected by written contract. Article 11 of the Decree permits the contract to 
involve multiple documents. The particulars of this contract are prescribed 
in Art. 812 of the Civil Code and amplified in Art. 16 of the Decree. These 
include: 
• particulars of the transferee and transferor; 
• definitions of contractual terms; 
• description of the technology to be transferred; 
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• documentary evidence of industrial property rights; 
• a schedule of the transfer timetable; 
• a statement of the rights and obligations of contracting parties; 
• details of technical training and support; 
• price and payment particulars; 
• undertakings as to the quality and reliability of technology, 
• confidentiality, environmental protection and work safety, 
• non-breach of third party rights and terms of payment; 
• obligations of the parties to co-operate and exchange information; 
• conditions on amendment and termination; 
• duration; and 
• applicable laws 
Article 17 of the Decree requires the contract to be prepared in Vietnamese 
and a common language agreed by the parties. Both languages will have 
equal validity. The commencement date of the contract is stipulated by Art. 
811 of the Civil Code and Art. 21 of the Decree to be the date on which 
approval is obtained from the approvals authority. 
Price 
Article 17 .2 of the Decree provides that 'subject to the modernity, contents 
and exclusivity of the relevant technology' the price of the technology shall 
be equal to: 
(i) from 0 per cent to 5 per cent of the net sale price of products; or 
(ii) from 0 per cent to 25 per cent of after-tax profits from products sole or 
services provided; or 
(iii) from 0 per cent to 8 per cent of total invested capital, less the land 
value, provided that the latter does not exceed 20 per cent of the 
registered capital of the project. 
In the case of high technology, technology of significance to Vietnamese 
development, or technology contributing to the development of products for 
export, Art. 26.3 permits the price to account for up to 8 per cent of the net 
sale price of products or to 30 per cent of after-tax profits. 
'Net sale price' is defined in Art. 2.13 of the Decree to mean the total 
sales price of products or services produced utilizing the technology from 
which is deducted: indirect taxes, prices and taxes for component parts and 
semi-finished products, and packing, transportation and advertising costs. 
The method of payment permitted under Art. 27 of the Decree is: 
(a) capital contribution of the transferred technology; 
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(b) periodic payment according to the percentage of after-tax profit; 
(c) payment in lump-sum, by installments or in kind; or 
(d) a combination of the above. 
Under Art. 29 of the Decree the proceeds from the technology transfer may 
be subject to a scheduled tax. 
Warranties 
(i) Quality 
Article 8 of the Decree enshrines the obligation within Art. 815 of the Civil 
Code that the transferor warrants the quality of the transferred technology. 
The Code in Art. 8 14 takes the objectives of the contract, together with 
product specifications and environmental factors into account in defining 
this warranty. 
(ii) Title 
Article 8.3 of the Decree requires the transferor to warrant that third party 
rights are not infringed by the contract. This is emphasized by Art. 12 of the 
Decree which, in the case of industrial property rights requires the transferor 
to warrant entitlement to use such rights. 
Remedies for breach 
Article 815 .3 of the Code requires the transferor to make good any breaches 
of warranty as to quality or title. In the event that these breaches are not 
cured, Art.8.4.c of the Decree permits the transferee to seek settlement or to 
terminate the contract with compensation. 
Duration 
Article 810.1 of the Civil Code prescribes a maximum seven year duration 
for technology transfer contracts, commencing from the date that the 
contract takes effect. In 'extraordinary circumstances' the Article makes 
provision for the extension of that term. The Decree, in Art. 19, identifies 
three such extraordinary circumstances. These are: (a) where upon the 
expiry of the contract, the technology remains a globally advanced 
technology; (b) the technology has great significance for socio-economic 
development; and (c) the technology transfer involves the maintenance to 
international standards of the quality of goods produced under the contract. 
In the case of technology transfer under foreign investment contracts, Art. 
810.2 provides that the duration of any technology transferred under the 
project will be computed according to the term of the investment. 
This duration provision has attracted considerable criticism from 
practising lawyers within Vietnam as inadequate for many technology 
projects (Counsell in Blakeney & Sinden (eds), 1996). In any event it ought 
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not be too difficult for a contract not to satisfy one of the requirements of 
Art. 19 .2 to secure an extension at least to a 10 year term. 
Prohibition of Restrictive Terms 
In common with most systems for the statutory regulation of technology 
transfer, the Vietnamese legislation proscribes the inclusion of a number of 
restrictive provisions. These include: 
(a) the supply of technology to which is tied the supply of unwanted 
goods, labour and industrial property rights; 
(b) forcing the transferee to comply with limits in relation to the scale of 
production, price, scope of consumption, and the appointment of 
product agents; 
( c) restricting exports by the transferee; 
(d) inhibitions on research by a transferee; 
(e) compulsory assignment of improvements; and 
(f) unreasonable prohibitions on the use of technology after the 
termination of the agreement. 
Article 9 of the Decree confers a positive right upon transferees to develop 
and improve technology on the basis of 'equality and mutual benefit'. 
Confidentiality 
Article 820 of the Civil Code permits the imposition of confidentiality 
obligations and in Art.820.2 provides for the compensation of a transferor if 
this term is breached. This is an important obligation in a country which 
does not yet have an unfair-competition law dealing with this issue or a 
general law confidentiality requirement. 
This protection is useful as Art.36 permits agreements to be 
submitted to appropriate experts for their comments during the 
approvals process. 
Avoidance of Technology Contracts 
Article 23 of the Decree renders null and void technology contracts which: 
(i) breach Art.3 in that the transferor is not legally capable of transferring 
the technology or where the transferor of industrial property rights 
cannot make good its title to those rights; 
(ii) the objects and contents of the contract are otherwise inconsistent with 
the Decree; 




(iv) the transferor loses any relevant industrial property rights during the 
currency of the contract. 
In the event of voidness Art. 24 provides that the contract may not be 
enforced or completed and each party shall be liable for any damages arising 
from defaults which lead to voidness. In the case of partial invalidity, Art. 
24.2 provides for the severance of invalid portions. 
Amendment and Tennination 
Article 37 permits the amendment or modification of technology contracts. 
In the event of such alteration the Article requires the altered contract to be 
submitted to the approvals authority. Article 825 of the Civil Code obliges 
parties to inform each other about new scientific and technical information 
which may affect the performance of a technology contract and must 
consider the possibility of alteration of the technology contract to take this 
into account. Article 825.3 imposes the expense of any alteration in these 
circumstances upon the transferor. This may be considered a trifle harsh and 
commercially unrealistic, particularly as the transferor is likely to be the 
source of relevant new information. 
Termination of the contract is provided for in Art. 25 upon expiry or 
according to the agreement of the parties. Where the parties agree to 
terminate the contract, they are required to notify the approvals authority 
and to make good any damages which may be caused to third parties. 
Termination may also result from force majeure or from an irremediable 
breach of the contract. 
In the event of termination caused by expiry or force majeure, Art. 25.2 
provides that all provisions concerning the settlement of disputes and claims 
shall continue to be in force. Where, however, the contract is terminated due 
to the breach of one of the parties, Art. 25.3 provides that all damages will 
be borne by the defaulting party, unless otherwise provided in the contract. 
Types of Technology Transfer Contracts 
The Civil Code and its implementing Decree provide specific provisions for 
particular types of technology transfer contracts. 
(i) Industrial property licences 
Where a technology transfer contract involves an industrial property right, 
Art. 821 of the Civil Code prohibits the exclusive transfer of such rights to 
third parties. Where the transfer of an industrial property right involves a 
transferee in liability, the Article provides for indemnification of the 
transferee. Article 12.3 of the Decree limits the duration of a licence of an 
industrial property right to the term for which that right is registered in 
Vietnam. 
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(ii) Trademark licences 
Article 822 of the Civil Code and Article 13 of the Decree permit the 
insertion of quality control provisions in trademark licences. This recognizes 
the requirement in most trademark laws that a trademark owner controls the 
use of that mark so that its use by a licensee can be imputed to an owner, 
thereby avoiding deception as to the origin of goods and services supplied 
under the mark. 
(iii) Technical services and consultancy agreements 
In contracts for the supply of technical consultancy and supplementary 
services, Art. 824 of the Civil Code requires inclusion within technology 
contracts of the qualification of the persons rendering the services and the 
results to be achieved under the contract. In the event that the parties cannot 
agree on a warranty of quality of the services, Art. 824.2 provides that the 
party rendering the services has satisfied the obligations of the contract if 
those services are rendered 'with due care, with proper qualifications and 
within the stipulated time.' 
Article 14 of the Decree provides in effect that the quality of the services 
which are provided under the contract will be measured against the standard 
of competence to which the transferee aspires under the contract to ensure 
product quality and the technical and economic criteria set out in the 
contract. 
Dispute Resolution 
Article 39 of the Decree encourages the resolution of disputes through 
negotiation and then arbitration. In the event that a dispute under the 
contract cannot be settled in this way, Art. 39.3 provides for judicial 
resolution. Where the dispute is between Vietnamese parties, the applicable 
law will be the law of Vietnam. Where a foreign party is involved, Art. 39.4 
permits the parties to make their own choice oflaw. 
Penalties for Breach of the Decree 
One of the final matters to be settled under the Decree is whether to impose 
criminal penalties for breaches of its provisions. Early drafts of the Decree 
provided for a range of fines and pecuniary penalties, which were related to 
the value of the technology contract. The Drafting Committee is currently 
considering the removal of these criminal sanctions, thereby instituting a 





Unlike Vietnam, which is fairly new to the business of technology transfer 
regulation, the Philippines has had a regulatory structure in place since 
1978. Presidential Decree No. 1520 of that year, established a Technology 
Transfer Board which was obliged to scrutinize technology transfer 
transactions to ensure that they complied with a catalogue of mandatory and 
advisory contractual terms, along the lines of the approach which has now 
been adopted in Vietnam. In 1986 the Technology Transfer Board was 
merged with the Philippines Patent Office to create the Bureau of Patents 
Trademarks and Technology Transfer (BPTTT). The regulations governing 
the import of technologies were incorporated into the Rules of Procedures of 
the Technology Transfer Registry (TTR) of the BPTTT. 
As part of a policy of deregulation inaugurated in the Philippines at the 
end of 1992, the Rules of procedure of the TTR were amended on 9 
November 1992, to permit the automatic registration of technology transfer 
arrangements, providing for royalty payments in an amount less than 5 per 
cent of net sales. 
Further liberalization followed with the Republic Act 8293 of 6 June 
1996, which introduces the Intellectual Property Code of the Philippines 
(IPC), which took effect on 1 January 1998. Under the IPC, technology 
transfer arrangements which do not contain any prohibited clauses and 
which complies with certain mandatory provisions, are not required to be 
registered. No cap is placed on royalties and a mechanism to resolve 
disputes arising from technology transfer payments is established. 
Technology Transfer Arrangements 
Under s 4.2 of the !PC, the term 'technology transfer arrangements' refers to 
contracts or arrangements involving the transfer of systematic knowledge 
for the manufacture of a product, the application of a process, or rendering 
of a service, including management contracts; and the transfer, assignment 
or licensing of all forms of intellectual property rights, including licensing of 
computer software, except software developed for a mass market. 
Previously, technology transfer arrangements which were examinable under 
the legislation were confined to industrial property licences between foreign 
and domestic companies. It now includes those entered into between 
domestic companies and includes copyright and integrated circuits. 
Prohibited Clauses in Technology Transfer Arrangements 
Under s.87 of the !PC, the following restrictive clauses are not allowed in 
technology transfer arrangements: 
328 
THE LEGAL REGULATION OF TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER 
(i) Export restrictions 
Clauses which directly or indirectly restrict the export of products 
manufactured by a technology recipient under a technology transfer 
arrangement are not acceptable under the IPC, unless justifiable for the 
protection of the legitimate interests of the parties. This may include 
restrictions obliged to prevent the infringement of another person's 
intellectual property rights; 
(ii) Post-expiry restrictions 
Restrictions on the use of technology supplied after the expiry of 
technology transfer arrangements are not permitted, except where the 
early termination of an agreement is attributable to the technology 
recipient. Similarly the IPC prohibits the continued payment for 
intellectual property rights after their expiration, termination, or 
invalidation; 
(iii) Improvements made by licensee 
The IPC invalidates clauses which require that major improvements 
made by a technology supplier should be supplied free of charge, or 
that they should be patented in the name of the supplier, or required to 
be exclusively assigned to the technology supplier; 
(iv) No-contest clauses 
The IPC prohibits clauses which prevent a technology recipient from 
contesting the validity of licensed patents; 
(v) Exclusive dealing clauses 
Provisions which prohibit a technology recipient from dealing with 
competitors of the technology supplier are invalidated by the IPC. Such 
provisions include prohibitions on obtaining patented technology from 
competitors of the technology supplier and provisions, which tie-in the 
supply of raw materials, components and equipment from the 
technology supplier. Such tie-ins may be permitted where the selling 
price of tied-in items is based on the international market price for 
those items and there are no other cheaper sources of supply and where 
the tie-in requirement is necessary to maintain the quality standards 
prescribed by the technology supplier; 
(vi) Restrictions on research and development 
The IPC prohibits clauses which restrict the activities of a technology 
recipient in absorbing and adapting the transferred technology to local 
conditions; and 
(vii) Exemption from liabilities 
Finally, the IPC prohibits prov1s1ons which exempt the technology 
supplier from liability for non-fulfilment of his responsibilities arising 
under the technology transfer arrangement and/or liability arising from 




Prescribed by the IPC as mandatory provisions to be included in technology 
transfer agreements are: 
(i) the choice of Philippines law in governing interpretation of the 
contract, with the venue for litigation being the courts in the place 
where the technology recipient maintains its principal office; 
(ii) a commitment from the technology supplier to provide continuing 
access to the acquirer of improvements to the technology; 
(iii) in cases of arbitration, the arbitration procedure of the Arbitration Law 
of the Philippines or the internationally accepted rules of arbitration, 
such as those of UNCTRAL or the ICC, shall apply and the venue of 
arbitration shall be the Philippines or a neutral country; and 
(iv) section 88.4 of the IPC provides that Philippine taxes on all payments 
relating to the technology transfer arrangements shall be borne by the 
licensor. 
Remuneration 
The IPC having abandoned the previous policy of regulating the amount of 
royalty which may be imposed, provides an administrative mechanism for 
the resolution of disputes involving royalty rates. Jurisdiction to resolve 
these disputes is conferred on the Documentation and Information 
Technology Transfer Bureau (DITTB). 
Exceptional Cases 
Section 91 of the IPC provides that in exceptional or meritorious cases, 
where substantial benefits will accrue to the economy, exemption from any 
of the above provisions may be allowed by the DITTB after evaluation on a 
case by case basis. Such benefits to the economy may include: increase in 
foreign exchange earnings, employment generation, regional dispersal of 
industries, substitution with and use of local raw materials, high technology 
content of a transaction and registered companies with 'pioneer status' 
granted by the board of Investments. 
Mekong Basin Group 
A central assumption underpinning technology transfer and intellectual 
property laws is that technological development is a precondition for 
economic development and that an intellectual property system is 
indispensable to the acquisition of technology. The perceived significance of 
the role of intellectual property in economic development probably explains 
the establishment of the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) in 
1970 as a specialized agency of the United Nations Organization. The 
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preamble to WIPO's Model Law for Developing Countries on Inventions 
states: 
(a) the importance of new technology for economic development and in 
particular the industrialization of the country; 
(b) the necessity of creating new technology in the country and of adapting 
existing technology to the needs of the country; and 
(c) the necessity of having access to foreign technology (WIPO Model 
Law for Developing Countries on Inventions 1979). 
Similarly WIPO's Licensing Guide for Developing Countries commences 
with the assertion that: 
Industrialization is a major objective of developing countries as a 
means to the attainment of high levels of the well-being of the 
peoples of such countries. The attainment of science and the 
development of a technological base are the essential conditions of 
industrial growth. The development of a technological base in a 
developing country depends on the existence of indigenous 
technological capacities and the acquisition of selected technology 
from abroad .. .. (WIPO Licensing Guide for Developing Countries 
1977). 
This reasoning explains the endeavours of the new members of the Mekong 
Basin group to promulgate intellectual property laws as an early priority. 
Cambodia 
In August 1991, the Cambodian Ministry of Commerce established a Trade 
Mark Registry and an informal procedure for the registration of trade and 
service marks. The period of protection is 10 years, with the opportunity for 
renewals. A mark is vulnerable to cancellation for non-use if it is not used 
during a five-year period. Where infringements occur, a complaint may be 
lodged with the Ministry of Commerce, which may require the Economic 
Police to investigate the complaint. Following this process, civil enforce-
ment may ensue or the complaint may be passed on to the Customs 
authorities for action. 
As part of the upgrading its legal system to facilitate democracy and to 
encourage the development of the economy, the Royal Government of 
Cambodia has issued three draft intellectual property statutes: the Patents 
and Designs Act, the Marks Protection Act, and the Copyright and Related 




From 1986, Laos has been moving towards a free market economy. Decree 
104, issued in 1987, recognizes the need to protect intellectual property 
rights in Laos. Although this decree was not a substantive intellectual 
property statute, Laos government ministries have relied upon the authority 
granted in the decree to permit the registration of industrial property rights. 
A Department of Industrial Property (DIP) was established under Decree 
l 04 and it currently attends to the registration of trade marks. The DIP is 
authorized to call upon other relevant government ministries to assist where 
necessary in the enforcement of trade mark rights. 
Myanmar 
Following the admission of Myanmar into ASEAN, four intellectual 
property statutes have been prepared by the Myanmar Attorney General's 
Office (Finch & Myint, 1997). Until these laws are enacted, there are no IP 
laws in the country. However, some protection can be obtained under the 
Myanmar Registration Act, which provides that documents not required by 
law to be registered, may be registered with the Office of Registration of 
Deeds. Direction 13 of the Registration Act provides that trade marks may 
be registered by means of a declaration of ownership. In practice, 
registrations are renewed every two years and in case of infringements, both 
civil and criminal actions may be brought (Finch & Myint, 1997). In the 
case of other categories of industrial property, the Patents and Designs 
(Emergency Provisions) Act 1946 provides that the India Patents and 
Designs Act of 1911 is still in force in Myanmar.7 
The Copyright Act of Myanmar came into force in 1914. This is an 
adaptation of the UK Copyright Act, 1911. The copyright period for works 
first published in Myanmar is 10 years from the date of first publication. The 
Act envisages the possibility of establishing a copyright registration system, 
but this has never been implemented. 
With the accession of Cambodia, Laos, and Myanmar to the Mekong 
Basin Group, under the tutelage of Thailand, close co-operation in 
intellectual property measures has been established, with a view to the 
harmonization of their intellectual property laws. 
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NOTES 
ASEAN then comprised Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, 
Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam. 
2 Vietnam became a member of ASEAN at the Bangkok Summit 
December 1995. 
3 For a comprehensive discussion of this agreement see M. Blakeney 
Trade Related A:,pects of Intellectual Property Rights: A Concise Guide 
to the TRIPs Agreement 1996. 
4 See Dr Vu Khae Trai, Legislative Framework for Intellectual Property 
Rights in Vietnam Blakeney and Sinden ( eds 1996) Proceedings of the 
National Symposium on the Role of Intellectual Property Rights in the 
International Trade and Business 23. 
5 Ibid, 6. 
6 For the influence of TRIPs on the intellectual property law reform in 
Asia see Blakeney (1996) The Influence of TRIPs on Intellectual 
Property Laws in the Asia Pacific Region EIPR. 
7 Myanmar was officially separated from India in 1937. 
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LAW AND DEVELOPMENT AND THE REGION 

CHAPTER13 
RESOLVING TRADE DISPUTES IN ASIA: 
AN ESSAY ABOUT THE LAWS, INSTITUTIONS, AND 
CULTURES1 
ROBERT E. LUTZ2 
THE MILIEU FOR PUBLIC AND PRIVATE 
DISPUTE-RESOLUTION IN ASIA 
'It is better to enter a tiger's mouth than a court of law,' so an ancient 
Chinese proverb states (Theroux, 1976:124; Maher, 1980:260 note; Koa, 
1991 :439). While it is difficult to generalize, the Asian experience in 
resolving international trade disputes of both private and public nature tends 
to confirm this reputed Asian aversion to adversarial processes where parties 
move from dispute toward resolution of their disputes. The hallmarks of this 
aversion are well known and frequently described: 
1. the overriding concern for harmony so that the goal of resolving a 
dispute is focused on the restoration and maintenance of the relationship 
rather than punishing the wrongdoer; 
2. the concern for face (we often call it 'saving face'); 
3. the general concern for the total context of the human relationship rather 
than the functionality of the relationship (Donahey, 1995:74). 
Logically, persons influenced by such Asian cultural imperatives would 
view dispute resolution in a person-oriented, non-adversarial way. The 
natural inclination of Asians is to lean toward the softer ADRs3 namely, 
negotiation, consultation, mediation, conciliation. By contrast, Westerners 
have a cultural tendency to prefer litigation in the settlement of disputes and, 
to the extent they employ arbitration, tend toward its more adversarial forms 
making it barely distinguishable from litigation (Coombe, 1996:708). 
However, cultural predisposition with respect to dispute-resolution must be 
seen in a larger context of forces both internal and external - operating in 
Asia today. These forces are, and will be, driving the direction and pace of 
legal development of regimes designed to resolve public and private trade 
disputes for the foreseeable future. 
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The first of these cultural forces suggests that despite the cultural 
underpinnings described, the rigidity of cultural preference in Asia is not 
what it used to be. A cultural fusion between Eastern and Western models is 
gradually occurring. This cultural fusion is making Asian traders more 
amenable to adversarial dispute-resolution processes, long the domain of the 
West. As a leading commentator has expressed: 
[T]he traffic on trade, investment, information, aviation, cultural, and 
educational highways is increasing by leaps and bounds. [T]he 
explosion of contacts must eventually lead to a two-way process of 
cultural osmosis (Mahbubani, 1995: 111 ). 
Thus, while the preference for less adversarial dispute resolution methods, 
such as mediation, is certainly still alive, Asians engaged in international 
trade are increasingly willing to accept arbitration, and even litigation, 
depending on the hospitality of the forum. In that same respect, as 
Westerners increase their involvement with international trade in Asia, they 
are more accepting of the less adversarial, traditionally Asian dispute 
resolution techniques (Donahey, 1995:77; Coombe, 1996:708). 
Second, the sweeping developments in communications and trans-
portation are minimizing the importance of global location. Advances in 
communication and technology together with the harmonization of legal 
structures of dispute-resolution have made the site where dispute resolution 
processes occurs less important than it used to be.4 A party can agree to 
arbitrate in almost any Asian country, and expect to be subject to basically 
the same arbitration laws and rules that would govern arbitration in another 
Asian country.5 
Third, the shift towards privatization (and away from socialist and statist 
economies) in Asia, coupled with the decline of developed-country foreign 
aid and, a corresponding replacement with private capital,6 will provide a 
breeding-ground for increased private trade disputes. The prospect of an 
increased number of private party disputes is likely, given the increased 
number of private traders and financiers who are wholly concerned with the 
bottom line. Furthennore, this prospect of an increased number of private 
party disputes is enhanced by the current economic malaise in Asia today.7 
To appreciate how these forces are guiding Asian dispute-resolution 
development, a survey of current Asian dispute-resolution institutions and 
methods follows. This survey will provide a baseline from which to assess 
some of the emerging issues contained in the final section of this essay. 
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NATURE OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN ASIA: THE BASELINE 
Parties and Fora 
Trade disputes can occur between private parties8 between private and 
public entities,9 and between states. Depending upon the relationship of the 
parties, very different institutions and legal procedures for resolving 
disputes apply. Most Asian countries have a legal structure for international 
arbitration and conciliation in-place for private party disputes. 10 Virtually all 
Asian nations have publicly-financed or privately-financed institutions to 
administer the dispute resolution processes. 11 In addition, most Asian 
nations are party to the United Nations Convention on the Recognition and 
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards - the New York Convention -
((1958) 21 UST 2517, 330 UN T S 38), the major multilateral convention 
on the enforcement of arbitral decisions. 
For private disputes, many Asian nations 12 provide an array of alternative 
dispute mechanisms for foreign parties to resolve their disputes with 
nationals of the forum country. In addition, many Asian nations function as 
a neutral (third party) forum to resolve commercial disputes between 
nationals of other countries. 13 In both types of fora, three basic methods of 
alternative dispute resolution are employed: consultation, conciliation/ 
mediation, and arbitration, or a combination of the three. 14 
Consultation between disputing parties appears as the preferred first step 
of dispute-resolution. Following consultation, the parties engage in 
conciliation or mediation. 15 If the parties fail to agree on a settlement during 
this stage, the dispute often proceeds to arbitration. Throughout the dispute 
resolution process, many Asian arbitrators continue to encourage 
conciliation. In fact, many Asian nations allow either a blending of the 
conciliation and arbitration processes or a conjoined procedure (infra 
discussion at III, C). Most Asian countries allow for ad hoe arbitration16 in 
addition to institutional arbitration. Ad hoe arbitration is becoming an 
increasingly popular alternative for parties which find institutional 
arbitration not as expedient nor as inexpensive as in the past (Arkin, 
1990:502; Wolf, 1995:196-8; Karalis, 1992). Litigation, especially in China, 
India, and Japan, is definitely a last resort for private disputes. 
When a dispute involves both private parties and governmental entities 
or state enterprises, there are major limitations that restrict dispute resolution 
through alternative dispute resolution mechanisms. These limitations arise 
from concerns about state sovereignty. One facility which does provide a 
forum for the settlement of private party/government entity disputes is the 
International Center for the Settlement oflnvestment Disputes of the World 
Bank (ICSID). 17 In addition, many Asian countries provide fora for private 
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party/government entity disputes and enforce the awards rendered 
(Nafziger, 1987:642). 
Where disputes arise between states within the Asian region, several 
regional economic organizations are available for dispute resolution, having 
recently developed that capability. On a global scale, the establishment of 
the World Trade Organization (WTO) has provided a forum for the 
resolution of state-to-state trade-related disputes (GA TT, 1994). 
Regional Economic Institutions 
A number of Asian regional organizations provide dispute-settlement 
facilities for member-states and some (but limited) assistance with respect to 
private-investor member-state disputes. 18 The Association of Southeast 
Asian Nations (ASEAN), founded in 1967, currently incorporates nine 
countries: Thailand, the Philippines, Malaysia, Singapore, Brunei, Vietnam, 
Indonesia, Laos, and Myanmar. 19 ASEAN was originally conceived as a 
defensive arrangement for Asian nations to combat communism. Presently, 
A SEAN exists to promote economic co-operation and social interests of this 
region (Stephenson, 1994:439; Koh, 1996:844). 
The ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) (see generally Haas, 1994:809; 
Kenevan, 1993 :224) was created by the original six ASEAN countries with 
the Singapore Declaration of 1992 (1992, 31 ILM 498). Its purpose was to 
dismantle intra-regional trade barriers and achieve a free trading area by 
2007. This framework agreement further prescribed the following with 
respect to dispute-settlement mechanisms: 'Any difference between the 
Member States concerning the interpretation or application of the agreement 
shall, as far as possible, be settled amicably between the parties, and 
whenever necessary, an appropriate body shall be designed for the 
settlement of disputes (ibid).' The process ensures that AFTA disputes, if 
not resolved by the parties, are ultimately resolved by the Economic 
Ministers. AFT A Ministers are able to retain maximum flexibility in dispute 
resolution by shielding disagreements between AFT A members from the 
public, while maintaining discretion to select what issues are addressed and 
what decisions are publicly revealed (Kaplan, 1996: 176). 
The Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC)20 came into being at 
the 1989 ministerial conference in Canberra, Australia, and initially included 
the ASEAN countries, the US, Korea, Japan, Canada, Australia, and New 
Zealand (Kodama, 1995:368). Although APEC was originally intended to 
be an informal consultative forum regarding economic matters, it has since 
taken on a more formal nature (ibid). 21 In 1994, discussion commenced 
regarding the formation of a dispute-settlement mechanism for ASEAN 
member economies (Green, 1995:719; Cardenas and Buranakanits, 1995:67-
9). Since APEC is not a rules-based organization, it lacks the competence to 
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establish a formal binding dispute-settlement mechanism (APEC, 1994; 
Cardenas and Buranakanits, 1995:68). APEC nations felt that trade and 
other types of disputes between APEC economies have negative 
implications for the implementation of agreed co-operative agreements. The 
leaders of APEC nations agreed that, whatever specific arrangements are 
adopted within APEC, they should supplement the World Trade 
Organization's dispute settlement mechanism, which will continue to be the 
primary channel for resolving trade disputes in the region (Kodama, 
1995:381-2). 
At this time, the APEC dispute mediation process is focused by ways in 
which disputes can be solved through dialogue and increased understanding. 
The approach taken is one of practical problem-solving as an effective 
means to reduce, avoid, and resolve disputes in the APEC region (Davidson, 
1997 :24 ). The goal of the APEC dispute mediation process is to find ways 
in which disputes can be addressed at an early stage by both or all of the 
involved economies so that member economies may avoid confrontation 
and dispute escalation, which would entail involving the WTO and other 
formal agreements to resolve disputes between member economies 
(Cardenas and Buranakanits,1995:68). 
International Institutions 
GATT/WTO 
Established in 1995, the World Trade Organization's General Council 
convenes as the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) to deal with disputes 
arising from any agreement contained in the GA TT Uruguay Round (WTO, 
1999). The Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) of the World Trade 
Organization has sole authority to establish panels, adopt panel and 
appellate reports, maintain surveillance of implementation and authorize 
retaliatory measures, if required in cases of non-implementation (ibid; 
Aldonas, 1995:76; Mota, 1999:75). 
The first stage of settling disputes under the World Trade Organization's 
Dispute Settlement Body requires bilateral consultation between the 
governments (parties) concerned (WTO Annex 2 Art. 4). If the parties fail to 
come to an agreement, the establishment of a panel to hear the case may be 
requested (WTO, 1999). The Panel's report is adopted by the Dispute 
Settlement Body unless one party notifies the DSB that it intends to appeal a 
decision, or a consensus among the WTO members forms against adoption 
of the report (WTO, Annex 2 Art. 16). Either party may appeal to the DSB's 
Appellate Body (ibid Art. 17; WTO, 1999). 
The Dispute allows a 'reasonable period of time' (set by the DSB) to 
delay implementation of the recommendation (WTO Annex 2 Art. 22; 
WTO, 1999). Ultimately, some form of compensation is prescribed and 
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paid, or the complainant may request to suspend concessions or obligations 
to the other party (WTO Annex 2 Art. 22). In the about five years of 
operation of the WTO's Dispute Settlement Body, Asian countries have 
actively employed the dispute settlement process of the WTO to complain 
about trade infractions; they have also been the respondent in numerous 
cases. However, on only a few occasions has an Asian country filed a 
complaint against another Asian country. 
The effects of the regional co-operatives - such as ASEAN, AFTA and 
APEC - on the WTO in settling Asian trade disputes are not yet known as 
these organizations have only recently implemented dispute resolution 
mechanisms for member countries. The existence of regional economic 
organizations with dispute resolution mechanisms for intra-member disputes 
will likely shift away member state reliance from the World Trade 
Organization's Dispute Settlement Body towards these regional co-
operatives. 
Both ASEAN and APEC have created their settlement procedures based 
on the WTO dispute resolution process, and require that the first step 
between disputing parties be consultations; the same first step is also 
required by the WTO (Annex 2 Art. 4). Although the initial steps to be 
followed are the same, the regional co-operatives of ASEAN and APEC are 
set up so that member parties can avoid resorting to the more public and 
legalistic procedures that the DSB utilizes. With this in mind, Asian nations 
which are members of a regional co-operatives and are involved in a dispute 
have the option of meeting behind closed doors. Since these regional co-
operatives incorporate regional cultural values, regional co-operative 
decisions may be rooted in Asian cultural values of harmony and justice, 
rather than what may be legally correct. This type of regional co-operative 
dispute resolution is, arguably, better suited to the Asian concept of dispute 
resolution. 
WIPO 
The World Arbitration and Mediation Center was established in 1994 as part 
of the International Bureau of the World Intellectual Property Organization 
(WIPO). WIPO offers arbitration and mediation services for the resolution 
of commercial disputes between private parties involving intellectual 
property (WIPO, 1999). The Center offers mediation, arbitration, and 
expedited arbitration and mediation (ibid). Parties to a dispute may select 
their own arbitrators, or may leave the choice to the Center. The Center 
maintains an index of mediators and arbitrators, including a comprehensive 
list of their qualifications and areas of expertise. Currently, the list is 
comprised of approximately 650 persons from 61 countries (ibid). 
Law of the Sea 
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The UN Convention of the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) (1982, 21 ILM 1261) 
which now has about 120 states parties (with the notable exception of the 
United States), requires that Parties to the Convention settle any dispute 
between them concerning the interpretation or application of the Convention 
by peaceful means in accordance with article 2(3) of the UN Charter and by 
the means indicated in UN Charter article 33(1).22 Pursuant to UNCLOS 
article 286, when no settlement is reached, the dispute must be submitted to 
a court or tribunal having jurisdiction. Those courts with jurisdiction in such 
matters are: The International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, including the 
Seabed Disputes Chamber (recently established in Hamburg, Germany); the 
International Court of Justice; an arbitral tribunal constituted in accordance 
with arbitration rules in UNCLOS Annex VII; and a special arbitral tribunal 
constituted in accordance with Annex VII (Special Arbitration Rules) of the 
Convention (United Nations, 1999B). 
Some important Asian territorial disputes are brewing and may be 
submitted to this process: the Spratly Islands (claimed by China and four 
ASEAN countries, Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Vietnam). Each 
claim part of the islands, which are believed to be rich with minerals and 
which straddle strategic sea lanes in the South China Sea. Other potential or 
existing disputes include: a fishing zones disagreement between Japan and 
the Republic of Korea related to ownership of small islands in the seas 
between those countries; and China's continued oil exploration in the South 
China Sea that is protested by Vietnam (United Nations, 1999A). 
ICSID 
The International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) 
was created by the 1965 Washington Convention on the Settlement of 
Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States to 
provide accessible facilities for the conciliation and arbitration of 
international investment disputes (World Bank, 1999). ICSID provides 
institutional facilities and performs related administrative functions for 
resolving investment disputes between contracting states and non-state 
entities. Under Article 25 of the Convention, ICSID's jurisdiction extends to 
'any legal dispute arising directly out of an investment between a 
contracting state ( or any constituent subdivision or agency of a Contracting 
State designated to the Centre by that State) and a national of another 
Contracting State, which the parties to the dispute consent in writing to 
submit to the Centre.' (1965, 4 ILM 532, 536) 
The Centre maintains a roster of qualified potential panelists who may at 
the request of the parties conduct conciliation or arbitration pursuant to 
ICSID's rules. Appeals are not allowed, but either party may apply to the 
ICSID Secretary-General for interpretation, revision, or annulment of the 
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award. Enforcement, however, depends upon the enforcement regime of the 
country in which enforcement is being sought (ibid; also Koa, 1991 :464 
note). 
TRENDS AND ISSUES 
In Asia, arbitration awards are more predictably obtained and more readily 
enforced than court judgments (Burton, 1995:637). Several trends have 
emerged with regard to alternative dispute resolution in Asia revealing that 
international alternative dispute-resolution of trade disputes has come of age 
in Asia. 
Emergence of the Chinese ADR Regime 
As of 1 January 1989 the Chinese government officially adopted new 
arbitration rules under the auspices of the China International Economic and 
Trade Arbitration Commission.23 The rules, known as '1989 CIETAC Rules' 
were based upon the UNCITRAL Model Law (1985). A number of 
fundamental changes were brought on by the CIETAC adoption. The 
jurisdiction of CIETAC was significantly expanded from the earlier Chinese 
arbitration framework found in the Foreign Trade Arbitration Commission 
of China (FTAC Rules) (Fishburne and Chuncheng, 1997:306). In addition, 
the CIET AC rules allowed for foreign nationals to be appointed to 
CIETAC's Panel of Arbitrators (ibid). These changes have brought Chinese 
law in line with international standards (Brown and Rogers, 1997:339). 
Statistically, according to reports available, Chinese nationals and foreigners 
are equally successful when using CIETAC (Volz and Haydock, 1996:902). 
The enactment in 1995 of the Arbitration Law of the People's Republic 
of China (August 31, 1994) significantly altered the structure of China's 
alternative dispute resolution process. Under the new Chinese arbitration 
law, the Chinese government established two separate arbitration systems. 
Depending upon the origins of the parties and the nature of the contract, 
disputes can be held in a forum dedicated to domestic economic disputes or 
one dedicated to foreign-related economic disputes (Cheng, 1996:291). This 
new Arbitration Law establishes independent, centrally governed arbitration 
commissions in provincial capitals and large cities which deal with domestic 
disputes (Brown and Rogers 1997:338; Fishburne and Chuncheng, 
1997:306; Cheng, 1996:291). The establishment of provincial arbitration 
commissions does not have any direct effect on international arbitration 
(Cheng, 1996:291). 
A major concern for foreign participants involved in alternative dispute 
resolution proceedings abroad is the independence of an arbitration 
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institution from its host government. In China, the work of arbitration 
commissions is overseen by the Chinese Arbitration Association (CAA), a 
separate legal entity. As a non-governmental organization, the CAA has 
jurisdiction over provincial arbitration commissions (Fishburne and Chun-
cheng, 1997:306). The Arbitration Law provides that 'an arbitration 
commission shall be independent of administrative bodies and shall have no 
subordinate relationships with [ administrative authorities] (ibid Art. 14 ). ' 
Although the Chinese Arbitration Association is not yet financially 
independent of the Chinese government, it acts as a self-regulatory 
organization overseeing provincial commissions (ibid Art. 15; Burton, 
1995 :63 7). The development of an independent self-regulatory committee to 
oversee commission work and the adoption of new arbitral rules by the 
Chinese government have served to legitimize the arbitration process as 




One potential hazard of international arbitration is the difficulty in judicial 
enforcement. The mechanism of enforcing arbitral awards in Asia is 
accomplished through the courts as in most countries, not through arbitral 
institutions. Although an arbitral award has the same effect as a court 
judgment, in most Asian nations, a party seeking enforcement of an award 
must either file an application with the appropriate court (usually in the 
defaulting party's home forum), or ask the court to stay litigation in violation 
of the arbitration agreement or award. What follows is a brief overview of 
enforcement of arbitral decision in Asian nations. 
The majority of Asian nations have now acceded to the Convention on 
the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (New York 
Convention) of 1958. Signatories to the New York Convention have agreed 
to recognize arbitral awards rendered by another contracting state and 
exclude any judicial review of the merits of an arbitral award when 
enforcement is sought (Craig, 1996:3). Most states have also adopted the 
reciprocity and commercial reservations of the New York Convention.24 
Under the reciprocity reservation in Hong Kong, Japan, and Malaysia, 
enforcement of awards in non-Convention countries will depend on local 
rules of comity and bilateral treaties. 
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China 
Once CIETAC has rendered its decision, CIETAC, itself, has no authority to 
enforce an award against a party (Volz and Haydock, 1996:903; Ge and 
Alexander, 1995:563-5). Due to local protectionism in China, it is often 
difficult for a foreigner to enforce an arbitration award against a Chinese 
national (Volz and Haydock, 1996:904). 'To minimize enforcement 
dilemmas, the Supreme People's Court in China has directed the local courts 
not to interfere with such awards, requiring that any review be done in 
Beijing (ibid). Judicial enforcement of CIETAC arbitral decisions is subject 
to procedural rules contained in the People's Republic of China Procedure 
Code, Article 195 (Volz and Haydock, 1996:903; Liu and Alexander, 
1995:563-5). The Arbitration Law of the People's Republic of China (Art. 
15) lists six conditions where Chinese courts may refuse to enforce 
arbitration decisions (Wang, 1996:5): 
(1) There is no arbitration agreement; 
(2) The arbitration is beyond the scope of the agreement or the arbitration 
institute has no jurisdiction; 
(3) The composition of the arbitral body or the arbitration procedures violate 
statutory procedure; 
( 4) Evidence is concealed resulting in an unfair hearing; 
(5) An arbitrator seeks or accepts a bride, misbehaves, or bends the law; 
(6) The award violates public policy (Volz and Haydock, 1996:904-5). 
Japan 
With the United States and Japan as major trade partners, arbitration is 
frequently selected by corporations when transnational disputes develop. 
Consistent with this policy to promote trade, arbitral decisions are relatively 
easy to enforce in Japan (Volz and Haydock, 1996:907). 'The Japanese 
Code of Civil Procedure, Article 800, provides that an arbitration award has 
the same effect as a judgement and is conclusive between the parties.'(ibid) 
Indonesia 
Until 1990, legal mechanisms were not in place to comply with the New 
York convention (ibid). To enforce an award in Indonesia, the award must 
be made by a country-party to the New York Convention and the dispute 
must be considered commercial under Indonesian law (Volz and Haydock, 
1996:908). Further, a party which seeks to enforce an arbitration decision in 
Indonesia must obtain a writ of execution from the Indonesia Supreme 
Court. It is unclear whether foreign arbitral decisions are enforced, despite 
Indonesia's ratification of the New York Convention (ibid). 
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Singapore 
Singapore has passed the International Arbitration Act, which is based upon 
UNCITRAL Model Law (Volz and Haydock, 1996:909). Singapore is also 
party to the New York Convention. 
Thailand 
Thailand has not ratified the New York Convention, but it generally follows 
the terms of the Convention (Volz and Haydock, 1996:910). Under the 
Arbitration Act of 1987, the Thai courts can deny the enforcement of a 
foreign arbitral award '[i]n case[s] where the court is of the opinion that an 
award is contrary to the law governing the dispute, is the result of any 
unjustified act or procedure, or is outside the scope of the binding arbitration 
agreement or relief sought by the party.'(ibid) As a result of the broad 
number of defenses available to vacate decisions under the Arbitration Act, 
many disputes eventually must be tried under the Thai legal system (Raissi, 
1992: 105). 
Foreign Judgment Enforcement 
Many Asian countries provide, in their laws, for judicial enforcement of 
foreign judgments on the basis of international agreement or reciprocity. As 
usual in Western countries, jurisdiction over the defendant is necessary and 
often problematic, and the defense of contrariness of the foreign judgment to 
the forum's public policy are frequent issues. Given such impediments, most 
trade disputants tend to prefer trying to enforce arbitral awards via the more 
developed and internationally accepted N.Y. Convention route (see 
generally Pryles, 1997). 
Combining Conciliation and Arbitration 
As previously discussed, Asian cultures tend to favour conciliation where 
the preference in Western nations is to favour arbitration. As the two 
cultures have interacted, a combination of the two procedures has developed 
merging the best of both worlds (Sagartz, 1998:700(note)). Utilizing this 
hybrid form of dispute resolution combining consultation and arbitration has 
proven to be attractive to parties of many cultures (ibid). 'Asian parties to 
international contracts have learned to accept the possibility of arbitration 
when all negotiations and conciliations efforts have failed and the parties are 
no longer "friends." Meanwhile, Western parties can hedge their bets on 
conciliation with arbitration as an option' (Burton, 1995 :63 7; Sagartz, 
1998:700). 
There are two primary ways to proceed with the hybrid form of 
consultation and arbitration. First, the blended method where the dispute 
resolution process shifts between consultation to arbitration and back again 
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without defined boundaries (Sagartz, 1998:701). Second, the conjoined 
method may be utilized as a hybrid method of alternative dispute resolution. 
'With a conjoined method, a conciliation may be arranged as an initial stage 
to occur within a fixed time. When that time period expires, conciliators 
would be required to acknowledge the failure of their efforts. This event 
would then trigger the right of the parties to embark upon arbitration or li-
tigation' (Lecuyer-Thieffry and Thieffry, 1990:577; also Sagartz, 1998:700). 
Whatever the formula, the most practical advantage of combining 
conciliation and arbitration is that arbitration can impose a final and binding 
resolution, while conciliation helps to preserve the business relationship. 
Thus this concept has been most widely accepted by dispute resolution 
centers in Asia and is gaining support from Westerners doing business in the 
Pacific Rim (Donahey, 1995:74-8). 
Foreign Lawyer Representation before Arbitration Tribunals 
A distinctive trend in Asian international commercial arbitration is allowing 
and encouraging foreign arbitrators and foreign counsel to participate in 
arbitral proceedings. Australia, China (in 1995), Hong Kong, Japan (in 
1996), Malaysia, and Singapore (in 1995) now permit foreign lawyers to 
appear as legal counsel in arbitrations or act as arbitrators in their respective 
institutions.25 The number and percentage of foreign arbitrators participating 
in Asian dispute resolution continues to increase (Stevens, 1997). 
Ethics Concerns Regarding Arbitrators and Representatives 
A major concern for international parties concerning foreign arbitration is 
that of arbitrator impartiality (Carter, 1988:141). Most alternative dispute 
resolution processes require disclosure to combat impartiality concerns. For 
example, Rule 7.3 of the CPR Rules for Non-administered Arbitration of 
International Disputes requires nominees to disclose 'circumstances that 
might cause doubt regarding the arbitrator's independence or impartiality. 
Such circumstances include bias, interest in the result of the arbitration, and 
past or present relations with a party or counsel' (UNICRAL, 1992:Rule 7.3; 
also Silver, 1995:37). Similarly, The International Bar Association Rules of 
Ethics for International Arbitrators (1992: Rule 4) compels disclosure of 
past relationships between the arbitrator and any party which is more than 
trivial (Silver, 1995 :37). 
New Rules and Laws 
There is a distinctive trend for most Asian nations to revise its arbitration 
laws and institutional rules to conform to the international standards of the 
UNCITRAL Model Law and the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules. This trend 
is toward harmonization and a convergence of arbitration laws. For example, 
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India, Korea, and Singapore have recently adopted, in large part, the Model 
Law and Arbitration Rules, as many other Asian countries did earlier. The 
Model Law, was designed to assist States in reforming and modernizing 
their laws on arbitral procedure. The Model Law takes into particular 
features and needs of international commercial arbitration, concentrating 
specifically on the powers of the arbitrators, the conduct of the arbitrators 
and the scope of judicial supervision (Kwatra 1996:86; Gerardi, 1995:686). 
AN EMERGING INTERNATIONAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION CULTURE 
Despite the recent Asian economic down-cycle, the incredible amount of 
economic activity in Asia - linking its trade and investment with the 
Americas and Europe - has spurred the development of transnational and 
regional institutions to facilitate such activity. Closely related has been the 
growth of legal infrastructure in the form of laws and institutions to provide 
for the effective and fair resolution of disputes between trade and investment 
participants. 
This has led inevitably to a shift away from the traditional, stereotypical 
role of dispute-resolution in Asia, often characterized as 'non-adversarial.' 
While cultural typologies are almost always risky, it is safe to say that the 
stereotype that Asians abhor adversarial processes and strongly favour 
conciliatory approaches is gradually eroding with the rise of foreign trade 
and investment in this region. It may be too much to suggest that Asian 
traders have embraced the more adversarial approaches of the West, but the 
old reluctance to participate in these processes is clearly an attitude of the 
past. The open acceptance of arbitration institutions to conduct international 
arbitrations, the speedy development of legal and institutional frameworks to 
implement the resolution process, and the growth in willingness to resort to 
the use of such facilities to settle disputes evidences a cultural tum away 
from the 'softer' co-operative resolution approaches formerly associated 
with Asian countries and commercial entities. 
Another sign of a changing Asian legal culture is the gradual move 
toward uniformity and harmonization of the legal framework for 
international dispute resolution. The UNCITRAL Arbitration Law and the 
New York Convention are legal models being adopted all over the Asian 
region. Acceptance and use of the many other 'public' and 'quasi-public' 
forms of dispute-resolution by most countries in the region reflect a 
worldwide trend toward building into trade institutions various dispute-
resolution capabilities. And yet a cautionary note about this development 
needs to be advanced: despite the surface-level uniformity, substantial 
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resistance to the enforcement of foreign-made judgments and arbitral awards 
still lies at the core of many national legal systems in Asia. 
Finally, the emergence of a capability to resolve disputes of a public, 
quasi-public, and private nature in Asia raises fundamental questions about 
whether such a legal regime will succeed. A commitment of governments 
and private participants to making the system independent and fair is 
necessary. Much like the commercial arbitration process has been 
challenged in the US for not providing basic due process, (Reuben, 1998:31) 
processes for resolving international trade and investment disputes must 
meet the criteria of being fair and transparent. Similarly, appropriate 
enforcement of foreign judgments and arbitration awards needs to be 
possible in a system that purports to provide a viable trading regime 
governed by the rule of law. 
There is much reason to applaud the developments in Asia, however. A 
transnational legal trading culture is being constructed, and, eventually, a 
rule of law will prevail to offer all international traders and investors a fair 
and efficient way of resolving their differences. 
A Mexican proverb expresses it best: 'The joy of disputes is in making 
peace.' As long as 'making peace' remains a goal of our international 
trading system, the rule of law - in a transnational sense - will prevail for 
the benefit of all those involved in the Asian trading process. 
NOTES 
l This essay is drawn from the remarks of the author to the Symposium 
on Trade with Asia: Legal Challenges for the Next Century, presented 
on 20 September 1997, at the University of California at Berkeley 
School of Law (Boalt Hall), and his participation in Leiden in the 
International Institute for Asian Studies' Conference on 'Law and 
Development in East and Southeast Asia,' on 30 January 1998, in 
Leiden, the Netherlands. 
2 Paul E. Treusch, Professor of Law, Southwestern University School of 
Law. The author is grateful for the outstanding research work of Tanya 
Garza (Southwestern Class of 1998), Pak Kouch (Southwestern Class of 
1999), and Jason Gundel (Southwestern Class of 2000). He is indebted 
to Southwestern for its financial support via Southwestern's Summer 
Research Program. 
3 ADR is an abbreviation often used to refer to 'alternative dispute 
resolution' processes, which include, but are not limited to, negotiation, 
mediation, conciliation and arbitration. 
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4 See generally, Knoke (1997), who suggests that with the revolutions in 
communication and transportation technologies have created a kind of 
'placeless' society. 
5 Location, however, is still important with respect to a number of 
aspects. For example, the experience and qualifications of arbitrators, 
their legal training, the legal culture of the country and how it influences 
judicial processes that might be involved. 
6 Richer countries, feeling strapped for cash themselves, have cut back 
their foreign aid. At the same time, however, many of the impoverished 
nations have abandoned socialism and embraced capitalism. As a result, 
private capital has become the economic mainstay in many poorer 
countries (Pine, 1997; Wang, 1999: 131 ). 
7 See Holley ( 1997) and Wysocki (1997) who states: 'In Southeast Asia, 
this year's currency crises will slow economic growth to an annual rate 
of 4 per cent or less from 8 per cent or more. The aftermath of that 
abrupt slowdown will be bankrupt companies, bad loans and falling 
consumer spending.' 
8 'Private Parties' are defined as non-governmental, commercial entities. 
9 'Public Parties' are defined as governmental entities or state enterprises. 
l O Meaning there is a national law that specifies the procedure to be 
followed for arbitration and concilliation/mediation. 
11 Most Asian arbitration institutions are operated as private or quasi-
public institutions of the judicial process. However, these are often 
partially financed by the Chamber of Commerce or other semi-publicly 
funded agency. 
12 The Asian nations studied include Australia, Cambodia, China, Hong 
Kong (an autonomous administrative unit of China), India, Indonesia, 
South Korea, Japan, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and 
Vietnam. 
13 While Hong Kong, Singapore, and Kuala Lumpur are the leading sites 
for neutral arbitration, the most popular alternative non-Asian venue is 
the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce in Sweden. The Stockholm 
Chamber of Commerce is especially favoured by the Chinese. 
14 The Asian countries studied utilizing the dispute resolution mechanisms 
of consultation, conciliation/mediation, and arbitration - both institu-
tional and ad hoe - include: Australia, Cambodia, China, Hong Kong, 
India, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, 
Thailand, and Vietnam. 
15 The terms, 'conciliation' and 'mediation,' are generally used inter-
changeably in the international context. 
16 Ad hoe arbitration refers to arbitration that is administered by the parties 
themselves (sometimes called, 'non-administered'), pursuant to the rules 
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established by the parties. 'Institutional arbitration', on the other hand, 
refers to arbitration that is administered by an organization which is in 
the business of arbitration administration. 
17 Approximately 130 countries have satisfied the Convention on the 
Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of other 
States (the 'Washington Convention') (1965) 17 UST 1270, UN T S 
159 which created ICSID. See infra discussion of ICSID at II.C.4. Also 
<http://www.worldbank.org/icsid> 
18 For example, a 'Protocol on Dispute Settlement Mechanism' amended 
in December 1995 and finalized in 1996, sets out a procedure of 
consultations, good offices, conciliation, or mediation which is followed 
by the establishment of a panel, and contains provisions for a report, 
appeal and compensation/suspension of concessions - quite similar to 
the WTO Dispute-Settlement Body's procedures. An ASEAN 
Framework Agreement on Intellectual Property Cooperation was signed 
specifying a consultation process for resolving intellectual property 
disputes among member states in 1995. In November 1996, ASEAN 
ministers approved a Dispute Settlement Mechanism to cover all 
economic agreements in ASEAN. 
19 Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand formed the predecessor of 
ASEAN, the Association of South-East Asia, in 1961. ASEAN was 
formed in 1967, when three founding members were joined by 
Indonesia and Singapore. In I 984, Brunei was added, and Vietnam, 
Laos, and Myanmar joined in the 1990s. Cambodia has observer status 
as of 1998 (Stephenson, 1994:439). 
20 The eighteen members of APEC are: Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, 
Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, China, Republic of Korea, Malaysia, 
Mexico, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Republic of the Philippines, 
Singapore, Taiwan, Thailand, and the United States. The 'three Chinas' 
(China, Hong Kong, Taiwan)joined in 1991. 
21 In 1992, a secretariat was established in Singapore, marking the first 
major step towards becoming a fully-fledged regional trade institution. 
22 See Settlement of Disputes, Oceans and Law of the Sea. (visited on 3 
Sept. 1999) <http:www.un.org/Depts/los/los_disp.htm#htmSD>. Article 
2 (3) of the UN Charter status: 'All Members shall settle their 
international dispute by peaceful means in such a manner that 
international peace and security and justice, are not endangered.' UN 
Charter Art. 33 (1) states: 'The parties to any dispute ... shall ... seek a 
solution by negotiation, inquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, 
judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other 
peaceful means of their own choice.' 
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23 China's Foreign Trade Arbitration Commission (FETAC), which later 
became the Chinese International Economic Trade Arbitration Center 
(CIET AC), was established in 1954 by the government. In September 
1997, China's New Arbitration Law made CIETAC and other arbitration 
institutions in China independent from administrative authorities. 
24 N.Y. Convention, Art. I. 3: ' ... [A]ny State may, on the basis of 
reciprocity declare that it will apply the Convention to the recognition 
and enforcement of awards made only in the territory of another 
Contracting State. It may also declare that it will apply the Convention 
only to differences arising out of legal relationships, whether contractual 
or not, which are considered as commercial under the national law of 
the State making such declarations' (Redfern and Hunter, 1986: 344-5). 
25 Singapore has a history of inhospitality toward foreign lawyers. The 
High Court prohibited foreign lawyers from arbitration in 1988. 
Legislation which would have permitted foreign counsel to participate in 
arbitration when foreign law was applicable was tabled by the Law 
Minister in 1991, but finally accepted in 1995. 
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CHAPTER14 
ASIAN ECONOMIC CRISIS AND LEGAL INSTITUTIONS: 
A TALE OF Two CITIES. 
ROMAN TOMASIC 
The Asian and world financial crisis of the late 1990s has shown the limits 
of governments as the sole or even primary contributors to policy debates 
regarding the development of commercial law and economic development. 
Non-governmental scholarly and professional groups, such as the Asia 
Pacific Economic Law Forum (APELF), have an important contribution to 
make, especially in the current policy vacuum. The Asian financial crisis 
presents opportunities for further collaborative endeavour. These 
possibilities are beginning to be recognized in governmental bodies such as 
APEC and the Asian Development Bank. 
This theme will be explored here. This area could also serve as the focus 
for further comparative research and analysis by socio-legal scholars 
interested in economic phenomena such as the process of economic law 
reform in Asia and its relationship to economic crisis and economic 
development. There is a major opportunity for 'retooling' legal institutions 
and bodies of commercial law across the Asian region. The enhancement of 
the commitment to the rule of law and the provision of access to justice are 
important goals which are relevant to all countries in the region, even those 
which already express a commitment to such values. This chapter will also 
argue that there is a need to keep an eye on broader issues when devising 
research questions in this field. 
Recent attacks on corruption and crony capitalism have shown the need 
for a further economic law reform effort. It should also be noted that, as 
many in the region have also noted, there are also problems in other parts of 
the world, such as with US hedge funds (as many in the Asia-Pacific region 
such as Malaysia's Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad, the Governor of the 
Reserve Bank of Australia, Ian Macfarlane (Henderson, 1998:1) and the 
head of the HK Monetary Authority have noted). This chapter seeks to 
approach the task of analysis through a number of Asian socio-legal stories 
(and their storytellers) as they may tell us much about the issues facing the 
region and which remain to be fully explored by socio-legal researchers 
interested in economic law issues. 
ASIAN ECONOMIC CRISIS AND LEGAL INSTITUTIONS 
Firstly, J would suggest that our research can achieve much by focusing 
upon some of the big issues or the big picture, rather than the microscopic 
focus which has dominated so many of our concerns as scholars and 
researchers. We have only had relatively slight success in adopting such an 
approach, although many socio-legal and economic disciplines clearly lend 
themselves to such a broader focus. This is not to suggest that we should 
avoid detailed research, but that we should be looking at some of the bigger 
issues and themes which abound. The 'stories' that will shortly be discussed 
in this chapter are good illustrations of this kind of broad ranging approach. 
All too often we have been content to look at narrow issues or themes 
without seeking to challenge prevailing orthodoxies or to take on board 
major themes. 
Events during the late 1990s have shown us how fragile the economic 
order is and how easy it has been to delude ourselves by uncritically 
accepting prevailing myths and ideologies about such matters as Asian 
values, the so-called Asian century, Asian tigers, and other such comforting 
illusions or stereotypes. Scholars and researchers interested in legal themes 
have an obligation to be more critical of concepts such as these and to be 
less timid in fonnulating research objectives and in devising research 
questions. 
Two HIGH-PROFILE STORYTELLERS AND THEIR EPIC TALES 
We can begin by looking at two recent efforts by two very well known 
public figures who have contributed to our understanding of some large 
questions affecting Asia today; one may be called the Hong Kong Story 
while the other is called the Singapore Story. Hong Kong and Singapore are 
frequently seen as rivals. These 'stories' have been written respectively by 
former British Hong Kong Governor Chris Patten (1998) and the former 
Singapore Prime Minister (Harry) Lee Kuan Yew (1998). Each book in 
different ways tells a story of law and political development, although their 
authors have each reached different conclusions in regard to the 
distinctiveness of Asian values.' 
Patten's book (1998:20) could have been entitled the 'Hong Kong 
Story'; he even uses this phrase at various points.2 In contrast, Lee's story is 
a highly personalized and detailed account of key political episodes which 
arose in the 25 years prior to Singapore's independence in 1965. The reader 
has to search carefully for generalizations in Lee's story, whilst in Patten's 
they are to be found on almost every page. However, Patten is more 
comfortable in seeking to address larger questions than Lee, as is most 
apparent from a phrase in the subtitle of his book, East and West, namely, 
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'On Power, Freedom and the Future.' Patten (1998:85) also observes that 
his Hong Kong experience 'raised more profound questions about politics 
and economics - questions that went well beyond the story of Hong Kong.' 
That Lee has his eyes on a similarly broad goal is immediately suggested 
when one opens his book to find 28 extraordinary admiring statements from 
former Presidents and Prime Ministers (of the US (2), the UK (4), Germany 
(2), France, Thailand, Japan, New Zealand, (2) and Australia (3)), as well as 
a variety of statements from other senior Ministers and Secretaries of State 
(like Henry Kissinger, George Schultz, and James Baker). These testimo-
nials seem to be directed to entrenching Lee in our minds as a great thinker 
and as someone who speaks for Asia.3 One way of looking at these 
statements is to see them merely as extravagant efforts at self-promotion, 
but that is probably unfair. In any event, Lee's book emphasizes the 
extremely pragmatic nature of his politics which have shifted with the needs 
of the times, from an alliance with communists and Malays to successful 
efforts to oust communists and exit from Malaysia. 
These two 1998 books and their authors, Chris Patten's East and West 
and Lee Kuan Yew's The Singapore Story, have been tremendously 
successful in their different ways. It is therefore legitimate to ask whether 
scholarly efforts have any hope of matching the influence and scope of 
these publishing endeavours or whether there is something to learn from 
their success. It is also legitimate to ask if statements of the kind made here 
by Lee and Patten can be supported through research efforts. These 
questions will be pursued later in this chapter. In the meantime something 
can be said about these two books, to give those who have not read them 
closely a flavour of their arguments. 
There are many similarities and differences of view in these two books, 
although each is compelling reading and each takes on big themes. Patten's 
340 page book is in many respects more complete than Lee's 664 page 
book; and the latter's book is but the first of a two volume memoir by its 
author. However, the detailed nature of Lee's analysis tells us a great deal 
about the nature of Lee as a politician and of the political, ethnic, and 
cultural forces which have been at work in Singapore during a critical 
period in the history of this city state. Patten does not look as closely at 
Hong Kong's own internal politics, except in so far as this relates to the lead 
up to the 1997 handover of sovereignty over Hong Kong to China. Whilst 
Patten seeks to provide a comprehensive treatment of a number of themes, 
as well as telling a story in ten chapters, the 43 short chapters in Lee's book 
are more constrained by their factual context of dealing with Lee's version 
of historical episodes and battles for ascendancy or control in Singapore and 
Malaysia. 
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Baroness Thatcher is quoted (in the introductory pages of Lee's book) as 
saying of the analyses in Lee's speeches while he was in office that '[h]e 
was never wrong.' Now, Chris Patten in his book tells us that he sometimes 
disagreed with Mrs Thatcher (Patten supra, pp. 61-2, 316-17). He certainly 
takes a different view of the supposed uniqueness of social values from 
those espoused by Mr Lee in his concern for Asian values, such as when 
Patten says that '[v]alues are universal' (ibid:4) and he goes on to point to 
the 'absurdity of arguing that there is a fundamental difference between the 
personal standards and moral principles of Asians on the one hand and 
Europeans and Americans on the other' (ibid:61). Patten enjoys 
emphasizing, for example, that loss of face is not only something which 
Chinese politicians worry about, this is also something which Western 
politicians are also concerned about.4 Patten also notes that Lee Kuan Yew: 
. . . thought I was wrong - wrong about Hong Kong, about China, 
about freedom and democracy in Asia (perhaps everywhere), and 
about their relationship to economic success and human decency and 
satisfaction. I think that what I did in Hong Kong and what I said 
there and elsewhere were regarded by Mr Lee as an almost personal 
affront, an attack on the very foundations of his philosophy of 
government . .. Hong Kong' s vitality was a sign that social 
engineering and an iron fist were not essential to success in a city of 
Chinese migrants (ibid: 14 7). 
It is not appropriate to deal here with all of the wide range of issues raised 
by each of these two authors in their richly diverse discussions. Two or 
three issues raised by them would suffice for present purposes. Those that 
stand out are the importance of the rule of law, the significance of Asian 
values and the effects of globalization on Asian and other economies. Mr 
Patten is more direct and expansive in dealing with these issues than Mr 
Lee. 
The Rule of Law 
Firstly, both Lee and Patten devote considerable attention to the importance 
of the rule of law, although each writer sees the application of this ideal in 
very different terms. While Patten is a defender of the rule of law ideal, Lee 
is a practitioner of the rule by law philosophy. One commentator notes that 
Lee's memoirs 'provide a glance at his early tactics that foretell of 
behaviour such as the deft use of law to obtain political advantage: rule by 
law rather than rule of law' (Lingle, 1989:23). At the outset, Lee tells us that 
when Singapore came into being in 1965, it was 'founded upon the 
principles of liberty and justice' (Lee supra, p. 13) although it is never really 
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quite clear from his later discussion what this statement of principles 
actually means. 
For example, Lee is far from enthusiastic about the jury system. 
Surprisingly, for an experienced lawyer, Lee reveals that in his first trial, in 
which he successfully defended a number of Muslims accused of the murder 
of an English serviceman (named Ryan), he considered that justice had been 
thwarted as he 'had no doubt that ... [his] ... four clients did kill Ryan.' Lee 
had achieved this acquittal result by casting many doubts in the minds of the 
jury about the prosecution case. Lee adds that he 'had no faith in a system 
that allowed the superstition, ignorance, biases, prejudices, and fears of 
seven jurymen to determine guilt or innocence ... I had seen juries in British 
courts. I did not think they deserved the reverence that lawyers and jurists 
ritually accorded to their collective wisdom.' 5 Of course, Lee may well be 
correct in this assessment. 
Lee seems to have much greater reverence for the role of the Special 
Branch; a police force which monitored political opposition groups over 
many years in Singapore. Lee's relationship with the Internal Security 
Department is not discussed by him as much as it might be, although this 
Department played an important role in destroying the leadership of Lee's 
political opponents and his critics in the media (Rodan, 1989:23). 
Mr Lee continued to support such internal security groups after he 
became Prime Minister, such as by the creation of the Corrupt Practices 
Investigation Bureau in 1960 (Lee supra, p. 346). A major priority for Lee 
in the discussions leading up to the formation of Malaysia was to ensure that 
the Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau and the Prevention of Corruption 
Ordinance in Singapore were carried over into the federation (ibid:479). The 
use of law to seek to prevent corruption is one kind of commitment to the 
rule of law. However, it is far from constituting a comprehensive 
commitment to this ideal. 
A clue to Lee's approach to policing also comes from this time. This is 
evident from his observation that after becoming Prime Minister at the age 
of 35, '[a]t the street level, I wanted the police to be disciplined, but also 
firm, decisive and robust once we decided to break up a demonstration or an 
incipient riot' (ibid:328). Law and legal institutions are seen primarily in 
terms of the maintenance of order rather than as guarantors of the 
expression of individual rights. Law and order has clearly been a principal 
concern for Lee from his earliest days, as is evident from his discussion of 
the Japanese occupation of Singapore where he observed that 'law and order 
[were] in suspended animation' (ibid:49). 
Twenty years later, the same concerns for law and order were evident, as 
is apparent from Lee's discussion of the race riots that took place in 
Singapore in 1964. In regard to this episode, Lee observes: '[d]eep inside, I 
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felt frustrated for I had lost control of the instruments of law and order and 
could not deal with these blatant racists' (ibid:559). He goes on to suggest 
that those in UMNO responsible for fanning racist sentiments amongst the 
Malays in Singapore should have been prosecuted for sedition by 'those in 
authority in Kuala Lumpur', but that they were not (ibid:562). Although Lee 
was probably correct in regard to the responsibility for the riots, this 
statement illustrates Lee's perception of the use of the law as an appropriate 
instrument for dealing with dissent and political rivals. 
Subsequently, Lee initiated legal proceedings for libel against an UMNO 
opponent who had published a statement (which Lee quotes) that the 1964 
'riots were started by agents provocateurs, who may even have been in the 
pay of Lee Kuan Yew. Lee's intention is to create disorder in Singapore ... ' 
(ibid:606). Lee notes that his critics became more circumspect '[n]ow that 
those words would be scrutinized in a court of law .. .' (ibid). This libel 
action was subsequently settled (in 1966) after Singapore separated from 
Malaysia. As seen in more recent years, defamation and libel actions have 
been used effectively in Singapore to restrain political opponents. 
Interestingly, Lee denied the claim made by Tun Abdul Razak that he 
had ever suggested that the 'Malays were not the indigenous people of 
Malaysia' (ibid:607). Whilst this may have been correct, strictly speaking, 
Lee himself does acknowledge that on a visit to Australia he had told Prime 
Minister Menzies that: ' ... the three major races in Malaysia the Malays, 
Chinese, and Indians - had the wellsprings of their culture outside Malaysia, 
in Indonesia, China, and India' (ibid:595). This looks very much like 
suggesting that the culture of the Malays was foreign to Malaysia and by 
implication that the Malays were themselves foreigners in their own 
country. But, of course, Lee did not say this directly, although it is hardly 
surprising that the Malays interpreted his words in the way that they did. 
Furthermore, Mr Lee acknowledges that compliance with the law should 
not be seen in isolation and that the achievement of wider objectives may 
depend on the use of non-legal means. Thus, he observes that in the 1950s, 
'[m]y way of constitutional opposition, working within the law, was in 
marked contrast to that of the communists, and I got results. But without the 
communists going beyond the law and using violence, my methods would 
not have been effective' (ibid:211). It should be noted that during this 
period Lee worked closely, if secretly, with the communists, even ifhe was 
politically opposed to them.6 Lee's penchant for law and order seems to be 
related to what may be an obsession with tidiness. His somewhat emotional 
statement in relation to untidy conditions in 1964 suggests this: 
But morale in Singapore had sagged. The city looked scruffy. With 
the weakening of law enforcement, Indian herdsmen had allowed 
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their cows and goats to graze on playing fields and even on grass 
verges of roundabouts. A lawyer drove his car into a cow one night 
just outside the town centre and was killed. From my office window, 
I could see cattle on the Esplanade. After two riots, the place was 
slovenly, with more litter, more cows and goats meandering on the 
streets, more stray dogs, more flies, more mosquitoes, more beggars. 
Even the grounds of the Singapore General Hospital were unkempt. I 
was determined to check this decline. I called a meeting at the 
Victoria Theatre of all officers concerned with public health, and 
with full press and television coverage urged them to restore 
standards of cleanliness and tidiness ... This had a salutary effect. The 
city spruced up. 
Singapore was clearly being prepared for a future as a tidy town maintained 
by the force oflaw. 
In contrast, Chris Patten frequently emphasizes the central role of the 
rule of law in explaining economic prosperity in Hong Kong and the United 
Kingdom. For example, Patten (1998:4) notes that '[t]reedom, democracy, 
the rule of law, stability and prosperity are found most frequently in one 
another's company.' He adds that '[g]ood government, the rule of law and 
market economics transformed the battered and beggared community of the 
post-war years into one of the greatest trading centres on earth ... ' (ibid:22). 
Noticeably absent from this list of qualities essential for prosperity was a 
thoroughgoing commitment to democratic values.7 
The rule of law is thus a major theme in Patten's analysis of the sources 
of prosperity and freedom. This of course has been a concern of socio-legal 
scholars over the years. For Patten, liberty and the use of the law by the 
citizen against the state are important principles, as illustrated by the 
concept of habeas corpus; that no one can be imprisoned or accused of an 
offence without having the opportunity of being brought to trial. 8 As Patten 
(1998:78) notes: ' [ w ]e can use the law to defend ourselves against anyone, 
however powerful.' This becomes increasingly important where a nation or 
community seeks to achieve what Patten described as 'quality growth' as 
opposed to 'quantity-based growth.' He observes that the former places a 
... premium on inventiveness, creativity and technological flexibility. 
The communities best able to unleash these qualities, in Asia as in 
other continents, will be those that provide their citizens with 
political liberty as well as economic, those communities that nurture 
their citizens' talents through pluralism (ibid:202). 
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Chris Patten goes on to add that: 
Tolerance of dissent, genuinely representative government, the rule 
of law and the free press bestow real comparative advantages in the 
race for quality growth (ibid). 
Curiously, Patten's most impassioned statements about the importance of 
the rule of law are made in a chapter entitled 'How to Make Money,' 
pointing to the close link between the rule of law and the growth of markets. 
Thus, Patten argues passionately that: 
A market place free and fair to all and an economic system purged of 
or at least resistant to graft are incomparably more likely where there 
exists the most important of all software in a free society, the rule of 
law. What does that mean? First, it means that everyone is subject to 
the law, however mighty they may be. The rule of law is not some 
convenient justification for coercion by the powerful, a legalistic 
cover for locking up or shooting people that the government does not 
like. It applies equally to those who govern and those who are 
governed, to lawmakers and law abiders. In a free society under the 
rule of law, with a fairly elected legislature that itself makes the laws, 
the ruled are also the rulers. It is vital to understand this. Rules and 
laws which may or may not apply impartially to everyone are 
different from the rule of law, majestic, comprehensive and wholly 
impartial (ibid:259). 
Patten notes that the rule of law does not only cover commercial life, but 
covers all other areas of society. He notes, for example, that the case of 
James Peng, an Australian citizen who was imprisoned in China for alleged 
economic crimes, is a notorious example of politics becoming intertwined 
with commercial disputes; this case remains an important illustration of the 
failure of the rule of law in China,9 as Patten also emphasizes: 
The law is not a ceremonial hulk. It lives and breathes. Without it, 
there is no market economy but a jungle economy, every one for 
himself or herself, a bracing environment for the brave but not a 
place where most of us would want to invest much if any of our 
pension funds. The rule of law underpins prosperity and sustains the 
most acceptable and profitable way of doing business .... The law 
constrains just as it enables. It acts as a brake, so that liberty does not 
slide and slither into anarchic licence. It draws lines in the sand, 
protects the weak from the strong, defines the public interest in an 
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orderly and balanced way, and ideally acquires the moral author-
ity to do all that by the extent to which it can demonstrate its own 
even handedness and by the manner in which it is made (ibid:260-1). 
These are two quite different conceptions of the rule of law; both are 
popular in different parts of Asia and both may be criticized in different 
ways. If anything, Mr Lee's view may be criticized for being overly austere 
and instrumentalist, whilst Mr Patten's may be criticized for verging on 
idealism and for failing to take into account the major obstacles which 
undermine the achievement of the rule of law, East and West. 
The Pursuit of Asian Values and Chinese Culture 
Another major theme which runs through these two books is the question of 
Asian or Chinese values. Although Lee Kuan Yew is often closely 
identified with the idea of Asian values, it is interesting to note how 
infrequently he uses this phrase in his discussion of his rise to power in 
Singapore. This is not to say that Lee was not determined to ensure that the 
Chinese community was not alienated and that it did not fall under the 
influence of the communists. During the period of time that he covers in this 
book, Lee was clearly very interested in being accepted by the Chinese-
speaking community and in being able to relate to Chinese cultural values. 
Lee therefore went to some trouble to learn to speak Mandarin and 
Hokkien languages and he even sent his children to Chinese schools so that 
the Chinese population of Singapore could be assured of Lee's Chinese 
identity. Lee notes that in the early 1950s '[i]t was often embarrassing 
because my Chinese was totally inadequate' (ibid:152). Lee also notes that 
his 'spoken Hakka and Hokkien were pathetic, almost negligible. I vowed to 
make up for past neglect' (ibid:183). As was to happen in later years, the 
adoption of Chinese values or manners was done for strategic or pragmatic 
purposes. During the Japanese occupation, he even started to learn Japanese 
for similar reasons (ibid:61-2). 
As Lee tells us, the Chinese are a very pragmatic people. He observes 
that '[t]he Chinese-speaking in Singapore, like the Chinese-speaking 
everywhere in Southeast Asia, traditionally preferred to sit on the fence 
until they saw clearly which way the wind was blowing' (ibid:390). 
However, Lee emphasizes the importance of manipulating language and 
culture for the purposes of political control when he tells us that he 
recognized that: 
The biggest single theme that galvanised the Chinese-speaking was 
Chinese culture, and the need to preserve Chinese traditions through 
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the Chinese schools. It was not a proletarian issue; it was plain, 
simple chauvinism' (ibid:185-6). 
Elsewhere, Lee notes that he: 
. . . never allowed the communists to exploit Chinese language, 
education and culture, and in this I gained strength from my children 
being educated in Chinese. Thus I denied the communists a powerful 
weapon against me. They could attack my bourgeois middle-class 
background but could not demonise me ... as an enemy who was a 
destroyer of Chinese culture (Lee supra, p. 409). 
Lee's success depended greatly upon his capacity to relate to different 
ethnic groups, as he notes that in the early 1960s: 
Speaking in Hokkien and Mandarin, I had convinced the Chinese that 
I was not a stooge of the British, that I was fighting for their future. 
The Malays backed me because they saw me fighting the Chinese 
communists. The Indians, as a smaller minority, were fearful and 
therefore reassured to find me completely at home with all races, 
speaking bazaar Malay and English to them and even a few words of 
greeting in Tamil (ibid:487). 
Turning to Chris Patten's book, Patten argues that Chinese culture is not 
incompatible with the rule of law, as can be seen from the operation of the 
rule of law in Hong Kong and Taiwan. Interestingly, he does not mention 
Singapore as a bastion of the rule of law. It could also be argued that the 
rule of law is increasingly becoming a part of the official language of 
Mainland China itself, although for the present its focus is mainly upon rule 
by law (South China Morning Post 1 December 1998).10 That a 
commitment to the rule of law was not incompatible with traditional 
Chinese values is emphasized by Patten when he remarks of Hong Kong in 
the years after the Second World War, 'Hong Kong had a competent 
government, pursuing market economics under the rule of law. It was a 
government that fully met the Confucian goal, 'Make the local people 
happy and attract migrants from afar' (Patten supra, p. 21). 
However, he also notes of Hong Kong that 'Confucian values did not 
seem to have led to the establishment of adequate services for the elderly, of 
whom there were growing numbers' (ibid:50). In any event, Patten cites the 
well known Sinologist, Simon Leys, when he argues that the more essential 
humanistic side of Confucian teaching has tended to be downplayed by 
governments whilst those aspects of his teaching that emphasized 
367 
ROMAN TOMASIC 
submission to authority have tended to be exaggerated by governments 
over the years. As Patten explains: 
Given how often one is told that Asians in general, and the Chinese 
in particular, are not really concerned about politics, it is interesting 
to note that Confucius regarded his true vocation as politics and was 
disappointed ... that he could not find anyone who would let him put 
his political ideas and sense of mission into practice. His views on 
politics have a universal appeal and force ... 
The discovery of Confucius as the reason for Asia's economic 
success would have puzzled some of his most faithful followers as 
well as earlier European philosophers and historians. Humanism is 
rarely analysed in terms of GDP per capita ... 
... In order to use Confucianism to justify unswerving obedience 
to the state, you have to tum a blind eye to many passages in the 
Analects that endorse personal liberty (ibid:162-4). 
Somewhat caustically, Patten notes that China's rediscovery of how to draw 
upon the Confucian legacy had to rely upon insights from Lee Kuan Yew, 
'to tell them how Confucius would teach them the way to yoke political 
control to capitalist success' (ibid:164). Patten remarks that Lee Kuan Yew 
' ... was the most intellectually rigorous of the exponents of this faith [that 
Asia's success was as much a cultural as an economic phenomenon], its 
high priest if not its most obvious exemplar' (ibid:93). Patten concludes 
that: 
Claims about Asianness and the Asian way, and about the contrasts 
between Asian and other societies, are customarily rhetorical or 
anecdotal; not very much has been done to try to establish with any 
modest degree of social-science measurement exactly what the 
differences may be. Evidence has not been sought or demanded for 
what is generally seen as an essentially political set of propositions 
(ibid: 165). 
To support his argument, Patten relies upon some empirical work 
undertaken by David Hitchcock in 1995, based on interviews with a range 
of Asian leaders, intellectuals and experts, and a smaller number of 
interviews with Americans. This research showed that there was little 
unanimity amongst Asian leaders regarding the so-called Asian values that 
they shared and that economic success was sometimes accompanied by 
increasing self-confidence (ibid: 165). 
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However, as Patten frequently notes, '[t]he very diversity of Asia questions 
the concept of Asian values' (ibid: 155). He adds that present political 
leaders of Asian polities are on different sides of the debate on Asian 
values. This is evident from different approaches to politics and dissent in 
India, the Philippines and Hong Kong when compared to other places such 
as Singapore, Myanmar, and China. Despite this diversity, Patten does 
however conclude that there is an underlying similarity between the 
situations of peoples in East and West, when he observes that: 
The more that I have looked at all these questions, the more it seems 
to me that we all face similar problems, face them to different 
degrees according (partly) to how we have developed, and will 
discover similar solutions rooted in the same respect for human 
decency and in the same regard for an economic philosophy that 
maximises the opportunity for the individual to excel. Some of the 
challenges cast at Western societies by Asians are wholly fair ... 
though I believe that the sweeping condemnation of the West [by Lee 
Kuan Yew] and the commendation of the East are overdrawn ... Men 
and women are political animals and not just economic machines and 
commercial appetites (ibid: 170-1 ). 
Not surprisingly, Patten acknowledges that there is a need for a new balance 
in the way that the East and the West are seen. He argues that those in the 
West can learn something from the East about the importance of order, 
harmony, partnership, and responsibility; whilst those in the East can learn 
from the West about the provision of more respect for citizens as persons 
who actually do possess rights (ibid: 172). 
There are many empirical questions raised by both Lee Kuan Yew and 
Chris Patten about the importance of Asian and other values and these are 
useful vehicles for an assessment of the role of law and legal institutions in 
Asian societies. However, they are ideas which are increasingly having to 
contend with the influence of global forces, which are perhaps seeing a 
process of Americanization sweeping the world; this is certainly the case at 
the level of cultural values and the mass media which influence the young. 
However, one should not overlook the influence of Japanese values and 
models across the Asia Pacific region; they are certainly very strong in 
Korea and Taiwan, and China itself has not been unknown to borrow legal 
ideas from Japan. 
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The Impact of Globalization 
Although Lee Kuan Yew does not contribute to the emerging debate about 
globalization, this is a crucial issue for Singapore due to the heavy exposure 
of Singapore to the international economy. Chris Patten relies heavily upon 
the concept of globalization. However, he repeatedly takes issue with the 
current use of this idea, arguing wrongly that the concept is not a new one 
as international trade and the movement of peoples and technologies across 
borders is not a recent phenomenon (ibid:209-13). In contrast, as Malcolm 
Waters (1995) has pointed out in his excellent review of the concept of 
globalization, we need to distinguish between internationalization of trade 
and commerce and the phenomenon of globalization. Globalization has 
been seen as 'the making of the world into a single place' (Robertson, 
1990). Internationalization never did this. The international securities 
market and the global corporation are two of the best illustrations of this 
kind of globalization, which seems to limit spatial and temporal constraints. 
Nevertheless, globalization occupies a central place in Patten's analysis. 
He observes that '[o]ne of the most spectacular casualties of globalization 
has been the delusion that governments are all-powerful' (Patten 1998:211 ). 
He concludes that: 
It is in this debate about globalization and its ethics that I see the 
main lesson to be absorbed from the Asian experience. The idea that 
there is some off-the-shelf Asian model which can be bought as it 
stands by growth-minded Western governments was always absurd, 
and now that the model - such as it was - appears to have fallen off 
the shelf and on to the floor the argument is even more preposterous. 
What I take from the Asian experience, and from the changes in the 
developed world that helped to make Asian growth possible, is the 
importance of three fundamental issues, the first two of which in 
particular are central to any discussion about globalization (ibid:213). 
Patten's three explanations for Asia's success over recent decades are, 
firstly, free trade and open markets (as opposed to pressures for 
protectionism, especially in the US) (ibid:213ff); secondly, the role and size 
of governments and their involvement in regard to economic performance 
(ibid:225ff); and thirdly, encouraging greater individual self reliance in the 
face of increasing welfare burdens being placed on the state. 
It is clear that globalization has been one of the key factors which have 
affected Asian and other financial markets. This is clear from the emergence 
of electronic commerce and the extent to which stock exchanges, securities 
trading, and investment flows have become internationalized. This is not to 
say that it is impossible to influence the effect of these global forces, as 
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Hong Kong has shown in its very successful efforts at defending the Hong 
Kong dollar and the value of securities traded on the Hong Kong Stock 
Exchange. However, such efforts cannot be sustained in the longer term.11 
The ongoing pressure arising out of China's pursuit of membership of 
the WTO, and the influence of bodies such as the IMF and the World Bank, 
are evidence of the continued effect of the forces of globalization. However, 
legal systems are probably less likely to be affected by the forces of 
globalization than are financial and banking systems; this is because of the 
extent to which local cultural factors underlie the operation of legal 
systems. 12 Nevertheless, in regard to commercial law, there are increasing 
pressures to achieve uniformity in areas of law such as contract law, 
insolvency law, securities law, company law, etc. International regulatory 
bodies, international financial institutions, and international legal and 
accounting firms have probably contributed to this process of globalization, 
although the impact of these bodies in this regard remains to be quantified 
by researchers. 
SOME OTHER (LESS WELL KNOWN) STORIES 
Much can be gained from comparative socio-legal analysis of economic 
institutions and behaviour. A number of studies can be examined which 
may be seen as exemplars of the kind of analyses that are most illuminating 
and which examine fundamental issues which are discussed by more high 
profile commentators, such as Messrs Patten and Lee. Clearly, the rule of 
law, the effects of cultural traditions and the effects of globalization are 
issues which are fundamental to an understanding of financial crises and 
systemic change. 
Three such studies may be examined here, although a number of others 
might have been examined.13 The three studies that will be briefly referred 
to are firstly, Anthony Woodiwiss's 1998 book, Globalisation, Human 
Rights and Labour Law in Pacific Asia; Tomasic and Little's 1997 book on 
Insolvency Law and Practice in Asia and (very briefly) the 1997 report for 
the Asian Development Bank (and subsequent book) by Katharina Pistor 
and Philip Wellons, on the Role of Law and Legal Institutions in Asian 
Economic Development 1960-1995. Each of these works deal with major 
issues of contemporary concern in the late 1990s and seek to draw upon 
detailed research to support their findings. None have however had the 
impact or generated the publicity of the works by more high profile political 
figures such as Mr Patten or Mr Lee. 
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Woodiwiss 's Globalisation, Human Rights and Labour Law in Pacific 
Asia 
Anthony Woodiwiss, a sociologist from the University of Essex, has 
previously written books on labour law in the United States and Japan. In 
his important new study, Globalisation, Human Rights and Labour Law in 
Pacific Asia, he examines human rights and labour law as these have 
emerged in four Asian legal systems: The Philippines, Hong Kong, 
Malaysia, and Singapore. Woodiwiss notes that human rights ideas drawn 
from socialist and liberal traditions (as reflected in the UN Covenants) have 
now been supplemented by a patriarchal model of human rights. Whilst the 
socialist tradition emphasized social and economic rights, the liberal 
tradition emphasized civil and political rights. Patriarchalism can be seen as 
a form of traditional authority (as Weber has noted) with a strong familialist 
focus. This is to be distinguished from paternalism or patriarchy, which 
refers to male dominance over females. Woodiwiss examines the nature of 
patriarchalism as reflected in the labour laws of four Asian legal systems, 
with Japan providing a model against which the labour laws of these four 
legal systems are compared. 
Woodiwiss goes on to refer to what he calls the mendicant patriarcha-
lism of the Philippines; the authoritarian patriarchalism of Malaysia; the 
patriarchalist individualism of Hong Kong, and the active patriarchalism of 
Singapore (Woodiwiss I 998:4). Patriarchalist systems find it difficult to 
accept individualist and universalistic norms, preferring heteronomy to 
autonomy as a social value. Such systems also find it culturally 
unacceptable to rely upon the 'cold' techniques of the law as having a place 
within 'warm' and flexible patriarchalist social relations. However, 
Woodiwiss argues that in the absence of the rule of law 'there is no reliable 
or effective means of enforcing respect for any rights ... ' (ibid:7). His theory 
of law is broadly Marxist-inspired seeing law as characterized by a relative 
autonomy from the structures of the state (ibid:45). For Woodiwiss, and 
other law and society theorists, such as Roberto Unger, the rule of law is 
primarily concerned with the reduction of arbitrariness and is not merely a 
reflection of liberalism (ibid:47). 
In addition to the importance of the rule of law, we are told that it is 
essential to seek to understand human rights from a transnational 
perspective. Woodiwiss seeks to do this by looking at labour law issues. In 
particular, he focuses on human rights that are most relevant to labour, such 
as civil and political rights of freedom of association and the social and 
economic rights to work, to enjoy just and favourable conditions, to enjoy 
trade union membership, the right to collective bargaining, and a living 
wage (ibid:9). It can be argued that any broadly based sociology of law 
needs to focus upon one substantive area of law in the way that Woodiwiss 
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now proceeds to do. 14 However, he does not provide the kind of detailed 
judicial case law and statutory analysis that one would expect of a lawyer; 
instead, he draws upon the work of others for this purpose. He argues that: 
... the best strategy for ensuring the effectiveness of labour and 
human rights regimes in Pacific Asia is likely to be one that seeks to 
articulate indigenous patriarchalist discourses with the rule of law 
and so reintroduce elements of internal critique and substantive 
mutuality into such discourses (Woodiwiss 1998:13). 
Woodiwiss seeks to determine whether a viable model for effective labour 
and human rights regimes in Asia can be found in post-war Japanese ideas. 
In that country, Woodiwiss tells us: 
a just labour law regime came to be seen as one wherein employee 
loyalty and cooperation had to be rewarded, albeit more by employer 
benevolence, specifically in the form of lifetime employment, than 
state welfare (ibid:14). 
He adds that Japan has become increasingly enmeshed in global structures, 
becoming the leading investor in the region, and that it is the Japanese 
rather than the American style of capitalism which is becoming archetypal 
in the Asia Pacific region (ibid:56). This is an interesting and logical 
argument, although finding the empirical evidence to support it may not be 
easy. Woodiwiss goes on to argue that Japan is important not only because 
of the merger of patriarchalism and capitalism, but also because of 'the 
potentially equally powerful symbiosis of patriarchalism and the rule of 
law' (ibid:83). These issues are examined in each of the country studies 
which Woodiwiss provides in the latter part of his book; two of these, 
Singapore and Hong Kong, will be discussed here as they can be related to 
the books by Patten and Lee discussed earlier. 
Woodiwiss criticizes proponents of Asian values on a number of 
grounds; firstly, he notes that the contemporary forms of patriarchialism are 
quite varied and that some of these are not Asian at all; secondly, he points 
out that whilst patriarchalism is not essentially antagonistic to human rights, 
its effectiveness in supporting human rights depends on the State and it also 
depends on the powerful being prepared to live by their own values; that is, 
the latter need to accept both the rule of law and that the less powerful 
should continue to enjoy certain irreducible liberties (ibid: 16-17). 
W oodiwiss goes on to castigate those who rely upon rationalizations, such 
as Asian values, when he obs<?rves that: 
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... what one sometimes encounters in Hong Kong, as in Japan ... 
Taiwan and Singapore, is a post hoe attempt to rationalise and dignify 
practices undertaken for decidedly more mundane political and 
economic, or what I term 'ordinary patriarch 
ialist', reasons by referring to them as Confucian or indeed Chinese. 15 
In his Singapore case study Woodiwiss makes the interesting observation 
that: 
... the Confucianism that the government for a time urged upon the 
population was not so much that of Japan, let alone China, but that to 
be found in a set of texts written by American social scientists such 
as Herman Khan and Ezra Vogel, who had developed a Confucianist 
twist to Modernization theory (Woodiwiss 1998 :228). 
Unlike Chris Patten, who subscribes to a form of convergence theory, based 
on similar approaches to technological problems, Woodiwiss concludes that 
the societies of Pacific Asia will remain different from those of the West. 
However, he does suggest that there is a positive side to globalization which 
may see the emergence of some mutual learning, whereby the West learns 
some lessons from the East and vice-versa (ibid: 17-18). 
Looking firstly at Hong Kong, Woodiwiss notes that as Hong Kong has 
become more fully localized it has become more patriarchialist. He argues 
that Hong Kong illustrates what a labour law and human rights regime 
would look like in a patriarchialist social structure of the kind found in the 
Pacific form of capitalism (ibid:143-4). He argues that a dominant 
discourse, with a shared appreciation of the meaning of the rule of law, has 
developed in Hong Kong as 'the "citizenry" have become ideologically 
more or less what the state has wanted them to be, whilst the state has 
become ideologically more or less what the citizenry has wanted it to be.' 
Expressed differently, this has seen the transformation of individualistic 
patriarchal ism into patriarchialist individualism (ibid: 156-7). 
Woodiwiss notes that Hong Kong's middle class is relatively small and 
its history has produced a striking imbalance between the respective powers 
of labour and capital, leading to the inhibition of labour action and solidarity 
(ibid:158). He also notes that, when compared to England, an examination 
of judicial statements in Hong Kong labour law cases shows that Hong 
Kong has tended to favour the interests of capital. This may also be seen by 
the existence of a relatively high number of industrial accidents. 
He concludes that in Hong Kong individual owners of capital 'have 
remained relatively unencumbered in their relations with each other, with 
their employees, with the general public, and with the overseas owners of 
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intellectual property' (ibid:164). This conclusion is supported by a 
discussion of the legal history of labour laws in Hong Kong which shows 
that these laws adopted a very restrictive approach to industrial action and 
the activity of unions in Hong Kong (ibid:167-75). Trade unions were 
marginalized or excluded in many circumstances after 1967 as: 
the state increasingly took up the role of labour's protector - access 
to the valuable protections afforded to individuals by the Labour 
Tribunal is normally on referral from the Labour Department, which 
will first attempt conciliation. Here, then, is where the state's 
assumption of the patriarchal role became both explicit and very hard 
to resist on labour's part (ibid: 175). 
The rights and claims which can arise under the 1968 Hong Kong 
Employment Ordinance seem largely to be premised on the existence of a 
'continuous contract', or employees who have worked for a period of four 
weeks for at least three days a week. This has the effect of excluding 
persons in short term or temporary employment. This is seen by Woodiwiss 
as being patriarchalist as rights seem to be reserved for employees who have 
developed some loyalty to an employer. 
He adds that the passage of the Employment Ordinance may be seen as 
the time from which the state in Hong Kong assumed the responsibilities of 
a patriarch. This has meant that the form of the law and legal rights under 
Hong Kong labour law may be characterized as 'enforceable benevolence' 
(ibid:177-80). Woodiwiss concludes his case study of Hong Kong's labour 
laws by observing that: 
Thus the net result of the coexistence of capitalism, patriarchalism 
and the rule of law in Hong Kong is a labour law system that, despite 
the absence of any formal borrowing from the Japanese system, may 
nevertheless be described as an embryonic form of 'enforceable 
benevolence'. 'Immunities' rather than 'liberties' have been exchang-
ed for enforceable, albeit lesser, industrial 'claims', supplemented by 
some significant though still insufficient improvements in social 
provision with respect to education, housing and welfare (ibid: 182). 
The labour law rights position in Hong Kong may be compared with the 
position in Singapore, as described in Woodiwiss's Singapore case study. 
This Singapore case study is a little disappointing, being the shortest of the 
four in this book. Whilst Malaysia is described as having a system of 
authoritarian patriarchalism, Singapore is described in terms of the 
possibility of achieving 'enforceable benevolence.' However, at present, 
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Woodiwiss sees Singapore as representing 'an instance par 
excellence of Pacific capitalism, that Singapore is an island of rampant 
patriarchalism.' Having said this, he acknowledges the flexibility and self-
discipline of Singapore's population in the face of transnational forces and 
observes that: 
In sum, I wish to argue that for all of the undoubted civil 
oppressiveness of the current structure of Singaporean society, the 
republic is structurally closer to representing a model of what a 
human rights regime premised upon 'enforceable benevolence' might 
look like than any other society in the region, including Japan. 
(ibid:216). 
One might recall that Lee Kuan Yew began his legal career in Singapore by 
representing trade union figures. However, soon after the landslide victory 
of the People's Action Party (PAP) in the 1959 elections, the Singapore 
government moved to deregister left-wing unions and political and 
sympathy strikes were banned. After independence in 1965, the National 
Trade Union Congress (NTUC) was drawn closer to the PAP and the 
government by being given a voice in the PAP's decision-making processes 
as well as by being given financial and administrative support by the 
government. 
In return for this support, the government was able to impose restrictions 
on the NTUC's freedom of action and to have control over the appointment 
of the NTUC's secretary-general. The PAP also nominated a number of 
NTUC officials as parliamentary candidates. Woodiwiss concludes that 'the 
most important single change of all these developments was that prime 
minister Lee appears to have come to regard himself as the unchallengeable 
patriarch of his people' (ibid:220-2). As the government took measures to 
make Singapore more attractive to foreign capital, Woodiwiss notes that 
'labour was ... required to give up some of its means of enhancing its 
autonomy in favour of future, loyalty-dependent benefits' (ibid:227). 
As in Hong Kong, the primary labour laws of Singapore were based on 
English colonial labour legislation which was based on labour's rights in 
immunities which related only to the achievement of approved economic 
objectives; however, these laws only applied to trade unions and their 
officials. The introduction of an Arbitration Court in 1960 constituted a 
grant of 'powers' to Singapore's trade unions in return for forgoing liberties 
and immunities (ibid:236-8). However, Singapore has not seen a 
strengthening of its trade unions, despite the many benefits which were 
provided to them and Singaporean employees by their government. 
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Woodiwiss observes that 'all the state's benevolence and therefore the 
"attachment" of labour and human rights to their supposed bearers remain 
discretionary and hence instance a paternalism, albeit a highly generous 
one' (ibid:241). However, he concludes somewhat optimistically, noting 
that it would not be difficult to amend some of Singapore's laws (such as by 
strengthening the independence of the judiciary), so as to radically enhance 
the legitimacy of the state and lead to a more pluralistic approach to the 
public interest. This seems to be an unrealistic expectation, for as 
Woodiwiss acknowledges, this would require the paternalistic PAP to 
sacrifice some of its political security in the national interest. As he adds, 
'[a]ll that is required is a little more liberty' (ibid:242-3). 
Woodiwiss has sought to apply a theoretical model to a set of very 
diverse societies and legal systems. His theory is quite rich in its 
explanatory possibilities, although some of Woodiwiss's arguments might 
have been better supported by further empirical evidence. While his work is 
not as readable as it might be, due to its occasional lapses into overly 
technical sociological jargon, it stands as a landmark highlighting the 
possibilities for comparative research of key areas of economic law in the 
region. 
Tomasic and Little 's Insolvency Law and Practice in Asia 
Turning now to discuss another kind of comparative analysis of economic 
law related issues which provide another model for further research in the 
region, it is appropriate to discuss 'Asian Insolvency Law and Practice' 
written by Roman Tomasic, Peter Little, and others.16 The book is primarily 
based upon six detailed case studies of insolvency law and practice in the 
PRC, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Singapore, Malaysia, and Indonesia. In each of 
these six jurisdictions, detailed interviews were conducted with insolvency 
practitioners, bankers, and regulators. In addition to background library 
research, a total of 115 interviews were undertaken, or a little less than an 
average of twenty interviews in each jurisdiction. Whilst these numbers are 
relatively small, the interviews were conducted with very experienced or 
elite informants who were able to provide extensive information and 
opinions which were confirmed by other sources. This served as a rich data 
source for later analysis. 
The book also contains an overview of insolvency laws in six other 
Asian legal systems, although this discussion will concentrate on the six 
empirical case studies which drew upon the fieldwork conducted for this 
study. It is interesting to note in passing that when the interviews were 
being conducted, in late 1996, the researchers were repeatedly told that 
insolvency was not an issue of any significance as an economic or legal 
problem in Asia. As we all now know, this was soon to change. Soon after 
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the publication of the book in early 1997 the Asian financial cns1s 
appeared, leading an Australian High Court judge and the Australian 
Business Review Weekly to suggest that the researchers might have been 
indirectly responsible for this turn of event; if only academic studies could 
have such an impact! 
The study sought to examine the extent to which traditional Asian 
values, such as ideas drawn from Confucian and Islamic traditions, had an 
impact on insolvency administration in different parts of Asia. Indonesia 
and Malaysia provided two Muslim societies which allowed the researchers 
to pursue this theme, whilst the remaining four jurisdictions allowed the 
researchers to examine the impact, if any, of Confucian ideas in 
predominantly Chinese-speaking societies. The research also examined the 
effect of globalization upon insolvency law reform in Asia. 
Not surprisingly, it was found that there were some differences between 
jurisdictions in regard to the impact of traditional values. What was perhaps 
surprising was that in Singapore, where Asian values have been so much 
discussed, there was very little if any overt impact of Confucian ideas on 
insolvency administration. Instead, what was found in Singapore was almost 
a strict and efficient legalism. However, before insolvency proceedings are 
commenced in Singapore, informal pressures might be placed on debtors 
and the potential loss of face caused by insolvency would be a factor to be 
considered (ibid: 159). These responses were clearly driven by traditional 
concerns. 
However, as in Hong Kong, the influence upon insolvency administra-
tion in Singapore of an English derived legal system has been very strong. 
Efforts to encourage compromise and negotiation in dealing with debt 
problems have also been encouraged, but these are not uniquely Asian 
responses, as similar strategies are built into many western bodies of 
insolvency law and practice. Sometimes, the Singapore government has 
indirectly sought to support the rescue of enterprises, but by and large, the 
government has sought to stay out of this process. 
In contrast to Singapore, in China the researchers found that Confucian 
ideas provided an undercurrent to discussion of insolvency issues. For 
example, respondents frequently said that bankruptcy was a capitalist idea 
and was alien to the Chinese tradition which valued the preservation of 
friendships. It was also said that an underlying Confucian influence 
remained strong in China; as one informant remarked: 'deep in the heart of 
every Chinese there is a Confucian influence in their daily life' (Tomasic 
and Little (eds) 1997:48-9). 
In an insolvency context, it therefore became difficult to impose winding 
up procedures, except as a last resort; this was because there was a 
preference for resort to other remedies, such as mergers of two or more 
378 
ASIAN ECONOMIC CRISIS AND LEGAL INSTITUTIONS 
enterprises or reorganizations. As one PRC interviewee explained in this 
context, '[t]he Confucian idea is to choose the middle way; to find the 
balance.' Another said that 'Confucianism encourages balance and 
hannony. Unless there is no other choice, people will try to keep their 
friendships and relationships intact' (ibid:49). 
Having said this, it should be noted that Confucian ideas are but one set 
of many influences which are at work in relation to insolvency 
administration in China. In practice, Confucian influences are probably less 
significant than other contemporary influences, such as the political 
implications of causing unemployment through the bankruptcy of 
enterprises, the massive size of China's state owned enterprise debt 
problems, the operation of the legal system itself, and the influence of over 
four decades of communism. 
It should also be noted that China is passing through a period of rapid 
change in regard to the acceptance of ideas such as bankruptcy and this is 
likely to see a greater acceptance of bankruptcy as a way of dealing with 
debt. In Shenzhen, for example, one government lawyer characteristically 
observed that 'bankruptcy law is in fact a good thing in China - it affects 
competition and improves the standard of enterprises' (ibid:52). 
In contrast to the more traditional attitudes found in Taiwan, on the 
mainland there was relatively little stigma associated with bankruptcy; as 
one senior PRC official stated: 'bankrupted people may feel a bit shameful. 
But they don't feel too bad' (ibid:55). In the meantime, China is moving 
slowly to enact a very modern new insolvency statute and the form of this 
law is likely to be more influenced by international best practice (such as 
the need to put in place a corporate rescue regime) and China's capacity to 
deal with related problems, such as unemployment and welfare support for 
those who lose their positions as a result of the bankruptcy of a state owned 
• 17 enterpnse. 
In contrast, in regard to Taiwan, one lawyer reported that '[i]n Taiwan, 
Confucian ideas see bankruptcy as something to be ashamed of (ibid:49, 
93). A Taipei based insolvency practitioner (an accountant) observed that in 
Taiwan ' ... what happens is that people try to find a solution and not to push 
for bankruptcy- despite what the law says' (ibid:90). Taiwanese seem to be 
most reluctant to use legal processes in dealing with debt problems. This 
research found that the tendency to engage in infonnal workouts outside of 
the formal legal process and the application of traditional concepts (such as 
tao-hao) was still a large part of the commercial practice in response to 
insolvency in Taiwan (ibid:90). At the same time, the court system was seen 
as expensive, slow and inefficient and this did not encourage the use of 
legal mechanisms for dealing with debt problems. The law was also seen as 
379 
ROMAN TOMASIC 
being very archaic. This was akin to the situation that was found to exist 
in Indonesia up until the recent reforms to its bankruptcy Iaws. 18 
Finally, reference may be made to research findings in Hong Kong 
where it was found in this study that attitudes to insolvency differed 
depending on whether the case involved small Chinese businesses or debts 
between internationally oriented firms. Stigma was still seen to be a factor 
in attitudes to insolvency amongst the Chinese in Hong Kong, but its 
significance seems to be waning (ibid:126). In contrast, Western companies 
operating in Hong Kong were said to be much more fearful of the effects of 
insolvency upon their reputations. There is however a well recognized 
Chinese tradition that people will be expected to pay their creditors when 
they can. The Chinese system of dealing with debts was also seen as being 
one of self-reliance (ibid: 128). 
Although background cultural attitudes are present in regard to the 
handling of debt problems in Hong Kong, the research found that these 
factors play little if any part in the way that the legal system handles 
insolvency cases. There was clearly a perception that this British derived 
legislation did not reflect local cultural values. Nevertheless, in general 
terms, as one interviewee observed of Hong Kong, 'the Confucian social 
tradition has a huge influence on the way individuals interact and deal with 
each other in the corporate environment.' Having said this, the legal system 
is very much governed by the application of British legal ideas (ibid:129). 
This may explain the relatively small number of insolvency cases coming 
before the courts in Hong Kong. 
This study of 'Insolvency Law and Practice in Asia' provides some 
lessons on comparative commercial law research in Asia and the social 
context in which these laws operate. Of course, all law is part of a social 
context and is constructed by that social context. Laws may be more or less 
out of date or irrelevant, especially if they have been imposed upon 
unwilling communities. 19 However, this context is somewhat more complex 
than it might seem, being subject to international and local influences. 
Although undertaking fieldwork of the kind that occurred with this study 
can be exhausting and frustrating, the end result can be quite illuminating, 
allowing one to assess some of the big contemporary debates, such as those 
which emphasize the importance of Asian or Confucian values. In the 
process, the research also induced the researchers to adopt a more critical 
view of their own legal system by comparing it with others of the kind 
examined in this book. 
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PISTOR AND WELLONS'S ROLE OF LAW AND LEGAL INSTITUTIONS IN 
ASIAN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 1960-95. 
Finally, reference should very be made to an important study by Katharina 
Pistor and Philip Wellons of Harvard University which was undertaken for 
the Asian Development Bank. The authors come from the Harvard Institute 
for International Development and their report sought to examine the Role 
of Law and Legal Institutions in Asian Economic Development from I 960-
95. This is a very ambitious project that asked whether law matters for 
purposes of achieving economic development and whether Asia was 
different in this regard from other parts of the world. 
The project draws upon data from a sample of six Asian jurisdictions, 
the PRC, India, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Malaysia, and Taiwan. The 
study is based on macro-economic data and socio-legal analyses. The report 
examines legal transplants in a number of different areas of law: such as 
competition law, environmental and consumer protection law, intellectual 
property law, and securities law. Also considered are laws protecting 
security interests in the face of bad debts. 
The authors note that in Asia, economic law developed before economic 
development had begun to accelerate and that economic development 
caught up with law much later. However, until this happened, the authors 
found that law only marginally affected economic behaviour. They note that 
the enactment of new laws over the last three decades has seen the state take 
a more active role in the economy which provided a decisive influence on 
shaping further economic and legal development. As the authors also note: 
'[t]his suggests that law is not irrelevant for economic development, but that 
for law to have a positive impact it must be congruent with the prevailing 
economic policies' (Pistor and Wellons unpub. report 1987:15). Pistor and 
Wellons also observe that there are elements of both convergence and 
divergence in Asian legal systems. As they explain: 
With the move towards market-oriented economic policies, the legal 
system in all countries became more market-allocative and more 
rule-based. Despite the overall trend towards market-allocative and 
rule-based legal systems, the remaining differences in legal processes 
and institutions lead us to conclude that legal systems are partly 
converging, and partly diverging (ibid: 15). 
Finally, Pistor and Wellons also assess the fundamental question of cultural 
influences on Asian legal systems and conclude that: 
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Cultural factors my have played a role in the evolution of law and 
legal processes. Our findings suggest that legal behavior responded to 
changes in economic policies. Cultural factors may have determined 
the nuances of this response or even helped explain the change in 
policy, but they did not stop the legal system from adapting to 
changing economic strategy and environment (ibid). 
This is a rich and broad ranging study which deserves closer analysis than 
has been possible here.20 It does however show the value of using cross-
jurisdictional economic and legal data as a means of seeking to develop 
models and make general observations about law and economic 
development in Asia. 
CONCLUSION: 
BIG PICTURES AND THE SEARCH FOR NEW STORIES TO TELL 
Many challenges await socio-legal researchers seeking to make a 
contribution to improving understandings of major contemporary issues, 
such as the late 1990s Asian financial crisis, the place of the rule of law, 
human rights, nation building, and the effects of globalization. Finding the 
time, resources, skills, and energies to undertake such work will provide 
some challenges in this regard. However, these challenges are not insur-
mountable, as some of the studies discussed above have shown. 
Although efforts should be made to contribute to the understanding of 
bigger questions, this is not to suggest an abandonment of research methods 
which look at issues from the 'grass roots', such as case studies, interviews 
with key actors, and economic modelling. After all, one of the first lessons 
of good research is ensuring manageability or the use of research methods, 
which are appropriate to research objectives, time-scale, and resources. 
There are great virtues in collaboration in research of this kind as this may 
help to compensate for deficiencies experienced by any one researcher. 
Collaboration between researchers also has other merits, which should not 
be ignored, such as maintaining momentum in large research projects 
through mutual support of members of the research team. Others, such as 
John Braithwaite, have also written of the advantages of group research 
activity when undertaking fieldwork or interviews of the economic, legal, 
and official elite. 
This chapter has sought to examine a number of very different ways of 
looking at the key issues of law and economic development in Asia. The 
stories of Chris Patten and Lee Kuan Yew are quite illuminating and their 
messages have been very influential. They do however call for closer 
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analysis and critique by researchers. What is interesting to note is the extent 
to which the concerns of these two authors mirror those which can be found 
in the academic literature, if the three academic studies discussed above are 
taken as reflecting trends in that literature. 
Legal researchers are only beginning to develop the tools and experience 
to undertake the kind of further research and analysis in legal and related 
economic issues that is called for in the region. There is no shortage of 
possible areas in which such further work can be undertaken, as this is a 
relatively unploughed field of endeavour. There are therefore many more 
'stories' to tell. However, these should provide for a balance of theory and 





This chapter is based on a paper delivered in 1998 at the Hong Kong 
annual conference of the Asia Pacific Economic Law Forum. A 
selection of papers from that conference are published in (1999-2000) 
Vol. 4 (Nos 1-2), Journal of Chinese and Comparative Law, pp. 1-198. 
Lee Kuan Yew's book is the first book of memoirs by Lee and 
described the years leading up to the independence of Singapore in 
1965. A subsequent Lee memoir dealing with the following 25 years 
has recently been published. 
Patten supra, p. 20. He also refers to what he calls the '[t]he Empire 
Story of the most humane and well-intentioned of the colonial powers -
a story that at its best encompasses scholar-administrators who knew 
and loved the distant lands they governed more than the country in 
whose name they served ... ' (supra, p. 6). 
For example, former Australian Prime Minister, Bob Hawke, (who 
opened the first APELF conference held in Brisbane) is quoted as 
saying that ' [ w ]hether one agrees with all the attitudes, decisions and 
analyses of Lee Kwan Yew, this book is a must for anyone who wants 
to understand the mind-set of Asia.' Similarly, Former German 
Chancellor, Helmut Schmidt, is quoted as saying of Lee that '[m]any 
American and European leaders have profited from his wisdom, 
particularly by his evaluation of China as a world power and by his 
analysis and explanations of Asian values.' 
See for example ibid:53 and p. 67. Patten also quotes (p. 290) George 
Kennan's remark that 'the Chinese have an "insatiable" ... thirst for 
"face" and prestige.' 
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5 Ibid: 144. It is interesting to note that Singapore abolished trial by jury in 
a large class of cases in 1960 and trial by jury was completely abolished 
in 1969; Anthony Woodiwiss, Globalisation, Human Rights and Labour 
Law in Pacific Asia, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1998, p. 
233. 
6 Lee devotes a number of pages to describing his secret meetings with 
the leader of the communists in Singapore in the later 1950s: see further 
ibid, pp. 278-89. Also see pp. 357-61. 
7 Patten denies that 'Hong Kongers had been politically lobotomised .. .' 
(as they did have a keen interests in politics), but successive 
administrations made the political judgement which led them to 
conclude that Hong Kong was not at that time quite right yet for 
democracy; Patten, ibid:24. 
8 Lee Kuan Yew tells of an episode in 1955 when he threatened to seek 
habeas corpus to gain the release of a Chinese communist, Liew Yit 
Fun. Liew was however then deported from Singapore to China by the 
British authorities. In a sense, the threat of habeas corpus backfired on 
Lee in this case. 
9 See further, R. Tomasic, 'Company Law and the Limits of the Rule of 
Law in China,' (1995) Australian Journal of Corporate Law 4, p. 470. 
I O It is interesting to note recent statements to this effect by former PRC 
Premier, Li Peng, speaking as the Chair of the National People's 
Congress when he said that: 
An important fundamental strategy for administration is to rule 
the country by law. The people's will and the [party's] will 
should be written into law through legal procedures for all the 
organizations in the country, including the [party] itself, to 
observe. In this way we can avoid repeating past mistakes. South 
China Morning Post, December I, 1998, p. 17. 
11 See for example, D. Saunders and S. Oldfield, 'Lyonnais sees peg cast 
aside by 2000.' South China Morning Post 1 December 1998, p. I 
(Business Post). 
12 See further R. Tomasic, 'Globalization and the Transformation of 
Commercial and Legal Practice in the Asia Pacific: Opportunities and 
Challenges for Australian Commercial Lawyers and their Clients,' 
(1997), Corporate and Business Law Journal 10, pp. 69-100. Also see 
generally R. Tomasic and B. Kamarul, 'Citizenship, Corporations and 
Globalisation in Asia: An Exploratory Analysis,' (1999) The Flinders 
Journal of Law Reform 311, pp. 75-96, and R. Tomasic and B. Kamarul, 
'The Rule of Law and Corporate Insolvency in Six Asian Legal 
Systems,' (1998) The Canterbury Law Review 7, pp. 157-70. Also see 
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W. Twining, Globalisation and Legal Theory, London, Butterworths, 
2000. 
13 Some other works which come to mind include studies of international 
arbitration by Bryant Garth and Yves Dezalay, John Braithwaite's work 
on international intellectual property law refonn and others: See further 
J. Braithwaite and P. Drahos, Global Business Regulation, Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 2000. 
14 See further R. Tomasic, Sociology of Law, London, Sage, 1985. 
15 Ibid: 152. In this regard, see further C. Jones, 'Capitalism, Globalization 
and Rule of Law: An Alternative Trajectory of Legal Change in China,' 
(1994) Social and Legal Studies 3, p. 195. 
16 The other members of the research team were Kam Kamarul, Kui Hua 
Wang, Angus Francis, and Kate Reid. However, either Roman Tomasic 
or Peter Little were present at all interviews. Roman Tomasic undertook 
interviews in the PRC, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore; whilst Peter 
Little undertook interviews in Singapore, Malaysia, and Indonesia. 
1 7 See further Wang Weiguo, 'Adopting Corporate Rescue Regimes in 
China: A Comparative Survey,' (1998)Australian Journal a/Corporate 
Law 9, pp. 234-62; and R. Tomasic, 'Insolvency Law Principles and the 
Draft Bankruptcy Law of the People's Republic of China,' (1998) 
Australian Journal a/Corporate Law 9, pp. 211-33. 
18 Ibid, pp. 218-22. See further J. Hoff (and G.J. Churchill, editor) 
Indonesian Bankruptcy Law, Indonesian Law and Practice Series: 2, PT 
Tatanusa, Jakarta, 1999. 
19 See further T. Lindsey, Indonesia: Law and Society, Sydney, The 
Federation Press, 1999; and V. Taylor (ed.), Asian Laws through 
Australian Eyes, Sydney, LBC Infonnation Services 1997. 
20 For a more detailed discussion of this report, see A.H.Y. Chen, 'Law, 
Development and the Typology of Legal Systems', (1999-2000) 
Journal a/Chinese and Comparative Law 4/1-2, pp. 30-49. 
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